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ABS'i'KA.CT OF OTKSIS 
"philppoeffiQiij a study i n HelleMstio History" liy R. M. SimmG-SON. 
The basis of the mtk is m examimtion of the aneient sourea 
material, i n particular Plutaroh'a 'LAfs of Fhilopoe»en« and the 
fragiaenta of Polytjiua' giBtogjj.^^^ whioh deal with the AQim&m 
league.. An outline of the resultant iiitsrprstation of Philopoewsn's 
eareer i s as follows, tJntil 222 B»C. he toote no part i n Aehaa&n 
polities* but was involved solely with Megalopolis. Between 222 
and ail PhilopoQfflsn. was i n Crete representixig the interests of 
l?hilip ? of Maqedonj from 210 to 200 i n Aohaea^ whwa after attaining 
a, juilitsopy indep«sadeno© of Macedonia-with Philip's enoourag^ment, 
h© used this to fett^rapt to 4oi» Home. Defeated on this issuo i n 
200 he ratumed to Cret^to halpj^Jlor-^snaians, Ashaean all i e s . I n 
iiis ahsono© his friend Arista^nus oarried his polioy and joined 
Aeha©a to Eome. 
On Philopoejaen'8 return i n 194 he f i r s t desired to ooogei-ate 
with Flamininuaj but wh®n he disoovored that Flaiaininus was B©r©3y 
using Aohaea. for Koaan polioy Philopoewen began to press th© lettar 
of tho law of th9 Aohaesm fggduj|- with Eoin9 at f i r s t ad&undorBtanding, 
hut f i n a l l y ©jcploiting Aohaeaa gjl ^ ^ i i t f l a . H© refused Rome any 
right of interferenoe i n pelopomiesian jaatter©, although h© hiiasalf 
was xaiahlo to find s§ti®faotory solutions to many of th© Aohaeans' 
problems^ partieularly thoas aaaooiated with exiles from Sparta and 
Messen©. Sh© Roman Senate, bound by i t a conventions oovild find 
-2-
no wey 3»otmd the imgaage u n t i l after PMlopoeji\en»s death i n 182, 
when Ms party Xost most of i t $ influenc© i n Aqhaea* Shis inter-
play of polioioa and puxposea of th© Semte and Philopo©mi is 
worked out i n detail. 
fh& ooneluding chapter traees the developing weakness of hi& 
p a r ^ after his d^ath and attewpts to oorreot soma modern inter-
pretations of PoSyhius* judgement of Philopoejhen and his polioies. 
Appendieoa deal with sottroa proWsniB, ohronology - whorahy som© 
new solutions «upe proposed to problems i n the Aehaean ||£g;|gsga 
l i s t - and «)ther pertinont problams* 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
his prior written consent and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
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A l l dates i n t h i s thesis are B.C. unless 
i t i s s p e c i f i c a l l y stated otherwise. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
I 
At the time of his death i n May/June l82, Philopoemen was i n 
his 70th year,"^ A calculation from this date gives June/July 252 as 
terminus post quern for the date of his b i r t h . Unfortunately, this 
cannot be accepted as altogether conclusive, for i t may co n f l i c t with 
evidence from Plutarch. The battle of Sellasia i s now generally agreed 
to have been i n 2 2 2 . I n the autumn before the battle Cleomenes 
attacked and took Megalopolis. At t h i s time Plutarch says that 
Philopoemen was 3O years of age.^ Imprecision l i e s i n the fact that we 
do not know whether Plutarch's figure represents an inclusive or 
exclusive calculation. I f exclusive, there i s a direct c o n f l i c t with 
the other Polybian evidence, for i t implies a date of between autumn 
2.5k and autumn 253. On the other hand, i f Plutarch i s simply recording 
Polybius' information, as i s quite possible, i t may represent an 
inclusive calculation - Polybius' usual method - and i s then compatible 
with the other Polybian date: i t gives us autumn 253 to autumn 252 as 
l i m i t s . This can then be combined with the terminus post quern of June/ 
July 252 -to produce a narrov; l i m i t for the b i r t h of between June and 
October 252. This, while open to objection, has the virtue of accept-
ing the certain Polybian date of June/July 252 as terminus post quem, 
and explaining Plutarch's figure as a compatible Polybian calculation. 
Philopoemen's father Craugis was one of the most distinguished 
citizens of Megalopolis. While he lived, he gave a home to Oleander of 
Mantinea, v^ ho had been exiled from his native c i t y . Craugis did not 
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long survive the b i r t h of his son, . who was brought up after his death 
by Oleander. No doubt the t i e of interest was added to the t i e of 
sentiment i n Oleander's case. The death of his Megalopolitan patron 
must have made his position as exile less secure i n Megalopolis; and 
the assumption of the duties of guardian of Philopoeraen would tend to 
predispose the Megalopolitans i n his favour.^ 
When Philopoemen became older, he was put under the training of 
Ecdemus and Megalophanes, who had helped Aratus free Sicyon, Both were 
Megalopolitans, both had studied with Arcesilaus of Pitane i n the 
Academy while i n exi l e . The two together had, perhaps i n 252, been 
responsible for the assassination of the tyrant of Megalopolis, 
Aristodemus 'The Good', and as a result were enabled to return to 
Megalopolis.^ A further result of their participation i n the two ' l i b -
erations' was that they acquired a reputation for being freedom-fighters; 
and t h e i r association with Arcesilaus gave their reputation, i n the 
popular mind, a philosophical basis. As a result, Plutarch, i n his 
idealised p o r t r a i t of Philopoemen, suggests that Philopoemen's famous 
love of freedom stemmed d i r e c t l y from his early association with the 
two tyrant-assassins. This idea gives him a philosophical theory v/hich 
provides a theme for the interpretation of Philopoemen's la t e r p o l i t i c a l 
a c t i v i t i e s . We s h a l l see that Philopoemen's l a t e r actions were based 
on far more r e a l i s t i c p o l i t i c a l considerations; and there i s no hint 
of the philosophical motivation which was b u i l t i n t o the legend and 
re t a i l e d by Plutarch, 
The t r a i n i n g of Ecdemus and Megalophanes cannot therefore be 
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considered to have been i n any way responsible for the courses of 
action which Philopoemen took l a t e r . Polybius seems to have realised 
t h i s , and describes the results of their t r a i n i n g i n very general terms. 
The emphasis, as he presents i t , seeras to have been l a i d on personal 
self-sufficiency and public morality. The results which Polybius 
attr i b u t e s to th i s course of training are very practical: that 
Philopoemen 'soon came to excel a l l his contemporaries i n endurance and 
n 
courage both i n hunting and i n v/ar'. These v;ere clearly useful 
personal acquisitions for his future public m i l i t a r y career; but bear 
l i t t l e r e l a t i o n to the policies which circumstances caused him to form. 
Plutarch's myth-making, whereby he attributes much of the glory of the 
'Last of the Greeks' to the teaching of Ecdemus and Megalophanes, can 
have no basis i n r e a l i t y . 
The f i r s t 30 years of Philopoemen's l i f e was a period of great 
change for Megalopolis. The c i t y had been founded i n 369 with the 
active support of Epaminondas as a concrete manifestation of Theban 
support for Arcadian independence, and a symbol of the destruction of 
Sparta's m i l i t a r y hegemony i n Peloponnese. After the eclipse of Thebes, 
Megalopolis looked to Macedon for support against Sparta; and t h i s 
continued throughout the t h i r d century. Taking no part i n the 
Ghremonidean war, Aristodemus, the current tyrant, suffered invasion 
from Acrotatus, the son of the Spartan King Cleomenes I I , whom he 
defeated and k i l l e d . He himself was assassinated by Ecdemus and 
Megalophanes - perhaps i n 252 - and at some time before 2^3 was 
replaced by Lydiadas, son of Eudamus. This nev; tyranny probably 
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accorded with the wishes of Antigonus G-onatas, although i t seems that 
the Aetolians were instrumental i n helping him to the tyranny; t h i s 
was perhaps as a. res u l t of making his reputation by the defeat of Agis 
at Mantinea, where he and Leocydes had led the Megalopolitans. After 
his accession to the tyranny he placated the Eleans, who were a l l i e s of 
the Aetolians, with' the g i f t of AJipheira - perhaps paying off a 
personal debt i n t h i s way. Although Alipheira v;as a constituent c i t y 
of the Megalopolitan koinon, i t seems to have maintained some municipal 
independence. As i t s sit u a t i o n probably made i t indefensible at t h i s 
time by Lydiadas, i t was ceded to the Eleans to keep them quiet while 
9 
he was engaged on the Spartan f r o n t . 
Lydiadas' assumption of the tyranny at Megalopolis coincided with 
the rise of Aratus to influence i n Achaeaj and with t h i s the pursuit 
of an expansionist policy by the Achaean League. The Achaean League 
had been reconstituted, probably i n 281/0, with the union of Patrae, 
Dymae, Pharae, and Tritaea; and the f i r s t federal magistrates assumed 
th e i r offices i n the strategos-year 280/79. I n 275/4 Aegium joined 
the League, giving momentum to the federal movement, and was quickly 
followed by Bura and Cerynea, after pressure had been brought to bear 
on the Macedon-supported tyrants by Margus of Cerynea. The remaining 
four c i t i e s i n Achaea - Leontion, Aegira, Pellene and Olenus - soon 
followed s u i t , again probably urged by Margus. I n 255/4 the federal 
administration was streamlined, and one annual strategos substituted 
f o r the two, which had been the system u n t i l the present. As Margus 
was the f i r s t man to occupy t h i s ne;v modified and more e f f i c i e n t 
5 -
strategla, we are probably j u s t i f i e d i n concluding that he had led 
the agitation for the change. Up to this time, the League had made 
l i t t l e impact on the Peloponnesian scene, except to underline the fact 
that Macedonian control \ja.s less powerful than i t had been i n the 
early part of the century. Nevertheless, tyrants, perhaps supported by 
Gonatas, s t i l l held Corinth, Sicyon and Argos; and the comparatively 
feeble Achaean League would be f u l l y occupied i n simply maintaining i t s 
independence as long as t h i s situation continued."^^ 
A change was suddenly brought about i n 25l/0. I n that year Aratus 
of Sicyon overthrew Nicocles, the tyrant of Sicyon, with the help of 
Ecdemus, and enrolled Sicyon i n the Achaean League. No doubt there 
were opponents v/ithin the League to this extra-ethnic expansion -
although t h i s was the practice i n the F i r s t League - and the bargain 
was not as one-sided as our sources, based on Aratus' memoirs, maintain. 
But we can surely envisage Margus' supporting Aratus' claim to unite 
his c i t y t o the League; and i f credit i s to be given, he should 
probably have at least as much as Aratus - who dominates the t r a d i t i o n -
for his foresight i n persuading the Achaeans to accept the neighbouring 
non-Achaean c i t y , and thus i n i t i a t e the period of expansion which 
eventually made Achaea synonymous v/ith Peloponnese. V/e hear l i t t l e of 
Achaea for eight years, when Aratus, now strategos of the League for 
the second time, led a successful attack on Corinth i n 2^3/2. With 
Corinth came Megara, Troezen and Epidaurus. I t must have been clear 
by now that the League had passed beyond the point of being simply 
another ephemeral attempt of weak states to unite against a common 
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danger, but had become a s o l i d community of interests."'""'" 
At Megalopolis Lydiadas had already had experience of Aratus 
through his contact with him at the battle of Mantinea - i f we are to 
accept as even part t r u t h Pausanias' account of the b a t t l e . But there 
i s no indication that at t h i s time Lydiadas had any thoughts about 
resigning his tyranny. The threat from Achaea was not s u f f i c i e n t l y 
urgent to make a decision pressing; and on the other hand Aratus 
seemed determined to pursue a policy d i r e c t l y opposite to t r a d i t i o n a l 
Megalopolitan policy. After the accessions to the League of 2^3/2, 
his open h o s t i l i t y to Macedon was confirmed by the regulation of his 
relations with Ptolemy. Euergetes, and the League assigned honorary 
hegemony to Euergetes. I n return for t h i s Aratus received an annuity 
of 6 talents: from the Egyptian point of view this v/as a cheap way of 
maintaining a policy of h o s t i l i t y to Macedon.'''^  
I n the next year, 242, an alliance with Sparta was i n operation. 
Agis IV and Aratus with the Achaeans combined at Corinth to oppose 
Aetolian militancy, which had been aroused by Achaean successes and 
was encouraged by Gonatas. Although t h i s alliance v/as quickly broken 
o f f when Aratus suspected that the influence of Agis' domestic policies 
was being extended to Achaea, "'"'^  i t is clear that there was no possib-
i l i t y of co-operation between Aratus and Lydiadas, whose t r a d i t i o n a l 
and immediate Megalopolitan opposition to Sparta could not be 
compromised, and who maintained friendly relations with Aetolia. 
Aratus' rupture v/ith Agis was followed i n 239 by the death of Gonatas 
and the accession of Demetrius I I to the Macedonian throne. At t h i s . 
- 7 -
a re-alignment of forces took place i n Greece, and an alliance between 
l4 
Achaea and Aetolia was made against Macedon, In i t s e l f this did not 
make any closer the p o s s i b i l i t y of Megalopolitan rapprochement with the 
League. But as E l i s was a t r a d i t i o n a l a l l y of Aetolia and enemy of 
Sparta, t h i s Aetolian alliance, following close on Aratus' break with 
Agis, tended to bring the whole Achaeo/Aetolian alliance into opposit-
ion with Sparta. 
Achaea now began to have the same basic foreign policy interests 
as Megalopolis vis-a-vis Sparta, and Aratus' expansionism was already 
beginning to bring pressure to bear on Lydiadas. Probably before 235» 
the League under Aratus and Dioetas had expanded to include large parts 
of the Arcadian hinterland of Megalopolis: i n these years Heraea, Alea, 
Cleonae, Cleitor, Cynaetha, Stymphalus and Thelphusa were brought i n t o 
15 
the League. I t must have become increasingly clear to Lydiadas that 
he was i n gra,ve danger of being sandwiched between a hostile and 
expansionist Achaea to the north, and a t r a d i t i o n a l l y hostile Sparta t o 
the south, where Cleomenes I I I had just come to power on the death of 
Leonidas. Prospects could not have been much less favourable for the 
maintenance of an independent Megalopolis. Lydiadas must have been 
aware of Aratus' reputation as tyrant-hater; and that his associates 
Ecdemus and Megalophanes were now l i v i n g i n Megalopolis and mixing w i t h 
many of the young Megalopolitans, I t must have been clear to Lydiadas 
that he was soon going to be faced with a c r i t i c a l decision: i f he 
anticipated the course of events and resigned his tyranny at 
Megalopolis, he could apply to j o i n the League; but i n thi s case his 
o -
c i t y would suffer a serious diminution of national sovereignty. On 
the other hand i t would effectually remove the threat from the north; 
and there would be a reasonable expectation of aid against Sparta. 
I f he did not take t h i s course, he would be compelled to face the ever-
increasing h o s t i l i t y from both Sparta and Achaea, and even f i f t h -
column attempts from within Megalopolis i t s e l f . The decision was 
unpleasant; but for a p o l i t i c i a n the Achaean rapprochement v/as 
inevitable. He chose t o anticipate the major threat, and secure safety 
f o r himself and Megalopolis. I n 235/^ he enrolled Megalopolis i n the 
Achaean League; and was rewarded by himself being elected to the 
federal strategia for 23V3. "The Megalopolitans became Achaean citizens; 
and as a r e s u l t , a much wider sphere for p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y vras opened 
up to the ambitious. There can have been few who disapproved of the 
long-term considerations which had influenced Lydiadas' decision. 
During the next few years u n t i l 230/29 Aratus and Lydiadas 
alternated i n holding the federal strategia. F r i c t i o n was almost bound 
to arise between the two outstanding personalities of the League; and 
t h i s was certainly increased by Lydiadas' emphasising as League policy 
his natural Megalopolitan fear of Sparta. Aratus may have been 
unwillin g to recognise the seriousness of the threat from Sparta and 
may have tended to a t t r i b u t e Lydiadas' fears to Megalopolitan t r a d i t i o n 
rather than to p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y . Added to t h i s was personal jealousy ~ 
another motive which created h o s t i l i t y between the two leaders; and i t 
i s t h i s aspect which Plutarch emphasises.''"'^  Aratus could see his 
personal supremacy threatened by the newcomer whom he had supported, 
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and i n 230/29 provoked a c r i s i s . 
Lydiadas was strategos; and i n his o f f i c i a l capacity opened 
negotiations v/ith the tyrant of Argos, Aristomachus, v/ith a view to 
taking Argos i n t o the League. When Aristomachus formally applied for 
membership with the support of Lydiadas, he was successfully opposed 
by Aratus. I t seems clear that Aratus was provoking a t r i a l of 
strength with Lydiadas; and Aratus had won. Plutarch f a i t h f u l l y 
records Aratus' propagandist accusation of Lydiadas, of poaching 
patronage. This v/as clearly the issue on which Aratus was prepared to 
f i g h t . I t was far more than simply the matter of Argive membership 
which v/as at stake: i t v/as the whole basis of Aratus' personal 
dominance within the League. Hence the attempt to suggest that 
Lydiadas v/as i n some way acting i l l e g i t i m a t e l y i n supporting 
Aristomachus' application. I n fact, i n Lydiadas' strategia, Aratus had 
no business to take upon himself negotiations for new League members. 
I t v/as Lydiadas' duty, and i f Aratus persisted, a clash was clearly 
inevitable, with legitimacy on the side of Lydiadas. Aratus of course, 
was able to pass t h i s over i n his apologia, and lay the blame firmly 
18 
on the shoulders of Lydiadas' (^cXotijata* 
This defeat v/as f a t a l to Lydiadas' p o l i t i c a l career. He had 
f a i l e d to appreciate the fact that he was a novus homo, an Arcadian i n 
Achaea; and on the other hand he had underestimated Aratus' personal 
follov/ing i n Achaea and the personal bitterness which the clash had 
engendered. The c r i s i s was engineered by Aratus; and his victory 
secured his personal prominence. When he v/as himself strategos i n 
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229/8 Aristomachus was quietly enrolled i n the League, under Aratus' 
patronage. During the years of Lydi8,das' a c t i v i t y , Mantinea had 
19 
joined the League, and possibly Orchomenus. But after the accession 
of Argos, vAen other tyrants saw the friendly reception which had 
ultimately been offered to Aristomachus, Aegina, Hermione, Phlius and 
perhaps Pheneus and Lasion, entered the League. Aratus was consolid-
ating his own position; and ostentatiously supported Aristomachus' 
successful bid for the strategia of 228/7.^^ 
Signs of trouble were already apparent i n Achaea, Before 229 
Mantinea was l o s t to the Aetolians, and i n 229 was taken from them by 
the m i l i t a n t Cleoraenes. Although i t was recovered by Aratus, i n 227? 
i t was almost immediately los t again i n the succession of disasters of 
21 
226/5. Caphyae v/as taken i n 228 by Aratus, but this was the last 
independent acquisition made by the League. For the future, any 
accessions were to be de-facto subject to the permission of the dominant 
power, whether Macedon or Rome. I n 226 and 225, under the strategoi 
Hyperbatus and Tiraoxenus, Achaea lost many of her recent acquisitions, 
and became subject to violent a.ttack from Cleomenes. The loss of 
Heraea and Alea was rapidly follov/ed by that of Mantinea, Caphyae, 
Pellene, Argos, Phlius, Cleonae, Epidaurus, Hermione, Troezen, Corinth, 
Pheneus, Lasion and Megara. One result of th i s desperate situation was 
that Megalopolis, although remaining for the moment in t a c t , was cut 
of f from the rest of Achaea; and as the federal authorities were 
f u l l y occupied with Cleomenes i n northern Achaea, Megalopolis could 
expect to be l e f t to fend for i t s e l f - p a r t i c u l a r l y after the death 
- 11 -
22 
of Lydiadas at Ladoceia i n 227. 
In the circumstances i t i s not surprising to f i n d that Aratus, 
quite early i n the series of disasters - i n 22? after Ladoceia - made 
use of two Megalopolitans, Nicophanes and Gercidas^to make an 
exploratory approach to the new Macedonian King, Antigonus Doson, i n 
an attempt to negotiate Macedonian aid for the League against 
Cleomenes. This l^ ;as, for Aratus, a direct change of policy from the 
h o s t i l i t y to Macedon, on which he had come to power i n Achaea. But 
he was now faced with a straight choice between defeat at the hands of 
Cleomenes and the acceptance of the tutelage of Doson. In the 
circumstances the l a t t e r was the lesser e v i l . I n the case of the 
Megalopolitans, h o s t i l i t y to Sparta and support for Macedon was the 
t r a d i t i o n a l policy of t h e i r period of independence. I t i s interesting 
to note that the incorporation of southern Arcadia in t o the League, 
and the resultant confrontation with Sparta, had the effect of causing 
Achaea to adopt the Megalopolitan policy rather than continue the 
ea r l i e r Achaean. But Antigonus' demand for Corinth could not be 
granted, i n 227 for both personal and public reasons of prestige. The 
res u l t v;as that the negotiations hung f i r e u n t i l the revolt of the c i t y 
i n summer 225 and i t s capture by Cleomenes. This effectual].y removed 
the stumbling block of Achaean prestige - now already shattered. By 
t h i s time too Achaea was so hard pressed by Cleomenes that the autumn 
synodos of the League voted to accept Antigonus' demands for Corinth 
23 
i n return for m i l i t a r y aid. 
Early i n 22^ Antigonus appeared i n the Megarid. V/ith the 
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support of Timoxenus (strategos 225/^1-), and Aratus (s_trategos 22V3)5 
he quickly dislodged Gleoraenes from his strongpoints of Corinth and 
Argos; and by the end of 22^ Gleornenes was confined to the south of 
Argos. During 223 Antigonus advanced int o Arcadia, took Tegea, 
Orchomenus, Mantinea, Heraea and Thelphusa from Gleomenes, and thus 
confined him further within the t r a d i t i o n a l boundaries of Laconia. 
This campaign successfully relieved Spartan pressure on Megalopolis 
2^1-
and southern Arcadia. 
I t was during these years of unremitting Megalopolitan h o s t i l i t y 
to Sparta that Philopoemen reached maturity and gained his early 
p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y ejcperience. He had seen Lydiadas lay down his 
tyranny i n favour of participation i n the larger p o l i t i c a l u n i t ; and 
had realised that t h i s did not mean a betrayal of loc a l sectional 
interests which could, i n the circumstances, be better defended by 
par t i c i p a t i o n i n the Achaean League; and these considei^ations v;ere not 
necessarily invalidated by the incapacity of Achaea to be wholly 
successful i n defending Megalopolis against Gleomenes. I t must be t o 
the continuous v/arfare of these years that Plutarch refers, v/hen he 
says that Philopoemen 'accustomed himself to march f i r s t on the outward 
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march and last on the return'. He probably took part i n a l l the 
serious f i g h t i n g of 227? and may vrell have been present when Lydiadas 
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was k i l l e d at Ladoceia, But his youth must liave prevented him from 
taking any active part i n Megalopolitan p o l i t i c s at th i s time; and he 
could have had l i t t l e to do with the appeal to Macedon. Hovirever, as a 
soldier, he must liave realised the need for m i l i t a r y reinforcement 
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against Cleomenes, which was clearly not forthcoming from Achaea 
alone; and therefore have supported the negotiations. There was, 
afte r a l l , no loss of prestige for the Megalopolitans i n an appeal to 
Macedon. But i f Philopoeraen can have played l i t t l e part i n the 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y of these years, he must have taken an important 
part i n the defence of Megalopolis u n t i l 223? v;hen the c i t y was 
relieved by the presence of Antigonus i n Arcadia; for by then he was 
recognised as an important m i l i t a r y figure by the Megalopolitans, 
although, as far as we know, he had as yet made no mark i n federal 
m i l i t a r y matters. 
I n 223 comes Philopoemen's f i r s t major recorded a c t i v i t y . 
During the summer Cleomenes had made an unsuccessful attack on 
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Megalopolis, apart from which the year had gone to Antigonus. I n 
the autumn, the Macedonian troops were allowed to go home instead of 
spending the winter uselessly i n b i l l e t s i n Peloponnese. This was 
equally satisfactory from the point of view of the soldiers, v;ho were 
able to return to t h e i r families, and the Achaeans, who thus avoided 
the expensive obligation of providing winter accommodation for the 
troops. The soldiers were therefore dispatched from Achaea while the 
roads to the north were s t i l l open.^^ This meant taking the gamble 
that Cleoraenes would not use what remained of the fine weather to 
attack Achaea; but i t seemed j u s t i f i e d , as Cleoraenes must have 
appeared cowed as a result of the reverses he had sustained during 
the summer. Cleomenes however looked upon t h i s rather d i f f e r e n t l y . 
To him t h i s was the g i f t of an opportunity for a successful surprise 
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attack on Megalopolis. He made his preparations rapidly, and i n a 
night attack on the inadequately defended c i t y - i t was too large for 
i t s population even i n normal times, and must have suffered severe 
losses i n the years of f i g h t i n g - he gained possession. I n the course 
of the f i g h t i n g some 1,000 Megalopolitans v;ere k i l l e d or taken 
prisoner; the remainder, including women and children, were led by 
Philopoemen to the safety of friendly Messene. In fact, Messene was 
not a member of the Leagu.e, nor yet of Antigonus' symmachy of 224, 
but the common h o s t i l i t y to Sparta, t r a d i t i o n a l i n both c i t i e s , was 
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s u f f i c i e n t to make Messene a safe retreat for the refugees. 
There are three accounts extant of events subsequent to the 
capture of the c i t y , a l l biassed to some extent. Plutarch, i n his 
Gleomenes (23 - 25)) r e l i e s largely on Phylarchus, whose bias was i n 
favour of Gleomenes. I n his Philopoemen (3), the source may have been 
Polybius' Philopoemen, which perhaps extracted from Phylarchus' account 
material which could be interpreted to the g l o r i f i c a t i o n of Philopoemen, 
and maintained essentially unaltered the Polybian bias against 
Gleomenes. I t i s possible that the material from Phylarchus was 
included by Plutarch himself, but he probably r e f l e c t s Polybius' 
p o r t r a i t . The t h i r d account i s Polybius' Histories (2.55 & 6l - 63), 
taken from Aratus' memoirs or Megalopolitan t r a d i t i o n , with the 
addition of his polemical discussion of Phylarchus' account - v;hich he 
does not altogether succeed i n contradicting. To these Pausanias adds 
l i t t l e of any v a l u e . A s the longest and most detailed account i s 
that i n Plutarch's Gleomenes, i t w i l l be most convenient to use that 
- 15 -
as a basis for discussion of the Polybian variations and criticisms. 
Of those who were captured i n the attack on Megalopolis, Plutarch 
names Lysandridas and Thearidas, dvbpec SvSo^ot xa i 6wvaxol [idXicTTa 
Tcov MeYaXarroXtTffiv » They were brought before Gleomenes, and 
Lysandridas immediately began negotiations for the safety of the c i t y , 
making the suggestion that the Megalopolitans v;ould be v/i l l i n g to j o i n 
Cleomenes i n return for the safety of th e i r homes. As a result, 
Cleomenes sent them both to Messene to present his conditions to the 
Megalopolitans who had escaped: that Megalopolis would be spared i f 
the union with Achaea was abandoned and support for Sparta promised. 
Philopoemen's influence was decisive i n persuading the Megalopolitans 
not to abandon Achaea, and drove out Thearidas and Lysandridas from 
Messene as t r a i t o r s . Cleomenes then did his best to wreck and loot 
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the abandoned c i t y before leaving for Sparta, 
Polybius' account ignores the negotiations altogether because i t 
suited Aratus and Polybius himself to paint as black a picture as 
possible of the destruction - Aratus to j u s t i f y his application for 
Macedonian aid, and Polybius for p a t r i o t i c Megalopolitan reasons. He 
goes on to explain Cleomenes' violence: TOBTO 8e -nroif^ oui |iot 
6oxet 8i,a TO %a%a xoc TCOV xacpcov ' f r epKTTaoEK; trapa [IOVOIQ 
MeYO-XoTroXi'mtc x a l 2i:\>[i<f)aKCot.Q \ir]bi'wo%e bxi\frp'i\vai, [irp' alpeTi<rrT)v 
xa l xoivwvov xS5v ibCoiv eXiri8a)v liiqTe 'nrpo86'cr|v xaxoaxeoaaotaSat. 
This motivation simply does not account for the facts. I t had been 
one of the main aims of Spartan policy towards Arcadia from the time 
of the foundation of Megalopolis to destroy i t . Cleomenes' violence 
needs no such personalised motivation.-^3 
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How then are we to judge the authenticity of the mission of 
Thearidas and Lysandridas? I f v;e can accept the probability that 
chapter 5 of Plutarch's Philopoemen has Polybius - i n some form -
as i t s base, t h i s offers us a check. I n t h i s passage Plutarch 
mentions the mission, and Philopoemen's part i n rejecting i t , without 
hoivever, mentioning Thearidas and Lysandridas. He may have simply 
omitted the names himself; but i t i s possible that he simply did not 
f i n d them i n his Polybian source. Confirmation of t h i s comes from 
Polybius' polemic against Phylarchus: he mentions t h i s episode, again 
without names, and although he suggests that Phylarchus i s vifhite-
washing Cleomenes, i t i s not t h i s which he sp e c i f i c a l l y objects to, 
so much as the omission of TOV inaivov x a l t r iv lir'aYoSw ^vrp.r\v 
TioJv St^ioXoYwy irpoaipecrewv • Again Polybius' p a t r i o t i c bias shov/s 
through his polemic; and his fai l u r e i n t h i s place to specifically, 
deny the existence of the negotiations seems conclusive for their 
being h i s t o r i c a l . . 
V/hy then did Polybius attempt to conceal the existence of these 
negotiations, which he did know about, and the names of the collabor-
ators? He v/as certainly influenced by his source's (Aratus') desire 
to paint as black a picture of Cleomenes as possible; and his o\i/n 
p a t r i o t i c desire to praise noteworthy conduct of Megalopolitans made 
him naturally sympathetic to t h i s view. However a more personal 
motive can perhaps be found. The name Thearidas i s known to have 
35 been the name of Lycortas' father, Polybius' paternal grandfather. 
There i s no chronological d i f f i c u l t y i n the v;ay of accepting the 
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i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the two Thearidas; and i t seems too much of a 
coincidence for there to be two important and i n f l u e n t i a l 
Megalopolitans at t h i s time neuned Thearidas. I f we accept this 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , i t removes the d i f f i c u l t y of Polybius' omission of 
t h i s rather discreditable episode i n his family history, which his 
father Lycortas and Polybius himself ~ both confirmed federalists -
must have preferred to forget. The clash with the family friend, 
Polybius' hero, could not be easily or consistently explained i n the 
family history; and inconvenient as i t was, could be simply 
eliminated by omission i n his own work.^^ However, he could not 
control the output of other writers; and t h i s gave him an additional, 
and personal, motive for his violent attack on the c r e d i b i l i t y of 
Phylarchus - which i n t h i s d e t a i l , at least, i s unconvincing. 
We can therefore accept as h i s t o r i c a l the negotiations between 
the Megalopolitan refugees, led by Philopoemen, and Gleomenes, 
through the medium of Thearidas and Lysandridas. The conversations 
however, which Plutarch records from Phylarchus, cannot be h i s t o r i c a l 
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and must be at t r i b u t e d to imaginative presentation. On the other 
hand, the considerations which they represent seem reasonable. The 
only reason why Cleomenes should enter negotiations at a l l was hope 
of p o l i t i c a l advantage: he v/ould gain nothing i n the long term by the 
destruction of Megalopolis; Philopoemen's competent rescue of the 
greater part of the c i v i l i a n population had even made the financial 
prospects from the sack of the c i t y meagre. I f the Megalopolitans 
could be persuaded to renounce their friendship with Achaea, 
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Megalopolis would become a Spartan forward post against the 
inevitable Macedonian/Achaean aggression of the following year. The 
empty shell was valueless strategically, as i t was far too large for 
Cleoraenes to hold himself with the forces at his disposal. Even the 
goods and chattels of the devastated c i t y could not be expected to 
y i e l d much, as Polybius himself points out. I t was therefore 
reasonable enough to open negotiations with the refugees: no Macedonian 
reinforcements could be expected, and he could deal adequately with 
whatever forces Achaea could muster. 
While Thearidas and Lysandridas may have been w i l l i n g to 
sacrifice long-terra Achaean interest for their p a r t i c u l a r i s t desire to 
preserve their c i t y i n t a c t ~ far more valuable, admittedly, to the 
Megalopolitans than to Cleomenes - Philopoemen was completely 
unwilling to compromise, although some of his fellow refugees had to 
be persuaded of the value of the course he advocated. For both 
personal and t r a d i t i o n a l reasons he viewed with distaste a rapproche-
ment with Sparta - though t h i s cannot have been his main reason for 
treating the negotiations with contempt and s a c r i f i c i n g the c i t y . He 
must have realised, as an experienced soldier, that since the appear-
ance of Antigonus i n Peloponnese, Macedonian power had become the key 
factor i n the s i t u a t i o n . The present impotence was only temporary; 
and any immediate advantage gained by a Megalopolitan agreement with 
Cleomenes v/ould last j u s t as long as Antigonus was without troops. 
Both for t r a d i t i o n a l and for immediate reasons, therefore, the 
presence of Antigonus i n Achaea, and his involvement i n the v/ar with 
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Gleomenes, forbade'' any consideration of short-term gains, which 
would inevitably prejudice the city's long-term v;elfare. Polybius 
might rant to his heart's content about the loyalty of the 
Megalopolitans to the League, the praiseviorthy sacrifice of their 
'land, tombs, temples, homes and possessions rather than break f a i t h 
with t h e i r a l l i e s ' . But he must have realised, had he not allowed 
his moralising rhetoric to carry him away, that the decision which 
involved these things was taken after a cool assessment of present 
p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y and the expected development of events i n the near 
future. Had Philopoemen f a i l e d to persuade his citizens, there would 
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probably have been no Polybius to t e l l the t a l e . 
I n the circumstances, Cleomenes had to make the best of his 
disappointment. The empty c i t y was useless to him. So that the 
expedition v/ould not be v/holly without result, he sacked i t , and 
removed a l l valuables to Sparta. A sum of about 300 talents, 
Polybius estimates, was the t o t a l result. Phylarchus, i n an attempt 
to make the a f f a i r a triumph for Cleomenes, exaggerated the figure to 
6,000.^ ° 
Cleomenes had not yet finished taking advantage of Antigonus' 
temporary incapacity. I n Spring 222, before the Macedonian troops 
had returned from t h e i r homes, he entered the t e r r i t o r y of Argos where 
Antigonus v;as wintering with a very small force. He did not dare to 
march out against Cleomenes with the forces at his disposal; and the 
Argives had to watch t h e i r countryside being devastated while their 
protector was able to do nothing to prevent i t . I n t h i s case Polybius 
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i s forced to express his admiration at the coolness of Cleomenes' 
calculation, i n the process again s t r i k i n g a blow against Phylarchus' 
t r a g i c a l history i n the persons of those 'who think t h i s was a rash 
In 
and hazardous act'. 
In July of the same year, 222, Cleomenes was brought to battle 
with the forces of Antigonus' symmachy at Sellasia. A detailed 
account of the b a t t l e would be out of place here;^^ but the part 
played by Philopoemen, which f i r s t brought him to notice outside his 
s t r i c t l y Megalopolitan a c t i v i t i e s , must be examined. I n Antigonus' 
army were 3?000 Achaean e'rriXexToi tre^ot , 300 Achaean cavalry, and 
1,000 Megalopolitans armed i n Macedonian fashion, and led by Cercidas. 
The number of Achaeans i s small, parti c u l a r l y when Megalopolis was 
able to provide 1,000 men; but this may have been arranged by 
Antigonus: the Achaeans would have to feed the army. The independent 
group of the Megalopolitans and their equipment can best be explained 
by the personal nature of the Plegalopolitan grievance against Cleomenes, 
now aggravated by the sack of their c i t y . The longstanding friendship 
between Megalopolis and Macedon, coupled with Antigonus' f a i l u r e to 
prevent the sack of Megalopolis, i s s u f f i c i e n t to explain the 
Macedonian provision of equipment for the destitute Megalopolitans. 
Cercidas himself had been one of the or i g i n a l Megalopolitan envoys to 
Antigonus i n 227; and t h i s established personal connection had 
probably been used again to secure the equipment for these troops. 
The presence of t h i s independent Megalopolitan infantry suggests that 
the Achaean authorities had not insisted on Megalopolis' providing a 
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contingent for t h e i r federal force - the selective nature of the 
troops required, being nowhere near a f u l l levy, made thi s possible. 
Hoxi/ever, we Imov/ that Philopoemen served among the cavalry; and 
as there i s no mention i n any source of separate Megalopolitan 
cavalry, he must have been with the 300 Achaeans. I t is. unlikely 
that he was the only Megalopolitan cavalryman, which suggests that 
Antigonus h3.d perhaps again offered help with equipment. 
The whole of the a l l i e d cavalry vras placed i n the centre of 
Antigonus' l i n e , i n the valley of the Oenus, between the two h i l l s 
Euas and Olympus. To t h e i r l e f t on Olympus was the Macedonian phalanx 
with 55000 mercenaries under Antigonus, facing that of Cleomenes who 
was f o r t i f i e d higher up the slope. On the r i g h t of the a l l i e d line 
were the Achaeajis and Megalopolitans, facing Euas on which the other 
Spartan king was i n command with some 5^ 000 men; i n the valley 
between r i g h t and l e f t were 1,000 - 2,000 Spartan mercenaries shielding 
the Spartan cavalry. Hidden overnight i n the tributary valley between 
the a l l i e d r i g h t and Euas were I l l y r i a n s and Acarnanians. Antigonus' 
plan was to attack Eu.as with these surprise troops, and outflanking the 
Spartan l e f t , to take them at a disadvantage, while the Macedonian 
phalanx prevented Cleomenes' leaving Olympus to aid Eucleidas. The 
centre was probably to be held back u n t i l both wings were engaged. 
The battle began at dawn with the Acarnanian attack on Euas. 
The Spartan light-armed mercenaries from the centre were at once 
despatched to take them i n the rear, i n the space between them and 
the a l l i e d centre. This move was clearly dangerous for the 
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Acarnanians, but perhaps not altogether unexpected by Antigonus. In 
any case he did not yet give the sign for his centre to j o i n b a t t l e , 
as he ^^ranted to give the outflanking I l l y r i a n s on the r i g h t of the 
ambush time to engage, and to involve the Spartan mercenaries on the 
less favourable ground of the h i l l s i d e , where the Acarnanian hillmen 
would be at home. This does not mean that he was intending to make 
a sac r i f i c e of the Acarnanians: only to take the utmost advantage from 
the engagement of the Spartan mercenaries before sending i n his centre. 
Philopoemen had no o f f i c i a l position i n the a l l i e d army, except 
perh^aps as leader of the Megalopolitan cavalry - even th i s i s not 
made clear i n the sources - and did not see the plan of the battle i n 
th i s way. What was apparent to hira i n his place i n the centre, the 
closest point to the Spartan attack on the Acarnanians, was that the 
Acarnanians were threatened from the rear. His reaction was based on 
i n s t i n c t rather than m i l i t a r y discipline. He drew the attention of 
the Macedonian offi c e r s to the threat from the Spartan mercenaries, 
and suggested immediate action. Reasonably enough, as well-trained 
o f f i c e r s , they resisted t h i s attempt from the ranks to teach them 
t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , and waited for the pre-arranged signal from 
Antigonus' headquarters. Before th i s came, Philopoemen broke ranks 
and led his Megalopolitans, followed by the rest of the cavalry, to 
relieve the Acarnanians by a charge against the Spartan cavalry, l e f t 
exposed by the mercenaries' absence. The Spartan mercenaries were 
thus forced to r e t i r e to protect their cavalry, the pressure on the 
Acarnanians was relieved, and the a l l i e d cavalry could return to 
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t h e i r position. I n the event, Philopoemen's s e l f - w i l l e d 
intervention had been successful i n allowing the Acarnanians a freer 
attack. But i n the long run i t made l i t t l e difference to the success 
of the attack on Euas. For by this time, the I l l y r i a n s had come over 
the brow of the h i l l ; and Eucleidas, instead of using the advantage 
which his superior position gave him for attack, allowed the I l l y r i a n s 
and Acarnanians time to reach close quarters. As a result of the 
subsequent f i g h t i n g the whole of the Spartan l e f t on Euas was beaten 
i n t o retreat down the opposite slope and annihilated. 
Philopoemen's e f f o r t therefore, i n t h i s part of the batt l e , was 
essentially a minor episode, which may have added to the comfort of 
the Acarnanians and saved some l i v e s , but had l i t t l e , i f any, effect 
on the course of the battle as a whole. Polybius' account of this -
perhaps influenced by information from Philopoemen himself - turns i t 
i n t o a major part of the f i g h t i n g , to the greater glory of 
Philopoemen and Achaea. I n fact he suggests that Philoj^men's 
i n i t i a t i v e was mainly responsible for the success of the attack on 
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Euas - which we have seen can scarcely have been the case. I n fact , 
had Philopoemen been a Macedonian, and not a member of the 
Megalojpolitan a l l i e d contingent, he may well have expected to suffer 
for his misplaced i n i t i a t i v e . But i n the f i n a l assessment Antigonus 
was generous with praise to Philopoemen, when he found him seriously 
wounded aft e r the l a t e r main cavalry engagement - although Polybius' 
anecdote suggests that had Alexander, the Macedonian commander of the 
r i g h t , been responsible for the premature cavalry attack, he would 
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have expected to answer for his temerity. 
Hovjever, there i s l i t t l e reason to doubt the authenticity of 
the compliment bestov/ed on Philopoemen by Antigonus, that he had 
acted l i k e a general - although there i s room for discussion about 
the s p i r i t i n which the compliment was offered. When the battle was 
over the wounded would appreciate the king's praise. There i s also 
no reason to doubt that Antigonus suggested that Philopoemen should 
serve hira i n Macedon, a d e t a i l v;hich must come o r i g i n a l l y from 
Philopoemen himself. I f his t a c t i c a l insight had been at f a u l t , there 
could be no doubt of his personal courage and i n i t i a t i v e i n f i g h t i n g 
on when his legs were transfixed by a j a v e l i n . Antigonus could no 
doubt f i n d employment for such men. 
After the success of the a l l i e d attack on Euas, Cleomenes on 
Olympus i n desperation launched a phalanx attack on Antigonus. The 
f i g h t i n g here was severe; but the weight of the Macedonian phalanx, 
now supported by the r i g h t , which had been freed as a result of the 
success of the attack on Euas, and the cavalry, vjas s u f f i c i e n t to win 
the day for the a l l i e s . The Spartans broke, and Cleomenes escaped to 
Gytheum from where he sailed to E g y p t . T h e war was over; the 
threat to Achaea from Sparta, for the moment at least, destroyed. 
The Megalopolitans could now thank Philopoemen's foresight for 
preventing t h e i r accepting Cleomenes' friendship. 
I I 
Having to some extent made his reputation as a soldier i n the 
war against Cleomenes, Philopoemen soon afterwards went to Crete, 
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where he stayed for ten years, f i g h t i n g on behalf of the Gortynians. 
I n this he was probably associated with the interests of Philip V of 
Macedon, who became king when Doson died i n the course of the winter 
after Sellasia. We shall discuss Philopoemen's a c t i v i t i e s i n Crete 
elsewhere.^"^ Here i t will be convenient to examine b r i e f l y events 
i n Greece between Sellasia and Philopoeraen's f i r s t federal appointment, 
as hipparch i n 210/09, 
The members of Doson's symmachy surrounded and enclosed the 
t e r r i t o r y of the Aetolian League, which had been strong enough to 
refuse to participate i n the symmachy. Ph i l i p was only l6; and the 
Aetolians took advantage of his youth to attack Achaea, which now 
r e l i e d wholly on Macedon for protection. I n 221 various raids 
against Achaea and elsev/here caused the symmachy to declare war on 
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the Aetolians. The threat to Achaea from Sparta was also renevjed 
when the Aetolians made an alliance i n 219 with Lycurgus, who had 
emerged as the dominant figure at Sparta from the chaos following 
Cleomenes' death. P h i l i p and his advisers saw the war as a whole, 
v;ith the resu l t that he spent 219 trying to open up the western route 
from Macedon to Peloponnese, and Achaea vras v i r t u a l l y l e f t to take 
care of herself. Philip's winter campaign against El i s and Triphylia 
did not s i g n i f i c a n t l y a l t e r t h i s state of a f f a i r s , and i n 2l8 the 
Achaeans were so d i s t r a i t that they agreed to pay P h i l i p for time 
which he spent i n defending speci f i c a l l y Achaean interests. Aratus 
had some influence over P h i l i p , and t r i e d to preserve some r e a l i t y 
behind the facade of the symmachy, whereas Philip's chief Macedonian 
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adviser, Apelles, saw the symmachy simply as a weapon of Macedonian 
aggrandizement - much as Doson had conceived i t . ^ - ^ 
The effect of these tv;o co n f l i c t i n g interests on Philip v/as 
confused s t i l l more i n 219) when he was joined by Demetrius of Pharos, 
who ha.d been driven out from his I l l y r i a n kingdom as a result of his 
misinterpreting Roman 'freedom'. Demetrius quickly gained influence 
over P h i l i p , and he was able to provide a new direction for Macedonian 
foreign policy. His own aim was the recovery of his kingdom, and i n 
2l8 he persuaded P h i l i p to bu i l d a f l e e t . Demetrius' influence 
distracted P h i l i p from Peloponnese and Achaean problems, and despite 
the fact that Aratus had f i n a l l y discredited Apelles, Achaea was for 
the most part l e f t to defend herself. This continued throughout 217) 
although the Nemea brought P h i l i p to Argos i n July. While there, he 
received news of the battle of Trasimene, which effectively replaced 
his interest i n the Aetolian war with a plan of invading I t a l y and 
joining Hannibal against Rome. The v;ar i n Greece was therefore quickly 
brought to an end i n 217 at a conference at Naupactus. Peace was made, 
and Agelaus of Naupactus recognised the danger of Philip's interest i n 
I t a l y when he warned the Greeks about the 'cloud i n the west'.^^ 
But P h i l i p was too much under the influence of Demetrius and his 
own desire to play a world role to take any notice of Agelaus' warning. 
A campaign against Scerdilaidas brought Philip a common border with 
Rome's friends; and winter 217/6 was spent i n the construction of , 
100 lembi. When t h i s f l e e t put to sea, Scerdilaidas appealed to Rorae. 
The Senate detached 10 ships from i t s f l e e t at Lilybaeura to investigate 
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S c e r d i l a i d a s ' complaint, v/hich P h i l i p i n t e r p r e t e d as the advance-
guard of the whole Roman f l e e t . Thinking t h a t h i s whole scheme was 
known he could only r e t u r n t o Macedon. But despite t h i s f a i l u r e , and 
the news of Cannae, which removed the greater p a r t of P h i l i p ' s 
b argaining power, he approached Hannibal. Although the negotiations 
were discovered by the Romans through the capture of P h i l i p ' s 
messenger, a t r e a t y was arranged i n 215? i n which Hannibal recognised 
P h i l i p ' s p o t e n t i a l d i v e r s i o n a r y value by acknowledging h i s i n t e r e s t s 
i n the Roman I l l y r i a n 'Protectorate' t o be legitimate.'^^ 
The Senate loiew of t h i s t r e a t y i n 215? but no a c t i o n was taken 
u n t i l P h i l i p ' s seriousness v;as expressed by attacks on Oricum and 
Apo l l o n i a i n 2l4. M. Va l e r i u s Laevinus, the Roman f l e e t commander, 
immediately crossed the A d r i a t i c , recovered Oricum, and forced P h i l i p 
t o burn h i s f l e e t a t the mouth of the Aous. P h i l i p ' s schemes had 
been spectacular only i n t h e i r f a i l u r e . Yet the Senate no longer 
could f e e l safe by simply t r u s t i n g t o bonds of ami ^ i t i a . w i t h the 
e x i s t i n g dynasts and c i t i e s . A permanent naval establishment was 
req u i r e d i n I l l y r i a t o p r o t e c t the s t r a i t s of Otranto: once Laevinus 
had regained Roman I l l y r i a , there he stayed. But p r o t e c t i o n of the 
s t r a i t s ifas considered t o be adequate safeguard, and no attempt t o 
extend Roman influence was made u n t i l 212, despite P h i l i p ' s drives 
against I l l y r i a from the i n l a n d . I n 212 approaches t o the Aetolians 
r e s u l t e d i n the agreement of an a l l i a n c e i n 211: but the terms 
c a r e f u l l y emphasised Roman u n i n t e r e s t i n permanent occupation of 
Greece. A l l tov/ns should go t o the Aetolians, a l l movable plunder -
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i n c l u d i n g p risoners - t o Rome. The Macedonian War was simply an 
57 
inconvenient d i s t r a c t i o n from the main war against Hannibal. 
With the end of the war against A e t o l i a , P h i l i p expressed even 
less i n t e r e s t i n Achaea. His only purpose i n southern Greece was t o 
keep Peloponnese q u i e t , so t h a t he could concentrate on h i s western 
plans. To t h i s end he r e t a i n e d some of h i s strongholds i n Peloponnese • 
Corinth, Heraea, Orchoraenus, A l i p h e i r a and T r i p h y l i a . I n 215 these 
proved t o be i n s u f f i c i e n t t o maintain peace i n Peloponnese, when 
f a c t i o n a l t r o u b l e broke out a t Messene. Achaean i n t e r e s t was c l e a r l y 
deeply i n v o l v e d , and Aratus t r a v e l l e d quickly t o Messene. When he 
a r r i v e d he found Ithome already occupied by P h i l i p and Demetrius. 
Demetrius urged t h a t Macedonian i n t e r e s t demanded a permanent 
Macedonian occupation of Ithome; Aratus argued t h a t the gbodwill of 
the people was l i k e l y t o be more e f f e c t i v e . P h i l i p vjas persuaded by 
Aratus - although the concession cost him l i t t l e . To make up f o r the 
absence of a permanent g a r r i s o n on Ithome, he ravaged Messenia i n 
214."^^ Aratus had f a i l e d i n h i s attempts t o conceal the f a c t t h a t 
Achaea had become a Macedonian s a t e l l i t e . His claims t o be able t o 
exert personal i n f l u e n c e over P h i l i p were f i n a l l y shattered, p r i v a t e l y 
by the discovery t h a t P h i l i p had seduced Aratus' daughter-in-law, 
p u b l i c l y by the l a c k of i n t e r e s t which P h i l i p a t l a s t showed i n the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l trappings of the symmachy. I t had been formed as an 
expression of Macedonian domination, and only b r i e f l y , while P h i l i p 
\ifas f i n d i n g h i s p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n under Aratus' guidance, had i t 
been anything e l s e . When Aratus died i n 213/12 i n his l 6 t h s t r a t e g i a ^ ^ 
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Achaea had become l i t t l e more than a toy i n the hands of the great 
pov/ers. I t w i l l be the purpose of the f o l l o w i n g chapters to trace 
the way i n which the next generation of Achaean p o l i t i c i a n s adapted 
themselves t o the changing circumstances. 
CHAPTER 2 
CRETAN CONNECTIONS 
I 
Philopoemen spent more than 15 years'^ of h i s mature l i f e i n 
Crete, which the l i t e r a r y sources v i r t u a l l y ignore. This i s p a r t l y 
due t o the loss of Polybius' biography, where the events i n v/hich 
Philopoemen took p a r t i n Crete must have been described. But since 
the work was a panegyric account, which would contain l i t t l e more 
than a l i s t of the hero's achievements without the a d d i t i o n of any 
background or discussion of motives, we might not have had much more 
u s e f u l i n f o r m a t i o n had i t survived. However, we have no means of 
judging the value of the m a t e r i a l i n the biography, since nei t h e r 
P l u t a r c h nor Pausanias made any use of i t f o r the Cretan years, and 
Polybius' H i s t o r i e s ignored t h i s part of Philopoemen's career. As 
f a r as the s u r v i v i n g l i t e r a r y sources are concerned, t h e r e f o r e , these 
two periods i n Crete are a gap, \ifhich i t i s the purpose of the 
present chapter t o attempt t o f i l l . 
The e s s e n t i a l inadequacy l i e s i n the sources. Philopoemen 
himself i s not mentioned a t a l l , Achaea only b r i e f l y , i n tiie l i t e r a r y 
sources which have anything about Crete a t t h i s period; and apart 
from the War of L y t t u s , t o yhlch Polybius devoted three chapters, the 
i n t e r n a l h i s t o r y of Crete i s j u s t as unc e r t a i n . ^ Epigraphic evidence 
can f i l l , t o some extent, the gaps i n the l i t e r a t u r e ; but as so 
of t e n when i n s c r i p t i o n s provide the bulk of the evidence, i n t e r p r e t -
a t i o n s are disputed, and i t i s therefore only possible t o o f f e r a 
l i k e l y r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of events i n Crete during these years, and the 
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r e l a t i o n s h i p of the i s l a n d t o the general Greek p o l i t i c a l movements 
of the age. The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f f e r e d here i s an attempt to use 
the a v a i l a b l e m a t e r i a l t o b u i l d up some k i n d of p o s i t i v e p i c t u r e of 
the place of some of the Cretan c i t i e s i n the h i s t o r y of t h i s period; 
and t o show the p a r t played by Philopoemen i n the events of the years 
of h i s absence from Achaea. 
At some time soon a f t e r S e l l a s i a (222) Philopoemen v/ent t o 
Crete. The r e a l circumstances are concealed by Plutarch's version, 
t h a t h i s a c t i v i t y a t S e l l a s i a had so a t t r a c t e d Boson's a t t e n t i o n t h a t 
he i n v i t e d him t o j o i n h i s s t a f f - an i n v i t a t i o n v/hich Philopoeraen 
refused; but because he d i d not want t o be under another man's 
orders, and y e t wanted m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y , he v;ent t o C r e t e , P l u t a r c h 
c l e a r l y knew l i t t l e about the true reason f o r Philopoemen's departure; 
but i t i s perhaps s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t i t v^ as only Antigonus' o f f e r of 
formal m i l i t a r y service which was refused. There i s no h i n t i n 
Plutarch's account of Philopoemen's being indignant a t the o f f e r of 
the k i n g , such as appears i n Pausanias. The way was c l e a r l y l e f t 
open f o r Philopoemen t o accept a less formal type of service: t o 
represent Macedonian i n t e r e s t s while at the same time r e t a i n i n g h i s 
own freedom of a c t i o n . And we s h a l l argue t h a t i t vi/as t h i s type of 
in f o r m a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of Macedon i n Crete, which Philopoemen under-
took f o r Antigonus' successor, i n the honourable t r a d i t i o n of the 
upper-class c o n d o t t i e r i . 
We do not know exactly when he v;ent t o Crete. But i t may be 
of some s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a t i n 220 P h i l i p sent a force of the SSIB^l 
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t o Crete to help the L y t t i a n s and t h e i r a l l i e s , among whom was the 
p a r t y of the n e o t e r o i a t Gortyn. Included i n t h i s force were some 200 
Achaeans.'^ The i n t e r n a l Gortynian quarrel beti^/een neoteroi and 
p r e s b y t e r o i , v/hich Polybius records, must have some ext e r n a l p o l i t i c a l , 
as v^7ell as i n t e r n a l s o c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . Van E f f e n t e r r e , accepting the 
obvious i n d i c a t i o n s of the names neoteroi and p r e s b y t e r o i , suggests 
t h a t they represent democratic and o l i g a r c h i c p a r t i e s w i t h i n Gortyn^ -
democratic i n the attenuated sense of the word forced upon the language 
by H e l l e n i s t i c c o n d i t i o n s : '. . l e terme s'oppose moins desormais a 
a r i s t o c r a t i e ou o l i g a r c h i e qu'aux diverses formes de pouvoir personnel 
favorisees souvent par l e s raonarques dans l e s c i t e s grecques'.'^ The 
only r e a l o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s i s the t o t a l lack of supporting evidence, 
Wille"l^s' use of Forbes' examination of the i n s t i t u t i o n of veot 
l e d him t o suggest t h a t t h i s s t a s i s at Gortyn was 'a c o n f l i c t between 
the older and younger c i t i z e n s , . . . promoted by i n t e r n a l causes of 
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which we are i g n o r a n t ' . This less precise i d e n t i f i c a t i o n seems i n 
i t s e l f s afer, and t h e r e f o r e preferable, i n the current s t a t e of our 
knowledge of Crete a t t h i s time. But the causes may perhaps be e l u c i d -
ated. The V/ar of L y t t u s s t a r t e d as a f i n a l phase i n the attempt of 
Cnossos and Gortyn - the p r e s b y t e r o i - t o subdue the v;hole i s l a n d t o 
t h e i r j o i n t hegemony. I n the course of t h i s war against L y t t u s , other 
c i t i e s broke from the a l l i a n c e w i t h Cnossos and Gortyn; and the s t a s i s 
broke out a t Gortyn. I t was only w i t h Aetolian help t h a t Cnossos and 
the Gortynian p r e s b y t e r o i were enabled to come out on top. A f t e r t h i s 
the war became more general and Lyttus was destroyed. At t h i s p o i n t 
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P h i l i p intervened v j i t h h i s contingent from the symmachj; and the 
war was soon decided i n favour of the dissidents from the Gortyno/ 
Cnossian dualism. A.t some time a f t e r t h i s , P h i l i p vras appointed 
p r o s t a t e s of a l l Crete - c l e a r l y by the v i c t o r i o u s p a r t y , whom he had 
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supported; and t h i s n a t u r a l l y included the neote r o i at Gortyn. 
Can v/e f i n d i n t h i s s e ries of events a reason f o r the s t a s i s at 
Gortyn? We cannot be sure t h a t the n e o t e r o i were democrats (even i n 
the h e l l e n i s t i c sense); but we can be sure t h a t they opposed Gnossos 
and the dual hegemony, which was supported by the pr e s b y t e r o i . A f t e r 
the success of the r e v o l t from Cnossos and Gortyn, the koinon -
whether founded then or e a r l i e r - seems t o have been dominated by 
Gortyn; and t h i s Gortynian domination l a s t e d , though gradually fading 
out:,, i n t o the mid-second century.'''^ This c l e a r l y means t h a t the 
n e o t e r o i had e f f e c t u a l l y managed t o exert Gortynian hegemony over the 
f e d e r a t i o n a f t e r the war. I t seems reasonable therefore t o see the 
n e o t e r o i as Gortynian n a t i o n a l i s t s and perhaps f e d e r a l i s t s , who were 
d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h the dual hegemony - and the i n t e r n a l power i n Gortyn 
f o r the p r e s b y t e r o i , v/hich t h i s implied. A r e v o l u t i o n towards feder-
a t i o n (or a more e f f e c t u a l koinon, i f i t already e x i s t e d ) , and away 
from the dual hegemony, v/ould r e s u l t i n pov/er i n Gortyn f o r the n e o t e r o i ; 
and i n Crete as a whole, the koinon would be l i k e l y t o look t o the 
.Gortynian n e o t e r o i f o r leadership. For success i n the r e v o l t meant 
t h a t Cnossos' pretensions t o hegemony were destroyed, and the presby-
t e r o i a t Gortyn w i t h them. From the p o i n t of view of the p a r t i c i p a n t s , 
t h i s was c l e a r l y worth f i g h t i n g f o r , worth c i v i l war - both f o r the 
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n e o t e r o i and f o r the Cretan c i t i e s , which v/ere d i s s a t i s f i e d v/ith the 
dual hegemony. And i t i s i n t h i s v/ay t h a t the s t a s i s seems t o make 
most sense, when set i n i t s Cretan context. 
The i n t e r v e n t i o n of P h i l i p i n Crete i s more e a s i l y explained. 
I n Greece the Soc i a l War was declared i n summer 220. Cnossos already 
had an a l l i a n c e w i t h the Aetolians, and t h i s was natura3.1y supported 
by the Gortynian p r e s b y t e r o i . I t i s not known when t h i s a l l i a n c e had 
been established, but i t f i t s conveniently i n t o the well-established 
anti-Macedonian t r a d i t i o n s of Cnossos, which had sent help t o the 
Rhodians as long ago as Demetrius' siege i n 305» 1,000 Aetolians were 
ins t r u m e n t a l i n d r i v i n g the neoteroi out of G o r t y n . T h i s alignment 
of the p r e s b y t e r o i w i t h the anti-Macedonian p a r t i e s offended the 
neo t e r o i p e r s o n a l l y and n a t i o n a l i s t i c a l l y ; f o r there had been close 
r e l a t i o n s between Gortyn and Macedon, as the extant t r e a t y between 
Gortyn and Demetrius I I shows c l e a r l y . T h i s may have been made by 
ne o t e r o i during an e a r l i e r period of power, or by the presbyteroi 
at a time before the idea of the dual Gortyno/Cnossian hegemony became 
p r a c t i c a b l e . But during Doson's r e i g n the Macedonian a l l i a n c e must 
have been abandoned, and a l l i a n c e made w i t h Cnossos and her a n t i -
Macedonian t r a d i t i o n s . 
When the n e o t e r o i were driven out, they had a ready-made grievance 
t o set before P h i l i p . Macedonian i n t e r e s t s were now threatened by the 
predominance of the p r e s b y t e r o i i n Gortyn; and now t h a t war w i t h 
A e t o l i a v/as common t o Macedonian i n t e r e s t s both i n Greece and i n Crete, 
the n e o t e r o i had a strong argument. They seem t o have gained Aratus' 
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support; and t h i s w i l l help t o account both f o r P h i l i p ' s undertaking 
t o help those v / i l l i n g t o support him i n Crete, and f o r the 200 
Achaeans i n the contingent from the symmachy. 
Philopoemen's p o s i t i o n i n t h i s i s not altogether clear. I t may 
be t h a t he was simply one of the 200 Achaeans; or he may have gone 
out w i t h the support of Antigonus or P h i l i p as an agent provocateur. 
I f t h i s l a t t e r v/ere the case, the secrecy which Polybius seems to 
have observed over h i s v i s i t t o Crete would be more e a s i l y explained: 
there could be nothing disreputable about membership of an a l l i e d 
contingent - although, on the other hand, there was probably l i t t l e 
spectacular about i t , which would deserve special mention. Further 
supporting t h i s view i s the l e n g t h of h i s stay i n Crete - a t l e a s t 
u n t i l 211 - i n an i s l a n d now dominated by P h i l i p and P h i l i p ' s f r i e n d s . 
Philopoemen must therefore have fought on the r i g h t side i n the War of 
L y t t u s ; f o r otherwise h i s p o s i t i o n i n Crete would have been i n t o l e r a b l e 
a f t e r i t . He must have supported the n e o t e r o i , f o r h i s r e t u r n t o Crete 
i n 200 i s at the s p e c i f i c request of the Gortynians; he must have 
supported the growth of P h i l i p ' s influence, f o r on his r e t u r n t o Achaea 
he was immediately elected t o the federal hipparchy i n a year when 
Cycliadas, the leader of the Macedonian party, was strategos. He 
probably therefore took some p a r t i n organising the appointment of 
P h i l i p t o h i s pr o s t a s i a . A close personal connection w i t h Macedonian 
i n t e r e s t s explains s a t i s f a c t o r i l y Philopoemen's prolonged residence i n 
Crete a f t e r the c r i s i s of the War of L y t t u s liad passed. This had 
happened by 219, f o r i t was then possible f o r the Polyrrhenians and 
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t h e i r a l l i e s t o send help t o P h i l i p and the Achaeans i n Greece.'^'^ 
This recovery on the p a r t of the f e d e r a l f a c t i o n i n Crete suggests 
t h a t the force from the symmachy yas able t o be withdrawn, thus 
throwing Philopoemen's s o l i t a r y p o s i t i o n i n t o r e l i e f . A l l f a c t o r s 
seem t o p o i n t t o a close r e l a t i o n s h i p between P h i l i p and Philopoemen 
during Philopoemen's f i r s t p e r i o d i n Crete. 
Despite t h i s close r e l a t i o n s h i p , which we have demonstrated, 
P l u t a r c h wrote t h a t Philopoemen refused co-operation w i t h Antigonus 
i n 222. This does not mean tha.t our analysis of Philopoemen's r e l a t i o n -
ship w i t h P h i l i p i s necessarily wrong. Plutarch took what he found, i n 
Polybius, and t h i s can only have represented Philopoemen's public 
statement. When Polybius vjrote his H i s t o r i e s , he could not admit t h a t 
Philopoemen had ever favoured Macedon, f o r t h i s would have seemed t o 
be simply confirming h i s anti-Roman r e p u t a t i o n , which Polybius was a t 
pains t o deny. Even i n 222 Philopoemen cannot have desired - f o r 
d i f f e r e n t reasons - t o become known as a Macedonian h i r e l i n g . I f he 
was t o have any hopes of a p o l i t i c a l career i n Achaea, he had t o 
maintain an appearance of independence from Macedon. Therefore h i s 
p u b l i c r e f u s a l t o co-operate v j i t h Antigonus a f t e r S e l l a s i a . 
But t h i s d i d not mean t h a t he was de facto p r o h i b i t e d from 
accepting Antigonus' o f f e r . A p u b l i c denial only meant the absence 
of p u b l i c co-operation: nothing prevented Philopoemen from representing 
Macedonian i n t e r e s t s i n Crete u n o f f i c i a l l y and i n f o r m a l l y . I n t h i s 
way he v/ould preserve h i s p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n i n Achaea, while at the 
same time he gained personal b e n e f i t s d i s c r e e t l y from h i s de f a c t o 
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acceptance of the o f f e r . He v/as not abandoning Achaea, f o r Achaean 
i n t e r e s t was as c l o s e l y i n v o lved as Macedonian i n defeating Aetolian 
in f l u e n c e i n Crete, His f i r s t period of Cretan a c t i v i t y could 
th e r e f o r e be regarded as p a t r i o t i c s e r v i c e , as long as the Macedonian 
influence v/as kept out of s i g h t . This explanation of Philopoeraen's 
p u b l i c r e j e c t i o n of Antigonus' o f f e r also suggests an explanation of 
the precise nature of the o f f e r . We have argued t h a t the r e j e c t i o n 
was only a p u b l i c demonstration of Achaean s o l i d a r i t y , which d i d not 
a f f e c t the de.facto c o l l a b o r a t i o n . This suggests t h a t the o r i g i n a l 
o f f e r was of v/hat Philopoemen a c t u a l l y undertook - service i n Crete, 
The d i f f e r e n c e between the plan and the r e s u l t was t h a t Antigonus 
had probably d i e d before Philopoeraen went out, and P h i l i p was the 
executant of the scheme. I t i s reasonable t o assume t h a t P h i l i p at 
f i r s t simply continued Boson's p o l i c y , as the Cretan plan f i t t e d w e l l 
w i t h the development of A e t o l i a n h o s t i l i t y t o Macedon. This added 
more t r u t h t o Philopoemen's s o p h i s t i c a l statement, recorded by P l u t a r c h , 
t h a t he had r e j e c t e d Antigonus' o f f e r . I t was t r u e , i n a sense, 
because he had i n f a c t r e j e c t e d i t p u b l i c l y ; i t was t r u e , i n another 
sense, because i t was, i n the event, P h i l i p who was served by 
Philopoemen. 
I I 
When Nabis came t o power i n Sparta a f t e r the death of Machanidas 
i n 207, he founded h i s p o s i t i o n on mercenary help. I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h i s 
came- from a l l i a n c e s w i t h Cretan c i t i e s . The a l l i a n c e s became so close 
t h a t Nabis came i n t o c o n t r o l of some of the Cretan c i t i e s . " ^ ^ I n 20^ 
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he was strong enough t o s t a r t attacks on Achaea, which continued f o r 
some years i n a desultory fashion. I n 200 Philopoemen held a success-
^'^1 s t r a t e g i a , during which he made some attempt t o take the war t o 
the enemy, and took the f i r s t steps t o g-uide the Achaean League t o 
the a l l i a n c e v;ith Rome. A f t e r t h i s s t r a t e g i a Philopoemen suffered 
defeat at the e l e c t i o n s and returned t o Crete, where he stayed u n t i l 
19^. One reason f o r h i s l e a v i n g Achaea i s clear: the e l e c t i o n defeat 
s p e l l e d danger, and t h i s i s discussed i n d e t a i l elsev/here."''^ The 
reason f o r h i s prolonged absence, a f t e r h i s supporter. Aristaenus 
gained power i n Achaea, comparatively soon a f t e r h i s departure, i s • 
less c l e a r . But i t seems l i k e l y that i t was a reason of p o l i c y which 
kept Philopoemen i n Crete, although at the time of h i s departure he 
17 
was simply making a v i r t u e of necessity. 
The f i r s t f a c t t o consider i s th a t Philopoemen went t o Crete i n 
l8 
200 at the express wish and i n v i t a t i o n of the Gortynians. From our 
analysis of h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h Gortyn during the V/ar of L y t t u s , i t i s 
cl e a r t h a t t h i s i n v i t a t i o n must have been issued by the neot e r o i , who 
had been i n povrer at l e a s t since the establishment of P h i l i p ' s 
p r o s t a s i a . He must the r e f o r e have been involved i n f i g h t i n g against 
the enemies of the n e o t e r o i . Nabis' p o s i t i o n i n Crete may be relev a n t 
t o t h i s . I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o trace any c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s between Sparta 
and any i n d i v i d u a l Cretan c i t y a t t h i s time; but there are some 
s i g n i f i c a n t i n d i c a t i o n s . A f t e r 200 - while Philopoemen was i n Crete -
] 9 
a war was c a r r i e d on between Gortyn and Cnossos. This i s c l e a r l y , 
i n some sense, a co n t i n u a t i o n of the Cnossian struggle f o r power i n 
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Crete, ii/hich had r e s u l t e d i n the War of Ly t t u s . But i n the new 
condit i o n s of the time, we should expect t o f i n d , i f there i s any 
p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i n Philopoemen's presence, Nabis' power 
centred on Cnossos or one of her a l l i e s . The Achaean h o s t i l i t y of 
200 towards Sparta would then be mirrored i n the Cretan a l l i a n c e s , 
as was the Achaeo/Macedonian h o s t i l i t y t o Ae t o l i a i n 220; and 
Philopoemen would provide the l i n l c . 
The i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t t h i s may i n f a c t have happened are not, 
at f i r s t s i g h t , of great relevance. I n 272 Areus I I of Sparta served 
i n Crete under the Gortynians. I t also seems l i k e l y t h a t a t the time 
of the Chremonidean Vfer the p o s i t i o n was reversed, and Sparta was 
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helped by Gortyn. These items seem t o poi n t i n the wrong d i r e c t i o n ; 
but i n 272 and l a t e r , the Gortynian party which had the f r i e n d s h i p of 
Sparta was probably t h a t which, by the time of the War of L y t t u s , was 
known as the p r e s b y t e r o i . At that time they were i n close r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h Cnossos, co-operating i n the attempt t o e s t a b l i s h the dual 
hegemony. A f t e r P h i l i p ' s i n t e r v e n t i o n , the neoteroi had become the 
dominajit p a r t y i n Gortyn; and although there seems t o have been 
general peace i n the i s l a n d a f t e r the War of L y t t u s , we have already 
noted t h a t the h o s t i l i t y betv/een Gortyn ( n e o t e r o i ) , and Cnossos (and 
presumably Gortynian p r e s b y t e r o i i n e x i l e ) , broke out again at the 
time of Philopoemen's v i s i t t o Crete i n 200. Nabis was probably of 
21 
the r o y a l Spartan blood; but i n any case, as k i n g of Sparta he 
v/ould take up t r a d i t i o n a l Spartan connections, which i n the changed 
circumstances involved an a l l i a n c e w i t h Cnossos. This i s what we 
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should n a t u r a l l y expect of a Spartan r u l e r l o o k i n g f o r support i n 
Crete; and Homolle has ind.ependently attempted t o demonstrate t h i s 
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connection. He suggests t h a t the i n s c r i p t i o n s IG XI 4, 716 (= D i t t . 
S y l l . , 58^) and 719 should be read closely together. This then 
suggests a connection between Nabis and Cnossos a t t h i s time. I t 
would be rash t o be as sure as van E f f e n t e r r e t h a t Homolle's demonstr-
a t i o n shows any c e r t a i n t y i n t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p - 'les Cnossiens sont 
sans doute parmi l e s amis de Nabis''^^ - but i t does suggest the same 
conclusion as the e a r l i e r evidence. 
There are other i n d i c a t i o n s , which suggest a close r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between Achaea and Gortyn on the one hand, and between Nabis and 
Cnossos on the other. I n the circumstances of the war which was 
going on i n Crete between Cnossos and Gortyn u n t i l some time before 
189,^'^ v/e should consider the Mycenaean proxeny decree f o r Protiraus 
25 
of Gortyn. This Protimus had been responsible f o r an attempt t o 
save Mycenaean epheboi v;ho had been taken t o Sparta by Nabis - perhaps 
26 
among the 2,000 Argives taken t o Sparta by Nabis i n 195, perhaps a t 
some other time during the Spartan domination of the A r g o l i d a f t e r 198. 
The decree must have been set up a f t e r the epheboi had returned - f o r 
i t could hardly have been erected while Nabis was s t i l l i n c o n t r o l o f 
the tovm. The type of r e l a t i o n s h i p enjoyed w i t h Sparta during Nabis' 
comparatively b r i e f p e r i o d of c o n t r o l i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the decree i n 
favour of Daiiiocleidas the Spartan, which renews [tote Aaxe6ai.fiovtot<;. 
T j a v xoivavtav ay[<iov(«)w, Sv] a xc^ aa -n'S-qTi, , V/e can scarcely imagine 
t h i s being passed v o l u n t a r i l y , when the Spartans were l i k e l y t o take 
- / f l -
a i l the epheboi they could l a y t h e i r hands on, as Protimus' almost 
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contemporary decree shows. The f r i e n d l i n e s s of a Gortynian t o the 
epheboi of an Achaean town, and i t s r e c o g n i t i o n by honorary decree, 
suggest again the p u b l i c f r i e n d s h i p of Gortyn f o r Achaea, which 
included mutual assistance, and the h o s t i l i t y t o Nabis v/hich t h i s 
i m p l i e d . The form of the service which Protimus rendered i s not 
c l e a r ; nor whether i t \iras successful. But the demonstration of mutual 
goodv/ill i s c l e a r . 
A l a t e r example of the same d i s p o s i t i o n on the p a r t of Gortyn 
may be seen i n the presence of Telemnastus of Gortyn w i t h 500 
'Cretans' as an important f i g u r e i n Philopoemen's campaign of 192 
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against Nabis. The close personal connection of Philopoemen v/ith 
Gortyn and the importance of the part Telemnastus played i n t h i s 
ex]pedition s t r o n g l y suggest a personal connection between Telemnastus 
and Philopoemen. They also imply a p u b l i c connection between Achaea 
and Gortyn, f o r Polybius mentions t h a t Telemnastus' e x p l o i t s were 
remembered almost 40 years l a t e r , i n 153» when his son was Cretan 
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ambassador t o Achaea. The f r i e n d l y connections between Gortyn and 
Achaea seem demonstrated; but they also imply o f f i c i a l Gortynian 
h o s t i l i t y t o Nabis. This, i n view of Nabis' known i n t e r e s t s and 
i n t e r f e r e n c e i n Crete, and i n the l i g h t of the current h o s t i l i t y 
between Gortyn and Cnossos, i n d i c a t e s a f r i e n d s h i p between Cnossos 
and Nabis, and supports what the other evidence has independently 
suggested. 
I n the l i g h t of t h i s evidence, s t r o n g l y suggesting f r i e n d l y 
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r e l a t i o n s betv/een Gortyn and Achaea, and Nabis and Cnossos (and 
other Cretan c i t i e s connected w i t h Gnossos), we can consider i t t o 
be of the greatest p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t Philopoemen's otherwise unnecess-
a r i l y long p e r i o d i n Crete from 20O t o 194 was d i r e c t e d against the 
p o s i t i o n which Nabis had b u i l t up f o r himself i n the i s l a n d . His 
f i g h t i n g i n the war between Gortyn and Cnossos vjas d i r e c t l y p a r a l l e l 
w i t h the Achaean \irar e f f o r t i n Peloponnese against Nabis. 
Having established t h i s w i t h some c e r t a i n t y , we can t u r n t o 
other evidence, which may f i t i n t o t h i s p a t t e r n of r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
betvreen the states of Crete and Greece. There i s some evidence which 
p o i n t s t o Polyrrhenia's having close r e l a t i o n s w i t h Sparta. I n the 
middle of the t h i r d century, the Polyrrhenians set up a s t e l e t o 
Areus I I of S p a r t a , T h i s i n d i c a t e s t h a t they v/ere anti-Macedonian 
a t the time. As we have already noticed, Areus had a close connection 
w i t h Gortyn, v;hich Nabis seems t o have taken up v/ith.the p r e s b y t e r o i . 
P o l y r r h e n i a gained the support of the Gortynian n e o t e r o i when leading 
the r e v o l t from the Gortyno/Cnossian dualism. With t h i s n a t u r a l l y 
went the support of P h i l i p ; and the body of opinion v;hich had l e d 
the r e v o l t and had enjoyed the help of P h i l i p ' s symmachy i n 220 
r e p l i e d by t a k i n g the lead i n organising the Cretan force which was 
sent t o Greece i n 219o^'^ This change from the e a r l i e r anti-Macedonian 
p o l i c y probably represents a change i n the dominant p o l i t i c a l group i n 
Poly r r h e n i a . But the change d i d not l a s t long. By the time of the 
Kr e t i k o s Polemos, which began i n 204, Polyrrhenia seems t o have again 
changed sides. I n the se r i e s of c i t y decrees f o r the a s y l i a of Teos, 
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the Macedonian Perdiccas does not appear i n the decree of 
Polyrrhenia. Holleaux, i n h i s i l l u m i n a t i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of these 
decrees, has understood t h i s t o mean t h a t the Polyrrhenians now 
sympathised w i t h Rhodes i n the war which she was f i g h t i n g w i t h 
P h i l i p . I f Holleaux i s r i g h t i n t h i s , the Polyrrhenians would seem 
t o be r e v e r t i n g t o t h e i r mid-century a t t i t u d e of anti-Macedonianism. 
At the e a r l i e r time, anti-Macedonianism was synonymous w i t h f r i e n d -
ship w i t h Sparta. I f the a t t i t u d e was repeated - and i t would no 
doubt receive adequate encouragement from Nabis - we may have 
c 
i d e n t i f i e d a second a l l y f o r Nabis i n Crete. However, t h i s argument 
depends too much on the correctness of Holleaux' persuasive, but 
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u n c e r t a i n , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the documents to i n s i s t on i t s v a l i d i t y , 
V/e have already mentioned the K r e t i k o s Polemos, which s t a r t e d i n 
20^1-: more must now be s a i d . I t has been discovered by scholars from 
two imprecise references i n Polybius, one concerning a mission of 
ambassadors who were sent by P h i l i p t o Crete t o s t i r up war against 
the Ehodians; the other concerning the increase of Nabis' influence 
i n Crete. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h i s , undated epigraphic evidence e x i s t s , 
some of which was f i r s t r e f e r r e d to t h i s war by Herzog, and a l l of 
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which has been o f t e n worked over since. But despite the work of 
the scholars, the war, i n course and o r i g i n , remains obscure. The 
epigraphic evidence can arguably be i n t e r p r e t e d as r e f e r r i n g t o the 
war of 167 between Crete and Shodes; and although Holleaux has put 
forward a very strong case f o r 20^ , which we accept here, t h i s i s not 
abs o l u t e l y c e r t a i n . 
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The passages of Polybius show us t h i s much: t h a t P h i l i p was 
i n t e n d i n g t o pursue h i s antagonism towards the Ehodians i n Crete at 
t h i s time. Vie have already seen that some 10 years previously he 
had e s t a b l i s h e d a p r o s t a s i a i n Crete; and i t seems l i k e l y t h a t he 
had maintained an i n t e r e s t i n the a f f a i r s of the koinon, and w i t h 
t h i s , i n the Gortynian n e o t e r o i . As f a r as Nabis i s concerned, the 
reference i n Polybius does not seem t o i n d i c a t e h i s undertaking a 
f u l l - s c a l e v;ar: Polybius simply describes him as supporting the 
p i r a t e s . As we have already shown, Nabis' i n t e r e s t s should have been 
on the side of Cnossos; and P h i l i p ' s , we should expect t o f i n d on 
the side of Gortyn and the koinon. I n any case, P h i l i p ' s undertaking 
i n Crete was only a diversionary move i n h i s main struggle against 
Rhodes; t h a t h i s i n t e r v e n t i o n r a p i d l y waned seems clear from the 
Gortynians' request t o Philopoemen,^^ at the time when P h i l i p ' s 
occupation elsewhere must have l e f t the koinon open t o a s p l i t l e d 
by Cnossos; and of course, Philopoemen's i n t e r e s t s were opposed t o 
Nabis'. The issues involved i n the Kretikos Polemos c l e a r l y cannot 
have been as c l e a r - c u t as t o have u n i t e d P h i l i p , Nabis, and 'the 
Cretans' - whatever t h i s may mean i n t h i s context - as Guarducci 
t h i n k s . 
As we have already pointed out, an a l l i a n c e between P h i l i p and 
Nabis a t t h i s time would be s u r p r i s i n g : i t seems much more l i k e l y 
t h a t there would be a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s i n Crete between Nabis 
and P h i l i p , r a t h e r than a c t i v e co-operation. For v/e must also 
remember the s i t u a t i o n i n Peloponnese. P h i l i p was s t i l l an a l l y of 
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Acliaea, and as l a t e as 200 he offered, however i n s i n c e r e l y , t o help 
the Achaeans i n p u t t i n g an end to the t r o u b l e from Nabis, v/hich 
Achaea had now been s u f f e r i n g f o r f i v e years. Without s o l i d 
evidence t o the c o n t r a r y , we should conclude t h a t no f r i e n d l y 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h Nabis had ever existed f o r P h i l i p . The agreement 
reached i n 198/7 over Argos cannot be used t o show any community of 
i n t e r e s t s as e a r l y as the Cretan war; f o r t h i s was only a stop-gap 
arrangement t o s p i t e the Achaeans, when they had j o i n e d the Roman 
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a l l i e s against him. But there i s some evidence t h a t P h i l i p and 
Nabis v/ere i n f a c t opposed i n the Cretan war; and t h i s i s connected 
w i t h the Ehodian p o s i t i o n i n Crete. By t r a d i t i o n , Cnossos was 
f r i e n d l y w i t h Rhodes. She had sent help i n 305 , v;hen the i s l a n d was 
blockaded by Demetrius; i n the V/ar of Lyt t u s Rhodes had sent help 
t o Cnossos; and at the time of the Kretikos Polemos f r i e n d l y 
r e l a t i o n s between Gnossos and Rhodes probably s t i l l subsisted. V/e 
have suggested t h a t Cnossos was one of Nabis' sources of power i n 
Crete: i f t h e r e f o r e we take together t h i s common fr i e n d s h i p of Rhodes 
and Nabis f o r Gnossos at the time of the Kretikos Polemos, i t i s 
clea r t h a t there i s no p o s s i b i l i t y of an a l l i a n c e between P h i l i p and 
Nabis f o r the Cretan war. 
I t seems clear therefore that i t i s i n c o r r e c t t o speak of 
•The Cretans' a t t h i s time as i f they acted as one body - t h i s 
despite the existence of the koinon. The i s l a n d v;as s p l i t i n t o a t 
l e a s t two camps; and one of the f a c t o r s which conditioned the s p l i t 
was the f r i e n d s h i p of Nabis or P h i l i p . This aspect of the otherwise 
i n t e r n a l s p l i t was probably emphasised a f t e r the b a t t l e of Chios, 
when P h i l i p ' s i n t e r e s t vras f o r c i b l y s h i f t e d from the Aegean, and 
h i s a b i l i t y t o create a balance of power i n Crete destroyed. I t i s 
scarcely s u r p r i s i n g t o f i n d Cnossos renewing her anti-Macedonian 
p o l i c i e s as soon as Ehodian support was a v a i l a b l e , f o r Cnossos can 
only have been brought tO' recognise P h i l i p ' s p r o s t a s i a a f t e r the 
War of L y t t u s u n w i l l i n g l y . The support o f f e r e d by Rhodes and the 
eagerness of Nabis t o gain influence i n the i s l a n d must have 
appeared a p r o v i d e n t i a l combination of circumstances, of which they 
took f u l l advantage. Gortyn and the koinon on the other hand were 
le s s f o r t u n a t e i n the enthusiasm of t h e i r f o r e i g n champion. P h i l i p ' s 
i n t e r e s t i n the Aegean was soon cut s h o r t , and they had t o look t o 
Achaea and Philopoemen, who had served them adequately i n his f i r s t 
p e r i o d of Gortynian s e r v i c e . 
A circumstance which may be connected w i t h t h i s i n v i t a t i o n i s 
the presence of Didascalondas the Cretan among the Achaean forces 
4l 
while Philopoeraen was s t i l l strategos i n 200 , Didascalondas 
accorapan^ied Philopoeraen i n h i s attack on Nabis' mercenaries at 
Pallene, and was important enough t o be entrusted w i t h the command 
of p a r t of the Achaean l e v y . This seems to mark him out as being 
more than simply a mercenary captain - although there were Cretan 
mercenaries i n Achaea i n 200 , as a dated i n s c r i p t i o n from Mantinea 
shows.^'"^ I t i s unfortunate t h a t the man's home c i t y cannot be 
discovered; but we can conclude w i t h some c e r t a i n t y t h a t i t was 
not Cnossos or one of the Cnossian a l l i e s . This leads t o the 
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suggestion t h a t he may have been from the koinon. The koinon was 
c o n t r o l l e d a t t h i s time by the Macedonian party, probably s t i l l l e d 
by the Gortynian n e o t e r o i , and had supported P h i l i p as long as 
P h i l i p supported i t . We have argued t h a t i t was threatened by a 
secession movement supported by Sparta and Rhodes during the Kretikos 
Polemos. I t would therefore be e n t i r e l y n a t u r a l t o f i n d a represent-
a t i v e of the koinon i n Achaea, i n the f i r s t instance helping the 
Achaeans i n t h e i r p a r a l l e l struggle against Nabis; but r e a l l y hoping 
t o secure some help f o r the Cretan sector of the v/ar. I t therefore 
seems possible t h a t Didascalondas v/as t h e i r representative; and t h a t 
the Cretan troops of the i n s c r i p t i o n were the koinon's token of good 
f a i t h t o t h e i r Achaean a l l i e s . He may i n f a c t have been a Qortynian 
who already had a close l i n k w i t h Philopoeraen; but we have no means 
of showing t h i s . 
There i s no other i n f o r m a t i o n which sheds any f u r t h e r l i g h t on 
r e l a t i o n s between Achaea and the c i t i e s of Crete; but some events 
should be r e l a t e d i n the l i g h t of what we have shown t o be the 
probable r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Cretan p o l i t i c s . I n 197» s h o r t l y before 
the campaign of Gynoscephalae, 300 Gortynians j o i n e d ilamininus under 
Zj.3 
the command of Gydas. I t has been argued by De Sanctis t h a t these 
were simply p a r t of the 6OO Cretans who were handed over t o Plamininus 
by Nabis i n the sp r i n g , a f t e r the negotiations at Mycenae. But 
from what \\ie have seen of r e l a t i o n s between Peloponnese and Crete 
at t h i s time, i t seems h i g h l y u n l i k e l y t h a t Gortynians would seek 
service w i t h Nabis (implying w i l l i n g n e s s t o serve against Achaea), 
- 48 -
when Philopoemen v/as h e l p i n g them t o f i g h t o f f the t h r e a t of Nabis' 
i n f l u e n c e i n Crete; and on the other hand, i t i s u n l i k e l y that Nabis 
would use mercenaries v/hose l o y a l t y was necessarily i n doubt. But, 
i n f a c t , there i s a much more compelling reason f o r t h i n k i n g t h a t 
these troops were not Nabis' ex-mercenaries. For Livy expressly 
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s t a t e s t h a t these troops were handed over a t once - d a t i s ; and we 
have every reason t o believe t h a t t h i s must be taken l i t e r a l l y , f o r 
these very troops were l a r g e l y responsible f o r showing Philocles a t 
Cor i n t h t h a t Nabis had already changed h i s alleg i a n c e . The 500 
Gortynians v/ho j o i n e d Flamininus i n P h t h i o t i s cannot therefore have 
been p a r t of Nabis' 600 Cretans. 
I n t h i s case the question must be asked: why d i d these Gortynisjis 
come t o j o i n the a l l i e d army? I t i s most u n l i k e l y t h a t they were 
mercenaries h i r e d by Flamininus. The answer may l i e i n Achaea. V/e 
s h a l l see t h a t there was no es s e n t i a l disagreement on p o l i c y between 
Philopoemen and .Aristaenus a t t h i s time; and there i s no reason to 
doubt t h a t Philopoemen f u l l y approved the Achaean agreement w i t h Rome 
i n 198 . I t i s therefore open t o suggestion t h a t Gortyn - having 
turned anti-Macedonian a f t e r being abandoned by P h i l i p - sent these 
troops on the advice of Philopoemen, who was a c t i n g i n co-operation 
w i t h Aristaenus and Ni c o s t r a t u s . I t seems too much of a coincidence 
f o r the Gortynians independently t o have decided t o send these troops 
t o j o i n Rome, j u s t a t the time v;hen Philopoemen might have been 
expected t o urge t h i s p o l i c y upon them, and when t h e i r main Greek 
a l l i e s , the Achaeans, had j u s t pronounced t h e i r readiness t o accept 
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a t r e a t y of a l l i a n c e w i t h Rome. I t may be going too f a r t o suggest 
t h a t they were meant as a s u b s t i t u t e f o r the Achaean troops, which 
were not a v a i l a b l e t o j o i n the a l l i e d array i n the n o r t h ; but i t does 
seem cle a r t h a t there v/as some Achaean influence a t work; and t h i s 
can perhaps be narrowed down t o Philopoemen. 
We have already mentioned the presence of Telemnastus of Gortyn 
on Philopoemen's expedition of 192 against Nabis. This demonstrates 
c l e a r l y enough the continuance of the public and p r i v a t e connections 
between Philopoemen and Achaea on the one hand, and Gortyn on the 
other. But why d i d Philopoemen only r e t u r n t o Achaea i n 194 , when he 
had been absent i n Crete during some of the most momentous events i n 
Achaean h i s t o r y ? The c o n t i n u i t y of f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s f o r b i d s us t o 
conclude t h a t he l e f t Crete while he was s t i l l needed. The i m p l i c a t i o n 
i s t h e r e f o r e t h a t the war between the Gortynians and Cnossians, vihich 
he had gone t o Crete t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n , v;as no longer continuing. We 
know t h a t i t had c e r t a i n l y ended i n I89, as the two c i t i e s j o i n e d 
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forces i n t h a t year t o f i g h t Cydonia - and t h i s suggests a p r i o r i 
t h a t some time had elapsed since the cessation of a c t i v e h o s t i l i t i e s 
between the tv/o c i t i e s . We should perhaps look f o r the answer i n 
Sparta, I f the Cnossians and a l l i e s had r e l i e d as much on Nabis as 
he on them, the t e r m i n a t i o n of h o s t i l i t i e s i n Peloponnese and the 
v i r t u a l n e u t r a l i s a t i o n of Nabis i n 195 would have a severe e f f e c t on 
the war i n Crete» I n p a r t i c u l a r , the s t i p u l a t i o n i n the terms of the 
t r e a t y w i t h Flaraininus t h a t Nabis must give up a l l the c i t i e s he 
c o n t r o l l e d i n Crete, as w e l l as his navy, would d r a s t i c a l l y a l t e r the 
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47 balance of power i n Crete i n favour of Gortyn and the koinon. I n 
these circumstances Cnossos may v/ell have f e l t i n c l i n e d t o make peace 
before i t was forced upon her. This would n a t u r a l l y be soon a f t e r 
Flamininus' settlement of Sparta, therefore l a t e 195 or early 194 -
perhaps v/inter 195/4. This gives Philopoemen s u f f i c i e n t time t o have 
ended h i s commitment i n Crete and returned t o Achaea t o spend a year 
or more r e c r e a t i n g a p o s i t i o n f o r himself, which he used t o secure h i s 
e l e c t i o n as strategos i n autumn 193* We therefore suggest that the 
reason f o r Philopoemen's r e t u r n from Crete i n 194 v/as t h a t the 
p a r a l l e l war i n Crete d i d not continue u n t i l 194 , but reached a 
conclusion by n e g o t i a t i o n as a d i r e c t r e s u l t of the enforced withdrawal 
of Nabis' support from the Cnossian a l l i a n c e . 
The honeymoon period of co-operation between Gortyn and Cnossos 
which followed the peace and i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the j o i n t war against 
Cydonia, d i d not l a s t long. By l84 they were f i g h t i n g each other 
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again. This war does not seem to have been very prolonged, f o r an 
extant decree of the koinon dated t o I 8 3 , records a t r e a t y of a l l i a n c e 
w i t h Euraenes; and at the head of the subscribing c i t i e s appear both 
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Gortyn and Cnossos. This implies t h a t the differences which had 
given r i s e t o the war had been s e t t l e d , and support f o r the koinon 
r e - e s t a b l i s h e d . Philopoemen re t a i n e d h i s close connection v/ith the 
koinon t o the end of h i s l i f e . During h i s l a s t caiiipaign he was 
accompanied by Cretans as well as Thracians and Achaean cavalry.'^'^ 
We have no means of t e l l i n g from which of the c i t i e s of Crete these 
troops came; but as Cnossos and Gortyn were enjoying one of t h e i r 
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periods of co-operation a t t h i s time, i t seems possible t h a t the 
troops were mercenaries from the koinon, and t h a t the Cnossians too 
may have c o n t r i b u t e d men. This circumstance provides an a d d i t i o n a l 
p l a u s i b i l i t y t o the arg-uments of Guarducci, who suggests t h a t the 
epitaph of Tharsymachus, found a t Cnossos, should be seen t o r e f e r 
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t o t h i s war, r a t h e r than some i n t e r n a l struggle i n Crete. I n any 
case, from our p o i n t of view, the presence of the Cretans shows 
c l e a r l y enough t h a t Philopoemen maintained h i s l i n k s vdth Crete 
during the i n t e r v e n i n g years; and s t i l l , as i n h i s e a r l i e r campaigns, 
set considerable s t o r e by the a i d of the Cretans. 
We s h a l l conclude t h i s analysis w i t h a summary of what we have 
argued was the probable course of events i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between 
the c i t i e s of Crete and the Greek mainland from the tirae of 
Philopoeraen's f i r s t v i s i t . I n 221 or 220 , Philopoeraen went t o Crete, 
probably as a p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l with the support of P h i l i p , a f t e r 
p u b l i c l y r e j e c t i n g Antigonus' o f f e r of formal service, or perhaps as 
a member of the Achaean expeditionary force, sent as a r e s u l t of 
Aratus' enthusiasm f o r the symmachy's in t e r f e r e n c e i n Crete. While 
i n Crete, he fought w i t h the c i t i e s opposed t o the dual hegemony of 
Cnossos and Gortyn; and as a r e s u l t came i n t o contact w i t h the 
Gortynian n e o t e r o i . As a representative of P h i l i p ' s i n t e r e s t s i n the 
i s l a n d he remained a f t e r the temporary emergency of the V/ar of Lyttus 
was over; and was present - perhaps even a c t i v e l y organising support 
f o r Macedon - when P h i l i p was granted the p o s i t i o n of prostates by 
koinon. As a r e s u l t of the success of the Macedonian camp i n 
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the war, the n e o t e r o i v/ere r e s t o r e d t o Gortyn; and under t h e i r 
l eadership Gortyn became the dominant influence i n the koinon. 
Philopoeraen was present through a l l t h i s , and must have been ac t i v e 
i n support of the Qortynians as v/ell as P h i l i p , as t h e i r l a t e r i n v i t -
a t i o n t o him suggests. 
We hear nothing more about Crete u n t i l 204 . I n the meanv/hile 
Philopoemen had been using the i n f l u e n c e , which he had gained w i t h 
P h i l i p i n Crete, t o e s t a b l i s h himself i n Achaea. During the Kretikos 
Polemos of the years a f t e r 204, Rhodian influence i n Cnossos on the 
one hand, and P h i l i p ' s i n Gortyn on the other, caused a s p l i t i n the 
koinon, o f which Nabis v/as able to take advantage. He had already 
e s t a b l i s h e d close l i n k s w i t h some Cretan c i t i e s , probably i n c l u d i n g 
Cnossos; and P h i l i p ' s war v/ith the Rhodians seems to have given him 
an o p p o r t u n i t y t o confirm h i s hold. P h i l i p soon began t o lose i n t e r e s t 
i n the Cretan v/ar a f t e r h i s main e f f o r t i n the Aegean had been f r u s t -
r a t e d by the Rhodians' success a t Chios and the t h r e a t of t h e i r union 
w i t h A t t a l u s i n an appeal t o Rome. As a r e s u l t , h i s a t t e n t i o n was 
t o t a l l y d i v e r t e d from Crete, and Gortyn was faced w i t h a secessionist 
movement i n the koinon, being hard--pressed a f t e r l o s i n g even the moral 
support of P h i l i p . Wabis, i n a p a r a l l e l e f f o r t t o h i s undeclared v/ar 
against Achaea i n Peloponnese, continued h i s support f o r Cnossos. The 
Gortynians appealed f o r help t o Philopoemen, the o l d f r i e n d of the 
n e o t e r o i . He h e s i t a t e d only as long as he was i n povi/er i n Achaea: 
v/hen the embarrassment of e l e c t o r a l defeat hung heavily on him, he 
accepted the Gortynian i n v i t a t i o n . He spent the next f i v e years, 
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even a f t e r h i s supporters had recovered t h e i r influence i n Achaea, 
t r y i n g - not very s u c c e s s f u l l y , i t seems, from the effectiveness of 
Nabis' e f f o r t s i n Peloponnese - to break the Cretan source of Nabis' 
power. 
The Cretan war v/as only brought t o a close as a r e s u l t of the 
peace t r e a t y between Nabis and Flamininus, one of the clauses of 
which wa.s t h a t Nabis should give up h i s possessions i n Crete. The 
f i g h t i n g had, i n any case, been sporadic, f o r Gortyn, probably urged 
by Philopoemen, had been able t o send 500 troops t o j o i n Flamininus' 
array i n 1 9 7 , as a demonstration of s o l i d a r i t y f o r the Achaean and 
Roman cause. A f t e r the i n d e c i s i v e conclusion of the war i n Crete, 
Philopoemen returned t o Achaea, from where he kept up his contacts 
w i t h Gortyn, r e g u l a r l y employing Gortynians such as Telemnastus i n 
the Achaean army; and even twelve years a f t e r h i s r e t u r n from Crete, 
at the time of h i s l a s t expedition i n l 8 2 , Cretan troops played an 
important p a r t i n the composition of h i s array. 
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IBMI^I9K^? PATRIOTISM 
I 
xmraec 
I n 211/10 Philopoeraen returned t o Achaea from Crete and v/as 
sd i a t e l y e l e c t e d hipparch of the League f o r 2IO/O9. His 
absence from Achaea had l a s t e d f o r 10 years, and such sudden 
prominence - despite the f a c t t h a t Achaea had ben e f i t | e d from h i s 
v/ork " requires explanation. His colleague i n o f f i c e , the 
.strategos, v/as G y c l i a d a s . I n 199/8 Cycliadas was expelled from 
Achaea f o r being leader of the pro-Macedonian f a c t i o n . ^ I f he 
p e r s i s t e d i n h i s pro-Macedonianism t o the j ) o i n t v/here he allov/ed 
himself t o be e x i l e d f o r i t , i t seems more than l i k e l y t h a t h i s 
as s o c i a t i o n w i t h P h i l i p v/as of long standing, and th a t a t the time 
of h i s s t i ^ t e ^ i a of 2IO/O9 he v/as a s o l i d supporter of the Achaean 
a l l i a n c e v/ith Macedon. Philopoeraen's association i n o f f i c e v/ith 
Cycliadas suggests t h a t he v/as running on the same t i c k e t - the tv/o 
o f f i c i a l s v/ere e l e c t e d a t the same time - and t h a t he therefore 
also represented a pro-Ms.cedonian p o l i c y . I t has already been 
demonstrated v/ith some p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t Philopoeraen had been 
3 
v/orking f o r P h i l i p i n Crete. His e l e c t i o n , together w i t h 
Cycliadas, suggests t h a t t h i s association continued a f t e r h i s 
r e t u r n , and the r a p i d i t y of h is e l e c t i o n probably means t h a t 
P h i l i p ' s i nfluence was a c t i v e l y at v/ork i n promoting the i n t e r e s t s 
of h i s supporters. This support of P h i l i p may allov/ us t o discover 
v/hy Philopoemen returned from Crete a t t h i s time. 
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Achaea had never been strong m i l i t a r i l y . Aratus had managed 
t o achieve a b r i e f p e r i o d of independence by t a k i n g advantage of 
the v/eakness of Macedon under Gonatas and Demetrivis I I , but the 
t h r e a t from Sparta under the a c t i v e Cleomenes demonstrated t h a t 
t h i s apparent independence v/as i l l u s i o n . The i n v i t a t i o n to Doson 
t o save Achaea i n r e t u r n f o r the Acrocorinth set the Achaean 
m i l i t a r y establishriient i n i t s c o r r e c t perspective. T o t a l depend-
ence on Macedon was the only route t o safety i n the long term. The 
b i t t e r n e s s of t h i s was p a r t l y disguised by Aratus by h i s claim t o 
exercise some inf l u e n c e over the young P h i l i p ; but by the tirae of 
h i s death i n 213/12 a l l i l l u s i o n s were shattered. T o t a l depend-
ence on Macedon v/as undisguised, and there seemed l i t t l e a l t e r -
n a t i v e . For Aratus had made no attempt t o keep up the e f f i c i e n c y 
of the Achaean army, and h i s f e l l o v ; sj^rate£oi and hipparchs simply 
follov/ed h i s lead i n t h i s . Polybius describes !Euryleon, the 
si£a.*£££?. °-- 211/10 as o-Tpat'nYOC &ToX(ioc • » • x a l iroXe(aixfic 
Xpeicu; aXXoTptoc . I n another place he castigates the Achaean 
s t r a t e g o i of t h i s time f o r being t o t a l l y ignorant of m i l i t a r y 
requirements. His opinion i s the same about the hipparchs: v/hether 
through sheer i n c a p a c i t y , or b l a t a n t desire t o be popular - w i t h an 
eye on f u t u r e e l e c t i o n s •- the t r a i n i n g and e f f i c i e n c y of the 
cavalry had been almost x^holly neglected. ' Po].ybius may be exag-
g e r a t i n g these d e f i c i e n c i e s i n order t o make Philopoemen's subse-
quent reorganisations contrast more sharply w i t h them; but the 
recent h i s t o r y of the Achaean array - p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Social 
War - goes f a r t o support Polybius. 
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Thanks t o P h i l i p ' s a c t i v i t y , the Achaean inca p a c i t y had not 
yet proved disastjrous. The Romans had been content t o preserve 
t h e i r hold on the s t r a i t s o f Otranto without a c t i v e l y extending the 
v/ar. But 2 1 1 sav/ a major development, v ; i t h the formation of an 
a l l i a n c e v / i t h A e t o l i a , P h i l i p ' s main enemy i n the S o c i a l War. This 
was q u i c k l y followed by a l l i a n c e s v/ith Sparta, E l i s and Messene, 
thus r e c r e a t i n g the alignment of the Social V/ar, v / i t h the addi t -
i o n a l hazard of Roman intervention.'^ The seriousness of t h i s 
l a t t e r vi/as f u r t h e r emphasised by the replacement of Laevinus w i t h 
P. S u l p i c i u s Galba Maxiraus. Galba held the consulship as his f i r s t 
curule o f f i c e i n 2 1 1 : he v/as c l e a r l y a man w i t h i n f l . u e n t i a l 
support, and h i s appointment t o Greece demonstrates the newly 
awakening i n t e r e s t i n the Macedonian V/ar of an important section of 
the Senate.^ These developments n a t u r a l l y a f f e c t e d P h i l i p ' s viev/ 
of the v/ar. Looking a t the s i t u a t i o n as a whole, the p a r a l l e l w i t h 
the S o c i a l V/ar alignment was embarrassingly close; and i f devel-
opments occiirred i n the same way, he would f i n d himself more and 
more confined t o f i g h t i n g i n the north. 
For Achaea the danger from the nev/ s i t u a t i o n v/as obvious. 
The combined h o s t i l i t y of Sparta, E l i s , Messenia and A e t o l i a could 
not be faced v / i t h any confidence without P h i l i p ' s continued help. 
Just at t h i s c r i t i c a l moment Philopoemen and Cycliadas v/ere 
elected t o the highest f e d e r a l o f f i c e s . V/e have already shov/n 
t h e i r Macedonian connections, and suggested t h a t P h i l i p ' s 
i nfluence must have helped them i n the e l e c t i o n s . This 
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examination of the circumstances of Acliaea at t h i s time does 
nothing but support our e a r l i e r conclusion. The c r i s i s i n which 
they were elected v/a.s e s s e n t i a l l y m i l i t a r y . Yet even 10 years 
l a t e r Gycliadas had not managed to b u i l d himself a r e p u t a t i o n as 
a m i l i t a r y l e a d e r . H i s Macedonian connections are s u f f i c i e n t to 
ex p l a i n his" e l e c t i o n . But the m i l i t a r y c r i s i s had t o be met; and 
Philopoemen spent the year of h i s hipparchy reorganising the 
Achaean cavalry, which took Achaea half-way t o l o c a l s e l f - s u f f i c -
iency. This suggests t h a t Philopoemen v/as intended, both by P h i l i p 
and the Achaean e l e c t o r s , t o carry out t h i s r eorganisation. And 
v/e can go f u r t h e r : Philopoemen's r e t u r n from Crete at t h i s c r i t i c a l 
time i s too convenient f o r P h i l i p and Achaea f o r i t t o ha.ve been 
v/holly c o i n c i d e n t a l . Therefore he must have been asked to come 
back t o Achaea by P h i l i p and the Achaeans, v;ho both required Achaea 
t o gain a nev; m i l i t a r y e f f i c i e n c y i n face of the new danger. The 
reason v/hy the r e o r g a n i s a t i o n v/as s t a r t e d w i t h the cavalry i s not 
al t o g e t h e r c l e a r , but can be suggested. Had i t been decided t h a t 
the i n f a n t r y should f i r s t receive a t t e n t i o n , the organiser, 
Philopoemen, would have lis.d t o be sj;2ia.tegos. For a man who had 
never held f e d e r a l o f f i c e and who had.only r e c e n t l y returned t o 
Achaea a f t e r a lOryear absence, the steAte£D^a v/as an i n v i d i o u s l y 
l i i g h o f f i c e ; and P h i l i p may well have he s i t a t e d before r i s k i n g the 
loss of sympathy among h i s Achaean supporters which a sta^ajL^iiiis 
Philopoeraen i n t h i s year would involve. The hipparchy was less 
p r e s t i g i o u s , and liad the advantage f o r P h i l i p of making i t poss-
i b l e f o r him t o t e s t Philopoeraen's l o y a l t y and effectiveness w i t h 
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the cavalry before he came t o the i n f a n t r y coiiimeaid; and on the 
other hand, Philopoemen v/ould have an opportunity of f i n d i n g h i s 
place i n f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s through the minor o f f i c e . 
I t i s easy enough t o see v/hy P h i l i p and the Achaeans should 
support Philopoemen's e l e c t i o n a.s hipparch. I t i s less easy t o 
see WTf Philopoemen should accept the i n v i t a t i o n t o r e t u r n t o 
Achaea, He had been av/ay f o r 10 years, v/as out of touch w i t h 
f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s ~ i n v/hich he had never played any p a r t - and had 
no doubt made h i s mercenary service, f i n a n c i a l l y v/orthwhile, both 
f o r himself.and probably f o r Achaea, i n the t r a d i t i o n of upper 
class c o n d o t t i e r i . This l a s t p o i n t i s important, f o r large 
qua,ntities of money v/ould be necessary i f a v/holesale re-equipment 
of the Achaean forces v/as going to be undertaken: the previous 
strate£0± and hipparchs had reduced morale to the poi n t v/here 
money v/ould not be forthcoming from i n d i v i d u a l s o l d i e r s , v/ho d i d 
not take t h e i r part-time s o l d i e r i n g s u f f i c i e n t l y s e r i o u s l y . 
Hacedon v/as not i n any p o s i t i o n to finance Achaea, v/ith a f u l l -
scale v/ar on her hands, and there i s no evidence t h a t the Achaean 
f e d e r a l t reasury ha.d money t o spare from normal sources. I f 
Philopoemen returned and undertook the task of re-organising the 
army, he vmst have expected t o have t o spend much of his earnings 
of h i s mercenary service on t h i s - and Plutarch perhaps r e f e r s t o 
t h i s : ta fisv o^v ex TWV cfTpa-cetoSv TrpocrcovTa xaTavdXioxev elc 
o 
XtrrrovQ xal ^irXa x a l XWOTSIC atxjJta-Xooxoov = . . He must have a n t i -
c i p a t e d s u b s t a n t i a l p o l i t i c a l rev/ards f o r t h i s . Up t o a p o i n t , 
p o l i t i c a l rev/ards could be promised i n advance. He could be 
promised Macedonian s u p p o r t , and t h a t o f t h e Macedonian p a r t y 
l e a d e r i n Achaea, f o r t h e f i r s t s tages o f h i s f e d e r a l career -
the h i p p a r c h y and t h e sj^ate£±a. But h i s c o n t i n u e d p o l i t i c a l 
success v;ould depend on h i s own e f f o r t s and p o p u l a r i t y as a p o l i t -
i c i a n - once the immediate work v/as accomplished, h i s s u p p o r t e r s 
c o u l d a f f o r d t o abandon him, s h o u l d t h i s become d e s i r a b l e . I t was, 
no doubt, p l e a s a n t t o serve h i s home as l e a d e r i n a c r i s i s ; and i n 
h i s l a t e r c a r e e r , Philopoemen showed t h a t he had the i n t e r e s t s o f 
Achaea a t h e a r t . But t h i s had n o t bro u g h t him back from Crete 
d u r i n g t h e c r i s e s o f t h e S o c i a l War« 
The m a jor d i f f e r e n c e between then and now v/as t h e absence o f 
A r a t u s , A r a t u s had dominated Acha.ean p o l i t i c s w i t h an a u o t o r i t a s 
a l l h i s own. And i t i s no a c c i d e n t th;-at few o f the o t h e r Achaean 
i^ £^ii'S?®£2i °^ •'^ s^ t i m e appear as p e r s o n a l i t i e s d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d o f 
h i s dominance. Philopoeraen had n o t wanted t o be dominated by t h e 
S i c y o n i a n , But a f t e r A r a t u s ' death, t h e r e was a power va.cuura i n 
Achaea.o A r a t u s ' presence had p r e v e n t e d any dominant p e r s o n a l -
i t i e s from -emerging d u r i n g h i s l i f e t i m e , and t h e r e v/as no one t o 
taice over a f t e r h i s d e a t h . The o p p o r t u n i t y v/as open, i f Philopoemen 
chose t o t a k e i t , and v/as made easier" by t h e promise o f Macedonian, 
s u p p o r t i n t h e e a r l y y e a r s . He c o u l d c l e a r l y envisage h i m s e l f 
a c q u i r i n g , with, t h i s i n i t i a l b a c k i n g , an i n f l u e n c e i n h i s ov/n 
g e n e r a t i o x i comparable w i t h A r a t u s ' i n h i s . E v e r y t h i n g combined t o 
make a r e t u r n t o Achaea h i g h l y a t t r a c t i v e . 
The danger t o Achaea from the more a c t i v e Koman commitment had 
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a l r e a d y been broug-ht home t o the Achaeans i n 2 1 0 v j h i l e E u r y l e o n 
v/as s t i l l stra_t£g;oB, and u n d e r l i n e d the importance o f Philoi3oemen's 
t a s k , Galba had a t t a c k e d and occupied Aegina, which was handed 
over t o t h e A e t o l i a n s i n accordance w i t h t h e i r ap;reement. The 
A e t o l i a n s d i d n o t v;ant t o keep the ( f o r them) avjkv/ardly s i t u a t e d 
i s l a n d and p r o m p t l y s o l d i t t o A t t a l u s o f Pergamum f o r 3 0 
t a l e n t s . T h i s b r o u g h t a n o t h e r enemy t o c l o s e q u a r t e r s w i t h Achaea, 
and a l s o c r e a t e d a r e f u g e e problem f o r her. N o t h i n g c o u l d be done 
t o r e c o v e r t h e i s l a n d : t h e A e g i n e t a n r e f u g e e s v/ho r e f u s e d t o 
accept A t t a l i d r u l e had t o talce v/hat s o l a c e t h e y c o u l d from exer-
c i s e o f t h e i r Achaean c i t i z e n s h i p i n t h e i r p l a c e o f e x i l e i n 
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Peloponnese. The danger from Achaean impotence no l o n g e r needed 
t h e p o l i t i c i a n s t o emphasise i t . As a r e s u l t , Philopoemen 
o b t a i n e d f u l l c o - o p e r a t i o n from the Achaean cavalrymen when he 
i n s t i t u t e d h i s new t r a i n i n g schedule as soon as he v/as e l e c t e d i n 
t h e autumn. He i n s i s t e d on a f o r m a l t r a i n i n g i n i n d i v i d u a l and 
c o r p o r a t e manoeuvres; t h e q u a l i t y o f the horses was improved -
t h i s must have r e q u i r e d disbursements from Philopoemen's e a r n i n g s ; 
a corps m e n t a l i t y v;as c u l t i v a t e d t o r e p l a c e t h e o l d i n d i v i d u a l -
i s t i c t r a d i t i o n . Philopoemen's own a c t i v e p a r t i n t h i s t r a i n i n g 
programme v/as t o v i s i t each c i t y i n t h e autumn and e x p l a i n the 
manoeiivres t o t h e assembled cavalrymen and t h e l o c a l commanders, 
who v/ere e^qoected t o p r a . c t i c e them d u r i n g the w i n t e r and t o have 
p e r f e c t e d them by the s p r i n g . He then r e v i s i t e d each town i n 
o r d e r t o check p r o g r e s s and p r o v i d e s o l u t i o n s f o r any d i f f i c -
u l t i e s w h i c h miight have a r i s e n i n t h e meanv/hile.-'-'^ I n t h e 
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s p r i n g , t h e v/hole f e d e r a l c a v a l r y f o r c e was c o l l e c t e d t o g e t h e r 
f o r j o i n t e x e r c i s e s and mass manoeuvres, once t h e i n d i v i d u a l 
c o n t i n g e n t s had become p r o f i c i e n t i n t h e i r s e c t i o n a l manoeuvres. 
The whole u n d e r t a k i n g seemis t o have been s u p e r v i s e d , as f a r as 
p o s s i b l e , by Philopoemen h i m s e l f , and no p e r s o n a l e f f o r t v/as 
spar e d i n t h e i n t e r e s t s o f efficiency,"'""^ The v e r y thoroughness 
and a t t e n t i o n t o d e t a i l mark out t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l s o l d i e r , v/ho had 
earned h i s l i v i n g by h i s m i l i t a r y s k i l l s . 
From t h e m i l i t a r y p o i n t o f viev/, P h i l i p and l i i s Achaean 
s u p p o r t e r s had cliosen t h e i r man v / e l l . But the c a v a l r y o r g a n i s a t -
i o n a l o n e was n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o assure m i l i t a r y s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . 
P h i l i p cannot have ejqpected t h i s , p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e C y c l i a d a s v/as 
stratej££. I t v / i l l t h e r e f o r e have been no s u r p r i s e v/hen he 
r e c e i v e d an anguished a p p e a l from G y c l i a d a s i n s p r i n g 2 0 9 . The 
'Pelo;ponnesian s e c t i o n o f t h e v/ar was warming up, and Achaea.v/as 
menaced f r o m tv/o s i d e s . Machanidas had f i n a l l y emerg;ed from the 
p o l i t i c a l chaos a..t S p a r t a ~ n o m i n a l l y perhaps as r e g e n t f o r 
Ly c u r g u s ' son Pelops - and f o l l o v / e d t r a d i t i o n a l S p a r t a n expans-
i o n i s t p o l i c y : a t t a c k s on s o u t h e r n A r c a d i a , o f w h i c h M e g a l o p o l i s 
would expect t o bear t h e b r u n t . A t t h e same t i m e , t h e f e d e r a l 
3 . u t h o r i t i e s v/ere o c c u p i e d i n b e a t i n g o f f an A e t o l i a n a t t a c k , 
l a u n c h e d a c r o s s t h e narrov/s o f the G u l f , L i v y does n o t mention 
any major Achaean d i s a s t e r ; b u t appeal t o Kacedon v/as a t r a d i t i o n 
founded by Ars.tus^ a.nd C y c l i a d a s v/as n o t the man t o break i t . The 
a t t a c k e r s might-be e x p e c t e d t o v/ithdraw a t the t h r e a t o f 
Macedonian o p p o s i t i o n v/hereas Achaea's v/eakness was n o t o r i o u s . ' ^ ^ 
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But P h i l i p ' s o c c u p a t i o n v / i t h h i s own s e c t i o n o f the v/ar 
emphasised Achaean i s o l a t i o n . His o p e r a t i o n s near Lamia a g a i n s t 
a j o i n t f o r c e o f A e t o l i a n s , Romans, and Pergamenes had produced 
two s u c c e s s f u l e n c o u n t e r s f o r him, v / i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t h i s 
r e t i r e m e n t t o P h a l a r a encouraged t h e Aegean commercial s t a t e s t o 
propose peace n e g o t i a t i o n s . As i n t h e S o c i a l V/ar, t h e renewed 
f i g h t i n g v/as d i s r u p t i n g Aegean commerce, and t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s v/ere 
u n d e r t a k e n by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f Sgypt, Rhodes, Athens and Chios. 
On t h e A e t o l i a n s i d e , M ynander o f Athamania was chosen t o 
n e g o t i a t e . No c o n c l u s i o n c o u l d be rea^ched on the s p o t , b u t a 
t r u c e f o r 3 0 days v/as a c c e p t a b l e t o b o t h s i d e s , and f u r t h e r 
d i s c u s s i o n v/as postponed i:iL.con£y_dj^^ f o r v/hich the 
p l a c e and d a t e were f i x e d . P h i l i p t h e n t r a v e l l e d t o Argos, v/here 
he c e l e b r a t e d t h e Heraea, a f t e r v/hich . he went t o Aegium ad 
'^'^  t h i s m.eeting t h e r e 
v/a.s d i s c u s s i o n a.bout e n d i n g t h e v/ar w i t h A e t o l i a and ( t o o Isi.te) ne 
.g-QrMsg-^SLUt^ Itomanis a u t A 1 1alo in:;iLrajidi__ GraeciaiB_ esse_t. I t seems 
c l e a r t h a t t h i s must be t h e meeting e a r l i e r d e s c r i b e d as coiicjJJaim 
ilSil^LSiPIll'Ili s i n c e i t v/as a t t h i s meeting t h a t the ambassadors v/ere 
r e c e i v e d v/ho had s t a r t e d the n e g o t i a t i o n s a t P h a l a r a . Any 
p r o s p e c t o f a s u c c e s s f u l outcome fr o m these renev/ed n e g o t i a t i o n s 
v\ras r a j ) i d l y removed v/hen the A e t o l i a n s announced t h a t t h e y v/ould 
c o n s i d e r peace o n l y on c o n d i t i o n t h a t Pylus be r e s t o r e d t o 
Messene, A t i n t a n i a t o Rome, t h e A r d i a e i t o S c e r d i l a i d a s and 
P l e u r a t u s o f I l l y r i a . ' 1 3 
The A e t o l i a n s are the l a s t people v/e v/ould expect t o f i n d 
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i n s i s t i n g i n t h i s v/ay on t h e r i g h t s o f t h e i r a l l i e s . L i v y 
f o l l o w s P o l y b i u s ' b i a s f a i t h f u l l y i n g i v i n g t he i m p r e s s i o n t h a t 
the A e t o l i a n s were t o blame f o r t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the v/ar;"'" ' 
b u t the viev/ i s t o o n a i f and G r e c o - c e n t r i c , The c h i e f contenders 
i n the v/ar v/ere Home and P h i l i p , /md v/hile e i t h e r o f these 
v/ished t o c o n t i n u e t h e f i g h t i n g , t h e r e v/as no hope o f ending t h e 
v/ar. Home was committed t o n e u t r a l i s i n g Macedon f o r as l o n g as 
H a n n i b a l was a s e r i o u s t h r e a t i n I t a l y : t h e Macedonian v/ar would 
n o t be ended s o l e l y by the course o f events i n Greece. The Greek 
commercial s t a t e s m i g h t s t r u g g l e as they v/ould t o g e t the p a r t i e s 
t o a co n f e r e n c e ; b u t u n t i l Rome v/anted peace, t h e i r e f f o r t s v/ould 
be f u t i l e . I t i s t h i s backgrotind a g a i n s t v^;hich v/e s h o u l d c o n s i d e r 
t h e A e t o l i a n s ' demands a t Aegium; and th e y are a t once seen t o be 
s i m p l y demands f o r m u l a t e d by Rome t o secure t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f 
the v/ar by t h e i r c e r t a i n r e j e c t i o n . The 3 0 days' t r u c e had been a 
co n v e n i e n t v;ay o u t o f a t e m p o r a r i l y embarrassing s i t u a t i o n a f t e r 
t h e Lamia o p e r a t i o n s : i t s o n l y e f f e c t v/as t h a t P h i l i p had 
squandered h i s success by m i s i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e n a t u r e o f the Rom.an 
commitment."''' 
By t h e t i m e o f the £on£dJJaAm the t l r r e a t s t o Achaea vi/ere 
becoming even g r e a t e r . "In a d d i t i o n t o the s e r i o u s attac'Ks which 
had i n d u c e d C y c l i a d a s t o c a l l i n P h i l i p , t he s i t u a t i o n v/as com.p-
l i c a t e d by A t t a i n s ' c r o s s i n g t o Aegina, and t h e Roman f l e e t ' s 
movement t o Naupactus, "''^  I t w a s c l e a r t h a t t h e break f o r 
n e g o t i a t i o n s v/as o n l y an i n t e r l u d e , and t h a t t h e war would c o n t i n u e 
a s b e f o r e . T h i s meant t h a t Achaea had t o be p r o t e c t e d , s i n c e a l l 
f o r c e s v/ere t r a i n e d on the G u l f ; and v/hile P h i l i p t r a v e l l e d t o 
Argos t o c e l e b r a t e t h e Nemea, he l e f t 4 , 0 0 0 t r o o p s and 3 s h i p s 
17 
a.s a guard f o r t h e n o r t h c o a s t . But 3 s h i p s c o u l d n o t t r a n s p o r t 
a 4 , 0 0 0 men, and t h e r e s u l t v/as t h a t t h e se f o r c e s were o n l y 
n o m i n a l p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f t h e mo b i l e Roman 
. f l e e t . A t t h e h e i g h t o f t h e Nemea Galba l a n d e d betv/een Sicyon 
and C o r i n t h w i t h t h e I n t e n t i o n of p l u n d e r i n g t h i s r i c h Achaean 
t e r r i t o r y . P h i l i p ' s g a r r i s o n on the .Acrocorinth d i d n o t a c t ; and 
th e nev/s o f the Roman i n c u r s i o n v/as b r o u g h t t o P h i l i p a t Argos. 
I t v/as a r a r e o p p o r t u n i t y o f d e m o n s t r a t i n g t o t h e Achaeans the 
v a l u e o f a q u i c k and e f f i c i e n t army: he l e f t the c e l e b r a t i o n s v / i t h 
h i s c a v a l r y , f o l l o w e d by t h e i n f a n t r y , and h u r r i e d northv/ards. He 
met t h e Roiiians v/andering about i n u n d i s c i p l i n e d f a s h i o n and drove 
-J o 
them back t o t h e i r s h i p s . ' There c o u l d be no doubt i n Achaea as 
t o t h e v a l u e o f t h e Ma,cedonian supjport; no doubt v/hat v/ould be 
th e e f f e c t o f i t s v/ithdrav.;al. P h i l i p ' s s u p p o r t f o r Philopoemen's 
r e o r g a n i s a t i o n v/ould a l l o v / him t o operate i n the n o r t h w i t h o u t 
s a c r i f i c i n g t he l o y a l t y o f t h e Achaeans t l i r o u g h h i s i n a b i l i t y t o 
h e l p them. The urgency o f t h i s v/as u n d e r l i n e d by t h e t h r e a t s o f 
t h i s y e a r . 
A f u r t h e r d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f ..lichaean r e l i a n c e on P h i l i p ' s 
s u p p o r t , and the p o t e n t i a l danger from i t s v/ithdrav/al, came soon 
a f t e r t he Nemea. The A e t o l i a n a t t a c k s on Achaea^ s t a r t e d i n the 
s p r i n g , had had t h e e f f e c t o f a t t r a c t i n g an i n v i t a t i o n from t h e 
19 p a r t y i n pov^/er i n E l i s f o r a permanent A e t o l i a n g a r r i s o n f o r c e , 
G y c l i a d a s had made no a t t e m p t t o d e a l w i t h t h i s t h r e a t e n i n g 
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development u n t i l P h i l i p v/as i n a p o s i t i o n t o s u p p o r t him. Th i s 
v/as a r r a n g e d a f t e r t h e Nemea. The a l l i e d f o r c e s advanced from 
t h e i r a s s e m b l y - p o i n t a t Dyme as f a r as t h e r i v e r L a r i s u s , v/hich 
v/as t h e boundary betv/een Achaea and E l i s . They v/ere met t h e r e by 
the Elean and A e t o l i a n c a v a l r y which t r i e d t o s t o p t h e i n v a s i o n . 
Philopoemen's nev/ly o r g a n i s e d c a v a l r y met i t s f i r s t t e s t , and came 
t h r o u g h v / i t h f l y i n g c o l o u r s . The a l l i e d c a v a l r y soundly d e f e a t e d 
t h e E l e a n , and Philopoemen v/on a p e r s o n a l encounter w i t h 
Damiophantus, t h e l e a d e r o f t h e Elean c a v a l r y , P h i l i p must have 
t a k e n encoura,gement from t h i s d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f the e f f e c t i v e n e s s 
o f t he r e o r g a n i s e d Achaean c a v a l r y f o r h i s scheme t o su p p o r t 
Philopoemen. 
A f t e r t h e b a t t l e , t h e Eleans v/ithdrev/ t o t h e i r c i t y . The 
i n v a d e r s spent t h e n e x t d.a.y i n a d v i s e d l y i n p l u n d e r i n g t he c o u n t r y -
s i d e v/hich had been abandoned t o them. D u r i n g the n i g h t , Galba 
i n t r o d u c e d A'-,000 Romans i n t o t he tov/n. The f i r s t t h i n g t h e 
i n v a d e r s knev/ o f the presence o f t h e Romans v/as on the f o l l o v / i n g 
day, v/hen t h e y t r i e d t o provoke a b a t t l e w i t h t h e Eleans, I n the 
ens u i n g s t r u g g l e , P h i l i p v/as f o r t u n a t e t o escape v / i t h h i s l i f e ; 
b u t e v e n t u a l l y a s u c c e s s f u l v/ithdrav/al v/as made t o Dyrae, 
c o l l e c t i n g more p l u n d e r on the v/ay. S t r a t e g i c a l l y t h e exped-
i t i o n had been a f a i l u r e , f o r the A e t o l i g n . g a r r i s o n s u r v i v e d 
i n t a c t : t h e t h r e a t t o Achaea remained. No major a c t i o n had been 
t a k e n a g a i n s t Machanidas, v / i t h the r e s u l t t h a t Achaea v/as s t i l l 
i n a v e r y dangerous s i t u a t i o n . Soon a f t e r v / a r d s , t he need t o 
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develop t h e Achaean army and t o cease r e l y i n g on . P h i l i p v/as 
f u r t h e r emphasised by t h e sudden w i t h d r a w a l o f P h i l i p from oper-
a t i o n s i n s o u t h e r n Greece. Nev/s of a nev/ Dardania.n i n v a s i o n o f 
Macedonia i m m e d i a t e l y t o o k him t o t h e n o r t h . The v/eakness o f h i s 
r e s o u r c e s i s emphasised by t h e f a c t t h a t he had o n l y 2 , 3 0 0 omnis 
il?£?Zi2..JSS!S^'~2£ii£i l e a v e as p r o t e c t i o n f o r Acbaea. These were 
commanded by Menippus a.nd Polyphantas, taut v/ere n o t l i k e l y t o be 
much p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t E l i s , S p arta and the f l e e t s o f A t t a l u s 
2 1 
and Rome based on Aegina, 
Galba a t once too.k advantage o f t h e Achaean predicament. 
.After P h i l i p ' s v / i t h d r a v / a l , t h e Roman t r o o p s were t a k e n from E l i s , 
and on t h e v/ay t o Aegina, v/here t h e y v/ere t o spend the v / i n t e r , 
t o o k r e t a l i a t i o n a g a i n s t Dyrae, s i n c e i t had been used as a base 
f o r t h e a l l i e d e x p e d i t i o n a g a i n s t E l i s . The tov/n v/as a t t a c k e d ' 
and d e s t r o y e d ; and a l t h o u g h i t v/as r e p a i r e d and r e s t o r e d t o the 
Dyraaeans on P h i l i p ' s o r d e r s by Polyphantas and Menippus, i t was a 
b r u t a l l e s s o n on t h e inadequacy o f r e l y i n g on Macedonian s u p p o r t , ^ 
Morale must have r e c o v e r e d a l i t t l e v/hen, tov/ards t h e end o f t h e 
y e a r , G y c l i a d a s won a b a ^ t t l e near Messene a g a i n s t t h e Eleans and 
.A e t o l i a n s , p r o b a b l y v / i t h t h e a i d o f the Macedonian t r o o p s . But 
i t v/as c o l d c o m f o r t f o r t h e ease v / i t h which t h e Romans had sv/ept 
a s i d e o p p o s i t i o n t o d e s t r o y Dyme, The c a v a l r y r e o r g a n i s a t i o n v/as 
c l e a r l y o n l y a. f i r s t s t e p i n t h e r i g h t d i r e c t i o n . I t was n o t 
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enough i n i t s e l f t o p r o v i d e adequate defence. 
D e s p i t e t h e t h r e a t e n i n g n a t u r e o f t h e s i t u a t i o n f a c i n g 
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Achaea, Philopoemen v/as n o t g i v e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y o f t u r n i n g h i s 
a t t e n t i o n t o the i n f a n t r y s e c t i o n o f the Achaean army i n the 
n e x t y e a r , P h i l i p ' s sudden d e p a r t u r e had perhaps l e f t h i s p l a n s 
f o r Philopoemen u n f u l f i l l e d ; and Philopoemen had n o t h i m s e l f 
y e t a c q u i r e d t h e p e r s o n a l p r e s t i g j e v/hich c o u l d dominate t h e 
e l e c t i o n s . I n P h i l i p ' s absence, t h e r e f o r e , N i c i a s v/as e l e c t e d 
SIS£2i£S .2g» Events p r e d i c t a b l y f o l l o v / e d t h e p a t t e r n o f the p r e -
v i o u s y e a r : t h e A e t o l i a n s , p r o b a b l y o p e r a t i n g from E l i s , v/ere 
a g a i n a c t i v e , and Machanidas took Tegea and a t t a c k e d Argos. His 
success b e f o r e Argos v/as so t t u r e a t e n i n g t h a t N i c i a s d i d n o t t h i n k 
o f r e s i s t i n g a l o n e : t h e t r a d i t i o n a l appeal was t h e r e f o r e made t o 
P h i l i p . P h i l i p , as alv/ays, v/as ready t o promise h e l p on any 
a p p e a l ~ and t h e Achaean v/as n o t t h e o n l y a p p e a l - b u t he v/as 
f u l l y o c c u p i e d i n d e a l i n g v / i t h t he more u r g e n t t h r e a t from the 
o p e r a t i o n s o f t h e Roman and Pergamene f l e e t s i n t h e Aegean. I t 
v/as alread.y f u l l summer and near t h e time o f the Olympic p;ames 
v/hen he found t i m e t o move i n t o Peloponnese. I n the meanwhile 
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Achaea had t o do her b e s t t o d.efend h e r s e l f . 
I n J u l y Machanidas t u r n e d h i s a t t e n t i o n t o E l i s , v/hich may 
r e f l e c t some success o f N i c i a s ' i n r e p e l l i n g him from t h e A r g o l i d . 
At t h e t i m e , the Eleans v/ere p r e p a r i n g f o r t h e c e l e b r a t i o n o f the 
Olympic ggimes; and as Machanidas was a l s o a member o f t h e Roman-
A e t o l i a n a l l i a n c e , he v/as n o t suspected o f b e i n g a danger, 
Machanida.s seems t o have been d i s s a t i s f i e d v / i t h t h e e f f e c t o f t h e 
A e t o l i a n a t t a c k s on Achaea from E l i s , and t o have c o n s i d e r e d t h a t 
he c o u l d p u t t h e anti-Achaean p o t e n t i a l o f the base t o b e t t e r 
- bo 
e f f e c t . I f he wanted to atta.ck. Achaea from the v-/est, E l i s v/as 
a c o n v e n i e n t base: Machanidas t h e r e f o r e i g n o r e d , h i s t i e s o f 
f r i e . n d s h i p v / i t h E l i s and t o o k advantage o f t h e Eleans' p r e p a r -
a t i o n s f o r t h e ga/nes. Up t o t h i s p o i n t , P h i l i p had n o t been i n 
Peloponnese t h i s y e a r , b u t Machanidas had u n d e r e s t i m a t e d him. A t 
th e t i m e o f t h e a t t a c k on E l i s , P h i l i p was a t E l a t e a d i s c u s s i n g 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r peace. The t h r e a t t o B l i s a f f e c t e d him 
d i r e c t l y , f o r i t t h r e a t e n e d h i s own s t r o n g h o l d s o f Heraea, 
A l i p h e i r a and T r i p h y l i a . The n e g o t i a t i o n s were t h e r e f o r e broken 
o f f , and P h i l i p h u r r i e d t o Heraea. VJhen he a r r i v e d he l e a r n t t h a t 
Machanidas had a l r e a d y been r e p u l s e d , and had r e t u r n e d t o S p a r t a , 
As t h e r e v/as no f u r t h e r advantage t o be gained from s t a y i n g a t 
Heraea, he t r a v e l l e d t o Aegium, v/here he a t t e n d e d an Achaean 
^ 26 synodos. 
P h i l i p ' s b o r d e r c a s t l e s had a d u a l jju r p o s e : t o keep Achaea i n 
p l a c e under t h e Macedonian hegemony, and t o p r e s e r v e t h e Achaean 
b o r d e r s from, e x t e r n a l a t t a c k . The c a s t l e s ' s a f e t y depe.nded 
b a s i c a l l y on P h i l i p ' s r e a d i n e s s t o come t o rei.Liforce the g a r r i s o n s , 
v/henever danger t h r e a t e n e d - a r e a d i n e s s v/hich t h e c o n f l i c t v / i t h 
Rome v/as malcing p r o g r e s s i v e l y more d i f f i c u l t . P h i l i p had a l r e a d y 
r e c o g n i s e d t h e v u l n e r a b i l i t y o f Achaea when he had s u p p o r t e d 
Philopoemen's c a v a l r y r e o r g a n i s a t i o n as a f i r s t s t e p towards 
.Achaean m i l i t a r j ' - s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . The A e t o l i t m g a r r i s o n a t E l i s 
had c l e s . r l y been a t h r e a t t o t h e w e s t e r n b o r d e r c a s t l e s ; 
Machanidas' a t t e m p t on E l i s again emphasised t h e i r e s s e n t i a l 
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i s o l a t i o n , P h i l i p v/as becoming every year more deeply i n v o l v e d 
i n t h e Roma.n v/ar, and t h e number o f t r o o p s cor/.mitted t o g a r r i s o n 
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d u t y v/as i n the r e g i o n o f 2 0 , 0 0 0 - c l e a r l y a number v/hich he 
would b e n e f i t from r e d u c i n g . The p r o t e c t i v e d u t y o f h i s border 
c a s t l e s c o u l d be r e p l a c e d "by encouraging Achaean s e l f - d e f e n c e ; 
t h e hegemonial asp e c t o f t h e i r duty c o u l d perhaps be served by 
m a i n t a i n i n g o n l y t h e s t r o n g e s t of the c a s t l e s ~ C o r i n t h and 
Orchomenus - p r o v i d e d t h a t t he safeg^uard vras t a k e n o f h a v i n g 
f r i e n d l y £trat_egoj. e l e c t e d i n Achaea.. 
T h i s v/as t h e scheme v/hich P h i l i p proposed t o t h e Achaeans. 
The hegeffionial a s p e c t o f t h e cast3.es miust have aroused r e s i s t a n c e 
among p a t r i o t i c Achaeans, and the d e f e n s i v e aspect had n o t been 
pr o m i n e n t i n r e c e n t y e a r s . P h i l i p t h e r e f o r e d e c l a r e d t o the 
sjnodo^s t h a t he i n t e n d e d t o v/ithdrav/ h i s g a r r i s o n s from Heraea, 
A l i p h e i r a and T r i p h y l i a , and r e s t o r e these p l a c e s t o the 
Achaeans .'^  The o f f e r v/as r e p r e s e n t e d as a genuine a t t e m p t t o 
g i v e the Achaeans more c o n t r o l over t h e i r ov/n a f f a i r s , and from 
the p a t r i o t i c v i e v / p o i n t v/as welcome. I t v/as a l s o an admi s s i o n o f 
v/eakness on P h i l i p ' s p a r t , b u t h i s maintenance o f C o r i n t h and 
Orchomenus v/ould p r e v e n t Achaea from t a k i n g any g r e a t advantage. 
T h i s f i r s t necessary s a f e g u a r d a g a i n s t any anti-Macedonian r e a c t i o n 
i n Achaea -v/as a l r e a d y i n e^cistence. The scheme v/as announced a t 
t h e s y i ^ d q s , b u t no dsite v/as fi.xed f o r the v/ithdrav/al. P h i l i p t o o k 
advantage o f h i s presence on the G u l f t o borrov/ some s h i p s from t h e 
Achaeans t o c a r r y o u t an a t t a c k a g a i n s t s o u t h e r n A e t o l i a . N i c i a s 
accompanied t h e e x p e d i t i o n ; and a l t h o u g h i t v/as n o t o f any 
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s t r a t e g i c i m p o r t a n c e , s u b s t a i i t i a l aniounts o f b o o t y v/ere c o l l e c t e d , 
and t h e Achaeans c o u l d f e e l g r a t e f u l t o P h i l i p f o r s u p p o r t i n g them 
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i n r e t a . l i 3 , t i o n a g a i n s t . A e t o l i a , " 
The second s a f e g u a r d f o r P h i l i p ' s p o s i t i o n i n Achaea v/as 
a c h i e v e d a t t h e autumn s^^nodos. Philopoemen v/as e l e c t e d 
s.trategos^'^ and i n i m e d i a t e l y s t a r t e d on h i s major r e f o r m o f t h e 
i n f a n t r y . Given t h e a s s o c i a t i o n between P h i l i p and Philopoemen i n 
Philopoemen's p e r i o d i n C r e t e , the f a c t t h a t P h i l i p had sup p o r t e d 
Philopoemen's e l e c t i o n t o t h e h i p p a r c h y i n 2 1 0 , and P h i l i p ' s 
p r o p o s a l s rega.rding t h e w i t h d r a v / a l o f h i s g a r r i s o n s , i t seems 
c l e a r t h a t Philopoemen v/as a g a i n s t r o n g l y s u p p o r t e d by P h i l i p i n 
these e ] . e c t i o n s . The p r e v i o u s connections are t o o s o l i d l y 
e s t a b l i s h e d , and the immediate a c t i v i t i e s o f Philopoemen t o o con-
v e n i e n t f o r P h i l i p , f o r a n o t h e r c o n c l u s i o n t o be t e n a b l e . P h i l i p 
r e a l i s e d , as he had s i n c e a t l e a s t 2 1 0 , t h a t Achaea must achieve 
a m i l i t a r y s e l f - s u f f i c i e . n c y , f o r he c o u l d n o t guarantee her s a f e t y 
h i m s e l f i n the nev/ c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Even h i s g a r r i s o n s v/ere t o o 
i s o l a t e d t o be o f much v a l u e and i n any case, he c o u l d no long;er 
a f f o r d t o squander t r o o p s and money u n n e c e s s a r i l y . But i f h i s 
v/ithdrav/al o f s u p p o r t caused Acbaea t o s u f f e r s e v e r e l y , she might 
j o i n h i s opponents d e s p i t e the g a r r i s o n s ' r e m a i n i n g at C o r i n t h and 
Orchomenus. I t v/as t h e r e f o r e v i t a l t h a t Achaea s h o u l d become s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n t , and t h a t t h i s s h o u l d be o r g a n i s e d by a s o l i d l y p r o -
Macedonian man. Philopoeraen liad a l r e a d y demonstrated h i s 
e f f i c i e n c y , and n o t h i n g up t o the p r e s e n t t i m e had caused P h i l i p 
t o have any doubts about h i s l o y a l t y . Philopoemen t h e r e f o r e 
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became s;trate£os f o r 208/7 w i t h P h i l i p ' s f u l l s u p p o r t and a 
mandate t o complete the aniiy r e o r g a n i s a t i o n v/hich he had s t a r t e d 
v / i t h t h e c a v a l r y . 
I t d i d n o t t a k e l o n g . f o r Philopoemen t o make h i s i n t e n t i o n s 
c l e a r . At t h e v e r y s j n o d o s a t which he was e l e c t e d , he addressed 
th e assembly i n a speech v A i c h d e p l o r e d t h e c u r r e n t decadence o f 
t h e Achaean army - many o f t h e members of which must have been 
p r e s e n t and u r g e d r e f o r m . P o l y b i u s says t h a t t h e r e s u l t was an 
immediate change o f h e a r t among h i s a.udience. I n i t s e l f , t h i s 
need mean no more t h a n t h a t t h e y expressed v / i l l i n g n e s s t o co-op-
e r a t e , v/hich must a l r e a d y ha.ve been ap p a r e n t from t h e i r v / i l l i n g -
3 1 
ness t o e l e c t him stra_te££s. , But t h e thoroughness v / i t h v/hich he 
u n d e r t o o k the r e f o r m i s i m p r e s s i v e . I t i s c l e a r from the r i g o r -
ousness o f t h e reform, i t s e l f t h a t he had managed t o g a i n the f u l l 
s u p p o r t o f t h e c l a s s e s v/hich c o n s t i t u t e d t.he army. B e g i n n i n g from 
f u n damentals, he scrapped t h e o l d equipment - the l i g h t b u t clumsy 
.iiSE,§.2S ^^'^ s h o r t j a v e l i n , v/hich had f o r c e d t h e army t o f i . g h t a t 
l o n g range - and s u b s t i t u t e d the more s o l i d s h i e l d and l o n g £arisa 
o f t h e Macedonian p h a l t m x . I n a d d i t i o n t o these - a complete 
i n n o v a t i o n f o r t h e Achaean m i l i t i a - he inti-oduced p h a l a n g i t e 
h e l m e t s , b r e a s t p l a t e s , and greaves. This removed some o f t h e 
b a s i c v/eakness, and t u r n e d t h e i n e f f e c t i v e l i g h t - a r m e d m i l i t i a 
i n t o a p o t e n t i a l l y s t r o n g army, v/hich c o u l d p ress home an. a t t a c k 
v / i t h o u t f e a r o f e x c e s s i v e da.nger t o i n d i v i d u a l s . A r e t u r n t o the 
e a r l i e r Achaean p r a c t i c e o f h i r i n g mercenaries was a l s o made. I t 
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i s c l e a r , from t h e f r e q u e n c y o f appeals t o P h i l i p i n r e c e n t y e a r s , 
tha.t a miercenary corps had ceased t o be a permanent p a r t o f the 
.Achaean m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s l i m e n t : t h i s d e f i c i e n c y v/as now r e p a i r e d 
by Philopoemen. 
The c o s t o f these i n n o v a t i o n s must have been v e r y .heavy, and 
cannot have been w h o l l y borne by i n d i v i d u a l p h a l a n g i t e s . The cost 
o f t h e m e r c e n a r i e s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , v/as s o l e l y t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
o f the f e d e r a l t r e a s u r y . Yet t h e r e i s no s i g n o f f i n a n c i a l s t r a i n 
in. Achaea. A c e r t a i n amount o f money must have come i n from the 
El e a n e x p e d i t i o n o f G y c l i a d a s and the A e t o l i a n e x p e d i t i o n o f 
N i c i a s , b u t t h i s cannot have been v/holly r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e 
i n f l u x o f money. P h i l i p cannot have p r o v i d e d any money: f o r had 
he been a b l e t o a f f o r d t o s u p p l y t h e Achaean army, he must have 
been a b l e t o a f f o r d merce.naries f o r h i s g a r r i s o n s i n Achaea. As 
v / i t h t h e c a v a l r y r e o r g a n i s a t i o n , ive must l o o k t o Philopoemen's 
p u b l i c and p r i v a t e e a r n i n g s as c p ^ d o t t i e r e i n Crete as a major 
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source o f t h e i n f l u x o f v/ealth, p r o b a b l y r e f e r r e d t o by P l u t a r c h . 
T h i s seems t o be t h e o n l y major source o f adequate v/ealth 
a v a i l a b l e , and i t i s no a c c i d e n t , f o r t h i s reason as much as t h e 
o t h e r s , t h a t Philopoemen v/as t h e man who v/as e n t r u s t e d v / i t h the 
r e o r g a n i s a t i o n o f each s e c t i o n of the army. 
The re-equipm.ent o f t h e t r o o p s and t h e h i r e o f mercenaries 
v/as o n l y one f a c e t o f Philopoemen's r e o r g a n i s a t i o n . ./\s v / i t h the 
c a v a l r y , he had t o t e a c h t h e i n f a n t r y t o use t h e i r new v/eapons, 
and t o comibine t o g e t h e r and w i t h the newly h i r e d m e r c e n a r i e s , 
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b e f o r e t h e y v/ere ready f o r b a t t l e , Philopoemen spent e i g h t 
months o f h i s year on t h i s t r a i n i n g , v i s i t i n g t h e i n d i v i d u a l 
c i t i e s , t e a c h i n g and a d v i s i n g . I n t h e s p r i n g , t h e v/hole army v/as 
c o l l e c t e d t o g e t h e r and p u t t h r o u g h e x e r c i s e s . When t h i s v/as done, 
as w e l l as s e c u r i n g i n c r e a s e d e f f i c i e n c y , t h e morale o f the t r o o p s 
v/as much h i g h e r , and Philopoemen c o n s i d e r e d t h a t i t v/as w o r t h 
r i s k i n g a b a t t l e w i t h Machanidas. He v/as, t h i s y e a r , t h e s o l e 
p r o b l em f o r .Achaea, s i n c e t h e A e t o l i a n s v/ere f u l l y occupied v / i t h 
t ^ h i l i p i n t h e n o r t h , Philopoemen c o l l e c t e d h i s army a t Mantinea, 
and Machanidas, eager t o accept the o f f e r o f a b a t t l e , v/hich he 
had l o n g bee.n t r y i n g t o provolce, advanced t o Tegea, The ensuing 
b a t t l e , t h e m i l i t a r y d e t a i l o f v/hich does n o t concern us, r e s u l t e d 
i n a major v i c t o r y f o r Philopoemen and h i s newly t r a i n e d array. 
Machanidas pursued t h e Achciean mercenaries t o o f a r when, they broke 
i n t he e a r l y p a r t o f t h e engagement, and r e t u r n e d t o f i n d t h a t t he 
r e s t o f h i s army had been overv/helmed i n h i s absence. The c u l m i n -
a t i n g d i s a s t e r f o r t h e t y r a n t v/as h i s i n a b i l i t y t o break back 
t i r r o u g h t h e Achaean l i n e s : i n a t t e m p t i n g t h i s , he v/as person.3.11y 
opposed by Philopoemen and k i l l e d i n a hand-to-hand s t r u g g l e with 
3/;. 
t h e Acha.ean .g t r a t e g o s . 
Philopoemen n a t u r a l l y e x p l o i t e d , h i s success. I m m e d i a t e l y 
a f t e r t h e b a t t l e , t h e Achaean army marched i n t o Tegea, which 
Hachanidas had t a k e n the p r e v i o u s year. From Tegea, Philopoeraen 
advanced i n t o L a c o n i a and allov/ed h i s t r o o p s t o ravage t h e 
c o u n t r y s i d e . The me r c e n a r i e s expected t h i s l i c e n c e t o supplement 
t h e i r pay, and t h e Achaeans would be g l a d t o t a k e revenge i n k i n d 
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on S p a r t a . But t h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t Philopoeme.n had any 
i n t e n t i o n o f making S p a r t a a member o f the Leagi;.e. His v i c t o r y 
over Machanidas v/as i m m e d i a t e l y s u b s t a n t i a l , b u t not i n the l o n g 
term overv/helming. He d i d n o t , even i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t he b a t t l e , 
c o n s i d e r h i m s e l f s t r o n g enough t o a t t a c k the c i t y o f Sp a r t a and 
face S p a r t a n d e s p e r a t i o n . And he v/as c l e a r l y r i g h t i n t h i s . The 
r a p i d emergence o f NelDis v / i t h a pov/er v/hich m a i n t a i n e d him as 
t y r a n t f o r 1 3 yea^rs i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e r e v/as s t i l l a f o r m i d a b l e 
s e c t i o n o f t h e S p a r t a n p o p u l a t i o n which c o n s i d e r e d i t s e l f t o be 
un d e f e a t e d and s o l i d l y a nti-Achaean. Had Machanidas n o t been 
k i l l e d a t Mantinea, t h e b a t t l e v/ould have been l i t t l e more than a 
t a c t i c a l v i c t o r y f o r Philopoemen. As i t v/as, i t gave him the 
o p p o r t u n i t y o f f o l l o v / i n g i t up by r a v a g i n g L a c o n i a , b u t n o t o f 
se e k i n g any k i n d o f permanent s e t t l e m e n t , such as he l a t e r 
a t t e m p t e d i n 1 9 2 . I n 2 0 7 he had no o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a n y t h i n g 
o t h e r fhsca. t h e immediate enjoyment o f h i s v i c t o r y , and the 
c r e a t i o n o f a perso.nal r e p u t a t i o n f o r h a v i n g crushed t h e t r a d i t -
i o n a l enemy o f Achaea. The immediate b e n e f i t s v/ere. n e v e r t h e l e s s 
s u b s t a n t i a l , f o r t h e success a t Mantinea c o i n c i d e d v/ith a 
l e s s e n i n g o f Roman i n t e r e s t i n the v/ar i n Greece. For 2 0 7 and 
206 t h e A e t o l i a n s v/ere l e f t t o bear the major p a r t o f t h e v/ar 
e f f o r t , s ince no Roman r e i n f o r c e m e n t s v/ere s e n t t o Greece f o r 
these two years."^^ T h i s meant t h a t Achaea v/as f r e e d from atta.ck 
by t h e A e t o l i a n s a t E l i s ; and a l t h o u g h Nabis must have become 
t y r a n t v e r y soon a f t e r t h e death o f Machanidas,"^ he v/as 
i n i t i a l l y t o o m.uch oc c u p i e d v/ith e s t a b l i s h i n g h i s c l a i m t o pov^ /er 
a t S p a r t a t o t h i n k o f an iraniediate r e s u m p t i o n o f Machanidas' 
a g g r e s s i v e f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 
Mantinea was an a l l - A c h a e a n success,-^" Philopoemen's r e p -
u t a t i o n i n Achaea was made; P h i l i p ' s p l a n s had been o u t s t a n d -
i n g l y s u c c e s s f u l . The most obvious immediate r e s u l t o f the 
b a t t l e \'ias t h e s a f e t y o f t h e Axhaea_n b o r d e r areas from .Spartan 
a t t a c k , S p a r t a was t e m p o r a r i l y weakened, and f o r the moment 
Achaea was the u n q u e s t i o n e d p r i m a r y povrer i n Peloponnese. The 
army r e f o r m o f Philopoeraen had, a t i t s f i r s t r e a l t e s t , a chieved 
th e d e f e a t o f t h e major t l i r e a t t o Achaean s a f e t y ; Ronlan l a c k o f 
i n t e r e s t i n t h e Macedonian war had removed t h e A e t o l i a n t h r e a t ; 
P h i l i p had promised t o v/ithdraw h i s b o r d e r g a r r i s o n s . I t must 
have seemed t o t h e Achaeans t h a t a new age o f independence was 
davming, i n which A r a t u s ' f i r s t a n t i - H a c e d o n i a n s t r o k e s tov;ards 
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Achaean independence m i g h t be r e p e a t e d . T h i s new s i t u a t i o n o f 
Achaea n a t u r a l l y t h r e w t h e p o s i t i o n o f P h i l i p ' s g a r r i s o n s i n t o 
r e l i e f . Of t h e i r two d u t i e s , defence o f Achaea from o u t s i d e 
danger and o p p r e s s i o n o f Acl-:3,ea f r o m i n s i d e , o n l y t h e l a t t e r now 
remained. The s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s must have been as c l e a r t o 
P h i l i p as t o the Achaeans: i f h i s b o r d e r c a s t l e s were now evac-
u a t e d , t h e r e was n o t h i n g b u t C o r i n t h and Orchomenus t o h o l d Achaea 
f i r m l y t o a l l i a n c e w i t h him; and w h i l e t h i s m ight be s u f f i c i e n t 
f o r t h e purpose w h i l e Aclia.ea was permanently weakened by a l o n g -
term b o r d e r war, t h e y c o u l d prove inadequate i n t h e nev; c o n d i t -
i o n s c r e a t e d by Mantinea, and t h e r e f o r e t h r e a t e n the v/hole b a s i s 
o f P h i l i p ' s power i n Peloponnese, 
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I t i s knovm t h a t t h e gari-^isons i n q u e s t i o n vjere n o t , i n 
f a c t , w i t h d r a w n u n t i l 198, v/hen Orchomenus was a l s o i n c l u d e d , b u t 
we do n o t have any s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n about v/hy or when P h i l i p 
^0 
changed h i s mind and d e c i d e d t o keep thern. We have argued 
t h a t , a l t h o u g h P h i l i p had s u p p o r t e d Philopoemen i n h i s army r e -
o r g a n i s a t i o n s , t h e e f f e c t o f I % n t i n e a was g r e a t e r t h a n he had 
a n t i c i p a t e d , and i n s t e a d o f s i m p l y r e l i e v i n g the p r e s s u r e on h i s 
inadequate r e s o u r c e s , seemed l i k e l y t o weaken the whole b a s i s o f 
h i s power i n Peloponnese, I n the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , i t seems l i k e l y 
t h a t i t wa.s a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t P h i l i p decided t h a t he must r e t a i n 
h i s b o r d e r c a s t l e s , v;hen Achaea f i r s t sav/ t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of i n d e -
pendence a f t e r Mantinea, ^^rhen the hegemonial aspect o f the b o r d e r 
c a s t l e s was b o t h more app a r e n t t o t h e Achaeans and a t the same 
•time more necessary f o r P h i l i p . P h i l i p ' s method o f r e c o u p i n g h i s 
p r e s t i g e over t h e v / i t h d r a w a l , by s u p p o r t i n g Philopoeraen and 
Achaean s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y , had rebounded by i t s em.barrassing 
success: i t v;as t h i s l a t t e r v/hich p r e v e n t e d h i s b e i n g a b l e t o 
c a r r y out t h e w i t h d r a w a l . 
Mantinea was a major blov/ t o S p a r t a n ;power: 4,000 from t h e 
'a 
S p a r t a n army had been k i l l e d , and v./hen Nabis had e s t a b l i s h e d 
h i m s e l f as ty.vant, he c a r r i e d out a r a d i c a l s o c i a l r e f o r m i n 
o r d e r t o compensate f o r t h i s l o s s o f man-power. The most n o t i c -
eable f e a t u r e s o f t h i s s o c i a l r e - o r g g . n i s a t i o n vrere a r e d i s t r i b -
u t i o n o f v/ealth and t h e dovm-grading or e x i l e o f the t r a d i t i o n a l 
a r i s t o c r a c y . P o l y b i u s d e s c r i b e s these i n n o v a t i o n s b i t t e r l y and 
a b u s i v e l y , and t h e r e can be l i t t l e doubt t h a t many o f h i s 
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s t r i c t u r e s a r e l e g i t i m a t e . ' On the o t h e r hand, Nabis' success, 
by whatever means, i n r e s u s c i t a t i n g S p a r t a and h o l d i n g i t 
s e c u r e l y i n h i s power f o r 15 y e a r s , deserves more a p p r e c i a t i o n 
t h a n P o l y b i u s i s p r e p a r e d t o g i v e . Nabis v/as a t y r a j i t , a 
complete a u t o c r a t ; b u t i f h i s success i n h i s i n e v i t a b l e p o l i c y 
o f h o s t i l i t y tovjards Achaea had n o t been so o u t s t a n d i n g , P o l y b i u s ' 
p i c t u r e o f h i s regime m i g h t have been r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t . I t was i n 
the propaganda o f h i s opponents t h a t Nabis' despotism became 
m o r a l l y u n a c c e p t a b l e , p r i m a r i l y because i t v/as p o l i t i c a l l y danger-
ous. I t was p o l i t i c a l l y dangerous i n the f i r s t p l a c e because i t 
v/as s u c c e s s f u l l y e s t a b l i s h e d , and because i t was a m a n i f e s t a t i o n 
o f t h e l o n g - s t a n d i n g S p a r t a n t h r e a t t o Achaea, j u s t as i f Mantinea 
had n o t been. I n t h e second p l a c e , t h e regime c r e a t e d e x i l e s . 
T h i s i\ras m o r a l l y o b j e c t i o n a b l e on h u m a n i s t i c grounds, i n t h a t 
Greek democracies tended - except i n t i m e s o f s t a s i s - t o accom-
raoda.te t h e i r opjponents i f t h e y v/ere w i l l i n g t o come t o terms. 
P o l y b i u s ' o b j e c t i o n t o Nabis i s p a r t l y an e x p r e s s i o n o f h i s 
humane d i s l i k e o f t h i s aspect of nakedly o l i g a r c h i c or a.utO" 
c r a t i c systems. But t h e e:;dJ.es were a l s o an immediate p o l i t i c a l 
jproblem, and t h i s has sharpened P o l y b i u s ' acrimony. For the 
problem o f t h e s e t t l e m e n t o f the Spartan e x i l e s was the major 
i s s u e i n Achaean p o l i t i c s i n the years f o l l o v j i n g the d e a t h o f 
Nabis and t h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f Sparta i n t h e League. Nabis' 
regime, t h e r e f o r e , v/as d o u b l y d e t e s t a b l e . But we s h o u l d assess 
Ncibis' success w i t h o u t t h e f l a v o u r o f P o l y b i u s ' m o r a l and 
p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n , as a phenomenon o f t h e t i m e . As we are 
r-iO ... ]o ™ 
concerned o n l y w i t h Nabis' p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Achaea, 
and h i s p a r t i n Greek p o l i t i c s i n g e n e r a l , t h e s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r 
o f h i s regime does n o t a f f e c t the i s s u e . 
I n 206 P h i l i p b r o u g h t h i s war v ; i t h the A e t o l i a n s , v/ho had 
become weary o f v / a i t i n g f o r Roman s u p p o r t , t o an end £uihus_ 
Z £ 3 i l ^ " L j I S l ^ i 5 i £ £ i ^ ^ Appian r e c o r d s t h e presence o f Galba a t 
t h e m e e t i n g o f the A e t o l i a n s i n 206, a t which i t v;as decided t o 
make peace w i t h P h i l i p . He t r i e d t o oppose the mo t i o n a c c e p t i n g 
t h e peace, b u t was shouted dovm. There c o u l d be no doubt t h a t 
t h e A e t o l i a n s were v/ar-v/eary and f e l t l e t dovm by t h e r e c e n t 
inadequacy o f Roman s u p p o r t . P h i l i p grasped h i s o p p o r t u n i t y o f 
d i s r u p t i n g t h e ranks o f h i s opponents by making peace w i t h 
A e t o l i a . There i s v e r y l i t t l e i n f o r m a t i o n i n the sources about 
t h i s peace, w h i c h t h e Romans opposedj b u t P h i l i p ' s a l l i e s , i n c -
l u d i n g Achaea, must have p a r t i c i p a t e d i n i t , and a l s o the Greek 
a l l i e s o f t h e A e t o l i a n s , T h i s had t h e e f f e c t o f r e . t u r n i n g t he 
war t o t h e s i t u a t i o n i n v;hich i t had been b e f o r e the Roman 
a l l i a n c e w i t h A e t o l i a i n 211: the ti«;o p r o t a g o n i s t s , P h i l i p and 
Rome, vfere s t i l l enemies and s t i l l a t v;ar, b u t Rome was now a g a i n 
h.h. 
v ; i t h o u t e f f e c t i v e a l l i e s . 
Even b e f o r e the peace o f 206 t h e Sens.te seems t o liave been 
impressed by A e t o l i a n vjar-weariness, f o r i t mounted a l a r g e 
e x p e d i t i o n o f 10,000 i n f a n t r y , 1,000 c a v a l r y and 35 s h i p s , vrfiich 
had a l r e a d y s e t o u t when t h e nevfs t h a t t h e A e t o l i a n s had made 
peace i n d e p e n d e n t l y a r r i v e d at-Rome. T h i s renewed Roman a c t i v i t y 
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vjas c l e a r l y a tard.y a t t e m p t t o shovj t h a t t h e n e g l e c t o f the 
e a s t e r n t h e a t r e ha.d n o t been the r e s u l t o f any e s s e n t i a l 
l e s s e n i n g o f Soman i n t e r e s t i n the war. P h i l i p v/as s t i l l t h e 
enemy, and the Senate c o u l d n o t e a s i l y a c q u i e s c e , f o r p r e s t i g e 
r e a sons, i n t h e wax's s i m p l y p e t e r i n g o u t , v / i t h o u t f i r s t me k i n g 
a d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f power. P. Serapronius T u d i t a n u s a r r i v e d a t 
Dyrrhachium a t the end o f 206 w i t h the Roman f o r c e s . But events 
o f t h e yei?Lr o f f e r e d no advantage t o e i t h e r s i d e : t he Romans were 
u n w i l l i n g t o c a r r y on t h e war a l o n e , and broke t h e deadlock by 
opening n e g o t i a t i o n s v r i i i c h l e d t o t h e peace o f Phoenice. T h i s i s 
no t t h e p l a c e f o r a. d i s c u s s i o n of the s i g n a t o r i e s o f the Peace. 
For our purpose, i t i s enough t o n o t i c e t he e f f e c t o f t h i s peace 
on t h e Peloponnesian s i t u a t i o n : Achaea v/as a d s c r i p t a on P h i l i p ' s 
s i d e - a.s we s h o u l d expect - and on the Roman, Nabis, E l i s and 
Messene. "For Achaea t h i s f o r m a l l y marked t h e end o f the war 
with Rome, whic h had n o t , i n f a c t , a f f e c t e d her g r e a t l y s i n c e 
208. The a s p e c t s o f t h e g e n e r a l c o n f l i c t v/hich had a f f e c t e d her 
most a t the h e i g h t o f t h e v;ar had a l r e a d y been removed b e f o r e the 
f i n a l peace was made a t Phoenice: the t h r e a t from S p a r t a had been 
t e m p o r a r i l y d e s t r o y e d by Philopoemen's v i c t o r y a t Mantinea; the 
t h r e a t from t h e A e t o l i a n e s t a b l i s l m i e n t a t E l i s had been removed 
by the vfar-v/eariness which c u l m i n a t e d i n the peace o f 206. 
I I 
The second p a r t o f t h i s chapter v ; i l l a t t e m p t t o show t h a t 
a f t e r Mantinea Philopoemen adopted Achaean independence, which he 
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had been encouraged t o a c h i e v e by P h i l i p , as an a c t i v e p o l i c y . 
T i l l s n a t u r a l l y b r o u g h t him i n t o c o n f l i c t v ; i t h P h i l i p and event-
u a l l y i n d u c e d him t o l o o k t o Rome as Achaea's most l i k e l y a l l y 
when t h e Second Macedonian k'ar v;a.s on the p o i n t o f b r e a k i n g o u t . 
B e f o r e e3:,amining the d e t a i l e d and c h r o n o l o g i c a l development o f 
t h i s change between 207 and 200, i t i s f i r s t necessary t o demon-
s t r a t e t h a t t h i s change i n p o l i c y v;as r e a l and d i d a c t u a l l y 
occur. 
The f i r s t evidence i s P h i l i p ' s a,ttempted murder o f 
Philopoemen, a l l e g e d by P l u t a r c h . The account i s undated, b u t 
the c o n t e x t p l a c e s i t around 205: ^iXiirrroc faev Y^P ° ''^ wv 
MaxeSovwv pao"t?iei>c ol6(.ievoc, av exiroSwv o ^tXcnotprjV Y E V I I T O - I - J 
irdXtv WarrTTigetv ahi^t^ xowc; ' A X C I I O U G , gireijiifev tic "Ap^oc ocp«(^a 
Touc avo.ipricrovTa<: a u t o v eviYVKC^eCorf, be %r\Q efripowXr^ 
-rravTrdiTCooc V e5e|jt,orj9T) xal 8i,ep>v.r]9'n Trpoc trowc'^^^'nvac, Pausanias 
has v i r t u a l l y t h e same account. P l u t a r c h ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f 
the attemjpt i n t h i s passa.ge, t h a t P h i l i p v/anted t o curb 
Philopoemen's i n s i s t e n c e on Achaean independence, s u i t s our 
t h e s i s i d e a l l y . I f P h i l i p was prepared t o go t o th e l e n g t h o f 
o r g a n i s i n g a p o l i t i c a l a s s a s s i n a t i o n o f Philopoemien, vje must 
s u r e l y conclude : i r i t h P l u t a r c h t h a t Philopoemen v/as f o l l o v / i n g a 
p o l i c y , n o t o n l y o f Acliaean s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y b u t a l s o o f a n t i -
Macedonian independence. T h i s c o n c l u s i o n i s necessary i f we 
b e l i e v e t h a t P l u t a r c h ' s account r e p r e s e n t s an a c t u a l murder 
a t t e m p t by P h i l i p . But the m a t t e r i s more c o m p l i c a t e d : f o r 
a l t h o u g h v/e can n o t p r o v e t h a t t h i s a t t e m p t e d murder i s an 
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u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d a l l e g a t i o n , some c o n s i d e r a t i o n s l e a d t o t h i s 
c o n c l u s i o n . 
I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , P h i l i p shov/ed l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n Achaea 
between h i s d e c i s i o n t o m a i n t a i n h i s bo r d e r g a r r i s o n s i n 207 axid 
200, vjhen he vjas a g a i n threatened, w i t h Roman i n t e r v e n t i o n . ' I n 
i t s e l f , t h i s i s by no means conc3-usive, f o r source m a t e r i a l i s 
fr a g m e n t a r y f o r these y e a r s . But the f a c t remains t h a t the major 
o b j e c t o f P h i l i p ' s i n t e r e s t i n these y e a r s was h i s a t t e m p t t o 
esrpand i n t h e Aegean and M a t o l i a , and t o t h i s aim Achaea was 
p e r i p h e r a l . The second o b j e c t i o n - aga.in n o t c o n c l u s i v e ~ i s 
t h a t P h i l i p was f r e q i i e n t l y charged w i t h murder: so much so t h a t 
i l a m i n i n u s j o k e d a bout i t v/hen ho c o n f e r r e d w i t h P h i l i p a t Nicaea 
i n 198. The j o k e v/as, no doubt, i n t e n d e d t o r e f e r t o t h e h a b i t , 
endemic i n t h e H e l l e n i s t i c monarchies, o f j u d i c i a l murder o f 
embarrassing i n d i v i d u a l s . But rumours were a l s o c u r r e n t o f s i m p l e 
p o l i t i c a l a s s a s s i n a t i o n s . The r e c o r d s o f these are u n i f o r m l y 
p r e s e r v e d f r o m h o s t i l e non-Macedonian, s o u r c e s , and i n every case 
the evidence i s such t h a t i t ca.uses s t r o n g s u s p i c i o n s t h a t t he 
a l l e g a t i o n s a r e f a b r i c a t i o n s o f h o s t i l e contemporaries. I n the 
ca.se o f Philopoemen, t h e account i s o n l y o f a t t e m p t e d assa.ss-
i i i a t i o n , and t h e r e f o r e g i v e s r i s e t o some s u s p i c i o n s . But 
s u s p i c i o n s do n o t c o n s t i t u t e s o l i d e v i d e n c e , a.nd do n o t h i n g t o 
Zj.9 
d.emonstrate t h e i r ovm v a l i d i t y . Our c o n c l u s i o n miust t h e r e f o r e 
be t h a t a f i n a l d e c i s i o n on the t r u t h o f P l u t a r c h ' s account i s 
n o t -possible, d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t such evidence as t h e r e i s 
p o i n t s tov/ards i t s p o s s i b l e f a l s e h o o d . 
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T h i s i n d e c i s i v e c o n c l u s i o n d.oes n o t jprovide us v / i t h much 
i n f o r m a t i o n about Philopoemen's p o l i c i e s a t t h i s t i m e , b u t we 
must e x p l o r e f u r t h e r t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e p o s s i b l e f a l s i t y o f 
P l u t a r c h ' s account. VJhether t r u e or f a l s e , P l u t a r c h ' s account 
must come from P o l y b i u s , and t h e r e f o r e i n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e from 
Philopoemen h i m s e l f . I f i t i s f a l s e , we must assume t h a t i t 
e n t e r e d t h e t r a d i t i o n i n one o f th:cee ways. I t may have been 
Philopoemen's propaganda, a complete f a b r i c a t i o n aimed s o l e l y a t 
d i s c r e d i t i n g P h i l i p . S t r o n g l y a g a i n s t t h i s i s t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f 
making such an a c c u s a t i o n s t i c k w i t h o u t e i t h e r evidence or 
v/itnesses. Ife can t h e r e f o r e have some c o n f i d e n c e i n assuming 
t h a t t h e r e was some a c t u a l occurrence v;hich v;as used as source 
f o r t h e o r i g i n a l o f P l u t a r c h ' s account. T h i s l e a d s t o the second 
and t h i r d p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r t h e way i n \ d i i c h the account may have 
e n t e r e d the t r a d i t i o n . An a c t u a l 9.ttempt on Philopoemen's l i f e 
c o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d i n two v/ays t o produce the r e s u l t v/e have: 
e i t h e r as a conscious d i s t o r t i o n f o r p r o p a g a n d i s t reasons, o f an 
acttemsgt i n w h i c h P h i l i p was n o t , i n f a c t , i m p l i c a t e d ; or as the 
r e s u l t o f a s i n c e r e b e l i e f t h a t P h i l i p m ight a t t a c k him i n t h i s 
v/ay. A l l o f these t h r e e p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s lia.ve a s i m i l a r 
s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r our purpose, f o r a l l i m p l y t h a t a h o s t i l i t y 
bet\Afeen P h i l i p and Philopoemen e x i s t e d a t t h i s t i m e . A l t h o u g h 
we can proba,bly r e j e c t t h e f i r s t , i t seems i m p o s s i b l e t o decide 
v/hich. o f t h e o t h e r tv/o a l t e r n a t i v e s i s t h e more p r o b a b l e . The 
c o n c l u s i o n w h i c h i s r e a c h e d from t h i s e x a m i n a t i o n o f the p o s s i b l e 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e a l l e g e d murder a t t e m p t , i s t h a t whether t r u e 
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o r f a l s e , i t c e r t a i n l j r i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e r e was a s t r o n g h o s t -
i l i t y a t t h i s t i m e betv;een Philopoemen and P h i l i p . 
The second p i e c e o f evidence w h i c h demonstrates Philopoemen'c 
a n t i - H a c e d o n i a n p o s i t i o n a f t e r HantineaJ-s h i s a s s o c i a t i o n with 
A r i s t a e n u s . A r i s t a e n u c i n h i s st i : a ^ t e ^ i a o f 199/8 was r e s p o n s i b l e 
f o r e x i l i n g C y c l i a d a s , t h e l e a d e r o f t h e Macedonian p a r t y , and 
f o r b r e a k i n g c o m p l e t e l y v ; i t h the Macedonian a l l i a n c e and j o i n i n g 
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Rome. There can be no doubt t h a t A r i s t a e n u s was a n t i -
Macedonian and pro-Roman a.t t h i s t i m e . I t i s h i s a s s o c i a t i o n 
with Philopoemen v j h i c h i s n o t u s u a l l y demonstrated. The reason 
f o r t h e o b s c u r i t y o f the c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p betvreen t h e two men 
i n t h i s p e r i o d i s t h a t l a t e r they v/ere opposed t o each o t h e r on 
p o i n t s o f p r i n c i p l e connected w i t h t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the 
Achaean foedus with Rome. T h i s l a t e r oiDposition c r y s t a l l i s e d in. 
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the t r a d i t i o n - s t a r t i n g with a rais-interpretation o f P o l y b i u s 
- and was r e f l e c t e d back i n t o the e s i r l i e r p e r i o d . We t l i e r e f o r e 
have t h e i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e p i c t u r e i n P l u t a r c h o f .Aristaenus 
h e l p i n g Philopoemen ~ a l t h o u g h , P l u t a r c h says, he d i f f e r e d from 
him p o ] . i t i c a l l y . '^'^  
The c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h i s v i t a l episode are t h a t when 
Philopoemen r e t u r n e d t o Crete i n 200, M e g a l o p o l i s v/as b e a r i n g 
the b r u n t o f the war with Nabis. The dominant M e g a l o p o l i t a n 
view o f Philopoemen's absence v/as t h a t he was d e s e r t i n g h i s 
n a t i v e c i t y j u s t a t t h e time when h i s h e l p was most needed. I t 
was t h e r e f o r e f o r m a l l y proposed t h a t he s h o u l d be e x i l e d . 
P l u t a r c h c o n t i n u e s : ol 6' 'Axaiol StexoAwav 'Aptoi-atvov 
iTe|j.i]/o.vTec etc MeYdXrjV noXtv o'xpaaTjYOv, oc xai'irep Stdcj^opoc xw 
§tXoirot|aevc trepl XT)V iToXcTetav, ow. efaoe TeXeoSr^vai, I;T)V 
xaxa6cxTjW. A r i s t a e n u s v/as £lt£a;tegos, and a l t h o u g h he i n t e r -
vened vtfith t h e s u p p o r t o f a f e d e r a l decree, i t i s i n c o n c e i v a b l e 
t h a t he v/ould have done so had he not wanted t o ; and he cannot 
have been p r e p a r e d t o t a k e e x t r a v a g a n t f e d e r a l a c t i o n t o p r e -
s e r v e Philopoemen's c i v i l r i g h t s i f he v/as opposed t o him -
A r i s t a e n u s v/as q u i t e p r e p a r e d t o e x i l e an i l l u s t r i o u s opponent, 
such as Cycliada.s. Philopoemen t h e r e f o r e would n o t m e r i t such 
f e d e r a l i n t e r v e n t i o n on h i s belia.lf a t t h i s c r i t i c a l t i m e u n l e s s 
he v/as a c l o s e a s s o c i a t e o f A r i s t e i e n u s ' . The c o n c l u s i o n seems 
i n e s c a p a b l e . 
I t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e t o demonstrate a p o s s i b l e e a r l i e r 
c o n n e c t i o n betv/een Philopoemen and A r i s t a e n u s , and w h i l e t h i s 
does n o t add a n y t h i n g t o our knowledge o f Philopoemen as p r o -
Roman or anti-Macedonian ~ i t i s b e f o r e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f such, 
a change becamie app a r e n t - i t does emphasise a g a i n t h e f a l s e h o o d 
o f t h e u n q u a l i f i e d a s s e r t i o n t h a t Philopoemen and A r i s t a e n u s v/ere 
opponents. I n t h e d i s p o s i t i o n s f o r Mantinea i n 207 P o l y b i u s 
g i v e s t h e name o f the .ichaean h i p p a r c h as 'kpimoXve^oQ o f 
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Dyffie. N i c c o l i n i has g i v e n a c o n v i n c i n g d e m o n s t r a t i o n t h a t the 
m a n u s c r i p t s are l i k e l y t o be i n e r r o r a t t h i s p l a c e , and t h a t 
t h e r e a d i n g s h o u l d p r o b a b l y be 'Api'crmi, voc ' I n t h r e e o f t h e 
p l a c e s where A r i s t a e n u s ' name occurs i n P o l y b i u s , some ma.nu-
s c r i p t s r e a d *Ap caxao vexog ,a.nd i n two passages o f P l u t a r c h the 
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same c o n f u s i o n o c c u r s . I t seems c l e a r t h a t i n t h e mddst o f 
such c o n f u s i o n among t h e m a n u s c r i p t s we s h o u l d n o t b o l d l y 
m a i n t a i n t.he co.rrectn.ess o f 'Apicrmtv£i;oc i ^ i P o l . 11.11.7, and 
s h o u l d s e r i o u s l y e n t e r t a i n N i c c o l i n i ' s s u g g e s t i o n t h a t the 
h i p p a r c h o f 208/7 and t h e s t r a t e ^ o s o f 199/8 are one and the 
same man,'''^  One d i f f i c u l t y i n t h i s , hov/ever, i s t h a t P l u t a r c h 
g i v e s t h e name o f A r i s t a e n u s ' home c i t y as M e g a l o p o l i s , 
P o l y b i u s , i n the s u r v i v i n g fragments, nov/here g i v e s t h e c i t y , 
u n l e s s we acce p t N i c c o l i n i ' s c o n j e c t u r e a t 11 ,11 .7 . T h i s g i v e s 
us a d i r e c t c l a s h between t h e two a u t h o r s . I f the P o l y b i a n 
r e a d i n g v/as c e r t a i n , we c o u l d e a s i l y e x p l a i n P l u t a r c h ' s v a r i a n t 
as a s i m p l e e r r o r . But the dilemma i s r e s o l v a b l e : an i n s c r i -
p t i o n from D e l p h i r e c o r d s honours s e t up by t h e .Achaeans t o 
'Apuoratvov Tt|.iom8eo(;: Aviiaiov apeTac evexev xal euuotac 'ccic eU 
a"o ^5voc xal xotx; av[nxd%o\>c xal T O V C (OCkovc "F.Xkavac; . As 
N i c c o l i n i p o i n t s o u t , i t would be s t r a n g e t o f i n d such a fulsome 
i n s c r i p t i o n s e t up a t D e l p h i f o r a man who shared t h e name, b u t 
n o t the b i r t h p l a c e o f the v/ell-loiown statesman, b u t o f whom no 
o t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n i n our c o m p a r a t i v e l y wide knowledge o f l e a d i n g 
.Achaean p o l i t i c i a n s i s available.'^'"^ The b e s t s o l u t i o n o f the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i s t h e r e f o r e t o accept t h a t P l u t a r c h has e r r e d , 
t h a t t h e m.anuscripts o f P o l y b i u s s h o u l d r e a d 'Aptcnrat voc a t 
11.11.7? aiid t h a t t h e D e l p h i c i n s c r i p t i o n r e f e r s t o t h e same man, 
the v/ell-known A r i s t a e n u s , t h e f r i e n d and contemporary o f 
Philopoemen. 
I f we accept t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n as p r o b a b l e , i t remains t o 
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make the p o i n t t h a t , s i n c e Philopoemen was s t r a t e g o s i n 208/7 
and A r i s t a e n a i s hipparch., t h e y v / i l l p r o b a b l y have shared the same 
p o l i t i c a l viev/s, t h e n a.s l a t e r . We have argued t h a t the 
e l e c t i o n s f o r 20o/7 were dominated by the sMctm^ltas o f P h i l i p , 
who wanted Philopoemen t o r e o r g a n i s e the .Achaean i n f a n t r y . Our 
c o n c l u s i o n must thereiTore be t h a t A r i s t a e n u s a l s o shared the 
s u p p o r t o f P h i l i p i n 208. We liave t h us shov/n t h a t Philopoemen 
was not alone i n h i s d e f e c t i o n from Macedon betv/een h i s success 
a t H a n t i n e a and the o u t b r e a k o f the Second Macedonian War, but 
v/as c l o s e l y connected v / i t h Aristae.nus t h r o u g h o u t the p e r i o d . 
The t h i r d p i e c e o f evidence v/hich demonstrates that 
Philopoemen was anti-Ma c e d o n i a n , and t h e r e f o r e pro-Roman., i n 200, 
i s h i s d e p a r t u r e f o r Crete in. 200/199. I t has a l r e a d y been 
shov/n t h a t Philopoemen's a c t i v i t y i n Crete v/as p a r t o f the 
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.Achaean v/ar a g a i n s t Nabis, but the events v/hich caused h i s 
d e p a r t u r e a t t h i s t i m e must be e l u c i d a t e d h e r e . The date and 
circ u m s t a n c e s are d i s c u s s e d by P l u t a r c h : o 6e KpTfr l troXepcov 
T T i i H x a B T a x a t crxpaTriYSov S taTTovTioc ex^Xriiam i r a p e t x e x a ^ ' eavToi ) 
x o t c EXSpoic cfrro&i&pdcrxojv %ov o t x o i iT6Xe{j.ov. rjcrav 8e xtvec; 
o l X e Y O V x e c , eirepouc xoov 'Axaim ^pT)|j,eva)v dpxovTac, tStcoxriv 
6v%a Tov § t X o r r o i | . i e v a xprfxai T T J V e a u t o C axoXf|V £.4>' TjYei-tovi'q. 
berpeZai xoXc, r o p x v v t o t c . V YO-p aXKoxpioc C T X O X T ^ , xaSdirep 
aXXo Tt XT%ia xriv OTpaT;r|Yi.XT)v xat iroXejj.txr|v apexriv Sx^tv 8ta 
iravTOC e v xpW^^ 'cpi-P^ poviX6!.iev>oc . • . The a c c u s a t i o n 
o f h i s enemies i s i n c r e d i b l e : Philopoemen was a d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
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mercenary s o l d i e r and engaged i n f i g h t i n g i n C r e t e : he would 
not r u n away from m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y . The o t h e r reason which 
P l u t a r c h g i v e s i s more f r u i t f u l , and can b e • s u b s t a n t i a t e d . I t s 
i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t t h i s was the v e r s i o n p r e f e r r e d by h i s 
f r i e n d s as a co u n t e r t o t h e l o c a l a c c u s a t i o n o f h i s abandoning 
M e g a l o p o l i s . The p o i n t o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n i n t h i s case i s 
concerned n o t w i t h h i s p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n i n Achaea, but w i t h 
h i s l o c a l p o s i t i o n i n M e g a l o p o l i s : there.iore i t c o u l d be s a i d , 
without l o s i n g f a c e , t h a t Philopoemen was s i m p l y u s i n g h i s 
i n v o l u n t a r y l e i s u r e . The vague i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e events 
which caused t h i s l e i s u r e - our p r i m a r y i n t e r e s t - may t h e r e f o r e 
b e t r u s t v / o r t h y . 
Philopoemen went to Crete becajase ( o r si r a p l y 'v/hen') the 
Achc^eans chose o t h e r s as gaigll:Pij-jg.§.° T b i s statement .is v a l u a b l e 
b o t h f o r t h e date and f o r t h e i n f o r m a . t i o n i t g i v e s about the 
reasons f o r the d e p a r t u r e . Philopoemen was s t r a t e £ p j S i n 2 0 l / 0 , 
and was succeeded by C y c l i a d a s (200/199) and A r i s t a e n u s (199 
/ 8 ) . I f we a r e t o take a secure da.te from P l u t a r c h ' s s t a t e -
ment, t h e e l e c t i o n o f i a rc2 io i r te£ must r e f e r t o C y c l i a d a s ' year 
or A r i s t a e n u s ' o r b o t h . Aymard-has a l r e a d y p o i n t e d o u t t h a t 
S£5Ji2Si?JS I'leet^ ^'^'^ mean £; t i jai2ejSoi, and t h e r e f o r e t h a t 
Philopoemen can have l e f t .Achaea i n 200/199 w i t h o u t c o n t r a -
d i c t i n g P l u t a r c h , But i n i t s e l f t h i s i s n o t p r o o f t h a t he d i d 
le a v e a t t h i s t i m e . Hov/ever, i f we take i t t o g e t h e r with the 
f a c t , v/hich we have a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d , t h a t Philopoemen and 
A r i s t a e n u s were c l o s e p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t e s , i t becomes 
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c o n c l u s i v e . For t h e e l e c t i o n of A r i s t a e n u s i n autumn 199 must 
be r e g a r d e d as a v i c t o r y f o r Philopoemen's p a r t y and p o l i c y , 
and would c e r t a i n l y n o t have the e f f e c t o f l e a v i n g him a t 
l e i s u r e t o l e a v e Achaea f o r Cre t e . V/e can t h e r e f o r e be sure 
t h a t Philopoeffien's d e p a r t u r e f o r Crete v/as d u r i n g t h e s t r a t e ^ j j i a 
o f G y c l i a d a s , 
I f A r i s t a e n u s ' p o l i t i c a l success would have p r e v e n t e d 
Philopoemen f r o m l e a v i n g Achaea, the c a u s a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f 
P l u t a r c h ' s g e n i t i v e a b s o l u t e - fav o u r e d by Patisanias - means t h a t 
Cyclia.das' e l e c t i o n was i t s e l f the reason f o r Philopoemen's 
d e p a r t u r e . C y c l i a d a s v/as l a s t mentioned i n t h e sources i n h i s 
strate£±a o f 210 /09 when Philopoeraen v/as h i p p a r c h . I n 200 he v/as 
e q u a l l y a s t r o n g s u p p o r t e r o f the Macedonian a l l i a n c e , b u t our 
evidence about Philopoeraen i n 20O suggests t h a t he v/as no 'longer • 
an a s s o c i a t e , b u t an opponent of C y c l i a d a s . We have shov/n t h a t 
Philopoeffien v;as f r i e n d l y v / i t h A r i s t a e n u s a t t h i s t i m e : b u t i n 
199 A r i s t a e n u s caused t h e e x i l e o f C y c l i a d a s , We a r e , t h e r e f o r e 
j u s t i f i e d i n c o n c l u d i n g t h a t Philopoemen and C y c l i a d a s v;ere 
s i m i l a r l y opposed p o l i t i c a . l l y a t t h i s t i m e . O p p o s i t i o n t o 
C y c l i a d a s meant o p p o s i t i o n t o Macedon; and i n the circumstances 
o f t h e t i m e , t h i s e n t a i l e d f r i e n d l i n e s s towards Rome. 
Philopoemen's departu.re f o r C r e t e , t h e r e f o r e , t o o k p l a c e i n 200/ 
199? was m o t i v a t e d by t h e e l e c t i o n of C y c l i a d a s and t h e r e s u l t i n g 
f e a r f o r h i s p o s i t i o n i n Achaea, and a g a i n demonstra.tes conc-
l u s i v e l y t h a t Philopoemen was no l o n g e r a s u p p o r t e r o f t h e 
Achaean a l l i a n c e v / i t h Macedon. 
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I n t h e l i g h t o f the change i n Phi].opoemen' s stand-point 
betv/een h i s success a t H a n t i n e a and h i s d e p a r t u r e f o r Crete i n 
200, v/hich we have demonstrated, a.n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the events 
o f t h i s p e r i o d can now be o f f e r e d . H antinea d i d more t h a n 
s i m p l y d e s t r o y t h e t h r e a t from Hachanidas: i t a l s o ope-ned up t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f c r e a . t i n g a new inde-pendent Achaean pov/er i n 
Peloponnese, P h i l i p shov/ed t h a t he had r e a l i s e d the s i g n i f i c a n c e 
o f 'the v i c t o r - y when he d e c i d e d t o keep the b o r d e r c a s t l e s , v/hich 
he .had p r e v i o u s l y o f f e r e d t o v a c a t e . But t h i s c o u l d n o t r e s t o r e 
Achaean morale t o i t s f e e b l e pre-Mantinea s t a t e . He h i m s e l f had 
begun t h e d i s c u s s i o n s a.bout t h e c a s t l e s , and the movement 
towards s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y i n Achaea - v/hich he had i n i t i a l l y 
encouraged - must have r e a c t e d u n f a v o u r a b l y t o h i s decisio'n n o t 
t o evacuate them. From t h i s p o i n t , i t must have ta k e n on some 
fe e l i n g ; s o f p o s i t i v e h o s t i l i t y towards P h i l i p . By 205 t h i s i n d e -
pendence rao-vem.ent.alread-y had a t t r a c t e d s u b s t a n t i a l s u p p o r t . 
P'hilopoernen v/£is stra_-bog-os f o r the second t i m e i n 206/5, and a t 
t h e Nemea o f 205 he paraded h i s v i c t o r i o u s Achaean t r o o p s t o 
scenes o f almost h y s t e r i c a l a c c l a i m . 
I n o r d e r t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e f u l l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s Achaean 
h y s t e r i a , we must bear i n mind th,at the Nemea v/as h e l d a t ^ A r g o s . 
Here t h e r e v/as t r a d i t i o n a l l y s t r o n g s u p p o r t f o r the Macedonian 
k i n g s , aiid P h i l i p i n p a r t i c u l a r had c u l t i v a t e d t h i s s u p p o r t by 
f r e q u e n t a t t e n d a n c e a t -the Nemea. Philopoemen's popula.r 
r e c e p t i o n must have seemed t o a Macedonian observer t o be i n the 
v/a.y o f a u s u r j s a t i o n o f P h i l i p ' s a.lniost t r a d i t i o n a l honours a t 
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the f e s t i v a l . And m.ore: h i s o v a t i o n v;as shared by the Achaean 
t r o o p s , who had saved t h e i r c o u n t r y by a c t i n g w i t h o u t a i d from 
abrocid and had become t h e .nev; e f f i c i e n c y - s y m b o l o f r e s u r g e n t 
Achtiean n a t i o n a l i s m . T h i s v/as a sharp cont.rast v / i t h the p r e v i o u s 
i n e f f e c t i v e f e e b l e n e s s o f the Achaean array, v/hich had even made 
i t necessary f o r P h i l i p t o leave the Memea o f 209 i n order t o 
r e p e l t h e .Romans. The p o p u l a r encouragement shov/n by t h i s 
o s t e n t a t i o u s l y p a t r i o t i c r e c e p t i o n - even i f aroused by s t r a t -
e g i c a l l y p3,aced c h e e r - l e a d e r s - c o u l d o n l y serve t o c o n f i r m 
Philopoemen i.n h i s embryo c l a i m t o Acliaean independence from. 
Macedon. P h i l i p ' s o f f e r t o vacate the b o r d e r c a s t l e s i n 208 i n 
a moment o f c r i s i s had demonstrated t o t h e Achaeans t h a t P h i l i p 
f e l t no s e i i t i m e n t a l attachmients t o Achaea. He had encouraged 
Achaean m i l i t e i r y e f f i c i e n c y and Philopoeraen had t a k e n him a t h i s 
word. A f t e r H a n t i n e a Philopoemen v/anted t o e x p l o i t t h e e f f e c t -
i v e n e s s o f tlrie Achaea.n army as a means o f a t t a i n i n g a form o f 
independence i n Peloponnese, v/hereas P h i l i p v/anted t o p u t the 
c l o c k back t o t.he p e r i o d o f un q u e s t i o n e d Macedo.nia_n hegemony. 
But he c o u l d n o t have i t b o t h ways, and the damage had a l r e a d y 
been done: Philopoem.en's success i n h i s independent a c t i o n a t 
Mantinea v/as f u l l y s u p p o r t e d by l a r g e numbers o f Achaeans, who 
g r e e t e d him a t t h e Nemea o f 205. P h i l i p had shov/n q u i t e b l u n t l y 
t h a t Macedonian i n t e r e s t a l o n e r u l e d h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p v / i t h 
Achaea: Philopoemen was now i n a p o s i t i o n i n which, he v/as p r e p -
a r e d t o show t h a t Aclia.ean i n t e r e s t , and Achaean i n t e r e s t a l o n e , 
s h o u l d i-ule Achaea's r e l a t i o n s h i p v / i t h Macedon. 
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Probably i n the same year, 20.5, Hegara v/as r e u n i t e d v/ith 
the League. Discussion has centred on the date a t vfhich the 
reunion occurred, and conclusions vary betvreen Philopoemen's 
1 9 3 / 2 , 2 0 1 / 0 , and 2 0 6 / 5 . But Ayniard bases h i s 
arguments i n favour of 2 0 6 / 5 on the order of events i n Plutarch's 
n a r r a t i v e , and vriiile they are not f i n a l l y d ecisive, they shov; the 
strong p r o b a b i l i t y of a date about t h i s time. We can therefore 
t e n t a t i v e l y accept t h a t the r e t u r n . o f Megara t o the League 
occurred i n Philopoemen' s s j t r a t e ^ i a of 2 0 6 / 5 , v/hich ma.kes i t 
possible t o i n t e r p r e t i t i n the l i g h t o f Philopoemen's nation-
a l i s t i c desire f o r Achaean expansionism and independence. From 
t h i s p o i n t of viev;, Megara. v/as an important gain f o r Achaea, as 
i t c o n t r o l l e d the passage through the Isthmus, But i t \'jas also 
a u s e f u l propaganda gain, i f P-'hilopoemen xvished t o gain support 
f o r h i s independent p o l i c y by emphasising the d e s i r a b i l i t y of 
reu.nifying the Acha.ea of the pre-Cleomenic War period. Tliis v;as 
the pe r i o d of Achaean independence and freedom from the shackles 
of the Macedonian hegemony: the emphasis placed by the accession 
of Megara on the conditions of t h i s early period of the Leagxxe 
must i n e v i t a b l y have had the e f f e c t of d i s c r e d i t i n g s t i l l f u r t h e r 
P h i l i p ' s current disregard f o r Achaean fe e l i n g s by continuing t o 
ii i a i n t a i n h i s hegemony over Achaea w i t h h i s garrisons. 
The independence a.t which Philopoemen aimed d i d not develop 
i n t o a d o c t r i n a i r e nationalism. There was a s o l i d p r a c t i c a l 
i n t e r e s t added t o the nationaJ.isra, which gave p r a c t i c a l a p p l i -
c a t i o n t o the p o l i c y . P h i l i p had encouraged Achaea t o defend 
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h e r s e l f against Sparta, and I'iantinea had not permanently ended 
the t h r e a t from Sparta. While Philopoemen had been enf-aged i n 
hi s a c t i v i t i e s i n Achaea, which provided him v/ith support--for a 
less close r e l a t i o n s h i p v/ith Hacedon, Nabis had been consolidating 
h i s p o s i t i o n i n Sparta. By 204 he possessed a mercenary army, 
r e c r u i t e d i n Crete as a r e s u l t of h i s close t i e s v/ith Cnossos and 
otlier Cretan c i t i e s j s.nd he f e l t strong enough at Sparta t o 
begin t o make use of i t abroad. The f i r s t move f o r an expan-
s i o n i s t Sparta v/as t r a d i t i o n a l l y towards the no r t h , and i n 
p a r t i c u l a r against southern.Arcadia. Nabis v/as no exception, and 
he nov/ began t o look f o r a £5L?ii£„^ ®l.li w i t h Achaea: i n 20A- he 
found i t . Some Boeotian t r a v e l l e r s had rested at Sparta, and 
before they l e f t persuaded one of Nabis' grooms t o defect and 
accompany them. He agreed and took w i t h him the best horse from 
Nabis' s t a b l e s . I n i t s e l f , t h i s d i d not have the makings of an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n c i d e n t . But the sequel involved Achaea: the men 
had s.lrea.d-y rea.ched Megalopolis before they v/ere caught by the 
Spartan p u r s u i t p a r t y . The Spartans n a t u r a l l y demanded that the 
alleged thieves be handed over, but were met v/ith a point-blank 
r e f u s a l from the Megalopolitans. Megalopolis v/as n a t u r a l l y 
h o s t i l e tov/ards a resurgent Sparta, and she v/as under no o b l i -
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gati o n t o hand over the f u g i t i v e s v/ho had sought asylum there. 
Nahis d i d not need t o take public offence at the Megalopolitan 
r e f u s a l unless he v/anted t o ; and i f he wanted to be provoc-
a t i v e , a po3.icy of appeasement by Mep^alopolis v/ould not s i g n i -
f i c a n t l y delay the outbreaJi of h o s t i l i t i e s . Nabis therefore 
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considered the r e f u s a l a s u f f i c i e n t p r e t e x t f o r an attack on 
Megalopolitan t e r r i t o r y , v/hich consisted of a r a i d on an out-
3.ying farm. V/e do not Imow whether the p r e t e x t was engineered 
by Nabis - i f so, v/e should have expected Polybius t o say so ~ 
or whether he simply took advantage of the opportunity v/hich v/as 
of f e r e d . I n amy ca.se, the slightness of the p r e t e x t makes i t 
quite clear t h a t he intended to provoke a war v/ith Achaea. The 
per i o d of freedom from a t t a c k from the south, won f o r Acliaea by 
Philopoemen's v i c t o r y a t Han tinea, v/as nov/ over. The nev/ t y r a n t 
had established himself, and the dangerous pre-Mantinea situstion 
v^ fas r e s t o r e d . Another opportunity f o r the continuing p r a c t i c a l 
a p p l i c a t i o n of Achaea's m i l i t a r y s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y was eas i l y 
found. 
The war, s t i l l undeclared on the p a r t of Achaea,^^ continued 
s p o r a d i c a l l y f o r the next two years, 203 and 2 0 2 . V/e have no 
inf o r m a t i o n about i t s events, and as a r e s u l t are probaMy j u s t -
i f i e d i n concluding t h a t no s i g n i f i c a n t advantage was v/on by 
e i t h e r side. LVen Philopoemen, xvho v/as probably stra^tegos f o r 
e i t h e r 20k-/3 or 2 0 3 / 2 , ^ ' ^ must have f a i l e d t o make any s i g n i f -
i c a n t impression. I f both sides v/ere content to occupy them™ 
selves v/ith border r a i d s - suggested by the Achaeans' f a i l u r e t o 
declare v/ar form.ally u n t i l 2 0 0 - there could, by the very nature 
of the war, be l i t t l e advantage gained. However, during the 
course of Lysippus' sjtra;be^^ of 2 0 2 / 1 Nabis a l t e r e d h i s 
t a c t i c s . He determined t o change the d i r e c t i o n of the v/ar by 
s t r i k i n g out f o r a. la.rger cind firmer base of oj)erations i n 
southern Peloponnese, from v/hich he would more e a s i l y be able 
to atta,ck Achaea. P'ollov/ing the exaiiple of Machanidas' attack 
on f r i e n d l y E l i s i n 2 0 8 , he launched an at t a c k on Messene, 
probably v/ith the support of an anti-Achaean p a r t y within the 
c i t y . At f i r s t he met l i t t l e resistance, as he was formally an 
a l l y from v/hom a t t a c k would be unexpected. 
I n h i s f i r s t a.pproach he gained c o n t r o l of a l l the c i t y 
except f o r Ithome. Philopoeraen immediately understood the new 
danger t o Achaea v/hich v/as i m p l i c i t i n the Spartan possession 
of Messene: t h i s would p a r t i c u l a r l y a f f e c t Megalopolis, which 
must already have borne the brunt of the undeclared v/ar. When 
Lysippus v/as urged by Philopoemen • to send f e d e r a l forces to 
prevent Nabis from occupying the whole of Hessene, he v/as more 
concerned t o r e f l e c t upon the fact tlia.t Messene had join e d 
A e t o l i a i n 23.1 and had remained a member of the h o s t i l e a l l i a n c e 
u n t i l 2 0 5 . Lysippus cannot have arjpreciated t h a t the danger to 
Achaea as a whole from Spartan possession of Messene v/as sub-
s t a n t i a l enough t o make i t v/orth h i s i-/hile g i v i n g the prestige 
of h i s o f f i c e t o an u n s o l i c i t e d and unapproved expedition t o the 
a i d of a recent enemy. I n s t r i c t lav/, he had ample excuse f o r 
refu.sing Philopoem.en' s request: no source mentions t h a t any 
f a c t i o n of the Messenians formally appealed t o Achaea, only t h a t 
Philopoemen took the i n i t i a t i v e I n urging Achaean i n t e r v e n t i o n . 
Philopoemeii may well have a n t i c i p a t e d some f a c t i o n a l support i n 
Ifessene f o r a c t i o n against Nabis' attempted coup; but Lysippus 
as s t r a t e ^ o s could not l e g i t i m a t e l y i n t e r f e r e i n the a f f a i r s of 
another sovereign s t a t e v/ithout r e c e i v i n g an appeal from some 
f a c t i o n . At the same time, Achaea v/as not formally a t v/ar v/ith 
Nabis, therefore f e d e r a l i n t e r v e n t i o n v/as doubly i l l e g i t i m a t e , 
Philopoemien, hov/ever, decided t o take p r i v a t e a c t i o n . He had 
no f e d e r a l o f f i c e , t h e r e f o r e v/as not prevented from a c t i n g by any 
f e d e r a l scruples. He could command no f e d e r a l forces, but he did 
not laave any d i f f i c u l t y i n r a i s i n g a force from Megalopolis, v/ith 
v/hich he marched t o Messene. The tlxreat t o Achaea from Nabis' 
possession of Messene n a t u r a l l y appjeared more r e a l when viev/ed from 
Megalopolis than from Aegiuin: the pro x i m i t y of the d.anger made 
a c t i o n which the f e d e r a l a u t h o r i t i e s considered unnecessary and 
i l l e g i t i m a t e v i t a l and equ i t a b l e . This was not the f i r s t time t h a t 
a s e c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t i n Achaea had taken i t i n t o i t s ovm hands to 
were p r o t e c t i t s e l f , v/hen i t v/as clear t h a t the f e d e r a l a u t h o r i t i e s 
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um«-lling; nor v/as i t the f i r s t time t h a t a close r e l a t i o n s h i p 
betvjeen Messene and Megalopolis had proved mutually b e n e f i c i a l : the 
refuge v/hich the Messenians had offered the Me galop olita:as i n 2 2 3 , 
under a r e v e r s a l of the present circumstances, v/ould not be f o r -
gotten by Philopoeraen. Nabis v/as surprised by the a r r i v a l of the 
Megalopolitans; the Emti-Spartan Messenians r a l l i e d , and as 
Philopoemen entered one gate, Na.bis escaped out of the opposite 
gate. There v/as l i t t l e f i g h t i n g , i f v/e are t o believe Polybius, v/ho 
i s behind Plutarch's account; and i t may be t h a t Nabis, v/ho had 
c l e a r l y overestima.ted the strength of h i s support, did. not wajit t o 
r i s k h i s forces i n an encounter i n v/hich he v/as l i k e l y t o be 
beaten. The a r r i v a l of Philopoemen and h i s Megalopolitans had 
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prevented him from c a p i t a l i s i n g on h i s i n i t i a l success,^^"^ 
The success of Philopoeraen's u n o f f i c i a l a c t i o n against Wabis 
must have increased h i s p o p u l a r i t y i n Achaea, f o r he v/as elected 
s.5raj£££.2S 201/0. The c r i t i c a l issue was s t i l l Sj)arta; and 
since P h i l i p v/as f u l l y occupied elsev/here, Achaea could j u s t l y be 
g r a t e f u l t o Philopoemen. He v/as successful enough against Nabis f o r 
i t t o be unnecessary f o r him t o i n s i s t on a formal d e c l a r a t i o n of 
v/ar by a f e d e r a l s^^^lg^tos. But h i s Megalopolitan o r i g i n s made him 
take care t o prevent the continuation of Nabis' attacks. He, as 
v/ell as Nabis, had h i s Cretan connections, and he made use of them 
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against Nabis i n 200, He had no scruples about s t r i k i n g back a t 
Nabis without a formal decla^ration of v/ar, and the success of a 
c u t t i n g - o u t e x p e d i t i o n , i n which his Cretans took p a r t , against some 
of Nabis' mercenaries at Pellana v/as. such that Nabis v/aited u n t i l 
Philopoemen had vacated the £t£ategla before launching any f u r t h e r 
attaclcs on Achaea. Polybius gives a d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of the 
impressive v/ay i n which t h i s escpedition v/as assembled i n secrecy 
before the a t t a c k , but h i s admiration does not ref].ect any major 
importance of the exped-ition i t s e l f : h i s admiration i s di r e c t e d 
s o l e l y toii/ards the t e c h n i c a l competence v/hich Philopoemen displayed 
i n c a r r y i n g out the complicated arrangements. But apart from t h i s 
t e c h n i c a l i n t e r e s t , t h e e x p e d i t i o n was simply a facet of 
Philopoemen's co n t i n u a t i o n of the v/ar of l o c a l border r a i d s . The 
only develojjment v/as t h a t the r e t a l i a t i o n v/as nov/ placed on a 
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f e d e r a l b a s i s . ' Although i t was not s u f f i c i e n t ] . y important f o r i t 
t o be necessary t o declare v/o-r, i t s success v/as s t a r t l i n g i n 
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keeping Nabis q u i e t f o r the remainder of the year. Nabis v;as no 
hothead, and h i s tv/o recent experiences of Philopoemen's energy 
v/ere s u f f i c i e n t f o r him t o decide to v/ait u n t i l he had been 
replaced i n the £"j;i£2Jteg2-!!; ^^e^oi^e continuing h i s plundering r a i d s 
on Megalopolis and southern Arcadia. I n the long run, 
Philopoemen's successes i n quietening Nabis bad l i t t l e e f f e c t on 
the course of the v/ar, but only served t o l u l l the Achaeans i n t o 
a f a l s e sense of s e c u r i t y . 
I t has already been noticed t h a t Cycliadas v/as elected 
strat^e£Os i n autumn 2 0 0 , and that Philopoeraen as a r e s u l t l e f t 
xlchaea f o r Crete. He v/as a p o l i t i c a l associa.te of Aristaenus', 
shared h i s anti-Macedonianism and' i n 199 f r i e n d l i n e s s tov/ards 
Home, and was th e r e f o r e i n opposition to Gycliada,s. Cycliadas' 
e l e c t i o n , i n f a c t , c o n s t i t u t e d a major defeat f o r Philopoemen and 
Aristaenus. The main problem remaining f o r us, about the elec-
t i o n of Cycliadas, i s t o ex p l a i n the circumstances i n which i t 
became p o l i t i c a l l y p o s s i ble. Philopoemen v/as strategos i n 2 0 1 / 
0 0 , and had some success against Nabis, v-zhich should have been 
s u f f i c i e n t t o secure the e l e c t i o n of another of his group as 
£.V.-£iitg.S,2® 2 0 0 / 1 9 9 ~ Aristaenus, f o r instance, v/as av a i l a b l e 
and e l i g i b l e . .We must, therefore, consider the other events of 
Philopoemen's ^^'^  '^-'^^ l i g h t of t h i s problem. 
I n the s p r i n g of 2 0 0 , the Eornan propag;anda mission, v/hich v/as 
sent t o Greece v/hen the Senate decided on v/ar vrith P h i l i p , v i s i t e d 
Aegium. The members v/ere C. Claudius Nero, M, /lerailius Lepidus and 
P. Serapronius l i i d i t a n u s . I t s main purpose was t o attempt t o seduce 
P h i l i p ' s Greek a l l i e s and t o confirm the f r i e n d s h i p of those 
s t a t e s v/hich had supported Rome i n the previous v/ar.'''^ ' On t h e i r 
v/ay from I t a l y the eimbassadors had already v i s i t e d the Ep i r o t s , 
Amynander and the Aetolians. Before going on from Naupactus to 
Athens, v/here they were t o meet A t t a l u s , they crossed the Gulf 
to v i s i t the Achaeans at Aegiura, I n each place they based 
t h e i r propaganda on the claim t h a t P h i l i p must %<x)V pev * E I X X T ^ V C O V 
jiTi6evl iToXe(j.erv The m.otif appeared mi l d enough: the Romans 
(unasked, except by Rhodes and A t t a l u s ) were announcing t h e i r 
P rotectorate of the Hellenes. I f P h i l i p v/as w i l l i n g to become 
a Roman c l i e n t and t o allow Greece t o become a Roman 
Protectora.te v/ithout f i g h t i n g for his hegemony - conditions v/hich 
were impossible f o r P h i l i p t o accept - v/ar v/ould be 
unnecessary,^"^ E s s e n t i a l l y benevolent i n tone to the Greeks, 
the mission and i t s message were generally v/ell received by the 
states i t v i s i t e d . 
I n Achaea, Philopoemen v/as strategos when the ambassadors 
a r r i v e d a t Aegium. Since Mantinea, he had been r e l y i n g on the 
st r e n g t h of the AchaeaJi army to give r e a l i t y to his attempts to 
persuade the Achaeans t o adopt an a t t i t u d e of independence from 
P h i l i p , as fa^r as the continued presence of the garrisons 
allov/ed. I n these circumstances, the Roma.n propaganda, m o t i f 
.v/as eminently s u i t a b l e . When Philopoemen heard the ambass-
adors' message, t h a t they were demanding that P h i l i p should stop 
making v/ar on the Greeks, h i s im.mediate r e a c t i o n must have been 
sympathetic. Por from Philopoemen's point of view, what were 
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the Macedonian garrisons other than one aspect of P h i l i p ' s war 
on the Greeks? There could be no dis g u i s i n g Philopoemen's 
i n t e r e s t i n the Roman proposal, f o r i t s u i t e d his p o l i c y 
admirably. We have no evidence t h a t h i s anti-Macedonianism -
evidenced by the alleged murder attempt - had yet turned t o pro-
Romanism. Yet Aristaenus i n 1 9 9 / 8 was f u l l y committed t o 
j o i n i n g Rome i n the v/ar against P h i l i p . The most economical 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the a v a i l a b l e evidence i s tha t Philopoemen's 
and Aristaenus' anti-Ma.cedonianism f i r s t turned tov/ards Rome 
when t h i s Roman propaganda embassy c a l l e d a t Aegium i n 2 0 0 , f o r 
at t h i s p o i n t the Romans and Philopoemenists discovered that 
they had a common anti-Macedonia.nism. 
For the moment there could be no p o s s i b i l i t y of Achaean 
a c t i o n against P h i l i p , even v/ith the promise of Roman support: 
the Macedonian garrisons held Achaea by the t h r o a t . And more 
than t h i s : i t v/as by no means c e r t a i n t h a t a m a j o r i t y of the 
Achaeans v/ould support a. move tov/a,rds ahaaidoning the Macedonian 
a l l i a n c e , despite Philopoemen's personal inf].uence. The 
p o s i t i v e aspect of Philopoemen's p o l i c y - the assertion of 
Achaean pov/er i n Peloponnese against Sparta and the r i g h t of 
independent a c t i o n - v/as recognised as p a t r i o t i c and desirable, 
as h i s r e c e p t i o n a t the Nemea of 203 adequately shov/s. The 
negcative aspect •- the anti-Macedonian asipect, which was a. 
n a t u r a l grov/th from the other - v/as more r e v o l u t i o n a r y , more 
dangerou.s t o put i n t o p r a c t i c e , and therefore demonstrably less 
d e s i r a b l e f o r Achaea. The independence achieved up t o t h i s 
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p o i n t had been exercised w i t h i n the l i m i t s imposed by the 
Macedonian hegemony: i t v/as safe, and had, i n the f i r s t 
insts.nce, been encouraged by P h i l i p . The step now envisaged 
v/as incomparably l a r g e r , and therefore could be expected t o 
a t t r a c t less support. Most Achaeans can have had l i t t l e con-
cept of the d i s p a r i t y between Roman and Macedonian pov/er: even 
a f t e r most of the garrisons were removed and the Roman a l l i e s 
were blockading C o r i n t h i n I98, i-Vristaenus had d i f f i c u l t y i n 
obt a i n i n g a m a j o r i t y f o r h i s proposal t o abandon the Macedonian 
a l l i a n c e and j o i n Rome. But the formation of a mild.ly pro-
Roman group i n Achaea seems l i k e l y to have taken i t s o r i g i n from 
the appearance of the Roman propaganda mission at Aegium i n 200, 
I t v/as not a group of pro-Roman q u i s l i n g s ; i t was rath e r a 
group ^^/hich ii/as prepared a t t h i s stage t o give a cautious 
v/elcome t o .Roman expressions of i n t e r e s t , v/hich happened t o have 
features i n common w i t h the p o l i c y v/hich the group ha.d .inde-
pendently evolved, Philopoemen's p a r t i a l achievement of ind.e-
pendence had n a t u r a l l y l e d t o anti-Maced-onianism; i n t h i s the 
i n t e r e s t s of Rome coincided. I t was therefore n a t u r a l t h a t an 
element of f r i e n d l i n e s s t o Rome should, i n the present circum-
stances, take i t s place i n the p o l i c i e s of the independence 
p a r t y . 
I f v/e are correct i n t a k i n g the presence of t h i s Roman 
mission at Aegium i n 200 as the point of o r i g i n of the Achaean 
pro-Roman, p a r t y , we have come close to expl a i n i n g the circum-
stances of Cycliadas' e l e c t i o n . I f Philopoemen and Aristaenus 
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at t h i s p o i n t formed a p o l i c y v/hich envisaged the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of co-operation v/ith Rome, the shape of t h e i r propaganda must 
have changed t o s u i t t h i s nev/ development i n t h e i r p o l i c y . 
They v / i l l not h_tive simply kept q u i e t about t h e i r proposed 
en^ejrte v/ith Rome, Cycliada,s, on the other lia.nd, v/as famous 
f o r only one t h i n g : f o r being head of the pro-Macedonian peirty 
i n Achaea. And v/e miust assume t h a t i t v/as t h i s domdnant feature 
of h i s p o l i t i c a l character v/hich caused his e l e c t i o n . The con-
f l i c t betv/een the nev/ Philopoemenist p o l i c y and Gycliadas' 
t r a d i t i o n a l i s m i s obvious, and v/e must conclude from Cycliadas' 
success t h a t the nev/ Philopoemenist p o l i c y v/as beaten conc-
l u s i v e l y i n the e l e c t i o n s - t o the extent that Philopoemen could 
not face l i v i n g i n Achaea w i t h the n o t o r i e t y of h i s defeat and 
perhaps the t h r e a t of e x i l e hanging over him. Aristaenus d i d 
stay i n Achaea, and braved the defeat. He seems t o liave been 
more of a p o l i t i c i a n than Philopoemen, and more prepared t o teike 
p o l i t i c a l r i s k s i f f u t u r e prospects were i n v i t i n g . I n any case 
he d i d not ha.ve a convenient i n v i t a t i o n from the Gortynians 
w a i t i n g t o be taken up, t o provide himself w i t h a p a t r i o t i c 
excuse f o r vo].untary e x i l e . The absence of Philopoem.en, 
hov/ever, d i d raesin t h a t Aristaenus v/as l e f t as chief represent-
a t i v e of the po.rty v/hich they had j o i n t l y formed ~ a p o s i t i o n 
which he may lia.ve f e l t v/as worth the r i s k of e x i l e at the hands 
of the resictionary Gycliadais. 
One f u r t h e r event of airburnn 2 0 0 tends to confirm t h a t t h i s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Cycliadas' e l e c t i o n i s c o r r e c t . The wave of 
n 
- 102 
r e a c t i o n against Philopoemen and Aristaenus seems t o have manif 
ested i t s e l f again, perhaps alread.y befoi^e the e l e c t i o n . A f t e r 
the f a l l of Abydus t o P h i l i p - probably i n September - Achaeai 
ambassadors ai-rived a t Rhodes, v/hich was ta k i n g the lead v/ith 
Pergsmium i n the reintrceduction of the Eomaias. The Achaeans 
asked the Rhodians t o t r y t o reach agreement v/ith P h i l i p ; but 
the Roman propaganda mission, v/hich v/as j u s t about t o complete 
i t s journey t o Antiochus ancl Ptolemiy Epiphanes, intervened and 
urged the .Rhodians not t o make peace v/ithout Roman consent. The 
Rhodians v/ere only too glad t o be reassured of Roman support, 
and immediately a.greed,'^^ 
The Romans opposed t h i s Acliaean embassy of c o n c i l i a t i o n f o r 
obvious reasons: they d i d not v/ant t h e i r p o t e n t i a l a l l i e s t o be 
n e u t r a l i s e d i n t h i s way. As t h i s embassy v/as so c l e a r l y 
contrary t o Roman i n t e r e s t s , i t cannot have been sent v/ith the 
consent of Philopoemen, but must represent the p o l i c y of 
Cycliadas and the pro-Macedonians. The a c t u a l date of the 
embassy and i t s chi'onological r e l a t i o n t o the .Achaean e l e c t i o n s 
are not cle a r , and cannot be discovered. I f i t was before the 
e l e c t i o n of Cycliadas, i t suggests.that the Philopoemenists had 
already l o s t the support of the s^rio6x>s before the e l e c t i o n s ; 
i f a f t e r the e l e c t i o n s , i t merely confirms t h a t Cycliadas was 
w i l l i n g t o v/ork i n the i n t e r e s t s of P h i l i p . But from the p o i n t 
of view of p a r t i e s and p o l i c i e s , t h i s e s s e n t i a l l y a.nti-Roman 
mission t o Rhodes confirms \iha^t we have already established, 
t h a t the support which Philopoeraen and Aristaenus bad a t t r a c t e d 
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v/hile t h e i r p o l i c y was based s o l e l y on p a t r i o t i c ind.ependence, 
v/as l o s t by t.he end of Philopoeraen' s sjb;;cit£gia of 2 0 1 / 0 ; and 
tha t the reason f o r t h i s loss of support v/as the proposed 
^''ith -Rome, 
The ten years of Philopoeraen's p o l i t i c a l career i n Achaea 
betv/een h i s v i s i t s to Crete saw a major change i n h i s p o l i c i e s . 
I n Crete u n t i l 2 1 1 , he had bee.n working i n P h i l i p ' s Lnterests, 
and he continued t o co-oi^erate a f t e r h i s r e t u r n t o Achaea, He 
gained l i i s f i r s t f e d e r a l o f f i c e s , the hipparchy i n 2 1 0 / 0 9 and 
'^^•^  .§ji£^ Li£EiS 2 0 8 / 7 , w i t h P h i l i p ' s support. .But the devel-
o;ping c r i s i s i n P h i l i p ' s v/ar w i t h Rome made i t impossible f o r him 
t o continue t o p r o t e c t Achaea from Sparta. His encouragement of 
Philopoemen t o undertake the remodelling of the Achaean army v/as 
too successful, and the death of Hachanidas at Mantinea created 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of an Achaean p o l i c y v/hich aimed a t achieving a 
l o c a l independence, v/hich Philopoeraen believed could be maint-
ained by the new Achaean array. I n t h i s he was probably supported, 
by -Aristaenus, A s o l i d b a r r i e r against achieving t h i s aim v/as 
formed by the Macedonian garrisons; and i t was n a t u r a l that the 
r e s u l t of th.is opposition should be the growth of an a n t i -
Macedonian aspect i n t h e i r p o l i c y of Achaean inde;pendence i n 
Peloponnese. The next - and most far-reaching - developra.ent came 
2 0 0 v/ith t h e i r r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t t h e i r anti-Macedonianism v/as 
ihared by Rome. This u n i t y of i n t e r e s t caused them t o e.xpress 
t i o u s v/il].ingness t o co-operate w i t h the Romans, But t h i s 
a s s o c i a t i o n v/ith Achaea's recent enemies caused a major p o l i t i c a l 
i n 
cau'i 
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r e a c t i o n i n Achaea, and a surge of new support f o r Cycliadas 
and h i s p o l i c y , probably stimulated by P h i l i p ' s r e a l i s a t i o n of 
the danger i m p l i c i t i n any success f o r h i s opponents. The 
embassy t o Rhodes and the e l e c t i o n of Cycliadas mark s u b s t a n t i a l 
defeats f o r Philopoemen. and Aristaenus. I t seemed t h a t , f o r the 
moment, they had l o s t the struggle. Philopoemen decided that the 
safest course f o r him was t o r e t u r n t o Crete. .Aristaenus took 
the r i s k of s t a y i n g i n Achaea as .d,e_,J"aa;to leader of the pa.rty and 
representative of Philopoemen's i n t e r e s t s i n Achaea. They had 
taken up an extreme p o s i t i o n , and had advanced beyond the p o i n t 
v/here t h e i r supporters would fo l l o w them. E l e c t o r a l defeat v/as 
temporarily the reward f o r t h e i r seeing the f u t u r e too c l e a r l y . 
I l l 
The years of Philopoemen's absence i n Crete v/ere epoch-
making f o r Acbaea and Greece; but since they are not c e n t r a l to 
the theme of t h i s v/ork, need only be surveyed b r i e f l y here. 
Cycliadas, v/hose e l e c t i o n t o the strate_gia v/as the main reason 
f o r Philopoemen's journey, v.fas not strong enough t o maintain h i s 
p a r t y i n pov/er a f t e r h i s £;cra;te£ia, and Arcistaenus v/as elected 
stra;te^os f o r 1 9 9 / 8 . I n the course of h i s year he established 
the Philopoemenist p o l i c y f i r m l y : Cycliadas v/as e x i l e d , the 
Macedonian a l l i a n c e abandoned, and a l l i a n c e formed w i t h Rome. 
Aristaenus met some entrenched resistance from those i n favour of 
maintaining the Macedonian a l l i a n c e at the sjnclej^s at Sicyon, 
which accepted Rome's f r i e n d s h i p , but the t h r e a t from the 
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presence o f the f l e e t s of Rome and A t t a l u s a t Cenchreae made 
Aristaenus successful. .Nabis too had no desire t o appear to be 
on the wrong side i n the v/ar, and although P h i l i p t r i e d to use 
t h e i r mutual anti-Achaean f e e l i n g s t o bind Nabis t o him by the 
g i f t of Argos, Nabis q u i c k l y j o i n e d Rome i n spring 1 9 7 . A truce 
f o r the du r a t i o n of the Macedoniem v/ar temporarily ended the 
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Spartan t h r e a t t o Achaea. 
I n summer 197 Flamininus defeated P h i l i p a t Cynoscephalae. 
The Acha.eans d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e i n the b a t t l e , but benex 
from the Roman success: u n t i l the b a t t l e Corinth had been 
r e t a i n e d i n Macedonian hands; nov/ i t v/as freed from i t s 
Macedonian g a r r i s o n . P h i l i p v/as broken, and the Senate under-
took the settlement of Greece by the despatch of 10 commiss-
ione r s . Flamininus i n s i s t e d that the freed towns should remain 
free and not pa.ss i n t o the i m p e r i a l hands of the a l l i e s ; i n t h i s 
v/ay he annoyed the Aetolians, v/ho had expected t o b e n e f i t from 
the j o i n t success. Achaea d i d not require very much: P h i l i p ' s 
Peloponnesian garrisons - except f o r Corinth - had been evac-
ua.ted i n 199? Siixd. the Roman commissioners confirmed Achaea i n 
c o n t r o l . Over the treatment of the other freed c i t i e s 
Flamininus disagreed, w i t h the members of the commission. The 
Senate v/as v/orried by re p o r t s of Antiochus I l l ' s successful 
progress through .Asia Minor, and the com,missioners, r e f l e c t i n g 
t h i s d i s q u i e t , v/anted t o r e t a i n c o n t r o l of at le a s t the ' f e t t e r s ' 
~ Acrocorinth, Ghalcis and Demetrias. Flamininus was equally 
aware of the p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t from Antiochus, but thought t h a t 
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Roman precautions could best be taken by ensuring the f r i e n d -
ship of the Gree.ks - by demonstrating the s i n c e r i t y of the 
Roman claim t o have 'freed the Greeks', r a t h e r tlian by m i l i t a r y 
a c t i v i t y v/hich v/ould f o r f e i t t h i s . 
Plaraininus' success over the commissioners was r e f l e c t e d 
i n h i s proclamation at^ the Isthmia of I 9 6 , t h a t a l l the Greelcs 
should be f r e e . As a.n immediate gesture, the town of Corinth 
was r e u n i t e d v/ith Acha.ea. The ' f e t t e r s ' v/ere r e t a i n e d f o r the 
moment, although by h i s proclamation Flamininus had committed 
himself to t h e i r eventual evacuation. .Antiochus, hov/ever, v/as 
s t i l l the great f e a r ; and Nabis' association v/ith Rome during 
the v/ar v/as not considered t o be s u f f i c i e n t evidence of cont-
i n u i n g Spartan l o y a l t y . The excuse t h a t he refused t o hand over 
Argos t o the Achaeans v-iaa therefore given f o r a campaign t o 
reduce Nabis, The Roman a l l i e s , l e d by Plaxnininus, invaded 
Laconia i n 1 9 5 and s t r i p p e d Nabis of h i s c o n t r o l of the 
p e r i o i c i c tov/ns on the coast, v/hich were given i n t o Achaean 
guardianship - but they d i d not become members of the League. 
Nabis' Cretan possessions v/ere also taken from him i n the 
settlement. .Argos v/as recovered by Achaea, but Nabis was 
a.llov/ed t o r e t a i n Sparta: Plamininus v/as aiming a t a bala.nce of 
pov/ei' i n Peloponnese r8.ther than a g r a t i f i c a . t i o n of his a l l i e s ' 
v/ishes. 
The seriousness of a potentiaJ. union of Nabis and 
Antioc.bus v/as now g r e a t l y diminished, and Flamininus had l i t t l e 
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f u r t h e r excuse f o r s t a y i n g i n Greece with Roman troops, i f the 
s i n c e r i t y of his 'freedom of the Gfreeks' was t o be believed. 
The s t r u g g l e cajne i n Kome a t the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the provinces 
f o r 19'^ <^. Scipio Africanus had been elected consul f o r 19'^f-
through the general Roman fea r of Antiochus, and he made i t 
cl e a r t h a t he wanted. Macedonia. Flamininus, on the other Kand, 
was more than ever committed to the 'freedom of the Greeks', and 
the evacuation which t h i s implied. I n the event, the Senate 
adopted a w a i t i n g p o l i c y and accepted Flamininus' view: they 
determined to meet the t h r e a t from Antiochus w i t h the'primaiy 
weapon of Greek g o o d w i l l . I t was therefore agreed t h a t a l l 
Roman troops should be v/ithdrawn from Greece. I n spring 19^ '-
Flamininus c a l l e d a general meeting of the Greek states at 
Corin t h , and announced the withdrav/al of the Roman troops. This 
v;as h i s f i n a l patronej- P_2]i£l^;£2:}^^l • ^ "^^  '^^ sis balanced by a 
request f o r the c l i e n t s ' pJ;ii£L-2i£i£itHS' r e p a t r i a t i o n of a l l 
Roraaji c i t i z e n s bought i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l slave markets during 
the Hannibalic war. The request was n a t u r a l l y granted, at a 
cost t o Achaea alone of 100 t a l e n t s i n compensation t o the 
ov/ners. 
S a t i s f i e d v/ith h i s success, Ilamininus passed through 
c e n t r a l Greece, v/ithdrawing garrisons and e s t a b l i s h i n g favourable 
governments. He continual]-y emphasised the benevolence of Roman 
i n t e r e s t i n Greece, the f a c t that Rome and Slaraininus v/ere the 
only sincere l i b e r a t o r s whom the Greeks luid known. The Aetolians 
v/ere not convinced; and Achaea had the continued t h r e a t from 
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.Nabis t o temper her entlmsiasii) f o r the Soraan evacuation. And 
these became major problems. But Flajnininus h^d ended his 
mission. He l e f t Greece, vjas greeted by the Senate meeting 
S-tiiL.iiE]?6£ l5 celebrated a three-day triumph. But despite 
the pomp of the triumph, there \-/as s t i l l apprehension at Home 
about M t i o c h u s ; and i t was t h i s c r i s i s which revealed the 
v/eakness i n Flamininus' balance of power i n Greece. 
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CHAPTER ^  
PATRIOTISM^AND CL 
I n the s p r i n g of 193, some time a f t e r the consuls had held 
l e v i e s and l e f t f o r t h e i r provinces, Flamininus asked the Senate f o r 
the r a t i f i c a t i o n of h i s settlement of G r e e c e , A t the time, envoys 
from the v/hole of the Greek world, Asia as w e l l as Greece, were 
present, and were used by Flamininus t o broadcast t o the Greek world 
the resounding diplomatic defeat which the envoys of Antiochus 
s u f f e r e d i n i n t e r v i e w w i t h Flamininus and the ten commissioners. 
I t seems u n l i k e l y t h a t the Aetolians v/ere represented i n Rome t h i s 
s p r i n g , as Flamininus had probably, t o some extent a t l e a s t , engineered 
these embassies t o demonstrate i n Rome the breadth of h i s patronage, 
and the Aetolians would not f i n d much welcome i n such a gathering.^ 
I n Greece i n the meanwhile, Philopoemen had returned t o Achaea, 
probably i n the autumn of 19^, when the war between Gortyn and 
Cnosso^, which had been supported by Nabis, had been brought t o an 
end. I t seems f a i r l y c l e a r t h a t i t i s t h i s period t o which P l u t a r c h 
r e f e r s , when he says t h a t Philopoemen caused the secession of small 
c o n s t i t u e n t states of the Megalopolitati. koinon, arguing t h a t they d i d 
not belong t o the c i t y , and had not i n the beginning. As a r e s u l t o f 
t h i s he was able t o create a supporting party f o r use i n f e d e r a l 
p o l i t i c s . " ^ I t seems clear t h a t the Megalopolitans had not fo r g i v e n 
Philopoemen f o r p u t t i n g personal and fed e r a l i n t e r e s t s before 
Megalopolitan i n 200, when he had l e f t Achaea t o f i g h t Nabis i n Crete. 
Soon afterwards they had t r i e d t o e x i l e him, and had only been pre-
vented by f e d e r a l i n t e r v e n t i o n headed by Aristaenusv 
- 110 -
Some of the to\«is which v/ere now encouraged towards independence 
w i t h i n the League by Philopoemen i n 193 may be t e n t a t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d 
by t h e i r copper coinage issues, which show t h e i r independence w i t h i n 
the League a t some period. I t has been suggested t h a t c i t i e s which 
we know had been c o n s t i t u e n t parts of Megalopolis, and f o r which 
there are independent coinage issues of the Achaean League period, 
should be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h i s time. These are: Alea, A l i p h e i r a , Asea, 
G a l l i s t a , Gortys, Dipaea, Methydrion, P a l l a n t i o n , Teuthis, Theisoa.^ 
But too much emphasis should not be placed on these coins. They are 
c e r t a i n l y coins of the League; but t h e i r date w i t h i n the League 
period depends s o l e l y on h i s t o r i c a l c r i t e r i a , not numismatic. I t i s 
therefore not possible t o d-emonstrate independently of the h i s t o r i c a l 
argument• t h a t the coin issues i n question are even contemporary. The 
mostlv^re can say i s t h a t they would agree w e l l enough w i t h the 
h i s t o r i c a l phenomena i f they could be shown t o have been issued 
subsequent t o Philopoeraen's r e t u r n from Crete. We cannot therefore 
be c e r t a i n t h a t the towns from which coins are extant were the 
Megalopolitan towns which supported Philopoemen, s t i l l less t h a t they 
were the only ones to do so. For even i f the coins can by some means 
be proved t o be s i g n . i f i c a n t i n t h i s context, t h i s l a t t e r consideration 
i s important, as v/e are completely dependent f o r info r m a t i o n upon the 
a c c i d e n t a l discovery of the League coins from the towns: there may 
w e l l have been other towns which supported Philopoemen which e i t h e r 
d i d not issue independent coinage a t a l l , or from which examples 
have not been discovered. V/ith or v/ithout the coinage towns, there 
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must have been a considerable body of support w i t h i n the League 
apart from Megalopolis, on which Philopoeraen could r e l y ; and i t 
must have been w i t h t h i s support, and not t h a t of Megalopolis - the 
main source of h i s e a r l i e r i n f l u e n c e - t h a t he i-jas elected f e d e r a l 
strategos i n the autumn of 193 for 193/2."^ 
On the i n t e r n a t i o n a l plane, the summer of 193 passed w i t h no 
s i g n i f i c a n t a l t e r a t i o n i n the cold war s i t u a t i o n between Rome and 
Antiochus. A f t e r the collapse of the negotiations a t Rome i n the 
s p r i n g , a Roman embassy was despatched t o Asia; but no concessions 
were ex t r a c t e d from Antiochus or his representatives - the king was 
u n s e t t l e d as a r e s u l t of the death of h i s eldest son Antiochus, and 
was not prepared t o pay much a t t e n t i o n t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s -
and the embassy returned, t o Rome i n the autumn, They reported simply 
t h a t they had not discovered anything which could be construed as 
preparations f o r v/ar,^ 
Although t h i s was true enough as f a r as Antiochus himself was 
concerned, a l l was by no means s e t t l e d i n A e t o l i a ; and matters came 
t o a head a t the autumn general meeting of the League, held as usual 
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i n connection w i t h the Thermica. Opposition t o Rome had been growing 
i n A e t o l i a since the settlement a f t e r Cynoscephalae, and at t h i s 
autumn assembly i n 193 i t was resolved t o send propaganda missions 
t o Nabis, P h i l i p and A n t i o c h u s . I t i s the embassy t o Nabis v/hich 
concerns Achaea most deeply, and must be examined i n d e t a i l here. 
Nabis had complied w i t h the terms of the peace w i t h Rome i n a l l but 
one respect: he s t i l l had a company of Cretans i n Sparta. I t i s 
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possible t h a t these had been h i r e d i n the course of the i n t e r v e n i n g 
months: they f i r s t appear i n 192 v/hen.Philopoemen made his at t a c k on 
Sparta. But the r e p o r t of the Roman l e g a t i of 193 i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
danger t o the Roman settlement of Greece v/as a n t i c i p a t e d from Nabis; 
and i t seems simplest t o assume t h a t the Cretans had simply not been 
dismissed i n 1 9 3 , A p a r t from t h i s , Nabis had complied w i t h the 
terms of the peace. No attempt had been made t o regain h i s 
Peloponnesian power, or t o encroach on the new Achaean protectorate 
of the p e r i o i c i c towns. The Aetolians might v;ell be l e d to believe 
t h a t the r e v o l u t i o n a r y f i r e , v/hich they hoped t o e x p l o i t , had been 
quenched a t Sparta, and t h a t Nabis, f a r from lending support t o any 
r i s i n g against Rome which they might contemplate, would at best be 
n e u t r a l , and a t worst on the Roman side. 
For these reasons the embassy of Daraocritus was necessary. He 
put h i s p o i n t s t r o n g l y t o Nabis: the Romans had l e f t Greece, and 
v/ould not r e t u r n j u s t because of Nabis, v/hatever he might do; he 
should t h e r e f o r e t r y t o get back the coastal t o m s , and w i t h them 
the basis of h i s e a r l i e r power. I t i s not l i k e l y t h a t the Aetolians 
s i n c e r e l y believed i n the arguments which Damocritus was p u t t i n g 
forward: a t best they represented Ae t o l i a n w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g . But 
they found an eager l i s t e n e r i n Nabis, who was prepared t o act as 
soon as he r e a l i s e d t h a t there v/as moral support forthcoming from 
A e t o l i a . I t i s l i k e l y t h a t he had already been encouraging h i s o l d 
supporters i n the maritime tov/ns - i t i s d i f f i c u l t otherwise t o see 
how he could be ready t o act so qui c k l y . He was therefore able t o 
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support or provoke coups d'etat i n those towns where his.support 
was strongest; i n others d i r e c t assassination achieved the desired 
r e s u l t s . 
By the end of October Achaea had formally protested t o Nabis, 
reminding him of h i s t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s . Other more concrete steps 
vjere also taken, behind which we can see the hand of Philopoemen, 
nov; strategos; a ga r r i s o n was sent t o Gytheum, the most important of 
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the coastal towns, and an embassy t o Rome, The establishment of 
an Achaean g a r r i s o n a t Gytheum was allowed under the t r e a t y between 
Nabis and Rome as p a r t of Achaean t u t e l a ; the embassy t o Rome was 
merely a ma n i f e s t a t i o n of diplomatic prudence. But i t does i n d i c a t e 
very c l e a r l y t h a t Philopoemen's e l e c t i o n i n 193 was by no means 
'malgracieux pour Rome', as Aymard suggests. There i s simply no 
evidence which v;ould suggest t h i s a t t h i s time. Philopoemen was no 
b l i n d c h a u v i n i s t , as Polybius makes quite clear i n h i s comparison 
between Aristaenus and Philopoemen. He f u l l y r e a l i s e d the l i m i t -
a t i o n s of what was possible f o r Achaea, even at a l a t e r time v;hen 
the formal fpedus was i n operation between Rome and Achaea. I n 193 
when there was no formal a l l i a n c e between the s t a t e s , v;hen there i s 
no i n d i c a t i o n i n any source t h a t he expressed any desire other than 
f o r co-operation w i t h Rome, as long as Roman and Achaean i n t e r e s t s 
coincided - as they c e r t a i n l y d i d i n t h i s case - unfounded assert-
i o n s , based on inadequate examination of the evidence, about a clash 
between the p o l i c i e s of Philopoemen and Rome, are the s t u f f from 
13 
which myths are made, and should v/holly disappear from our t r a d i t i o n . 
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When the Senate carne t o consider i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y towards 
the east i n s p r i n g 192, the l e g a t i who had been t o Antiochus 
impressed the Senate v/ith the lack of warlike preparations by 
Antiochus, and no d i r e c t a c t i o n was taken. But the cold war was t o 
go on; and the Achaean embassy bearing news of Nabis' recent host-
i l i t y made some k i n d of a c t i o n both desirable and d i p l o m a t i c a l l y 
p o s s i b l e , both t o prevent southern Peloponnese becoming a d i s a f f e c t e d 
area under the renewed self-assertiveness of Nabis, and therefore 
p o s s i b l y a base f o r Antiochus; and on the other hand, t o r e i n f o r c e 
Achaean s o l i d a r i t y by p r o v i d i n g support on appeal i n what appeared 
to be, at f i r s t s i g h t , merely a l o c a l war. A. A t i l i u s Serranus, who 
had been given Hispania U l t e r i o r a t the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the praet-
o r i a n provinces, had h i s appointment changed by a vote of the people, 
and v/as now given Macedonia and the f l e e t . S i m i l a r l y , M. Baebius 
Tamphilus, who had o r i g i n a l l y been given C i t e r i o r , was t r a n s f e r r e d 
t o Bruttium. A t i l i u s was ordered t o undertake the construction of 
30 quinqueremes, and t o s e l e c t from the e x i s t i n g f l e e t any vessels 
which v/ere s t i l l seav/orthy; t o man the f l e e t he was t o e n l i s t s o c i i 
, 14 navales. 
These p r e l i m i n a r i e s took most of the summer; and although 
A t i l i u s v/as ordered t o go t o Greece at once, i t was the end of summer 
192 before he had completed h i s preparations and appeared o f f 
Gytheum, By t h i s time everything v/as almost s e t t l e d and Nabis 
already dead. Aymard refuses t o believe t h a t A t i l i u s had taken so 
long over h i s preparations; and assumes t h a t he must have taken some 
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p a r t i n the events of the year. But t h i s i s contrary t o the 
impression we get from reading Livy and, f o r what i t i s worth, 
the phrase of Zonaras, O«TOC \xhv ovbev -^rrpaSjev - both of which 
have as u l t i m a t e source the f u l l t e x t of Polybius. And there i s 
not even any compelling a . p r i o r i reason f o r making such an assump-
t i o n against the t r e n d of the evidence. I n a d d i t i o n t o A t i l i u s and 
the f l e e t , a propaganda mission was also sent t o Greece w i t h the 
purpose of attempting t o cut the ground from under Antiochus' f e e t 
i n advance, by counteracting the propaganda of the Aetolians and 
the use they were making of h i s r e p u t a t i o n . The mission was headed 
by Flamininus and was composed of Cn. Octavius, Cn. S e r v i l i u s Caepio 
and P. V i l l i u s Tappulus,''"^ This was an extremely p r e s t i g i o u s 
mission, c o n s i s t i n g as i t d i d of three consulars (Flamininus, 
S e r v i l i u s and V i l l i u s ) , and a distinguished p r a e t o r i a n . Of the 
consulars, V i l l i u s had had almost as much experience i n Greece as 
Flamininus himself: he was h i s predecessor as consul i n Macedonia i n 
199) i n 197 he was appointed t o h i s s t a f f as s e n a t o r i a l legatus; 
he served as a member of the ten commissioners f o r the settlement of 
Greece; i n 193 he was a member of Ser. Sulpicius Galba's embassy t o 
Antiochus, from which he had j u s t returned."''^ The composition of 
t h i s embassy shows c l e a r l y t h a t the Senate attached great import-
ance t o t h i s aspect of the c o l d war: Nabis might be used as an 
excuse, but Antiochus was behind i t . They l e f t Rome early i n the 
year, and Flamininus was i n Greece e a r l y enough t o be able t o play 
a p a r t i n the e a r l y stages of the war against Nabis. 
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As soon as the weather allov/ed m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y t o take place, 
Nabis attacked Gytheum; and i n an attempt t o repay the Achaeans f o r 
p u t t i n g a gar r i s o n i n Gytheum - and t o t r y t o persuade them to w i t h -
draw i t - ravaged some Achaecin t e r r i t o r y . Despite t h i s , Philopoemen 
made no move u n t i l the ambassadors who had been sent t o Rome 
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returned. I t seems q u i t e clear that a t t h i s stage he wanted t o 
preserve as close a r e l a t i o n s h i p as possible between Achaea and Rome, 
even i f t h i s involved some trouble f o r o u t l y i n g p a r t s of Achaea - i n 
p a r t i c u l a r . Megalopolis would be one of the f i r s t t o s u f f e r . As 
soon as the ambassadors d i d r e t u r n , a syncletos was c a l l e d a t Sicyon; 
a t the same time an embassy v/as sent t o Flamininus, who had nov; 
a r r i v e d i n Greece, but v/as s t i l l i n the no r t h . As a r e s u l t of his 
distance from Achaea the r e p l y of Flamininus, t o the e f f e c t that the 
Achaeans should wait f o r the a r r i v a l of A t i l i u s ' f l e e t before 
embarking on open war vifith Nabis, d i d not a r r i v e u n t i l the Achaean 
syncletos was already i n session and l i k e l y t o decide i n favour of 
war."*"^  The delay can have been nobody's f a u l t : the f a c t t h a t 
Philopoemen sent the embassy t o Flarnininus a t a l l , as soon as he 
heaxd he had a r r i v e d i n Greece, shows that he v/as eager t o co-operate. 
On the other hand, Flamininus can scarcely have calculated the 
t r a v e l l i n g time of the envoys' r e t u r n so exactly as t o v i r t u a l l y 
ensure t h a t h i s advice would be ignored. There was no calc u l a t e d 
d u p l i c i t y on h i s p a r t over t h i s matter. He intended his advice t o 
be taken s e r i o u s l y , and there i s room f o r an examination of h i s 
motives i n g i v i n g i t . 
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I t must have been urged on him by the Achaean ambassadors t h a t 
the matter of Nabis was urgent: a l l the f a c t s , with t h e i r f u l l 
charge of Achaean emotion, had been placed a t h i s f i n g e r t i p s , and 
the only advice he could give was t o wait f o r A t i l i u s - . Despite the 
Senate's i n s t r u c t i o n s t o A t i l i u s t o go t o h i s province at once, 
Flajnininus must have known t h a t he was l i k e l y t o be involved i n 
b u i l d i n g ships and r e c r u i t i n g crews f o r some time. This meant t h a t 
i f the Achaeans took no immediate a c t i o n , Gytheum v/ould c e r t a i n l y be 
l o s t , and Achaea would be l a i d open t o a t t a c k from Nabis on a l a r g e r 
scale than was already the case. Why d i d Flamininus want this ? I n 
the f i r s t place i t must have been g a l l i n g t o hira t o be v i r t u a l l y 
powerless u n t i l A t i l i u s a r r i v e d . Diplomacy ivithout gunboats was an 
emasculated weapon t o Flamininus. Yet h i s task was t o counteract 
A e t o l i a n i n f l u e n c e . The method favoured by Flamininus was t o acquire 
personal t i e s w i t h the c l i e n t s t a t e s , and secure t h e i r l o y a l t y as a 
r e s u l t of t h e i r g r a t i t u d e f o r beneficia conferred by him. I n Achaea 
he was presented w i t h a textbook s i t u a t i o n : the Achaeans were 
v o l u n t a r i l y humbling themselves by asking f o r a beneficium, yet 
Flamininus was prevented by force of circumstances from co n f e r r i n g i t . 
The s i t u a t i o n was d i f f i c u l t ; but Flajdininus d i d not make the 
most of i t . I nstead of bowing t o the necessity forced upon him by 
the urgency of the Achaeans f o r a decision about a c t i o n against Nabis, 
and the clear necessity t h a t they should engage him alone f o r the 
sa f e t y of the Roman settlement and t h e i r own s e c u r i t y , without 
w a i t i n g f o r p h y s i c a l Roman help to a r r i v e , he t r i e d t o t u r n back the 
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t i d e of events. Instead of promising the f u l l Roman moral support 
of h i s ov/n a u t h o r i t a t i v e presence f o r t h e i r m i l i t a r i l y independent 
undertaking, he refused t o compromise h i s chance of conferring a 
great beneficium by f i g h t i n g the whole war f o r the Achaeans, and 
excluding them from p l a y i n g a major p a r t i n t h e i r ov/n- defence. He 
therefore simply, and u n r e a l i s t i c a l l y , t o l d them t o v/ait f o r A t i l i u s . 
I f they d i d t h i s , of course, he would take the v/ar o f f t h e i r hands: 
he was simply - and clu m s i l y - t r y i n g to create an opportunity of 
ex e r c i s i n g patronage where none existed on the scale which he 
envisaged. As a r e s u l t of h i s clumsiness i n h i s treatment of t h i s 
s i t u a t i o n , he l o s t the chance of gaining the minor advantage f o r 
Rome of g i v i n g the Achaeans the backing of Roman pr e s t i g e : v/hen i t 
came t o the p o i n t , the Achaeans d i d not need A t i l i u s t o rescue thern -
as Flamininus may have suspected when he i n s i s t e d on t h e i r w a i t i n g 
f o r him - and no bene f i c i u m v/as conferred. 
From the Achaean p o i n t of view Flamininus' advice was t o t a l l y 
unexpected. Not only d i d i t mean t h a t Roman h o s t i l i t y would be 
aroused by any independent Achaean a c t i o n t o preserve themselves and 
the Roman settlement, but i t was also a personal a f f r o n t t o 
Philopoemen, He had scrupulously talcen care t o obtain Roman approval 
f o r every a c t i o n he had contemplated against Nabis, and now found h i s 
independence of a c t i o n incomprehensibly withheld - apparently against 
the Roman i n t e r e s t , and c e r t a i n l y against h i s view of the Achaean. 
His viev/ of Roman aims must have immediately undergone a r a p i d change. 
His absence i n Crete had prevented his previously experiencing 
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Flamininus' methods i n person; and Aristaenus was too closely 
i n v olved personally w i t h the Spartan settlement t o have done more 
than h i n t a t d i s s a t i s f a . c t i o n w i t h Ilamininus' methods. I n any case, 
Achaea had so f a r come w e l l enough out of the Roman settlement f o r 
i t s t i l l t o be possible t o believe t h a t Flamininus had some f r i e n d l y 
i n t e r e s t i n Achaea more than i n other Greek st a t e s . But now the 
ac t i v e Philopoemen had returned, and was presented with the s i t u a t i o n 
through hearsay and Aristaenus' already compromised ideas. At f i r s t 
Philopoeraen's w i l l i n g n e s s t o follov/ Aristaenus' established l i n e of 
conduct i s manifest i n the cautious embassies t o Rome and Flajnininus. 
But the c r i s i s i n h i s b e l i e f i n Roman generosity t o Achaea r a p i d l y 
came w i t h the a r r i v a l of Flamininus' l e t t e r and i t s delaying advice. 
M i l i t a r i l y delay v;as inadvisable, but u n l i k e l y t o prove 
disastrous: the a r r i v a l of A t i l i u s ' f l e e t would q u i c k l y have secured 
the recovery of places l o s t t o Nabis, and there had i n any case 
already been delay while the embassy was sent t o Rome. Admittedly 
t h i s was i n the w i n t e r ; but a wait of a fev; months more - or even 
weeks, had they decided t o wait f o r Flamininus' presence - could not 
have had much e f f e c t on the s i t u a t i o n . Flamininus' a u c t o r i t a s alone 
might have been s u f f i c i e n t t o end the war, even without the support 
of Roman troops, as he d i d i n f a c t eventually intervene i n the war 
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himself and make a peace,. But p o l i t i c a l l y , the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between Flamininus and Achaea was r a d i c a l l y a l t e r e d by the a r r i v a l 
of Flamininus' l e t t e r : asked t o endorse a c t i o n , he had .simply 
advised f u r t h e r delay. To him, Achaean desire f o r a c t i o n was a new 
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phenomenon,, and he n a t u r a l l y acted defensively. But i t d i d 
demonstrate h i s e s s e n t i a l Roman selfishness and lack of a l t r u i s t i c 
benevolent i n t e r e s t i n Achaea, and i t s e f f e c t on Philopoemen was 
correspondingly disastrous. Ready t o t r u s t h i s experienced advisers 
u n t i l events proved them wrong, t h i s p o i n t had now been reached. 
The 'freedom of the Greeks' d i d not a f f e c t Philopoemen i n the same 
way as h i s f e l l o v / Achaean p o l i t i c i a n s - f o r even Aristaenus was 
p o l i t i c a l l y compromised over t h i s slogan - as he had not experienced 
the mass emotions of the Isthmia of I96 , the Nemea of 195, scad the 
evacuation scenes of 194. He seems to have c o r r e c t l y seen no 
e s s e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e between the freedom conferred by Rome and the 
freedom granted by Macedon. E a r l i e r i n h i s career he had had some 
success i n brealcing away from t o t a l m i l i t a r y dependence on Macedon 
by h i s success a t Mantinea, He had nov/ been l e d t o expect t h a t the 
s i t u a t i o n under Rome was d i f f e r e n t , t h a t Rome would wholly co-operate 
w i t h him; but h i s colleagues had been shown to be l i v i n g i n a f o o l s ' 
paradise, and t h e i r expectations had been shown t o be v/rong. I t was 
there f o r e necessary t o take immediate a c t i o n i n order t o stake the 
Achaean claim t o f o l l o w an ind-ependent p o l i c y i n Peloponnese, I t 
was quite clear t o Philopoemen that Flamininus wanted t o deprive 
Achaea of the p r e s t i g e of a p o t e n t i a l m i l i t a r y success; v/ith h i s 
view unprejudiced by close association, Rome was simply repeating 
the diplomacy of P h i l i p ' s symmachy. Action was the way i n which h i s 
experience advised him t o claim p o l i t i c a l i n d i v i d u a l i s m . 
His decision v/as made easier by the f a c t t h a t the syncletos had 
- 121 -
expected Flamininus' message simply t o endorse Philopoeraen's desire 
f o r a c t i o n , had discussed the matter accordingly, and almost 
decided f o r v;ar before the l e t t e r a r r i v e d . Elirther discussion was 
conditioned by the contents of the l e t t e r , and t h i s was i n d e c i s i v e . 
The opinion of the strategos was therefore sought. Philopoemen took 
h i s o p p o r t u n i t y , and t a c t f u l l y said he was w i l l i n g t o undertalce the 
consequences of any decision of the syncletos, which c o r r e c t l y 
i n t e r p r e t e d t h i s as an exrpression of h i s desire f o r viar. The 
decision was carried, by a large m a j o r i t y . V / h a t e v e r decision the 
syncletos had taken would have meant compromising Achaean i n t e r e s t s . 
To the mass of the syncletos the most immediate matter was the v;ar 
w i t h Nabis, t o Philopoemen the necessity of staking a claim f o r the 
r i g h t t o f o l l o w an independent p o l i c y i n Peloponnese against the 
r e c e n t l y revealed macchiavellianism of Flamininus. The circumstances 
of the a r r i v a l of the l e t t e r simply made easier the decision, which 
was necessary from both p o i n t s of view. 
I t was from t h i s time t h a t the h o s t i l i t y between Flamininus and 
Philopoemen began. The unique source of our infor m a t i o n about t h i s 
i s Polybius; and as a r e s u l t of Polybius' OTO personal association 
w i t h Philopoemen we might a n t i c i p a t e some tendency t o throw the 
blame onto Flamininus; and t h i s i s , i n f a c t , v;hat we f i n d . The 
i l l - f e e l i n g between the two men seems t o have f i r s t become general 
knowledge towards the end of 192, when Philopoemen gained greater 
honours than Flamininus f o r h i s war against Nabis. The record i s 
i n P l u t a r c h , comes from Polybius, and i s represented as simple 
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21 jealousy on the p a r t of Flamininus,"^"^ The idea of t h i s was 
c e r t a i n l y common knowledge i n autumn 192, as Polybius makes i t a 
reason f o r the A e t o l i a n attempt t o seduce Achaea from Rome: he 
s p o i l s the e f f e c t of t h i s by l a y i n g the h o s t i l i t y a t the fe e t of 
Flamininus, ajid s t i l l making i t an argument f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
Achaean d e f e c t i o n ; but the same i m p l i c a t i o n i s there, t l i a t 
Philopoemen v/as hated by Flamininus. I t i s not made clear whether 
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the h o s t i l i t y was mutual. The next evidencecomes ten years l a t e r . 
Deinocrates of Messene hoped t o get help from Flamininus as a r e s u l t 
of h i s h o s t i l i t y t o Philopoemen, Again the same i m p l i c a t i o n i s 
there, again coming from Polybius; and i t i s nowhere stated t h a t 
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Flamininus' h o s t i l i t y was e i t h e r reciprocated or j u s t i f i e d . 
But there are considerations which must be made i n each case. 
There was indeed, from Flaraininus' p o i n t of view, some reason f o r 
him t o be h o s t i l e towards Philopoemen. Philopoeraen's a c t i o n , i n 
d i r e c t c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o h i s advice, v/as the f i r s t time he had 
experienced such f a i l u r e t o apprecia.te the moral o b l i g a t i o n s of 
c l i e n t e l a i n Achaea. He could regard, h i s advice as completely 
acceptable t o the Achaeans, i f they wished t o f o l l o w i t ; the 
strategos could e a s i l y s t i f l e any opposition i f he v/anted t o . I t 
v/as clear t o Flamininus t h a t Philopoemen v/as d e l i b e r a t e l y f l o u t i n g 
the advice given i n h i s l e t t e r . Polybius does not r e a l l y c l a r i f y 
the s i t u a t i o n v/hen he apologises f o r Philopoemen's a c t i o n , by 
e x p l a i n i n g t h a t Philopoemen r e a l l y wanted t o co-operate w i t h 
Flamininus and wait f o r the f l e e t , but the danger t o Gytheum and 
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the Achaean g a r r i s o n v/as too great. Yet a f l e e t was necessary 
f o r a successful a t t a c k , and Achaea's v/as woefully feeble. I n 
f a c t , i f Philopoemen had been r e a l i s t i c a l l j ' - assessing only the 
m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n , he would have waited f o r A t i l i u s and not r i s k e d 
l o s s of men and p r e s t i g e i n contravening Flamininus' expressed wish. 
Flamininus c l e a r l y had sound reasons f o r b e l i e v i n g t h a t Philopoemen 
d e l i b e r a t e l y wanted t o cross h i s plans. 
This i n i t s e l f was s u f f i c i e n t t o create an i n i t i a l h o s t i l i t y . 
But i t i m p l i e d more. I t i m p l i e d t h a t Philopoemen had r e a l i s e d t h a t 
Flamininus' own schemes were not aimed s o l e l y at the b e n e f i t of 
Achaea. I f Philopoemen was abusing c l i e n t e l a , he had now good 
reason t o believe t h a t Flamininus was p l a y i n g a double game w i t h 
Achaea; and Flamininus could not l i k e the idea t h a t t h i s was f u l l y 
recognised by the strategos, v;hora he knew by r e p u t a t i o n only. 
Philopoemen's a c t i o n t h e r e f o r e represented both a breach of the 
c l i e n t ' s o b l i g a t i o n s , and a t a c i t accusation t l m t Flamininus v;as 
breaking h i s o b l i g a t i o n s as patron. We can now appreciate f u l l y 
t h a t even at t h i s i n i t i a l stage, before they had even met, the 
clash betv;een the two s e l f - v / i l l e d and successful statesmen contained 
elements of gres-t p o t e n t i a l personal and p o l i t i c a l h o s t i l i t y . 
I f Philopoemen ha.d no f u l l r e a l i s a t i o n of what Eome required 
of a c l i e n t s t a t e , he had nevertheless shovm himself i i / i l l i n g t o 
accept the unspoken i d e a l as long as i t vjas expedient. But he also 
had a sound r e c o g n i t i o n of what a Greek state required of i t s 
p r o t e c t o r . This was the langu.age he understood, V/hen Flamininus 
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refused t o endorse proposed Achaean a c t i o n against Nabis, r e f u s i n g 
even t o give h i s name t o be used i n Achaean propaganda, i n 
Philopoemen's eyes Flarnininus was f a i l i n g i n h i s duty as p r o t e c t o r . 
VJhen P h i l i p had f a i l e d i n h i s duty as p r o t e c t o r , Philopoemen had 
taken successful independent a c t i o n . Flamininus was now f a i l i n g ; 
the same remedy was t o be applied. So f a r the matter was simple, 
and i n i t s e l f q u i t e s u f f i c i e n t to arouse a personal h o s t i l i t y on 
Philopoemen's p a r t , not so much because i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case 
Achaea vrould s u f f e r d i s a s t e r i f Philopoemen complied vdth Flamininus' 
advice - although f a i l u r e t o act at once might prove p o l i t i c a l l y 
inconvenient - but because i t was a p o i n t e r t o a general Roman 
p o l i c y . I n case of a c o n f l i c t over a serious danger, Flaraininus, 
i n Philopoemen's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , had shown conclusively t h a t what 
happened t o Achaea d i d not concern him unless Roman safety or 
pre s t i g e were i n t i m a t e l y involved. This was the more d i s t r e s s i n g 
as i t was the t r u t h . Yet Flamininus was attempting t o salvage the 
present s i t u a t i o n , not i n order t o help Achaea - or he would have 
given the weight of h i s prestige t o immediate i n t e r f e r e n c e against 
Nabis - but simply t o assert his own and Roman dominance over 
Achaea, and emphasise Achaean indebtedness t o Rome. Philopoemen 
had not had time t o develop the consciousness of Flamininus' 
p r e s t i g e and the power of Rome, which other Achaean p o l i t i c i a n s 
may have f e l t , and th e r e f o r e considered immediate a c t i o n against 
Nabis both possible and desirable, f o r the very reason t h a t he 
wanted t o prevent Flaraininus' taking undeserved advantage from 
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delay. I f there was some confusion about the meaning of c l i e n t e l a •• 
so f a r understood t o Flamininus' s a t i s f a c t i o n by Aristaenus - there 
was f u l l understanding by both men of the personal issues involved: 
and i t was from the c o n f l i c t of p e r s o n a l i t i e s expressed i n a c t i o n 
t h a t h o s t i l i t y between the two men arose. The issues were clear t o 
both: the choice was Philopoemen's, 
Polybius wcote w i t h f u l l e r understanding of Roman p o l i c y and 
i t s base i n c l i e n t e l e , than any of the contemporary p o l i t i c i a n s ; 
and he seems t o have f e l t t h a t i t was necessary t o o f f e r a defence 
of Philopoemen's c o l l i s i o n course w i t h Flamininus. I n only one 
case does he imply t h a t Philopoemen hated Flamininus, when the 
Aetolians sought Achaean help f o r t h i s reason a f t e r m i s i n t e r p r e t i n g 
i t s e f f e c t . He does i n s i s t upon the matter of the danger t o 
Gytheum's being the cause of Philopoemen's a c t i o n , which v/e have 
shown i s inadequate. S i m i l a r l y i n the case of the Achaean navy. 
No acceptable reason f o r Philopoemen's use of the antique ships 
appears i n L i v y , and t h i s must be because there was none i n 
Polybius. Polybius' excuse, recorded by L i v y , i s the Homeric tag 
t h a t Philopoeraen was Areas, mediterraneus homo - I'/hich i s no 
explanation of the f a i l u r e of the Achaean strategos i n h i s p r o f -
essional duty.^^ Polybius c l e a r l y f e l t a d i f f i c u l t y which he was 
u n w i l l i n g ~ or unable - t o c l a r i f y ; and the only explanation can 
be t h a t Philopoemen was i n such a hurry t o secure some success 
before Flamininus a r r i v e d i n Achaea, so tha t he could present him 
w i t h a f a i t accompli, t h a t he was w i l l i n g t o take any r i s k s . 
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Polybian apologetics cannot excuse Philopoemen f o r the part he 
played i n c r e a t i n g the h o s t i l i t y between himself and Flamininus. 
Philopoemen's f i r s t a c t i o n i n t h i s new Achaean war against 
Nabis v/as an attempt t o r e l i e v e Gytheum and i t s Achaean garrison 
by a naval a t t a c k . The tovm was already besieged by land by Nabis, 
and i t v/as the complete ina.dequacy of the Achaean navy which had 
made help from the Romans the more desirable i n the f i r s t place. 
But as t h i s was not forthcoming, and p o l i t i c a l conditions made 
immediate a c t i o n novj e s s e n t i a l , the best had to be made of the 
f l e e t a t the disposal of the Achaeans. I t was i n t h i s t h a t 
Philopoemen made the gross mistake v/hich ruined the expedition, as 
a r e s u l t allov/ed Nabis time t o take Gytheum, and demonstrated the 
probable i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of Philopoemen's hasty and i l l - p r e p a r e d 
scheme t o prevent Flamininus' taking advantage of the war. Too 
eager t o make use of every ship which was a v a i l a b l e , he chose as 
f l a g s h i p a quadrireme which h3.d been i n Achaean possession f o r 80 
years, vjas completely unseav;orthy, and incapable of withstanding 
any pressure i n b a t t l e . Nabis on the other hand had b u i l t some 
nevi ships since the t r e a t y v;ith Rome, and i t was against these 
tha.t the Achaean f l e e t would have t o f i g h t . S e t t i n g out from 
Patrae, the r e g u l a r base of the f l e e t , Philopoemen s a i l e d t o 
Gytheum where he was met by the nei-j Spartan ships. The antique 
f l a g s h i p was q u i c k l y sunk, and Philopoemen escaped on another 
small ship. The f l e e t returned discomfited t o Patrae. 
Before an ex p e d i t i o n could reach Gytheum by land the town 
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was taken by Nabis. Such was the f i r s t r e s u l t of Philopoemen's 
badly planned naval r a i d , undertaken s o l e l y f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons. 
A l l the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was Philopoemen's. I t i s inconceivable t h a t 
i f the o l d ship v/as as unseaworthy as Livy's account from Polybius 
i m p l i e s , he had not been warned by the admiral, Tison of Patrae -
who had t o take the same r i s k of shipwreck. I f , on the other hand, 
advice had been given t h a t the vessel would stand the t e s t , 
Philopoemen, although u l t i m a t e l y responsible f o r the r e s u l t , d i d 
have the excuse t h a t he had been disappointed by h i s advisers. We 
have already n o t i c e d Livy's f a i l u r e t o record a s a t i s f a c t o r y reason 
f o r the haste of the Achaean preparations and the t o t a l incompetence 
of Philopoeraen. This can only be because Polybius' own apologetics 
have obscured the true reason for the haste, the decision taken by 
Philopoemen a t the Sicyon syncletos t o f i n i s h the war before 
Flaraininus or A t i l i u s could i n t e r f e r e . The item was d i s c r e d i t a b l e ; 
t h e r e f o r e , although i t could not be omitted, i t could be glossed 
over w i t h an apposite l i t e r a r y quotation. 
A f t e r t h i s i n i t i a l f a i l u r e a land expedition was organised as 
r a p i d l y as possible. The s i t u a t i o n of the Achaean gar r i s o n i n 
Gytheum had not changed, as nothing had been achieved by the naval 
ex p e d i t i o n . I n a n t i c i p a t i o n of an attack by land, Nabis had 
moved a t h i r d of h i s blockading force t o Pleiae, v;here he expected 
the a t t a c k t o be launched. While a large-scale Achaean expedition 
was i n preparation, a n i g h t r a i d on these Spartan troops succeeded 
i n destroying t h e i r camp. Philopoemen followed up t h i s success by 
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r a i d i n g T r i p o l i s , the area of n o r t h Laconia near Megalopolis. 
Gytheum was s t i l l under siege; and when the main Achaean expedition 
f i n a l l y entered Laconia, before i t could make contact w i t h the 
enemy, Gytheum succumbed t o Nabis' persistence. As a r e s u l t Nabis' 
troops were freed t o meet the Achaean attack before Philopoemen 
r e a l i s e d t h i s . He shov/ed q u a l i t i e s of leadership i n e x t r i c a t i n g 
h i s army from an attempted ambush close t o Sparta,. and vjent on t o 
ravage Laconia, although he made no attempt on the s t r a t e g i c towns 
of Gytheum and Sparta, which remained s t r o n g l y held by Nabis. 
Again very l i t t l e of p o s i t i v e value had been achieved by Philopoemen, 
although the p r e s t i g e of the successful r a i d i n g expedition must have 
done something t o remove the ignominy of the naval debacle. But 
Gytheum v/as noi^ i n Nabis' hands; and as the r e l i e f of Gytheum had 
been the main reason s t a t e d f o r the whole Achaean war e f f o r t , t h i s 
28 
could be considered t o have f a i l e d . 
An i n t e r e s t i n g aspect of t h i s expedition i s the presence of a 
body of Cretans under the leadership of Telemnastus of Gortyn; and 
a t the meeting a t Tegea before the main campaign s t a r t e d , of 
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Epirotarum et Acarnanum pr i n c i p e s . The connection between the 
Gortynians and Philopoeraen has been discussed elsev/here, and 
represents s o l i d personal support f o r Philopoemen. The p o s i t i o n of 
the E p i r o t s and Acarnanians i s more d i f f i c u l t t o a s s e s s . A t 
f i r s t s i g h t i t seems t h a t they were simply sympathisers w i t h 
Philopoemen's desire t o take a c t i o n against Nabis. They had 
probably p a r t i c i p a t e d i n Flamininus' war, and were eager t o check 
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the forces of s o c i a l r e v o l u t i o n which might be e x p l o i t e d by t h e i r 
d i s a f f e c t e d A e t o l i a n neighbours. But t h i s does not adequately 
e x p l a i n Livy's e x p l i c i t mention of the E p i r o t s and Acarnanians, 
and t h e i r presence only at the concilium. I t i s clear t h a t h i s 
source must have had some more lengthy discussion of the presence 
o f these p r i n c i p e s , which L i v y has c u r t a i l e d . A__2£iori i t v;ould be 
strange t o find, a c l i e n t s t a t e , which Flamininus had probably 
already v i s i t e d , o f f e r i n g support t o Philopoemen's independent 
a c t i o n , of which Flamininus disapproved. I t therefore seems 
possible t h a t these p r i n c i p e s had come as the u n o f f i c i a l represent-
a t i v e s of Flamininus,. i n a l a s t attempt t o urge Philopoemen t o 
abandon h i s p r i v a t e war and wait f o r A t i l i u s . This would s a t i s f a c t -
o r i l y account f o r L i v y ' s mention of them alone of the other s o c i i a t 
the meeting a t Tegea, h i s f a i l u r e t o mention them a t a l l i n the 
ac t u a l war, f o r i n t h i s case only the prin c i p e s would have t r a v e l l e d 
t o Achaea. I f t h i s explanation could be accepted, Philopoemen's 
r e j e c t i o n of t h e i r representations would mark a f u r t h e r stage both 
i n h i s commitment t o the war and i n the mutual h o s t i l i t y between liim 
and Flamininus. 
From the p o i n t of view of the immediate aims of Achaea and 
Philopoemen the exj)e d i t i o n had achieved l i t t l e . From the point of 
view of Flamininus, and Roman p o l i c y as represented by him, i t was 
less disastrous than might have been expected. On the one liand the 
Achaeans had been too successful f o r him t o allo\ir them the luxury 
of another exped i t i o n , and upset once and f o r a l l the precarious 
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balance of power i n Peloponnese - they must have taken some 
encouragement from being able t o deny the use of h i s country t o 
Nabis. On the other hand, Nabis had had s u f f i c i e n t success i n his 
immediate aims t o give him some encouragement; and so f a r , as the 
Aetolians had for e c a s t , there was no sign of a Roman army or navy: 
\;rhy otherwise had the Achaeans acted alone? Nabis could look forward 
t o f i g h t i n g Achaea alone f o r an expansion of h i s influence over the 
coa s t a l towns, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f he could expect some Aetolian support. 
By the end of the main Achaean expedition Flamininus had a r r i v e d i n 
Peloponnese and decided t o intervene. He vjould a t l e a s t be able t o 
claim some thanks among the Achaeans f o r p u t t i n g an end t o the war. 
And Nabis v;as i n no p o s i t i o n t o refuse the dem.and f o r a truce which 
Flamininus made. He was s t i l l under t r e a t y - even i f i t was somewhat 
s t r a i n e d by t h i s time - and he had no i n t e n t i o n of i n c u r r i n g more 
Roman i n t e r e s t than a b s o l u t e l y necessary. Flamininus therefore 
negotiated the truce w i t h Nabis, so p u t t i n g an end t o h o s t i l i t i e s . 
Any f u r t h e r a c t i v i t y i n t h i s f i e l d would be associated w i t h the 
presence of the f l e e t of A t i l i u s . For the moment the war was over. 
Philopoemen had t o t a l l y f a i l e d i n his aim of gaining s u f f i c i e n t 
advantage from h i s independent a c t i o n to restore a measure of 
e q u a l i t y t o the r e l a t i o n s h i p between Achaea and Rome. The truce v/as 
achieved by Flamininus alone; the peace v/as imposed on the Achaeans. 
A l l t h a t had been achieved was the c r e a t i o n of personal animosity 
between the two men."^ ''' 
Despite Philopoemen's f a i l u r e i n achieving the f i n a l aim of the 
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war, h i s r a i d on the camp of Nabis' troops and h i s successful 
e x t r i c a t i o n of h i s army from the ambush were the f i r s t m i l i t a r y 
a c t i v i t i e s of any a l l i e d Greek s t a t e , undertaken without e i t h e r the 
phy s i c a l or moral support of Rome, since Philopoemen's departure f o r 
Crete i n 200, They were not p a r t i c u l a r l y g l o r i o u s by comparison 
v/ith the Roman achievement; but they were Greek. And as a r e s u l t 
Philopoemen was aYaircofjevoc xai -nficotaevoc extrpeircoc Wo TSJV'EXXrivoov 
ev Totc Sedxpotc .. P l u t a r c h does not make any attempt to c l a r i f y 
wliat he envisages by t h i s . Aymard i n t e r p r e t s i t simply as an 
ovation a t the Isthmia, which were again due i n 192.'^^ The circum-
stances would c e r t a i n l y be s u f f i c i e n t t o cause those v j i t h a taste 
f o r i r o n y t o enjoy the presence of Flamininus; and there i s 
precedent enough, f o r t h i s type of ovation a t games - i n Philopoemen's 
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ovm case, a t the Nemea of 205.-^ But despite the p l a u s i b i l i t y of 
the suggestion, there i s d i f f i c u l t y i n t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , as i t 
does not e x p l a i n Plutarch's mention of the t h e a t r a . There must be 
some s i g n i f i c a n c e i n the p l u r a l form, even i f i t only i n d i c a t e s the 
theatres of two or three i n d i v i d u a l Achaean towns. V/e can add t o 
t h i s , t h a t P l u t a r c h regards these honours t o Philopoemen as a 
s i g n i f i c a n t stage i n the development of h o s t i l i t y between the two 
men, and he i s s u r e l y r e f l e c t i n g Polybius i n t h i s . Philopoemen was 
being honoured equally x-;ith Flamininus, and Flaraininus d i d not l i k e 
i t . 
Although Flamininus' most spectacular s i n g l e honour was the 
tremendous spontaneous r e c e p t i o n he had received a t the Isthmia of 
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196, t h i s v;as by no means a permanent honour - although the memory 
of i t might l i n g e r . I t v/as merely the r e j o i c i n g of the day; and we 
must assume t h a t i n d i v i d u a l c i t i e s would be prepared t o show t h e i r 
a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e i r benefactor i n a more permanent way. P l u t a r c h 
i n d i c a t e s t h i s c l e a r l y when he says xm be 'Axaiwv a{)T(~ iroXXa 'irpoc 
TiliTiv ^r]4>i<jap.ivwv,» No c i v i c honour was considered more precious 
than an honorary decree or statue set up i n the c i v i c t h e a t r e . 
Statues seem t o have been, f o r the most p a r t , reserved for poets, 
as i n the case of P h i l i p p i d e s , honoured at Athens c. 287/6; but 
f o r Philopoemen, a f t e r h i s death, i t was voted oTe<^vo5aat 8e xal 
adxov elxoot xaXxiaiQ tecjcrapcrt, xal orocfat lav [lev \itav kv twi 
Sedxpooi . Honorary decrees were also r e g u l a r l y set up i n theatres; 
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and grants of proedria were the commonest of a l l . I t seems clear 
t h a t something of t h i s permanent k i n d must have been bestowed on 
Flaimininus by a g r a t e f u l people. This was the f u l l e s t expression 
of c i v i c g r a t i t u d e , and must have been recognised as such by 
Flamininus. Although always ready t o take advantage of spectacular, 
i f ephemeral, displays of p u b l i c emotion, he would be c e r t a i n t o 
appreciate more f u l l y the s o l i d bonds of c l i e n t s h i p demonstrated by 
these permanent forms of thanksgiving. I t must therefore have been 
Philopoemen's a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h him i n t h i s permanent type of 
o f f e r i n g , i n the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t f o r a l l time Philopoemen, the 
&v9pttnrov *Apxd6a |j.txpc6v xal opopoov troXeiiWV crrpaxriYOV was being 
held t o be h i s equal which caused him t o f e e l t h a t h i s honour was 
threatened. No Greek could ever equal h i s Isthmian proclamation of 
196; hov;ever much acclamation Philopoemen might receive a t the same 
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f e s t i v a l i n 192, i t could not match the h y s t e r i c a l r e j o i c i n g s i n 
the name of Flamininus a t the f e s t i v a l four years e a r l i e r . But i n 
the c i v i c honours, the plaques and statues set up i n the theatres 
of the independent towns, h i s honoured status could be approached, 
and by being shared, lessened. And he had some j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r 
h i s d i s t r e s s ; f o r Philopoemen v/as r e c e i v i n g these expensive honours 
f o r a ctions i n a war i n which, f o r the moment at l e a s t , he had 
f a i l e d , both i n h i s p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y o b j e c t i v e s ; and i f we 
can take Plutarch's*E\Xr|VC0V a t i t s face value, approval of 
Philopoemen's attempt t o break Achaea's bonds of c l i e n t s h i p was 
expressed f u r t h e r a f i e l d than simply i n Achaea. Honours of t h i s 
type t o Philopoemen i n these circumstances were an i n s u l t t o 
Flamininus and the p o l i c y he represented. His mission to counteract 
A e t o l i a n i n f l u e n c e v/as ha.ving unexpected and undesirable personal 
r e s u l t s . 
Nabis was not slov; t o make-his next move. Using the time 
granted by the truce w i t h Flamininus, he appealed t o the Aetolians 
f o r help. I t seems clear t h a t he must have knovm. t h a t Flamininus 
had simply checked the Achaeans i n order t o wait f o r A t i l i u s ; and 
as he now considered himself t o be too deeply committed t o the a n t i -
Roman camp - although h i s son Armenas and other i n f l u e n t i a l Spartans 
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were s t i l l hostages a t Rome - to expect any favourable terms i n a 
new permanent settlement, he determined t o take what advantage he 
could of the r e s p i t e granted him by the t r u c e . On the other hand, 
he v/as now by no means as desirable an a l l y f o r the Aetolians as he 
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had appeared i n the autumn. M i l i t a r i l y Sparta had been envisaged 
as a h o s t i l e power constantly occupying the Achaeans. While t h i s 
was s t i l l p o s s i b l e , i t had l o s t a great amount of i t s value since 
the n e u t r a l i s a t i o n of Nabis' forces by Philopoeraen, While there 
was s t i l l value from the Aetolian p o i n t of view i n the f a c t t h a t he 
s t i l l held Gytheum, the Achaeans had nevertheless prevented Nabis' 
becoming a raajor t h r e a t t o t h e i r s e c u r i t y . Unless there v;as a 
r a p i d change i n the balance of power i n Peloponnese, Nabis was 
e f f e c t i v e l y out of a c t i o n . 
P o l i t i c a l l y too the s i t u a t i o n had changed since the autumn, 
Matching Nabis' m i l i t a r y wealoiess, there was the p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t 
of the rapprochement which he had entered w i t h Flamininus t o be 
considered: he could not expect the Aetolians t o sympathise v;ith 
h i s motives f o r accepting a truce which Flamininus d i d not have the 
power to enforce. An a p p l i c a t i o n f o r Ae t o l i a n a i d a f t e r t h i s could 
only a t t r a c t the suspicion t h a t he v/as t r y i n g t o play a double gexme, 
and was therefore t o be t r u s t e d by n e i t h e r party. Yet the s t r a t e g i c 
arguments advanced f o r A e t o l i a n possession of a f r i e n d l y Sparta were 
s t i l l v a l i d : Achaea should s t i l l be prevented from t a k i n g p a r t i n a 
general war by having her forces occupied i n a permanent struggle 
i n the south. The d e c i s i o n was therefore taken by the Aetolians t o 
assassinate Nabis and take the c i t y of Sparta d i r e c t l y under the 
c o n t r o l of the A e t o l i a n League. 
The f i r s t p a r t of t h i s mission v;as successfully accomplished; 
but as soon as Nabis was dead the forces which had been entrusted 
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v/ith the operation s t a r t e d l o o t i n g the town, and enough support 
was gained by those who undertook t o r a l l y the Spartans to drive 
out the l o o t e r s . Many of them were k i l l e d , but some managed t o 
escape t o Tegea and Megalopolis, hoping t o f i n d there a f r i e n d l y 
r e c e p t i o n f o r the murderers of the t y r a n t ; but as Aetolians they 
found no sympathy among the Achaeans, and were a t once arrested and 
s o l d i n t o slavery. Philopoemen l e a r n t by t h i s means of the death 
of Nabis, and determined t o make an attempt t o b r i n g Sparta i n t o 
the Achaean League before any one party could gain the support of 
Flamininus and f o r t i f y i t s e l f i n power w i t h the remnants of the 
tyranny. This he suc c e s s f u l l y accomplished j u s t at the moment when 
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A t i l i u s ' f l e e t a r r i v e d o f f Gytheum; but we must examine i n d e t a i l 
the manner i n v/hich t h i s union was achieved, as the Spartan problem, 
s t a r t i n g as i t does f o r Achaea w i t h the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the c i t y i n 
the League i n 192, v/as the main stumbling block t o a peaceful 
settlement of Peloponnese f o r the next 13 years. The idea of the 
union was a t f i r s t s i g h t sensible enough: the main t h r e a t t o the 
s a f e t y of Achaea would be removed by the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of Sparta i n 
the League. C e r t a i n l y the external threat disappeared. But Sparta's 
i n t e r n a l problems became Achaea's and had superimposed on them the 
t r a d i t i o n a l problems of r e l a t i o n s between Sparta and Achaea, v/hich 
as a r e s u l t became even more confused and d i f f i c u l t t o solve. 
There are two accounts of the a c t u a l business of union. Livy 
simply mentions a c o u n c i l of p r i n c i p e s , and says t h a t i t decided 
t o j o i n Acha.ea. He says nothing of the f e e l i n g s and d i s p o s i t i o n s 
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of the p r i n c i p e s involved. I n the circumstances i t can only be 
assumed t h a t they were representatives of a l l f a c t i o n s , among which 
L i v y d i d not t r o u b l e t o d i s t i n g x i i s h . P lutarch, i n describing the 
same scene, i s more e x p l i c i t : TeTapaYnevT)c 6e T ^ ^ Sirdptrii: o 
fiXoirot|j.riv aptraoac, xov xatpov eirimiTTet, [leta bviva\ieox,, xal xwv 
|jiev axovTcov, T O V C 6e crv|jjrei'oac irpocrriYxxYeTo xal |iei;ex6(ii.crev EIQ 
Tovc 'AxaLovQ TTjv iToXiv. . . ave\aj3e 8e xal Aaxe8a i | j i ov i«v T^OVG 
aptOTooc, (^vXaxa TT^C eXev^epioc exetvov eXiri'oavirac l ^ e i v , The 
p a r t y d i s t i n c t i o n s given here are extremely vague; and there i s 
the p o s s i b i l i t y t o be considered t h a t Plutarch was merely v / r i t i n g 
such d i s t i n c t i o n s i n t o h i s account as a r h e t o r i c a l commonplace -
although the account as a v/hole must depend on Polybius. ' Plutarch 
however does go on t o e x p l a i n who the a r i s t o i were - among them 
4 l 
Timolaus, Philopoemen's gu e s t - f r i e n d . Of the two perhaps r e a l 
groups d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n Plutarch's f i r s t sentence, these a r i s t o i 
who gained Philopoemen's support can only be the l a t t e r group, 
those whom he persuaded t o j o i n the League: he c l e a r l y could not 
t r u s t those who remained unconvinced. These l a t t e r must have had 
good reason f o r t h e i r unwillingness t o be won over by Philopoemen; 
and i t must be because they saw greater personal advantage from 
independence, or even a c t u a l danger from the union. We should 
therefore see i n them the remainder of Nabis' supporters. 
This malies i t easier t o i d e n t i f y the p o l i t i c s of the a r i s t o i . 
They were c l e a r l y a group which had not been as dangerously close 
t o Nabis as t h e i r opponents: t o them the loss of s t a t e i d e n t i t y , by 
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the a b o l i t i o n of the Spartan kingship and the entry i n t o the 
League, would not carry the sai'ne personal r i s k s . I t i s true t h a t 
even they had t o be persuaded, but compromise f o r them was c l e a r l y 
p r a c t i c a b l e . On the other hand, they cannot have been a c t i v e l y 
h o s t i l e t o Nabis or they would quickly have been forced i n t o e x i l e 
or a n n i h i l a t i o n . I f they had any p r i n c i p l e s about the n a t i o n a l i s t 
bogey of Spartan t r a d i t i o n s , they had already compromised them by 
l i v i n g und.er Nabis' regime; and they were ready t o compromise them 
again, V/e do not hear of the e x i l e of t h e i r opponents, and they 
cannot reasonably be i d e n t i f i e d v/ith any of the l a t e r groups of 
e x i l e s . I t t h e r e f o r e seems l i k e l y t h a t they were allowed t o continue 
l i v i n g i n the c i t y , although prevented from t a k i n g any a c t i v e p a r t 
i n the government. 
The p o l i t i c a l confusion i n Sparta v/as, t o some extent at 
l e a s t , resolved by Philopoemen's i n s t a l l a t i o n i n power of those 
Zj.2 
v / i l l i n g t o support him and the union v/ith Achaea. I n the 
circumstances i t v/as not unnatural t h a t they should look t o him 
f o r the s e c u r i t y of the government. I t i s against t h i s background 
t h a t we should consider the o f f e r t o Philopoemen of the 120 t a l e n t s 
raised, by the sale of the house of Nabis. The accounts which we 
have of t h i s show no s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a t i o n ; therefore Plutarch's, 
which i s more d e t a i l e d and precise, w i l l be the basis of the 
discussion. I t i s clear t h a t the Spartan a r i s t o i , despite the 
support of Philopoemen, were not secure i n power. Philopoeraen's 
r e p l y t o t h e i r o f f e r shows t l i a t opposition w i t h i n the c i t y was 
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a g i t a t i n g against t h e i r government, and t h i s opposition must have 
provoked the circumstances i n which the o f f e r was made t o 
Philopoemen, as an attempt t o buy h i s support f o r the government. 
The f a c t t h a t i t v/as made by Timolaus, Philopoemen's guest-friend, 
i n d i c a t e s the importance which the government attached t o the 
support of Philopoemen, and t o t h i s attempt t o bribe him; and on 
the other hand suggests t h a t they were not yet f u l l y sure that they 
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had h i s v/holehearted support. But the r e f u s a l of the bribe by 
Philopoemen made i t clear t h a t he d i d not want t o have his p o l i c i e s 
d i c t a t e d t o him i n advance by personal t i e s based on t h i s kind of 
f i n a n c i a l g r a t i t u d e . He pr e f e r r e d t h a t they should meet the 
d i c t a t e s of circumstances, and tha t he should be free' t o form them 
i n t h a t v/ay without i n c u r r i n g the charge of disappointing l e g i t i m a t e 
expectations based on such devious t i e s of g r a t i t u d e . He made i t 
clear t h a t he was a f r i e n d of Timolaus' group - raeaning that f o r 
the raoraent at l e a s t , he saw Achaean i n t e r e s t i n t i m a t e l y associated 
with t h e i r r e t e n t i o n of power - but refused t o accept unconditional 
advance o b l i g a t i o n s . By accepting the g i f t he would have associated 
himself too cl o s e l y w i t h one f a c t i o n t o make himself ever acceptable 
t o the other; and he c l e a r l y envisaged some kind of compromise as 
the only p r a c t i c a b l e s o l u t i o n t o the Spartan confusion. He wanted 
t o leave the door open f o r himself t o act as mediator. I f 
Polybius' r e p o r t of Philopoemen's advice t o the Spartan government 
at t h i s time i s authentic - t o bribe t h e i r enemies t o silence 
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r a t h e r than t h e i r f r i e n d s - Philopoemen was already working 
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towards h i s goal of compromising differences betv/een the Spartan 
f a c t i o n s i n the Achaean i n t e r e s t . He must have c l e a r l y been 
a f r a i d t h a t Flamininus v;ould enjoy f i s h i n g i n the troubled waters 
of Spartan p o l i t i c s , and v/as eager t o prevent t h i s . 
Soon a f t e r t h i s the Achaean year came t o an end w i t h the 
autumn synodqs and the e l e c t i o n of Diophanes as strategos. There . 
seems t o be no reason why we should not consider t h a t Diophanes i n 
autumn 192 was elected as a supported of Philopoemen: he was a 
f e l l o w Megalopolitan, and had served under him freq u e n t l y i n the 
various campaigns against Nabis. There i s nothing t o i n d i c a t e t h a t 
he had any serious d i f f e r e n c e of opinion w i t h Philopoemen before 
the attempt t o reorganise Sparta w i t h the help of Flamininus i n 
191. Although t h i s d i f f e r e n c e of opinion developed i n t o open 
h o s t i l i t y , t h i s i s no argument f o r p o l i t i c a l opposition t o 
Philopoemen a t the time of the el e c t i o n s . I t would, i n any case, 
be extremely strange t o f i n d a p o l i t i c a l opponent of Philopoemen's 
elected t o the s t r a t e g i a a t the very time when Philopoemen's own 
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g l o r y , and t h e r e f o r e i n f l u e n c e , was a t i t s peak. 
I n the autumn of 192 Antiochus a r r i v e d a t Demetrias; and 
a f t e r an a b o r t i v e attempt t o gain support at Chalcis, vent i n t o 
conference w i t h the Aetolians at Demetrias. A decision was taken 
t o t r y t o gain support i n Boeotia, Achaea and Athamania. As f a r 
as Achaea v;as concerned, the attempt was agreed upon as a r e s u l t 
of rumours c i r c u l a t i n g about the increasing h o s t i l i t y betiveen 
Philopoemen and Flamininus, as a r e s u l t of Philopoemen's 
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independently undertaking the v/ar against Nabis and the subsequent 
annexation of Sparta. They apparently had no reason t o believe 
t h a t the change of strategos i n Achaea would make any difference 
t o Achaean p o l i c y . But they had grossly m i s i n t e r p r e t e d the 
Achaean s i t u a t i o n . Even a t the time of the f i r s t d i f ference of 
opinion between Philopoemen and Flaraininus, Flamininus had had 
l i t t l e doubt t h a t Achaea was l o y a l t o Rome on major issues, and. 
di r e c t e d the v/eight of h i s propaganda t o other objects. He rnay 
not have been quite as sure by t h i s time t h a t Philopoemen's host-
i l i t y Mas only the r e s u l t of r e a c t i o n t o Flamininus* i n t e r f e r e n c e 
i n Peloponnese; but i n any case, i t was no p a r t of h i s task t o 
take r i s k s . He v/as th e r e f o r e present a t the syncletos c a l l e d at 
Aegium by Diophanes t o hear the Aetolians. 
This syncletos was a resounding success f o r Flamininus. The 
emissaries of the Aetolians and Antiochus were shown d e c i s i v e l y 
t h a t there was no sympathy f o r t h e i r cause i n Achaea. There was 
no stage i n the syncletos when there v/as any l i k e l i h o o d of the 
Achaeans' being persuaded by the dissidents. They made t h i s 
a b solutely clear by going f u r t h e r than simply r e j e c t i n g the 
suggestions of the ambassadors, v;ith the d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t they 
would have the same f r i e n d s and enemies as the Romans. Had there 
been any doubt i n Flarnininus* mind about the e s s e n t i a l l o y a l t y of 
the Achaeans, i t must have vanished now. At the same time, i t i s 
clear from t h i s Achaean de c l a r a t i o n t h a t there was at t h i s time 
no formal t r e a t y of a l l i a n c e between Rome and Achaea. The leading 
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s p i r i t behind Achaean a c t i o n at the syncletos must have been the 
strategos Diophanes. He,was of the p a r t y of Philopoemen, and 
Philopoemen's support f o r h i s a c t i o n was a f f i r m ed by Polybius i n 
h i s own defence of Philopoemen before the Roman commissioners i n 
l45. There can t h e r e f o r e be l i t t l e doubt t h a t Philopoemen f u l l y 
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supported the a c t i o n of Diophanes over t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n of war. 
Diophanes was w i l l i n g t o back up the Achaean decision at once 
w i t h arms. 1,000 Achaean troops v/ere mobilised, and 500 sent t o 
both Piraeus and Chalcis as garrisons. This was done openly on 
the request of Flarnininus, and although i t was i n general unusual 
f o r Achaean troops t o serve abroad, i t was not unknown i n times of 
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exceptional circumstances. The use which Flamininus was immed-
i a t e l y ready t o make of these troops i n d i c a t e s t h a t he had probably 
exerted some behind-the-scenes pressure on the Achaean o f f i c i a l s t o 
propose the d e c l a r a t i o n of war, the ground f o r which v;as prepared 
a t the syncletos i t s e l f by the speech of Flamininus. I f t h i s was 
so, Philopoemen must have Imown about i t and approved, despite the 
s p l i t betvjeen himself and Flamininus. 
At Piraeus the Achaean troops were successful i n helping 
Flamininus expel Apollodorus, the leader of the party favouring 
Antiochus. At Ghalcis they were less successful, and seem to have 
in c u r r e d some disgrace, at least i n Philopoemen's eyes - who took 
no p a r t i n these m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s . They v/ere forced t o bargain 
f o r t h e i r release from the siege; and as Plutarch's record of h i s 
r e a c t i o n s t o t h i s shows^ Philopoemen displayed the same type of 
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a t t i t u d e towards the Syrians as Flaraininus i n h i s speech before the 
syncletos - he would have cut them o f f i n t h e i r taverns. I f t h i s 
r e a c t i o n i s contemporary ~ i t may be l a t e r reminiscence, perhaps t o 
Polybius himself - i t already indi.cates a c r i t i c i s m of Diophanes' 
leadership, and perhaps r e f l e c t s h i s growing disapproval of the 
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closeness of Diophanes and Flamininus. 
I n E l i s , Achaea caused apprehension on two counts: on the one 
hand, continued Achaean expansion v/ithin Peloponnese must eventually 
a f f e c t E l i s . I f Sparta could be simply annexed w i t h l i t t l e immediate 
t r o u b l e , how v/as E l i s going t o be able t o stand alone? On the other 
hand, the t r a d i t i o n a l t i e s of friend.ship between E l i s and A e t o l i a 
s t i l l e x i s t e d . I n the past these had repeatedly brought E l i s i n t o 
c o n f l i c t w i t h Achaea, and now that A e t o l i a and Achaea had again 
chosen d i f f e r e n t sides i n the approaching war, c o n f l i c t could again 
be a n t i c i p a t e d . I n v;inter 192/1 the only possible a c t i o n f o r an 
anti-Achaean s t a t e , which'did not f u l l y r e a l i s e the nature of 
Antiochus' commitment i n Greece, was t o enter negotiations w i t h him. 
This the Eleans d i d , hoping f o r p r o t e c t i o n from Achaea and from the 
support which Rome might be expected t o o f f e r f o r her f u r t h e r 
expansion. The Eleans were successful i n t h i s , and a force of 1,000 
f o o t s o l d i e r s under a Cretan Euphanes - otherwise unknown - was sent 
t o p r o t e c t them. As there i s no record of any Achaean at t a c k on 
E l i s during 191, i t i s reasonable t o conclude t h a t the force v/as 
successful i n i t s o b j e c t i v e s u n t i l Thermopylae.^"^ 
One other event, v/hich probably occurred during t h i s w i n t e r , of 
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f i r s t importance f o r Achaea, was the grant by the Senate of a 
foedus aequum. The reasons f o r accepting t h i s date are tha t the 
decision of the Achaeans to declare v/ar on Antiochus i n the autum.n 
was of inestimable p h y s i c a l and propagandist value t o the Romans; 
ther e f o r e the Senate would f e e l i n c l i n e d t o grant the foedus as a 
r e c o g n i t i o n of Roman g r a t i t u d e f o r the Achaean a c t i o n . This f i t s 
w e l l too, as we s h a l l see, v/ith the increased expansionist a c t i v i t y 
of summer I 9 I , when i t was necessary f o r Flamininus t o explain 
harshly - but not e x p l i c i t l y - that the s i t u a t i o n had not been 
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changed i n i t s e s s e n t i a l s by the grant of the foedus. 
Roman p o l i c y tov/ards the East does not seem t o have created 
s u f f i c i e n t p a r t i s a n f e e l i n g i n Rome f o r i t t o become the basis of 
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any major i n t e r - p a r t y disputes. The one feature which i s i n f a c t 
apparent i s the remarkable lack of controversy over the major issues. 
Dispute such as there v;as, v/as concerned w i t h methods rather than 
ends. For instance, i n I96 Flamininus had had some d i f f i c u l t y i n 
persuading the commissioners f o r Greece and the Senate t o accept the 
f u l l i m p l i c a t i o n s of the 'freedom of the Greeks', t o which he v/as 
personally committed. But t h i s issue was not f a c t i o n a l , and d i d not 
become so. I t v/as simply based on a d i f f e r e n t assessment of the 
necessary strategy t o be employed towards Antiochus: the p o t e n t i a l 
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t h r e a t was agreed. Flamininus was able t o persuade the Senate t o 
f o l l o w h i s view by showing t h a t h i s was the best Roman p o l i c y - as 
f a r as v/e can t e l l , v/ithout any 'party' disputes. There was no 
fundamental disagreement on p o l i c y between Flamininus and those v/ho 
disagreed v j i t h h i s assessment of the p o s i t i o n . Attempts t o see a 
pa r t y issue i n eastern p o l i c y , a c o n f l i c t betxi/een the Scipios and 
Fl a m i n i n i , do not seem t o have any basis i n the f a c t s given by our 
sources, and are t o a large extent i l l u s o r y . C e r t a i n l y Africanus 
and h i s f r i e n d s took the danger from Antiochus s e r i o u s l y ; so did 
the Roman people when they elected him consul f o r 194; but so 
equally d i d Flamininus when he saw Greek c l i e n t e l a as a major weapon 
f o r use against Antiochus. And the m a j o r i t y of the Senate r e l i e d on 
the calmer advice of t h e i r eastern experts, and d i d not create a 
consular province of Macedonia i n 194, because they considered t h i s 
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the best p o l i c y . 
When there was again the threat of r e a l danger from Antiochus 
i n 192, Flamininus* propaganda mission of eastern experts was sent 
t o Greece by the Senate. There i s no p o s s i b i l i t y of seeing a party 
issue i n t h i s . Flamininus was no longer an evacuationist: the hope 
was tha.t the b e n e f i c i a l r e s u l t s of the evacuation p o l i c y were now 
t o be seen. The Senate's r e a c t i o n was based s o l e l y on an assessment 
of the s i t u a t i o n , and i t sent the best men f o r the job. As events 
took a more serious t u r n , i t became necessary t o send a consular 
army t o Greece i n 191. I t happened that M'. A c i l i u s Glabrio was 
successful a t the consular e l e c t i o n f o r I 9 I , probably helped by the 
pr e s t i g e of the Sc i p i o s , and he was sent t o Greece t o deal w i t h 
Antiochus. But i t would be vn-ong t o assume t h a t opposition a t the 
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e l e c t i o n s was based on a d i f f e r e n t p o l i c y to be pursued towards 
Antiochus. Reports of the state of a f f a i r s i n Greece came from 
Flamininus' mission, and the early e l e c t i o n s f o r I 9 I must have been 
held as a r e s u l t of the r e c e i p t of information from him. This shows 
c l e a r l y t h a t Flamininus, as w e l l as the Scipios, f u l l y appreciated 
the need f o r a Roman army i n Greece. His e a r l i e r p o l i c y of evac-
u a t i o n cannot now be a t t r i b u t e d t o him, as he continued h i s work i n 
Greece i n f u l l co-operation w i t h the consul. Again, there was no 
c o n f l i c t of p o l i c i e s a t the el e c t i o n s : only the usual c o n f l i c t of 
persons. And t h i s seems t o have continued t o be the case w i t h 
regard t o eastern p o l i c y throughout our period. 
I n s p r i n g I 9 I the new consul M'. A c i l i u s Glabrio a r r i v e d i n 
Greece w i t h M. Porcius Cato on his s t a f f . One of Cato's f i r s t 
tasks was t o engage i n a minor propaganda mission f o r Glabrio. 
From the base of the Romans a t or near Corinth he made expeditions 
t o t h a t c i t y , followed by Patrae and Aegiura, before going on t o 
Athens. The purpose of these v i s i t s v;as probably simply t o announce 
the a r r i v a l of the new consul i n Greece at the p r i n c i p a l centres of 
populat i o n . I t was a confirmation of the Roman commitment t o help 
t h e i r a l l i e s against Antiochus, a ph y s i c a l demonstration t h a t the 
war was not going t o be wholly fought by a l l i e d arms and Flamininus' 
propaganda. The presence of the brash young Cato s t r a i g h t from 
Rome viould be quite s u f f i c i e n t to show the c i t i e s he v i s i t e d t h a t 
h i s was a wholly Roman commitment. Gato v i s i t e d the convenient 
coastal towns; perhaps another legate v i s i t e d the southern Achaean 
ci t i e s . ' ^ ' ^ 
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During the sp r i n g and e a r l y suimner, events i n the n o r t h 
developed and culminated i n the defeat of Antiochus by Glabrio a t 
Thermopylae, probably i n May, A f t e r the capture of Ghalcis the 
previous autumn by Antiochus, the Achaeans had played no part i n the 
war. I n Peloponnese hov/ever, there v/as considerable a c t i v i t y t h i s 
year. Early i n the year Diophanes v/as faced v/ith v i o l e n t d i s a f f e c t -
i o n a t Sparta. Plutarch's account i s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d : the Spartans 
etc iroXeiiov xa^iatdiievoi, bieidpaxycov TT)V neXonovvncrov , Philopoemen 
t r i e d t o prevent Diophanes from i n t e r f e r i n g by c a l l i n g h i s a t t e n t i o n 
t o the broader issues involved i n connection w i t h the presence of 
Antiochus i n Greece; but Diopha,nes took no no t i c e , invaded Laconia 
i n company w i t h Flamininus, and marched on Sparta, Philopoeraen 
rushed t o Sparta, organised the opposition t o Diophanes and Flamininus, 
and s u c c e s s f u l l y prevented them from entering Sparta, As a r e s u l t 
Tos 6*ev xvj iroXet tapaxoQ ^mvae xai xaTeoriricre TOUC Aaxe8at|iOvco«c 
TToXiv elc TO xoivov, SoTrep apyjf. rpav , • Plutarch makes no 
a,tterapt t o analyse e i t h e r the party groupings a t Sparta which l e d 
t o t h i s v i o l e n c e , or the motives of Diophanes, Flamininus, or 
Philopoemen f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s ; and Pausanias' even b r i e f e r account 
i s of no help i n t h i s . But i t i s necessary t o attempt t o elucidate 
these matters, as they are fundamental f o r any understanding of 
58 
Achaean p o l i t i c s a t t h i s p e r i o d . 
A f t e r Philopoemen's settlement a t Sparta the previous autumn, 
Timolaus and the a r i s t o i had been confirm.ed i n pov/er w i t h the support 
of Achaea and Philopoemen; but t h e i r p o s i t i o n was by no means 
- 147 -
secure, as t h e i r attempt t o buy Philopoemen shows. Any p o l i t i c a l 
confusion, t h e r e f o r e , a t Sparta must have been p r i m a r i l y a c o n f l i c t 
betv/een the a r i s t o i and Nabis' party. When Plut a r c h says th a t the 
Spartans eli; froXeiJiov xaSioT;d|ievoi } t h i s must be i n t e r p r e t e d i n the 
l i g h t of the party groupings. What i t means, i n f a c t , i s v;ar 
against the Leagu.e, as i s made quite clear by Plutarch fe statement 
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t h a t Philopoemen r e j o i n e d the c i t y t o the Leagxie. This h o s t i l e 
a c t i v i t y t h erefore cannot be by Tlmolaus' group, whose i n t e r e s t was 
i n t i m a t e l y connected with the League, but must i n d i c a t e that they had 
been overthrown and replaced by the anti-League p a r t y . 
The reactions of the League p o l i t i c i a n s t o t h i s news were 
v a r i e d . Philopoemen must have wanted t o intervene on behalf of 
Timolaus and h i s own settlement, but he was no longer strategos. 
Diophanes must equally have wanted Sparta t o remain i n the League; 
but he cannot have been as eager as Philopoemen t o save Philopoemen's 
p r e s t i g e . There was also ^Flamininus t o be considered; and Diophanes 
may have been u n w i l l i n g t o act at f i r s t without F],amininus' approval, 
Flamininus' p o s i t i o n was d i f f i c u l t , as he v;as not a free agent, and 
had t o take due consideration of the possible e f f e c t of any a c t i o n 
on the war against Antiochus. For t h i s reason, the general d i s t u r b -
ance i n southemPeloponnese was dangerous, and could not be allov/ed 
t o continue. But there were also h i s personal f e e l i n g s t o be 
considered: he was t i e d t o support the Spartan p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the 
League, otherwise he would get no support from e i t h e r Diophanes or 
Philopoeraen; and h i s balance of -power i d e a l had i n any case only 
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been v i a b l e v/hile Nabis v/as a l i v e . On the other hand, he was by 
no means t i e d t o the support of Philopoemen's f r i e n d s i n Sparta, 
His connections of c l i e n t e l a , from h i s defeat of Nabis, v/ere w i t h 
the t y r a n t p a r t y , and i t v/as s t i l l h i s view of Roman i n t e r e s t t o 
keep Achaea f a i r l y v/eak. I f t h i s could no longer be done by main-
t a i n i n g another power t o hold her i n check, i t could be achieved 
more s u b t l y by causing i n t e r n a l t rouble w i t h i n the League. His aim 
there f o r e seems t o have been t o destroy Philopoeraen's prestige and 
gain h i s new l a r g e r and weaker Achaea a t the same time, by reuniting-
Sparta t o the League under the government of the anti-League p a r t y . 
Diophanes' r e a c t i o n t o t h i s i s demonstrated by his j o i n t exped-
i t i o n v/ith Flamininus t o Sparta. His motives f o r co-operating v/ith 
Flamininus against h i s o l d colleague Philopoemen may have been mixed. 
His d e d i c a t i o n , seen by Pausanias, proclaimed t h a t Diophanes was the 
f i r s t man t o u n i t e Peloponnese under Achaean c o n t r o l . He was c l e a r l y 
proud o f t h i s achievement, and t h i s should probably be seen as the key 
t o h i s p o l i c y i n 191,^ '^  He may si n c e r e l y have been convinced t h a t 
h i s aim ~ i n which he v/as d i r e c t l y competing v/ith Philopoemen - could 
only be achieved i n h i s year v/ith the f u l l co-operation of Flamininus, 
i n t h i s respect d i f f e r i n g from Philopoemen, And i t i s possible t h a t 
he had an i n f o r m a l agreement v/ith Flamininus t o t h i s e f f e c t . This 
v/ould immediately cause him t o be v / i l l i n g t o support Flamininus a t 
Sparta, f o r as Sparta had now seceded from the Leagiie, Diophanes 
would be able t o claim t o have restored i t ; and at the same time 
himself become the League patron of the Spartan government, i n t h i s 
r e p l a c i n g Philopoemen, 
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I t i s i n t h i s context t h a t v;e should i n t e r p r e t Philopoemen's 
v i o l e n t objections t o Diophanes' i n t e r f e r i n g i n Laconia. He cannot 
have favoured t o t a l l a c k of Achaean a c t i o n , as Plutarch suggests, 
f o r h i s f r i e n d s had been ousted by the anti-Achaean party; but he 
d i d have v i o l e n t f e e l i n g s about the a c t i o n v/hich Diophanes was 
contemplating. This was both personal and p u b l i c : personal, because 
of h i s connection v/ith the settlement and Timolaus' government, 
p u b l i c because, with h i s generally d i s t r u s t f u l view of Flamininus' 
a c t i v i t i e s , he probably understood what Flamininus was t r y i n g t o do. 
While Timolaus' group was i n pov/er, Achaea d i d not have t o exert 
pressure on the recognised government t o keep Sparta v d t h i n the 
League: any i n t e r v e n t i o n could be represented as a c t i o n on behalf o f 
the government against d i s s i d e n t f a c t i o n s . With the e l e v a t i o n of an 
anti-Achaean group t o power, with the l i m i t a r t i f i c i a l l y placed on 
t h e i r freedom t h a t they vrould have t o belong t o the League, f u t u r e 
r e l a t i o n s between Achaea and Sparta would be confusion worse con-
founded - which Flaraininus desired, as i t would give him the oppor-
t u n i t y of frequent i n t e r v e n t i o n and the demonstration i n Rome of the 
breadth of his patronage» 
These considerations, added t o a wish t o prevent Flamininus and 
Diophames from gaining undeserved prestige from a revers&l of h i s 
own settlement, made Philopoemen decide t o ignore any possible 
consequences of opposing the strategos and Flamininus a t Sparta: 
h i s p r e s t i g e - and the r e f o r e h i s p o l i t i c a l career - was a t stake. 
I f i t came t o j u s t i f i c a t i o n he could represent his a c t i o n as support 
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f o r the l e g i t i m a t e and recognised government against i n t e r n a l r e b e l s , 
whom the powers of the League v/ere supporting. He a r r i v e d a t Sparta 
before Flamininus and Diophanes, and had time t o organise his f r i e n d s 
i n t o resistance before they a r r i v e d . I t seems u n l i k e l y that there 
v/as any a c t u a l f i g h t i n g before the c i t y : Philopoemen no doubt organ-
i s e d h i s Spartan government troops and propaganda s u f f i c i e n t l y v/ell 
t o make t h i s p o l i t i c a l l y undesirable f o r Diophanes and Flamininus, 
who had no a l t e r n a t i v e but t o withdraw, having s u f f e r e d a major 
p o l i t i c a l defeat. The support which they had intended t o o f f e r t o 
the t y r a n t p a r t y had f a i l e d t o achieve i t s aim, 
Philopoemen's a c t i o n cannot be judged by the c r i t e r i o n of 
absolute l e g a l i t y , f o r l e g a l i t y had become a v/eapon of the p o l i t i c a l 
c o n f l i c t . He had c e r t a i n l y opposed the strategos and Flamininus; 
but because he v/as successful, he d i d not s u f f e r ;.for. t h i s rashness, 
Diophanes and F].amininus had set out t o restore Sparta t o the League 
and prevent general t r o u b l e i n Laconia, They could not i n equity 
complain when Philopoemen, although a c t i n g u n o f f i c i a l l y , had achieved 
t h i s r e s u l t , P lutarch i s quite precise on t h i s p o i n t : Philopoeraen 
calmed the c i t y and restored, i t to the League. He had f u l f i l l e d h i s 
o b l i g a t i o n s t o h i s f r i e n d s , preserved h i s prestige by p r o t e c t i n g h i s 
settlement, robbed Flamininus and Diophanes of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l s p o i l s 
by achieving t h e i r ends v/ithout using t h e i r methods - on which they 
had placed a t l e a s t equal importance. Wha.t i s more, h i s s o l u t i o n 
was l i k e l y t o be f a r more popular among the Achaean voters than the 
o f f i c i a l s o l u t i o n favouring Nabis' ex-supporters. He was successful. 
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therefore he was not punished f o r h i s a c t i o n . He was successful 
because he had the propaganda of l e g a l i t y on h i s side, and had 
managed t o p a i n t the o f f i c i a l f e d e r a l a c t i o n as the d e s t r u c t i o n of 
the l e g i t i m a t e government. Flamininus was not prepared to r e s o r t 
t o naked pov;er p o l i t i c s ; therefore had t o concede defeat. Had 
Philopoemen f a i l e d , the f u l l force of Achaean l e g a l i s t i c propaganda 
would have been turned against him, and h i s p o l i t i c a l career would 
have been a t an end. 
This a c t i o n o f Philopoemen could not improve h i s r e l a t i o n s with 
Flamininus, which had already begu.n to d e t e r i o r a t e the previous year. 
I t also marks the f i r s t break vj i t h Diophanes, v;hich r e s u l t e d i n 
Dkphanes' j o i n i n g Aristaenus - who had also had no major d i f f e r e n c e 
of opinion w i t h Philopoemen before h i s r e t u r n from Crete - i n the 
opposition t o Philopoemen which f l o u r i s h e d i n the next decade.^"'' 
But t h i s i n c i p i e n t h o s t i l i t y t o Philopoemen d i d not prevent Diophanes 
from continuing t o pursue t h e i r j o i n t p o l i c y of expansion. Just 
a f t e r Thermopylae the i s l a n d of Zacynthus, v/hich had been held f o r 
Amynander of Athamania by Hierocles of Agrigentum, v;as bought by 
Diophanes from Hierocles f o r Achaea. At about t h i s time too, the 
neg o t i a t i o n s v;hich had been going on w i t h Messene broke dovm. At 
E l i s a more favourable r e p l y was received. The Eleans c l e a r l y had 
nowhere t o t u r n f o r help against Achaea now t h a t Antiochus was 
defeated, and the purchase of Zacynthus could not make them f e e l 
more secure. I t was t h e r e f o r e a matter of expediency t h a t they 
should be willing to allow negotiations t o proceed on a more f r i e n d l y 
basis.62 
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For the moment, i t seemed that Diophanes might have more success 
i n gaining new adherents t o Achaea by applying pressure t o Messene. 
A f t e r Thermopylae, a c t i o n against Messene seemed l e g i t i m a t e , as the 
Messenians were knov/n t o have favoured i\ntiochus, without a c t u a l l y 
having taken an a c t i v e p a r t i n his support; and Diophanes may have 
f e l t tha.t extreme measures v/ere j u s t i f i e d i n t r e a t i n g t h i s p o t e n t i a l 
e n e m y . H e l e d the Achaean array against Messene and made prepar-
a t i o n s t o besiege the town. But he had made the mistake of f a i l i n g 
t o consult Flamininus. This may have been d e l i b e r a t e , as h i s f l i r t -
a t i o n w i t h Flamininus' p o l i c i e s at Sparta had not had the success he 
desired, and he may have been d i s i l l u s i o n e d by t h i s f a i l u r e . He 
could always argue, i f necessary, t h a t the foedus granted y\chaea the 
r i g h t t o independ.ent a c t i o n . The Messenians however appreciated the 
importance of Flamininus' i n t e r v e n t i o n i n any Peloponnesian s e t t l e -
ment, and appealed t o him a t Chalcis. They o f f e r e d t o open t h e i r 
gates t o the Romans, but not the Achaeans. Flamininus h u r r i e d t o 
Megalopolis and sent messengers ordering Diophanes t o stop the 
f i g h t i n g . Diophanes, despite h i s desire f o r expansion and the 
recent foedus, had not expected a demand i n these naked power 
p o l i t i c a l terms, and f e l t obliged t o acquiesce i n Flamininus' demands. 
He played no p a r t i n the discussions f o r the f i n a l settlement of 
Messene, but simply accepted what Flamininus imposed. This was, i n 
f a c t , on the whole favourable t o Achaea: Messene v/as u n i t e d vdth the 
League, and her e x i l e s were t o be taken back. 
From the p o i n t of view of Achaea t h i s settlement was acceptable. 
I 0 
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although the e x i l e s might prove troublesome, and Diophanes was 
deprived of the g l o r y of having achieved i t himself. Flamininus 
was placed i n an avjkward p o s i t i o n by Diophanes' independent a c t i o n , 
yet he raana,ged t o f i n d both a s u i t a b l e immediate compromise and a 
new general p o l i c y f o r the f u t u r e . He had l i t t l e a l t e r n a t i v e aboui 
g r a n t i n g Diophanes Messene. Diophanes was a u s e f u l man f o r 
Flamininus i n Achaea, and he had t o c o n c i l i a t e him a f t e r preventing 
h i s f i g h t i n g against Messene; i f Messene were l e f t independent, 
Philopoemen would c e r t a i n l y have taken the c i t y i n h i s next s t r a t e g i a 
without asking Flamininus' permission, and Flamininus would have been 
robbed of a l l chance of extending h i s c l i e n t e l a both i n Messene and 
i n Achaea. This settlement of Messene marks an important new phase 
i n Flafflininus' p o l i c y of c r e a t i n g i n t e r n a l discord i n a c i t y which 
he j o i n e d t o the Leagoxe. At Sparta he had f a i l e d i n h i s attempt t o 
achieve t h i s by changing the pro-Achaean government. At Messene f o r 
the' f i r s t time, he t r i e d t o achieve t h i s by i n s i s t i n g on the r e s t o r -
a t i o n of the e x i l e s - who at Messene were already h i s c l i e n t s - an 
equally potent cause of c i v i l disturbance, w i t h the a d d i t i o n a l prop-
agandist b e n e f i t of having equity on i t s side. I t was the lack of 
t h i s v/hich had c o n t r i b u t e d t o h i s enforced acknowledgement of defeat 
by Philopoemen a t Sparta. A f t e r Messene, 'the r e s t o r a t i o n of the 
e x i l e s ' becomes the key theme of Roman p o l i c y towards Achaea. 
From the p o i n t of view of Flajnininus' r e l a t i o n s v;ith Messene, 
t h i s settlement was also s a t i s f a c t o r y , although before t h i s becomes 
apparent i t i s necessary t o i d e n t i f y the Messenian p o l i t i c a l groups. 
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The only account which we have of the events of I 9 I i s th a t of 
L i v y , i n v/hich tv/o groups of Messenians are di s t i n g u i s h e d , those 
holding the c i t y , who o f f e r d e d i t i o t o Flamininus, and the exules, 
who are restored as a r e s u l t of the settlement. The one Messenian 
p o l i t i c i a n v/hose name v/e know at t h i s period i s Deinocrates; and 
i t i s convenient t o examine the party groupings as they a f f e c t e d him. 
I n 195 he had been leader of the Messenian contingent t o the 
a l l i e d forces i n Flamininus' war against Nabis. As a r e s u l t of t h i s 
he had become cvvfpr^ with F l a m i n i n u s . W e can therefore conclude 
t h a t the pa r t y represented by Deinocrates had been i n pov/er i n 
Messene i n 195. The next v/e hear of Deinocrates i s i n winter l84/3, 
when he api.ears i n Rome, lo o k i n g t o Flamininus f o r support against 
Achaea f o r Messenian independence. The basis f o r t h i s hope i s h i s 
long-standing f r i e n d s h i p v/ith Flamininus, which had been formed i n 
195 and presumably continued unbroken u n t i l 184/3, This at l e a s t , 
i s the impression which Polybius' account gives. Deinocrates 
assumes au t o m a t i c a l l y t h a t the bond of c l i e n t e l a v / i l l work i n h i s 
favour. There i s c e r t a i n l y no doubt i n h i s mind t h a t the 10-year 
long f r i e n d s h i p had a l t e r e d i n any way, or t h a t anything had i n t e r -
vened v/hich would make the answer to his request seem at a l l 
d o u b t f u l t o him.^'^ This l a t e r t r u s t i n the s o l i d a r i t y of the 
c l i e n t e l a i s important i n consideration of the groupings of 19I. 
For i f the group of Deinocrates were the holders of the c i t y i n 191, 
they must have f e l t t h a t the foundations of the c l i e n t e l a e x i s t i n g 
between Flamininus and Deinocrates had been betrayed by Flamininus: 
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deditio was offered, with the result that the worst fears of the 
party vjere realised - enforced membership of the Achaean League, 
which i t was the very purpose of the deditio to avoid, and the 
enforced restoration of the exiles, v;ho must have been their p o l i t -
i c a l opponents.^° This was scarcely the way i n which Deinocrates 
would expect c l i e n t e l a to work; and i t did not augur well for 
future relations with Flamininus. Yet there i s no hint i n l8V3 
that any such betrayal had taken place. 
From t h i s examination of the earl i e r and l a t e r relationship 
betvjeen Deinocrates and Flamininus, we would expect the benefit of 
any settlement to have accrued to Deinocrates' party. I n the 
settlement i t s e l f , the group which certainly gained the greatest 
benefits was the exile group, not the c i t y group. There are 
reasons connected vdth Flaraininus' developing policies which made 
the restoration of the exiles at Messene desirable; but a persona.l 
l i n k between Flamininus and the exiles should not be discounted on 
these grounds. I f we discard the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of Deinocrates 
with the government party and examine the alternative, the d i f f i c -
u l t i e s are much less. I f Deinocrates i s one of the exiles, there 
i s no need to see Flamininus' action of 191 as being contradictory 
to the friendship with Deinocrates dating from 195; and i t shovfs 
more clearly the s o l i d basis for hope v/hich Deinocrates shov/ed i n 
18 V3. 
The main d i f f i c u l t y i n t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s that we know 
nothing of the change of circumstances, v;hich turned Deinocr3.tes 
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from leader of his countrymen i n 195 to exile seeking restoration 
i n 191. I n i t s e l f the change i s not wholly surprising; nor i s the 
fact that v;e hear nothing of i t , i f we make due allowance for the 
state of our sources. Nevertheless, the d i f f i c u l t y does remain 
unless a change i n general circumstances can be found to support 
the hypothesis - i t i s clear that neither the government group nor 
the exile group was i n favour of union with Achaea, so that this 
cannot have been the issue over which they s p l i t . 
The single most important issue facing the states of Greece 
between 195 and 191 v/as the attitude to be taken towards the 
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Aetolians and Antiochus, This was a p a r t i c u l a r l y v i t a l issue i n 
the case of E l i s and Messene, which were old a l l i e s of Aetolia and 
Rome. El i s had quickly made her decision, and a Syrian-paid garr-
ison was accepted in t o the c i t y . Messene was not openly committed 
to the same extent, but t h i s should not be taken to mean that the 
issue was not a l i v e . I t i s not possible to envisage Beinocrates* 
recommending any policy other than that of closer union v/ith Rome. 
In autumn 192, before i t was known how f u l l y the Senate was 
committed to the war vdth Antiochus, at a time when Antiochus was 
already i n Greece, t h i s may well have appeared a dangerous course; 
v;hen the Syrian garrison came to E l i s i t was impossible. Deinocrates 
must have seen great personal advantage i n a close relationship with 
Rome; and he seems to have had a f u l l e r understanding of Roman 
pov;er than his opponents. At the time of the s t a r t of the negotiat-
ions by Diophanes, i t was known that the government group was i n 
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favour of Antiochus. I t therefore seems very l i k e l y that 
Deinocrates ha.d been forced into exile over t h i s issue. 
The presence of Deinocrates ainong the exiles made possible a 
settlement of the Messenian problem which would be a cause of 
sati s f a c t i o n to Flamininus. We have already seen how the s e t t l e -
ment suited his Achaean policies. Similar considerations were at 
work i n his relations with Messene. I t was again a compromise by 
the friends of Rome: Deinocrates was restored, but Messene was 
united with Achaea; the government party which had favoured 
Antiochus was weakened by the union with Achaea and the restoration 
of t h e i r opponents, v/ithout any compensating advantages. A l l 
advantages gained by the various interests i n Achaea and Messene 
could be claimed by Flarnininus as manifestations of Roman generosity 
and a heavy-handed demonstration of how clientela v/orked. A l l 
disadvantages and d i f f i c u l t i e s could be l a i d at the door of loc a l 
party squabbles and the necessity for compromise. The settlement 
was a neat d i s t r i b u t i o n of beneficia to those w i l l i n g to compromise; 
but as so often i n a compromise ~ as Flamininus no doubt realised -
no one v;as s a t i s f i e d , and Messene was a s a t i s f a c t o r i l y recurring 
problem for Achaea for the next 12 years. 
After the settlement had been imposed on Messene, Flamininus 
made i t knovm. to Diophanes that he wanted him to c a l l a syncletos. 
At t h i s meeting, despite his recent acceptance of the accession of 
•Messene int o the League, he made i t quite clear that Rome was not 
prepared to allow Achaean expansion to continue i n d e f i n i t e l y : 
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vj-ithin Peloponnese - a concession to Diophanes' aims, and a bid 
for his support - i t could be acceptable; outside the mainland was 
out of bounds. The matter v/hich brought t h i s to a head was that of 
Zacynthus, which had recently been bought by Diophanes. Flamininus 
used the simile of the tortoise's v u l n e r a b i l i t y , once i t s head was 
out of i t s s h e l l , to point out that Achaea must keep v/ithin 
Peloponnese. I n any case there had been some sharp practice i n the 
purchase of the island, which Flamininus could legitimately claim 
as Roman by r i g h t of the defeat of Amynander before i t was bought 
by the Achaeans. There was clearly some t r u t h i n th i s claim, and 
Diophanes must have realised the p o s s i b i l i t y of the charge at the 
time. But at the s^fncletos he vainly insisted on the legitimacy of 
his action, against the arguments of Flamininus and of an unidenti-
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f i e d group of quidam Achaeorum. 
The problems ar i s i n g from Livy's narrative of the syncletos 
are the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of these ^idam Achaeorum, and the reasons 
for Diophanes' violent reaction to Flamininus' interference over 
Zacynthus, v/hen vi/e should expect him to be coming closer to 
Flamininus' policy for Achaea, We have seen that relations between 
Philopoemen and Diophanes must have been openly hostile after 
Sparta; and yet i t i s clear that they both believed i n the poss-
i b i l i t y and d e s i r a b i l i t y of annexing new t e r r i t o r y . The growth of 
personal antipathy betvjeen the two men was no reason for Diophanes 
to change the policy i n v/hich he believed and to which he v;as 
p o l i t i c a l l y committed: the Messenian a f f a i r shov/s t h i s clearly, and 
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Zacynthus i s t h i s pattern. He had again t r i e d to present Flamininus 
with a a^iJ^ a£comjDli^  and now that this had f a i l e d , he had no 
alternative but to defend his purchase of the island, i n which his 
personal prestige v;as deeply involved. He had l o s t l i t t l e by 
complying with Flamininus' order over Messene, as i t had arrived 
before any conclusion had been reached. With Zacynthus, the s i t -
uation v;as d i f f e r e n t : an a.lready existing Achaean settlement was to 
be overturned. Hovrever much Diophanes may have been v j i l l i n g to 
co-operate v/ith Flarnininus i n general, he wa.e already too much 
personally involved on the opposite side to be able to do anything 
but defend his position on th i s issue. I f he did not have any hopes 
of winning, he could hope to take some advantage from demonstrating 
his patriotism. 
The opposition to Diophanes, v;hich Livy leaves anonymous, 
cannot be certainly i d e n t i f i e d . I t seems f a i r l y clear that since 
Livy does not give the spokesm.an, Polybius did not either. This 
should immediately arouse suspicion. The a c t i v i t y of the opposition 
'^^  ^ -^^  sym^etos was confined to attacking Diophanes i n person, and 
i n dissociating themselves from his action: e t ^ J ^ j u ^ ^ 
There i s no suggestion that there was any general sympathy for 
Flaraininus; and i t i s made quite clear that i t was this specific 
issue v/hich was the object of their h o s t i l i t y - ea/n^ rem. I t must 
be considered possible that Livy has recorded a piece of deliberate 
concealment by Polybius. Were the ^ui^dam Philopoemen and his 
supporters, using the Zacynthus issue, which was already l o s t , to 
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destroy Diophanes p o l i t i c a l l y , just as Diophanes had attempted to 
destroy Philopoemen p o l i t i c a l l y over Sparta? This would certainly 
make sound p o l i t i c a l sense. The difference of opinion cannot have 
been over the ideology of expansion, as t h i s was a.pparently agreed 
by a l l groups. But i t could v/ell have been a personal matter of 
t h i s nature; and Philopoemen may have sittracted support on this 
issue from the more moderate Achaeans who were unwilling to act 
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independently of Flamininus. 
I f Diophanes hoped that his display of patriotism i n a lost 
cause at the syncletos would make up for his earl i e r f a i l u r e at 
Sparta, and create s u f f i c i e n t influence to prevent Philopoemen's 
election as strategos at the synodos which followed soon aft e r , he 
was badly disappointed. Philopoeraen was elected, and at the very 
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electoral synodos came again into c o n f l i c t with Flamininus. 
Diophanes, on the other hand, v;as not, as far as we know, ever again 
elected strategos; and was driven in t o a policy of close co-oper-
ation with Rome, i n order to provide an alternative policy to the 
more openly independent action of Philopoemen's group, ]participation 
i n which he had f o r f e i t e d by his stab i n the back at Sparta, when he 
deserted Philopoeraen for Flamininus, He did hov;ever, despite his 
ultimate f a i l u r e i n federal p o l i t i c s , succeed i n unifying 
Peloponnese under Achaea; and his statue proclaimed t h i s u n t i l 
imperial times. But as far as v;e know, his p o l i t i c a l u n r e l i a b i l i t y 
d i s q u a l i f i e d him from playing any important part i n administering 
his achievement. 
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A further attempt to assert Roman patronage on Achaea v/as 
made at the autumn synodos of the League, at v;hich Philopoemen was 
re-elected strategos, Flamininus had convinced Glabrio of the value 
of his Peloponnesian policy, and both came to Aegium. Since the 
spring, Flaraininus had discovered a new diplomatic weapon for 
harrying expansionist Achaea, i n the numerous exiles i n Peloponnese, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y from Sparta. The restoration of the exiles had been 
accomplished at Messene; now i t was to be introduced at Sparta. 
There v/ere large numbers of exiles from the various Spartan extremist 
regimes of the Spartan revolution: Flamininus did not distingxiish 
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betv/een the various groups, but insisted on wholesale restoration. 
They had become clients at the time of the expedition against Nabis;"^^ 
but u n t i l his restoration of Deinocrates to Messene he had not 
formed any policy which involved t h e i r restoration. This v/as put 
forward for the f i r s t time at the synodos of autumn 191, and 
naturally met violent opposition from Philopoemen. His argT;.ment, 
recorded by Plutarch, was that he wanted the exiles to owe t h e i r 
gratitude for t h e i r restoration to Achaea and Philopoemen, not to 
the Romans. The issue i s very clearly formulated, as i t via.s 
clearly understood by Philopoemen: he knew well that Flamininus 
stood to gain from the restoration of the exiles v/hat he had f a i l e d 
to achieve by his attempt to change the governing party. His own 
direct public and private interest was to prevent Flamininus from 
achieving t h i s , to prevent his causing trouble to the League and 
increasing his own influence at the same time. I f the Romans should 
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i n s i s t on a restoration, Philopoeraen realised that he would have 
to submit; but he could manipulate the circumstances i n such a 
v/ay that Achaean and Philopoemen's patronage would achieve the 
res u l t , not Roman and Flaraininus'. But even th i s point had not 
yet been reached. The matter had just been broached, and there 
was yet time to see whether the Senate would endorse i t s represent-
atives' demands. For the moment Philopoemen managed to have the 
issue shelved by the synodos. 
The other matter to be discussed, i n which the Romans v/ere 
interested, was the accession of E l i s . The Eleans too had every 
reason to want to prevent the Romans from exercising t h e i r patron-
age. They had much to gain from t h i s , for they had been openly on 
the side of Antiochus, and could therefore be regarded as defeated 
enemies. They considered that i f they joined the Leag-ue of th e i r 
own accord, they might avoid Roman r e t a l i a t i o n - the value of 
which was driven home to them by the fate of the Messenians, who 
had been i n a similar s i t u a t i o n . Flamininus' treatment of Messene, 
i n particular his restoration of the exiles, could scarcely 
encourage other states to put themselves i n his hands. The Eleans, 
since they had no alternative to joining the League, naturally 
wanted to do so on as favourable terms as possible. This meant, 
without Roman interference. They stated t h e i r position clearly; 
and the synodos recognised the coincidence of Achaean and Elean 
interests - perhaps again advised by Philopoemen's experience of 
Flamininus' patronage diplomacy - and accepted the Eleans' statement. 
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The Romans had been deprived of another chance to assert their 
patronage, again frustrated by Philopoemen, now aided by Elean susp-
icions. The continuation i n useful diplomatic l i f e of 'the freedom 
of the Greeks' depended on the absence of demands i n terms of power 
p o l i t i c s ; and the Romans had to accept their defeat. 
The formalities of Elean union with Achaea were probably carried 
out at once, i f ve are t o accept the vjhole t r u t h of the claim on the 
base of Diophanes' statue, that Diophanes was the man who f i r s t 
u n i f i e d the Peloponnese under the Achaean League. We have no reason 
for r ejecting t h i s claim; and as Diophanes' year must have ended at , 
or soon a f t e r , the synodos, the union was probably arranged and 
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r a t i f i e d at t h i s synodos. 
Opposition over Peloponnesian matters did not mean that 
Philopoemen considered that i t v/as necessary to refuse a l l co-oper-
ation to the Romans. During the winter an Achaean force ravaged the 
southern coast of Aetolia. This seems to have had l i t t l e effect on 
the general course of the war.^^ 
Flamininus' policy tov/ards the Spartan exiles was re-emphasised, 
now by the Senate, during the winter I91/O. A Spartan government 
embassy v/ent to Rome to ask about the p o s s i b i l i t y of the restoration 
of the f i v e hostages, who had been taken by FlaBiininus i n his war 
against Nabis, and the coastal towns v/hich had been placed under 
Achaean tutela at the same time. The Roman reply v/as that they would 
give instructions about the coastal tov/ns to envoys who v/ere being 
sent to Greece; as far as the hostages were concerned, there would 
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have to be further consideration. They then asked why the 'old 
exiles' had not yet been restored, now that Sparta was free. The 
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reply of the embassy i s l o s t . 
The f i r s t point for discussion i s the date of the embassy. 
Aymard wants to place i t i n summer 19I, on the grounds that there 
would be no value i n sending i t after the Achaean autumn synodos, at 
which Philopoemen had refused to capitulate to the Romans on the 
exile question. This, his main objection to the t r a d i t i o n a l date 
accepted here, must be rejected when we remember that the policy which 
Flamininus pursued was, i n the eyes of the Spartans, his ovm policy, 
not necessarily that of the Senate. An embassy to the Senate might 
well secure support which was simply not apparent on the spot. The 
Spartans must have been hoping for t h i s . Again, Aymard dismisses too 
l i g h t l y the usual senatorial custom of receiving foreign embassies 
under the new consuls. Although i t i s true that t h i s was not a fixed 
rule incapable of variation, the present case offers no exceptional 
circumstances which would suggest the necessity for a change i n the 
customary procedure. 
The main objection, however, to dating t h i s embassy earli e r than 
winter I91/O i s the Senate's rider to i t s reply, about the 'old 
exiles'. We have seen how the idea of using exiles was essentially 
Flamininus', and f i r s t appeared i n summer 191 at Messene. Fi r s t 
applied to Sparta i n the autumn at the synodos, i t had been thwarted 
by Philopoemen. The relevance of this to dating the embassy i s clear: 
the policy v/hich Flamininus represented as Roman interest vdth regard 
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to Sparta could not be presented to the Senate u n t i l he himself 
returned to Rome, i n the l a t e autumn or winter I9I/0. Therefore 
the senatorial reply, i-^hich Polybius records, cannot precede the 
synodos. The fragment of Polybius can stand i n winter 191/O where 
BUttner-Wobst places i t . 
The appearance of th i s embassy i n Rome i s of great importance 
for understanding the state of the government at Sparta. I t i s clear 
that t h i s i s a Spartan government embassy: Polybius would not other-
wise have called the ambassadors simply Aaxe8ai|i6vioi . But the 
requests v/hich they make are very strange i f Timolaus' group v/as s t i l l 
i n power, and we must assume that they had been overthrown between 
Philopoemen's defence i n spring I 9 I and this embassy of winter I91/O, 
I n the f i r s t place the embassy was contrary to the convention included 
i n the Achaean foedus with Rome, v/hich prevented a constituent state 
from p e t i t i o n i n g the Senate. Timolaus' group would certainly have 
acted leg a l l y thjrough t h e i r protector Philopoemen, Again, although 
Tiraolaus' group may have wanted the restoration of the coastal towns, 
i t could have no interest i n asking for the restoration of the 
hostages taken from Nabis: they included Armenas, Nabis' son, and must 
have been a l l f i v e strong supporters of the tyrant party. This again 
points to a change of Spartan government. 
Just as sig n i f i c a n t i s the terminology of the Senate's reply. 
For the f i r s t time, the phrase ^p-yaXoL ^iVfabeQ i s used i n connect-
ion with the Spartan exiles. At the synodps i t was only exules who 
were considered to need restoration. This refinement of terminology 
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must imply that there were at least two groups of exiles now; and 
of these, the Senate was not concerned with the 'new exiles'. As 
the d i s t i n c t i o n f i r s t appears between, the Achaean autumn synodos and 
the v/inter audience at Rome, we must conclude that the creation of 
the 'nev; exiles' must have taken place i n that period. Since the 
demands of the embassy i n themselves suggest that there had been a 
change of government between the spring and the winter, i t i s an 
economical hypothesis to conclude that the 'nevj exiles' had been 
created by t h i s change of government, and were therefore Tiraolaus' 
group. 
I t could, perhaps, be argued against t h i s view that Livy's f a i l -
ure to specify 'old exiles' i s not decisive for a change of Spartan 
government between the synodos and the winter. He could be simply 
using imprecise language. This objection, however, involves explain-
ing the creation of the 'nev/ exiles' before the synodos. The only 
occasions when there v/as trouble i n Sparta between the death of Nabis 
'^ ^^  terminus post quern for the creation of 'new exiles' - and the 
synodos of autumn 191, v/ere at the time of Philopoemen's or i g i n a l 
settlement, and at the time of his interference i n spring 191. On 
neither of these occasions were his opponents driven i n t o exile. 
The o r i g i n a l settlement involved 'persuading some, compelling others', 
but not e x i l i n g them, as i s clear from the trouble v/hich Timolaus' 
group had i n maintaining themselves i n power after the settlement. 
Similarly, at the time of Philopoemen's intervention there were no 
exiles created.. I f exiles v/ere created then, they would have been 
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the anti-Achaean group, the party which was opposed to Timolaus and 
whom Flamininus was eager to have i n s t a l l e d i n power instead of 
Timolaus' group. I n v/inter I91/O th i s group was responsible for the 
request to the Senate for the restoration of the hostages. Therefore 
they must have been restored betv/een Philopoemen's intervention and 
th e i r winter appeal to Rome, The only occasion i n th i s period when 
Spartan exiles are mentioned i s at the Achaean autumn synodos, v/here 
Flamininus and Glabrio demanded the restoration of the exules. I f 
the anti-Tifflolaus group v/as exiled at Philopoemen's intervention, they 
must have been restored at th i s time to be able to send the embassy to 
Rome the subsequent winter. But Philopoemen refused to restore the 
exules at the synodos. Therefore they cannot have been the tyrant 
group, who must accordingly have been at Sparta a l l along. V/e can 
therefore have confidence i n Livy's statement that only unspecified, 
exules were involved i n the discussions at the synodos, and i n our 
conclusion from t h i s that the dist i n c t i o n between Livy's exules of the 
autumn and Polybius' apxa^ot (fiXifabsQ i n the winter i s a genuine d i s t -
i n c t i o n . I t , must be due to the creation of ^ new exiles' between the 
two events. These 'new exiles', v/e argue, were Timolaus' group. 
The circumstances of the change cannot be certainly ascertained; 
but the fact that the embassy to Rome was so quickly despatched 
suggests that Flamininus had had a hand i n i t - on th i s occasion 
Philopoemen was unable to prevent the coug^Jetat. Equally suggestive 
of Flamininus' interference i s the fact that the hostages - except 
for Armenas, who did not long survive - were i n fact released soon 
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84 afte r the embassy had been received. The tyrant party was composed 
of his c l i e n t s ; and he was more than ever attached to them after 
being frustrated by Philopoemen i n the spring. I t seems quite l i k e l y 
that, v/ithout physical interference on his part - which could again 
be anticipated and frustrated by Philopoemen - he had continued 
throughout the year to encourage his friends, and had offered them 
diplomatic support and recognition by the Senate as the legitimate 
government. Hence t h e i r liaste i n sending the embassy to Rome before 
Philopoemen could i n t e r f e r e . But the question of the exiles created 
by the tyrants - now described en bloc as 'old exiles' to distinguish 
them from Timolaus' group - was s t i l l a hare worth pursuing; and 
despite the change i n government - enough i n i t s e l f to cause Achaea 
i n f i n i t e discomfort - the Senate seized upon the cause of the 'old 
exiles': i t had the supreme advantage of being the cause of equity 
as well as convenience. 
In spring I90 an embassy arrived i n Achaea from Eumenes of 
Pergamum, seeking help and confirmation of his alliance. The 
Achaeans did not hesitate. A syncletos confirmed the alliance and 
1,000 A.chaean infantry, matched by 100 cavalry, were sent to Euraenes 
under Diophanes. Diophanes must have been a p o l i t i c a l embarrassment 
to Philopoemen t h i s year, but he knew Diophanes was a competent 
soldier, and therefore made use of Eumenes' claim on the alliance to 
remove the potential p o l i t i c a l trouble-maker, by sending him with the 
expeditionary force, which v/as s t i l l i n Asia i n the autumn and formed 
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part of Eumenes' contingent at Magnesia. 
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No information i s extant regarding Acliaean a c t i v i t y for the 
remainder of I9O; but i n the spring of I89 Achaea continued her 
par t i c i p a t i o n i n the Roman war e f f o r t against Aetolia: she co-operated 
v/ith Pleuratus of I l l y r i a i n an expedition to ravage the south coast 
of Aetolia. I t seems to have had l i t t l e success or effect on the 
course of the war. I n the autumn, after the beginning of the siege of 
Same, Achaean funditores from Aegium, Patrae and Dyme v/ere with 
Fulvius i n Gephallenia. Livy, from Polybius, i s careful to point out 
that there was no p o l i t i c a l significance i n the choice of these towns, 
but that they provided the best slingers because of the pebbly beaches. 
Apart from these two incidents of participation i n the general war, v/e 
knov/,nothing more of Achaea u n t i l autumn l89) when internal troubles 
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again broke out at Sparta, 
The course of these troubles and their settlement are related by 
Livy, but his chronology i s very confused, although the narrative 
material i s from Polybius, and therefore trustv/orthy. This confusion 
has led to great differences i n interpretation of the events related; 
and i t was not u n t i l Holleaux applied himself to elucidate the chron-
ology that i t became clear. His fundamental study raises no disagree-
ments about chronology, and a detailed re p e t i t i o n of his 8.rguments 
seems unnecessary.- However, a resume of his results i s necessary for 
87 
a discussion of the events themselves as they affect Achaea. 
The siege of Same began about the beginning of October I89, and 
lasted four months - a round figxire - ending towards the end of 
January I88. Fulvius l e f t Same for Rome, once the siege v/as under 
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way, to conduct the elections: this was towards the end of October, 
After the elections he returned to Same, arriv i n g i n mid/late 
December; for the remainder of the siege he.remained at Same. I n 
Peloponnese Philopoemen v/as elected strate£0S at about the time of 
the beginning of the siege; shortly after t h i s 'the Spartans' 
attacked.'the exiles' at Las, 'the exiles' appealed to Achaea, and 
^ syncletos demanded satisfaction from 'the Spartans' - the 
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surrender of the ringleaders. A massacre of those 'Spartans' 
favouring compliance v/ith the Achaean demand followed, together with 
a decree seceding from the League and an appeal to Jlilvius, who by 
t h i s time had l e f t Same for the elections. Another Achaean syncletos 
declared war on Sparta, and h o s t i l i t i e s began on a small scale, but 
v/ere prevented from becoming general by the approach of winter. At 
the same time Philopoemen l e t i t be known that he intended to attempt 
to carry a law making the meeting place of the synodos variable: the 
people of Aegium f e l t their- privilege threatened, and also appealed to 
Fulvius - s t i l l i n his absence from Same, 
After the return of Fulvius, the siege occupied him f u l l y u n t i l 
i t s end. Meanwhile the Achaean damiourgoi announced the normal f i r s t 
synodos of the year for February, as usual.at.Aegium. I n order to 
have his proposal discussed before the synodos took place, 
Philopoemen summoned a syncletos to Argos. Fulvius, when he was 
able to attend to the accumulation of Peloponnesian a f f a i r s , came 
f i r s t to Aegiura; but v/hen . he . discovered that the regular s^^iodos 
was being preceded by a s^^SlSiSSj on to Argos. He found 
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l i t t l e opposition to support there, and Philopoemen's proposal was 
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successfully passed. Another syncletos was then summoned to Elis 
to discuss the Spartan question - by thi s time i t must have been late 
February - and at t h i s syncletos l'\j.lvius advised sending ambassadors 
to the Senate. Lycortas and Diophanes represented the tvjo facets of 
Achaean policy, and had probably returned to Achaea by the end of 
A p r i l with an ambigu.ous reply. In May, Philopoemen was joined by 
large numbers of 'exiles' when he led the Achaean army against Sparta. 
At Compasion, he met the leaders of the 'Spartans', and i n a r i o t 
some were k i l l e d ; the next day others were j u d i c i a l l y murdered. A 
settlement of Sparta was then carried out. 
This i s the chronology which i s accepted i n the follo\\ring 
discussion. Two matters arise from these events which require 
further discussion: the Achaean constitutional a l t e r a t i o n , and the 
Spartan question, which are discussed i n that order. 
Aegium had been v i r t u a l l y the capitsi c i t y of the early Achaean 
League. I t was the centre of Old Achaea and easily accessible from 
each of the or i g i n a l Achaean c i t i e s . For thi s reason synodoi had 
always been held there, and the Aegienses had come to regard i t as 
th e i r p r i v i l e g e . They no doubt found economic advantages i n holding 
syi^ocl-oi i n t h e i r c i t y ; but i n addition to t h i s , there v;as the 
prestige vjithin the League, and the p o s s i b i l i t y , not to be discounted, 
of exerting u n o f f i c i a l l o c a l influence on decisions taken i n the 
synodoi: i t v/as not necessary to vote to be able to exercise influence. 
As the League expanded, and the weight of population was increasingly 
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i n Arcadia rather than Old Achaea, i t became increasingly inconven-
ient t o r e t a i n Aegium as the fixed meeting place of the regular 
business s^nodol. This was the more important, as Megalopolis was 
providing a larger proportion of leading Achaean statesmen than any-
other single c i t y ~ to our knov/ledge, Philopoemen, Lycortas and 
Diophanes. 
There vrere also occasions which could be envisaged v;hen i t 
might be more e f f i c i e n t to hold a synodos elsev/here than at Aegium; 
and t h i s type of consideration seems to have been behind the reform 
of 188. I t did also open the p o s s i b i l i t y of manipulation, i n order 
to subject the members to excessive l o c a l influence i n the case of 
specific l o c a l issues, as v/as already the case v;ith the syncletoi -
although there i s no evidence ths.t t h i s occurred. Of the 17 
recorded synodoi after the r e f o r m , h were held at Megalopolis, 3 
at Corinth, 2 at Aegium, 1 at Sicyon, and 7 at places unknown. This 
scarcely suggests regular manipulation by dominant local interests ~ 
although i t i s not possible from such a small scattered ssjnple of 
meetings to reach a definite conclusion. I t i s clear, however, that 
Aegium was not excluded. In addition to his natural desire to offer 
help on appeal, the support \diich Fulvius had given the Aegienses 
had been also soundly based,on the greater convenience for the 
Romans of laiowing that the synodoi would regularly take place only 
at one convenient coastal town - although i n fact most Roman 
ambassadors vrere received at syncletoi - and the only two known 
synodoi a f t e r Philopoemen's law at which Romans were present v;ere 
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91 the Aegium meetings. But again, the paucity of evidence makes 
i t impossible to decide f i n a l l y . Nevertheless, i n the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, i t does seem indicated that efficiency and 
privilege-breaking v;ere the keynotes to the reform, rather than the 
creation of the p o s s i b i l i t y of manipulation. 
This seems indicated too by the fact that there was l i t t l e 
opposition to Philopoemen's proposal when the syncletos met at Argos. 
There i s no need to see corruption i n the haste of his summoning the 
syncletos. I n order to prevent the matter from being discussed at 
synodos - already announced. - i n the hostile atmosphere of Aegium, 
i t was essential to have the syncletos both before the synodos and at 
a distance from Aegium. Hence Argos and the haste. There was some 
opposition from the Aegienses; but i t was not voluble enough to make 
Fulvius consider staking Roman prestige on wliat appeared to him to be 
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a losing cause: and i t was clearly a victory for the better cause. 
The evidence of these chapters of Livy i s the f i r s t indication 
we have of how matters v/ere going at Sparta, since the embassy to 
Rome of winter 191/O. Flaraininus' policy of the reintegration of the 
'old exiles' had been heavily empha.sised i n 19I. I n I90 another 
Roman mission was sent to Greece v;hich carried instructions about 
the coastal toifns. V/e know nothing of the composition or detailed 
task of t h i s embassy; but i t seems l i k e l y , from the circumstances 
of i t s appointment, that the instructions would include a further 
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emphasis on Roman insistence on the restoration of the exiles. 
Philopoemen must again have offered resistance to this statement of 
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Roraaji policy, as he had to Flajnininus and Glabrio at the 191 synodos, 
for there i s nothing which suggests that the 'old exiles' were 
restored before l88. .At the same time, Philopoemen must have r e a l -
ised that, i f the exile problem re a l l y reached c r i s i s point, the 
Senate could i n s i s t on the restoration, and he would have to agree. 
He must, therefore, by this time, have been t r y i n g to find a face-
saving formula. His action i n l88 shows that by t h i s time he thought 
the formtila had been found. 
The p o s s i b i l i t y of discovering the circumstances of this comes 
from a fragment of Polybius, i n which he describes and moralises upon 
Philopoemen's action at Gompasion: xaXov |iev Y^p TO xairdYetv tovQ 
atx|iaXcoTo«c (pvfabaz e tc SirdpTTiv, crvfj^epov 6e TO TatreivoSoat TV 
TSOV Aaxs6ai |aovta)v iroXiv , <xaTa(^ovei)cra,VT)a TO»g 8e8opW(^opT]K6Tac 
Toov TU<pav>v<co>v <6t)va<yTetq,> » The contrast between the 'captive 
exiles' and. the 'strong-arm men of the tyrants' provides a valuable 
guide i f we read Livy's account v/ith Polybius' description i n mind. 
I t i s clear that the 'captive exiles' - nowhere else mentioned - v/ere 
at least part of those who were with Philopoemen, and who were even-
t u a l l y restored. The 'strong-arm men', on the other hand, must have 
been those vjhom Livy calls simply Lacedaemonii. Since they are 
e x p l i c i t l y described by Polybius as supporters of the tyrants, they 
must be the group v;hich sent the embassy to Rome i n winter 193-/0, 
whom Polybius then dignified with the t i t l e Aaxe5ac(i6vioi - i n fac t , 
as Livy's unprejudiced account vrould suggest, the government i n 
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pov/er. Betv;een autumn 191, therefore, when Timolaus' party was 
overwhelmed, and autumn I 8 9 , there had been no change i n the holders 
of power at Sparta. 
Polybius' description of those v/hom i t was worthy of Philopoemen 
to restore as 'captives' does not allow a xijholly satisfactory explan-
ation. He uses the term to distinguish a particular group of exiles, 
but does not make i t clear i n this passage whether he means one 
group from among the 'old exiles', or a separate group i n contrast t o 
the whole mass of 'old exiles'. Polybius' ovm bias tov/ards Achaea 
and Philopoemen suggests that he would approve most of a l l of the 
restoration of the exile group which favoured Achaea and Philopoemen -
Timolaus' party. His arnbig-uity may be deliberate, . for he certainly 
had a misleading statement v;hich Livy translated: Philopoemen praetor 
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iam inde ab i n i t i o exulum causae amicus. I f this i s referred to 
the 'old exiles' alone i t i s patently untrue; but i f to simply 
'exiles' - among whom were by now Timolaus' group of recent exiles -
i t can be ambiguously interpreted to include the 'old exiles', and 
save Philopoemen's reputation as a humanitarian for posterity 
(although i t does not enhance Polybius' as honest historian). We 
may therefore te n t a t i v e l y prefer t h i s explanation of 'captive 
exiles', and assume, from the terminology, that at f i r s t some 
members of Tiraolaus' group had been taken prisoner by the tyrant 
party before escaping to, among other places. Las. This would 
explain more easily the violence of the government's attack on the 
town: the issue of the 'old exiles' v/as certainly a l i v e , as the 
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Senate had made quite clear; but not as alive as that of the com-
paratively recently expelled government party. The appeal of these 
exiles to Achaea after the attack also tends to show that they were 
not the 'old exiles', but the 'captive exiles': the 'old exiles' 
could not anticipate much support from Philopoemen, despite the fact 
that Las was s t i l l i n Achaean tutelgu On the other hand, the appeal 
of the government to Fulvius against Achaea, after slaughtering the 
remaining pro-Achaean elements, shov;s clearly that they had great 
t r u s t i n the protection of Rome, which had f i r s t been demonstrated 
by Flamininus, to the extent that Rome would support them against 
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Achaea. 
VJe are nov; i n a position to understand the nature of the face-
saving s i t u a t i o n i n which. Philopoeraen was able, as a by-product of 
action i n the support of Timolaus' group, which'he'had supported 
throughout at Sparta - iam inde ab i n i t i o exulum causae amicus - to 
restore the 'old exiles', i n accordance with the policy of Flaraininus, 
and steal the patronage of the restored exiles which Flamininus had 
hoped to gain for the Senate. This was a compromise, for 
Philopoemen could hardly desire to bring additional trouble on 
Achaea from the restoration; but on this Philopoemen ultimately had 
no choice, since the Senate chose to i n s i s t . He therefore attempted 
to gain as much advantage as was available by stealing the Senate's 
policy. The attack on Las i n autumn 189 by the government of the 
tyrant party was primarily aimed at the annihilation of the remaining 
members of Timolaus' group. The appeal made to Philopoemen, v;hich 
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f i r s t involved Achaea again i n Spartan internal troubles, Vifas by 
Timolaus' party; and Philopoemen responded, as expected, by demand-
ing those of the tyrant group v/ho were responsible. The result of 
t h i s v;as a further anti-Achaean demonstration at Sparta, the murder 
of 30 Achaean supporters, secession from Achaea, and the appeal to 
-•plilvius. Some f i g h t i n g followed the . subsequent Achaean declaration 
of war, but the winter froze the status quo. 
The Achaean ambassadors to Rome, sent i n the spring after the 
E l i s syncletos on the suggestion of Fulvius, were Lycortas and 
Diophanes. Lycortas represented the well-established view of 
Philopoemen, that the Achaeans should be allowed to decide matters 
at Sparta i n accordance with the agreement i-dth v;hich the c i t y had 
entered the League, and t h e i r own laws. This represented the issue 
as an i n t e r n a l Achaean matter of neither interest nor importance to 
the Senate; and implied that the intervention of Flamininus, and 
the interest he had i n the Spartan question, was i l l e g i t i m a t e . 
Diophanes' position was that which he had f i r s t taken up i n spring 
191, and was now probably confirmed by the support of Aristaenus. 
He had then allowed that Flamininus might have an interest i n Sparta, 
and committed himself to his support on t h i s . The same point of view 
was expressed by him now, that the Senate should have the f i r s t and 
l a s t words on the Spartan question. He recognised - as did 
Philopoemen ~ that i n the l a s t resort the Senate could i n s i s t 
i r r e s i s t i b l y that i t s demands be carried out; he differed from 
Philopoemen i n the same way as Aristaenus: by acceding to, and going 
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half-way to meet the inevitable, the inevitable might be less 
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disastrous i n i t s e f f e c t . 
The r e s u l t of t h i s embassy v/as that the Senate decided novari 
n i h i l de Lacedaemoniis, although, according to Livy, magnae 
a u c t o r i t a t i s apud, Romanes turn gens Achaeorum erat. To some extent t h i s 
i s true, although i t did not mean that the Achaean dominant group 
could get what i t vranted from the Senate. This i s clear from the 
reply, which simply attempted to preserve the status quo. I t means 
more precisely, that a large body of senators had been recently 
involved i n Achaean a f f a i r s , and understood what the issues v;ere; 
and the Senate as a whole ha.d been grateful enough to the Achaeans 
for t h e i r declaration of war against Antiochus to grant them a foedus. 
aequum. Since then, Achaea had supplied contingents of troops 
against the Aetolians, and helped Eumenes up to Magnesia. The 
auctoritas was based s o l i d l y on the Senate's recognition of the value 
of these o f f i c i a . But despite t h i s , the Senate expressed i t s view of 
the essentially peripheral nature of i t s involvement i n Achaean 
a f f a i r s , now that Antiochus was f i n a l l y defeated. As long as 
Peloponnese remained comparatively quiet and played i t s part as 
Roman c l i e n t , the Senate did not care unduly what action was taken 
at Sparta. The result was that both the Spartans and Philopoeraen 
were able to argue that the ambiguous reply gave them the r i g h t to 
t h e i r own vjay: the only thing that was clear v;as that the Senate v;as 
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not going to intervene openly as Diophanes had requested. 
I n May, after the receipt of the Senate's reply, Philopoemen 
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assembled the Achaean array, and accompanied by large numbers of 
e x i l e s - certainly Timolaus' group, and at least some of the 'old 
exiles' too - made his v/ay to Compasion i n Spartan territory."'"'^^ 
Secession was a major federal offence, and he demanded the surrender 
of the leaders of thetyrant party who had been responsible. A con-
ference was arranged, and 80 Spartans accepted Philopoemen's pledge 
of safety. As they approached the Achaean camp they were given a 
hostile reception by the groups of exiles, and although Achaean 
o f f i c i a l s t r i e d , at this stage, to honour Philopoemen's pledges, -
although t h i s may be simply Polybian apologetics - 17 were stoned to 
death on the spot by the exiles, both groups of vjhom had great 
feelings of personal h o s t i l i t y to the leaders of the tyrant party. 
The next day the remaining 63 V\rere given a summary t r i a l and 
executed."'"'^ "^  Polybius l a t e r expresses the view that t h i s X'jas a bene-
f i c i a l action on the part of Philopoeraen; but he does not, i n that 
place, describe or express an opinion about the means by which i t was 
accomplished."'"^^ I t would have been d i f f i c u l t to defend this breach 
of the pledge of safety at the time of the conference, international 
diplomatic procedure being sacrificed to temporary p o l i t i c a l 
advantage. The expediency of taking the advantage offered must have 
seemed to outweigh the moral aspects. The p o s s i b i l i t y must have 
seemed at hand of f i n a l l y resolving the Spartan problem: the a n n i h i l -
ation of the leaders of the tyrant party would make the restoration 
of Tifflolaus' group easy; and with them could go the 'old exiles', 
thus removing a source of Roman interest i n Sparta; both groups i n 
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Sparta would then be so closely attached to Achaea and Philopoemen 
by t i e s of gratitude that future serious trouble could not be 
expected. 
With these considerations to the fore, i t was easy enough for 
interested parties such as Polybius to condone the pseudo-judicial 
massacre. The only fragment of a non-Achaean account i s that pre-
served i n Plutarch, of the Spartan historian and antiquarian 
Aristocrates. Aristocrates' recorded version i s that Philopoemen 
k i l l e d 350 Spartans, whereas Polybius gives only 80. Aristocrates' 
figure must be either exaggerated, or include figures which Polybius 
f a i l e d to record. There may ha.ve been a continuation of the massacre 
once Philopoemen gained control of the c i t y , the casualties from 
which Polybius discreetly f a i l e d to include i n his figure for 
Compasion. On the other hand, Aristocrates' figure may have been 
deliberately exaggerated i n order to v i l i f y Philopoemen - although 
i n t h i s case we would probably expect an even larger figure. The 
choice between the two figures must be largely a p r i o r i , i n which 
case we must not' allovj Polybius' reputation for accuracy to over-
weight the issue i n his favour: v;e have i n s u f f i c i e n t information to 
form any judgement about Aristocrates' h i s t o r i c a l tendencies."'"'^•^ 
Despite Polybius' sympathy \ilth the aims and methods of 
Philopoemen, the solution imposed at Sparta after the massacre at 
Compasion was the source of future troubles for Achaea, for he 
sacrificed, to some extent, the goodv/ill of a l l parties by the 
violence of his settlement. He ordered the walls to be torn do\«i. 
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mercenaries, who had supported the tyrants and their successors, 
and helots, who had been enfranchised by the tyrants, to be 
expelled. Neither the ordinary citizens nor the returning exiles 
would have much quarrel with this,' although a source of future 
trouble might arise i n the ex-helots: those v;ho refused to leave 
Laconia, some 3)000, were sold as slaves i n Achaea, and a portico 
b u i l t at Megalopolis with the money realised. The t r a d i t i o n a l 
Spartan i n s t i t u t i o n s were abolished - including most s i g n i f i c a n t l y , 
the Agoge. This clearly v/as s t r i k i n g at the heart of the t r a d i t i o n a l 
Spartan state of the days of independence; and the substitution of 
the Achaean system could have been consolation to neither group of 
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exiles, nor the remaining population of Sparta. 
But the issue which affected the largest numbers of the 
remaining population and the exiles themselves, v/as the problem of 
reintegrating- the 'old exiles'. There could have been nothing l i k e 
the same problem with Timolaus' group, who had not been away from 
the c i t y for anything l i k e the same length of time. But Philopoemen 
made no attempt to solve t h i s problem. The property of the murdered 
and dispossessed of the tyrant pajrty v/as available; the money from 
the sale of the 3)000 helots v/ould have gone far to s e t t l i n g the 
real physical problems associated v/ith the restoration. Yet 
Philopoemen squandered t h i s invidiously on a portico at Megalopolis, 
emphasising - i f t h i s Mas s t i l l necessary - the t o t a l submergence of 
a l l Spartan interests i n those of Achaea. He had lost his oppor-
tu n i t y of solving the problem v/hich v/as to vex Achaea for the next 
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nine years by his ill-considered display of victorious j u b i l a t i o n . 
The v/ealcest point i n his compromise with Roman policy had been that 
Achaea would be burdened with the exile problem: he had rashly thrown 
avjay his chance to eradicate t h i s vieakness. Although there can be 
l i t t l e excuse for t h i s major fai l u r e i n statesmanship, we can perhaps 
discern the reason for i t . I n the fragmentary passage i n v/hich 
Polybius analyses Philopoemen's motives, he seems to provide 
Philopoemen's reasons for not using the money for the exiles. He 
realised that money was necessary to restore the monarchy: therefore 
he prevented money becoming easily available."'"'^^ This consideration 
i s c r u c i a l ; for i t adequately provides the reason for Philopoemen's 
shortsightedness. His mind was fixed solely on the prevention of a 
restoration of the monarchy. Since Cleomenes, th i s had been the 
major problem for Achaea. I t i s easy enough i n t h i s context to 
understand, his f a i l u r e to realise that t h i s problem had already been 
solved by his own massacre of the tyrant party, and replaced by the 
development of exile complaints, equally dangerous i n the new 
conditions of the Senate's vjillingness to int e r f e r e . Philopoemen's 
lack of magnanimity i n victory insulted his friends, and gave new 
point to immediate agita t i o n for a further settlement of Sparta. 
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CHAPTER_^  
2L]™!SiLiMJESLPAx ACHAICA 
The solution of the Spartan problem, attempted by Philopoemen 
i n the settlement after Corapasion, offended too many interests to 
have any chance of being Lincompromisingly successful. As soon as the 
character of the settlement became clear, bvcfapeoirioavzeQ T ivec Toov 
ev AaxeSacfJOvt to te veYOVocrt x a l vo[xiaavT:eQ Wo tots f iXoiroi'iaevoc 
&(ia TV 6uva |jitv x a l TT)V irpoa-coo-tav xamXeXvo^ai triv'Pqaaicov -> ''''^ '^^  '^ o 
Rome a.nd apx^ealed against Philopoemen's settlement, i n the hope of 
the Senate's i n t e r f e r i n g to al t e r i t s terms."'" V/ho v/ere these diss-
a t i s f i e d men, l e f t surprisingly anonymoLis by Polybius, v/ho v/ere 
immediately ready to appeal to Rome against Achaea? The p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
are, that they v/ere either one of the exile groups, or the remains of 
the tyrant party. One v/ould not expect either group of exiles to 
tiirov/ t h e i r gratitude at their restoration to the winds immediately 
after they v/ere restored: the pro-Achaean group could not expect any 
benefit from an appeal to Rome, and the 'old exiles' might be 
expected, at least for the f i r s t six months of their restoration, to 
v/ithhold t h e i r complaints u n t i l they sav/ more clearly what their 
position v/ould be. And ha.d the 'old exiles' turned ingrate so 
rapidly, v/e should have expected Polybius to say so i n ambig;uous 
langviage. But he does not mention their dissatisfaction u n t i l 
185A.^ 
The one aspect of the settlement v/hich caused the greatest 
distress at Sparta, according to Livy, v/as the restoration of the 
exiles. Therefore, those who suffered most from the restoration of 
the exiles would f e e l the greatest and most immediate dissatisfaction 
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at the Achaean settlement. The remains of the tyrant group, which 
Philopoemen had overthrown and almost annihilated, would clearly 
f e e l the greatest loss. They also had been most closely attached to 
Rome: Flamininus had supported them i n 191; the Senate had granted 
them the restoration of the hostages i n I90, and had l e f t them i n 
power; when threatened by Philopoemen the previous autumn, they had 
been responsible for the offer of the c i t y to Fulvius. I t would 
clearly be natural for them - much more than for any other i d e n t i f -
iable group - to appeal to Rome. Their position of power had been 
overthrown; and with i t , they could claim, the Roman prostasia, 
which was given form most recently i n the ambiguous reply of the 
Senate to the envoys from Achaea and Sparta i n spring I88, which 
t r i e d to pi'eserve a stable situation i n Peloponnese. They naturally 
interpreted t h i s as a continuation of Roman patronage i n their favour 
and the confirmation of their right to rule Sparta. I n these circum-
stances t h e i r overthrow was i n i t s e l f s u f f i c i e n t provocation for an 
appeal to the Senate vjhich, they argued, should feel as offended as 
they themselves. I t therefore seems quite clear that t h i s hasty 
appeal to the Senate v/as by those members of the tyrant group who 
survived the massacre at Gompasion. That there was such a group, as 
late as l84/3 - then i n exile - i s clear from Polybius' description 
of Chaeron at Rome atrb be T55V le^avmw^evm x a l %wv exireiTTwxoTMV 
xaTO. TO, T8)V *Axa.owv 66YVia'''^ Q, '"^ 
As soon as Philopoemen learnt that a Spartan embassy had been 
sent to Rome, late i n his steate^ia, he immediately sent Nicodemus 
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of Elis to represent the point of view of the Achaean government.'^ 
Our i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the Spartan group which sent the embassy makes 
i t easier to understand the urgency with which Philopoemen sent 
Nicodemus. For the Spartans would be sure to emphasise their own 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Senate's answer i n the spring; and as the 
recent history of t h e i r relations vjith the Senate might lead the 
Achaeans to expect the Senate to show them favour i n t h i s case also, 
i t was necessary to point out that, from the Achaean point of view, 
Philopoemen's interpretation of the ambiguous Senatus Consultum was 
just as reasonable: i f the Senate had been prepared to accept the 
situ a t i o n existing i n the spring for the sake of s t a b i l i t y - the 
declared policy of t h e i r reply - they should be equally prepared to 
accept the s i t u a t i o n existing i n the autumn, as t h i s included the 
restoration of the 'old exiles', v;hich had been continually emphasised 
since 191 as a chief aim of senatorial policy. Added to t h i s , the 
Achaeans were, on t h e i r own interpretation of the foedus aequum, free 
and eqiual a l l i e s of the Romans, and should therefore a t t r a c t more 
benevolent attention than the disreputable remains of the troublesome 
tyrant party. 
From the Senate's point of view, the Achaeans were simply cl i e n t s 
who, blinded by t h e i r apparent legal r i g h t s , did not recognise t h e i r 
extra-legal moral obligations. As a r e s u l t , the Senate was for some 
years af t e r the f i n a l defeat of Antiochus unable to form a positive 
policy, i n the absence of immediate active interest, which made 
s u f f i c i e n t l y clear what was expected of Roman clients. While 
ilamininus v/as active i n Greece, i t had been possible for him to 
f i n d solutions for matters arising among the clients of Rome, v/hom 
circumstances had also made his own personal clients; and l a t t e r l y , 
the equitable demand for the restoration of the 'old exiles' had 
given direction to senatorial policy tov/ards Achaea. The Senate had-
neither the need nor the desire to interfere physically i n Greece; 
but the cause of the 'old. exiles' had given i t an opportunity of e^ cer--
cising patronage, and, as the senators thought, making i t abundantly-
clear that the Achaeans v/ere expected to obey. Opposition i n Achaea 
ha.d been unexpected; but the repetition of the policy had se.rved to 
maintain i n clear outline the expected relationship. V/hen Flaraininus 
l e f t Greece i n a.utumn 191, the connecting l i n k , v/hich had given a 
continuity to Roman policy tov/ards Achaea, v/as broken; and the rapid 
change of circumstances at Sparta radically altered the situation. 
The Senate s t i l l v/anted to emphasise the client-patron relationship; 
but Philopoemen had shattered the p o s s i b i l i t y of making t h i s under-
standable to the Achaeans by his implementation of Roman policy i n 
the restoration of the 'old exiles'. This eff e c t i v e l y destroyed the 
comprehensible recent g,u,iding l i g h t of senatorial policy. 
VJhile the problem of the 'old exiles' had remained unsolved, 
senatorial policy could appear consistent and purposeful - so much 
so that Philopoeraen had found no alte.rnative to stealing the Semvfce's 
thunder - although the r e a l desires of the Senate, for s t a b i l i t y on 
the one hand, and £lien/oe_la on the other, v/ere not f u l l y comprehended 
by the Achaeans, Once t h i s problem v/as solved, however inadequately. 
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the continual, but non-committal and ineffective partisan i n t e r -
ference by the Senate and i t s representatives - the only way i n 
\\rhich the desired relationship could now be asserted - eventually 
revealed to Philopoemen the limitations imposed on the Senate by i t s 
own code of conduct, and led him to exploit the situation. I t took 
Callicrates, a f t e r years of confusion, to give direction again to 
senatorial policy. 
I t i s t h i s i n i t i a l confusion i n the minds of the Achaeans as to 
the r e a l aims of senatorial policy, followed by understanding and 
exploitation, and on the other hand, the apparently directionless 
d r i f t of the policy i t s e l f , resulting from an essential lack of 
interest i n Achaea after the crises of the v/ars against Philip and 
Antiochus, which are the touchstones by which relations between the 
Senate and the Achaeans i n the l80s should be interpreted. This 
f i r s t becomes clear i n the senatorial reply to the envoys sent to 
Rome by Achaea and Sparta, with the encouragement of Pulvius, i n 
spring 188. The Senate's answer to the problem was simply to pre-
serve the existing situation: noyari n i h i l de L;a.cedaemoniis placebat. 
Exactly the same attitude can be seen i n the reply of winter 188/7 
to Nicodemus: bvoapeoxo^wai (lev x a l TCOV Tetxcov 0T)VTeXecrei* x a t 
xaxaXwcrei • Tww ev Koiiiracritp 8t,a09apevToi3V, ^r\v axvpov T t 
irotetv . The senators had to express disapproval: Philopoemen had 
acted v i o l e n t l y and w i l f u l l y , although senatorial advice had been 
for inaction; the offended parties at Sparta were Rome's cli e n t s , 
and had appealed for support. The Senate had to pay lip-service to 
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t h i s moral commitment. But the 'old exiles', also Roman clients, 
had been restored, and no disapproval could be expressed about t h i s . 
The Senate therefore expressed forma,lly i t s disapproval at the most 
obviously factional and violent - therefore controversial - aspects 
of Philopoemen's settlement, the destruction of the avails and the 
'Lycurgan' constitution,^^ and the mass murder at Compasion. But i t 
was s a t i s f i e d with t h i s paternal admonishment, and expressed no 
intentions for the future, to v;hich i t might be held morally commit-
ted. Peace, s t a b i l i t y , and the due recognition of clientela were 
the aims; therefore the fathers would not do anything to a l t e r the 
new established s i t u a t i o n . Perhaps taken by surprise, and found 
v/ithout a positive reaction to this c o n f l i c t of petty clients' claims, 
they could only repeat the disinterested negative of the previous 
year. The Spartan mission did not have much more success i n e l i c i t -
ing positive support for t h e i r new situation. After a delay, they 
managed to obtain a l e t t e r addressed to the Achaeans from the consul 
M. Aemilius Lepidus; but he only repeated the Senate's non-
committal a t t i t u d e : otx op^HcQ o^Tovf; . x e ' x e i p t x e v a t icam xohc 
Aaxe8ai ( j toviovc I t i s not surprising that when the Achaeans 
received t h e i r report from Nicodernus they simply l e t the matter pass 
without opposition or discussion. I t must have seemed a clear 
victo r y for Philopoemen, now openly admitted- by the Senate. 
Proba.bly during t h i s same sta;ategia of Philopoemen, trouble with 
Boeotia broke out, v/hich reached serious dimensions. The Achaeans 
and the Aetolians had been urged by the Senate to act as d u t i f u l 
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c l i e n t s , and to press upon the Boeotians the necessity of their 
complying vdth senatorial policy and restoring Zeuxippus. The 
Achaeans had responded by sending an embassy which urged the 
Boeotians to do t h i s ; but they determined to make use of their role 
as Roman agents to gain the weight of Roman prestige for pressing a 
loc a l issue also. There were several outstanding lawsuits to be 
settl e d i n Boeotian courts between the Megarians - members of the 
Achaean League since 206/5 - and the Boeotians, which the Boeotians 
were reluctant to s e t t l e . As this was apparently a federal matter, 
the Achaeans, at the same time as they presented the Roman request 
about Zeuxippus, asked that these lawsuits should be settled by the 
Boeotians. When t h i s v;as agreed, but the Boeotians did nothing, 
Philopoemen allowed the Megarians to lay hands on Boeotian property. 
The s i t u a t i o n rapidly became c r i t i c a l . Polybius says that i f the 
Senate had pressed the restoration of Zeuxippus at thi s point, there 
would have been war; and the situation was only eased on the 
Achaean side, by the Megarians' stopping their raids, and on the 
7 
Boeotian side, by the settlement of the lawsuits. This easing of 
tension was the result of a compromise; but from the Achaeans' 
point of view, the outcome was satisfactory, for i t was the Roman 
policy which had been the sufferer i n the compromise. By tacking 
the matter of the Achaean lawsuits onto the Roman requests about 
Zeuxippus, Philopoemen had created a tension which made i t impossible 
for Roman policy with regard to Zeuxippus to be f u l f i l l e d at t h i s 
time. I t seems f a i r l y clear that Philopoemen, when he realised that 
he could not enforce both the Roman and the Achaean demands, must 
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have deliberately decided that the Roman policy of restoration was 
to be sacrificed i n favour of the compromise which settled the 
Achaean lawsuits. This was simply a bargain betv/een the Achaeans 
and the Boeotians for the better interest of both parties. The 
Boeotians had the same objections to the restoration of Zeuxippus as 
the Achaeans had to the restoration of the Spartan 'old exiles'. 
Philopoemen was only acting as agent for Rome i n this matter, and 
must have seen Achaean interest i n the f i r s t place i n the settlement 
of the Megarian complaints, i n the second place i n maintaining 
generally good relations vjith Boeotia. Neither of the aims could be 
achieved by i n s i s t i n g on Zeuxippus' restora.tion; both were achieved 
by his neglect of i t . The Roman policy, which had been the reason 
for opening the o r i g i n a l negotiations, was lost i n the diplomatic 
melee. As t h i s policy was essentially Plainininus', i t must have 
appeared i n Rome that Achaean preoccupation with their own local 
problems, and f a i l u r e to recognise the p r i o r i t i e s expected of a 
c l i e n t , were again f r u s t r a t i n g his policies; and i t was again 
Philopoemen who was responsible. The h o s t i l i t y between the two 
could not have been lessened as a result of this episode. 
Again, probably i n t h i s strategia, Philopoemen clashed with the 
policy of Flamininus, t h i s time over Messene. He i s alleged to 
have interfered with the terms of Flamininus' diagramma., which was 
issued at the time of the Messenian settlement of 191. This was 
probably a comprehensive document regulating the whole settlement, 
the basis of which Livy gives when describing how Messene was 
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treated i n his account of 191. The circumstances i n which we learn 
about t h i s 6i.6p3axrtc these: the embassy headed by Q. Caecilius 
Metellus was entertained i n Achaea i n 185, and accusations of 
respo n s i b i l i t y for the current discontent i n Peloponnese were 
levelled at Philopoemen by Diophanes. Disputes had arisen, i t was 
alleged, about the Messenian exiles, and i n particular i rept xo TOB 
T t t o w 6idYpa|a(j.a x a i %r]V -rotJ $tXoirot | ievo<; 5i,6p9co(nv . What had this 
5t6pSaxrcc involved, that i t should cause serious disputes? Roebuck 
r i g h t l y dismisses the view that the emendation was a constitutional 
move i n a democratic direction, but f a i l s to suggest an alternative. 
While t h i s rejection of a trend to democracy i s reasonable, some 
attempt at a more precise alternative explanation must be made. I t 
seems f a i r l y clear that sincere democracy was not a l i v e issue i n 
Achaea (or elsewhere i n Greece) at this time, i f for no other reason 
than that Mabis' propaganda must have made democracy a d i r t y word. 
I f , then, we agree with Roebuck i n rejecting a change to democracy, 
what was the effect of Philopoemen's emendation'?^ 
I n the circumstances, the most l i k e l y action would have been an 
attempt at securing, i n some way, greater Achaean control over 
Messenia. This was certainly desirable, for Messene was an unwilling 
member of the League. Neither the restored exiles, nor the party i n 
power i n 191, had wanted to be united with Achaea i n the f i r s t 
place. The resu l t , therefore, from the Achaean point of view, must 
ha.ve been unsatisfactory, although Diophanes, given no alternative, 
had accepted the terms.''"^ Added to t h i s was the internal Messenian 
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problem of the re-integration of the exiles. As at Sparta, union 
with the League had mad.e exile integration an Achaean problem, v/hich 
the h o s t i l i t y of both parties to Achaea must have made both more 
d i f f i c u l t and more essential to solve. Two methods were feasible of 
gaining greater Achaean control: the establishment of a group i n 
power i n Messene which, for the sake of Achaean support i n internal 
matters, was prepared to compromise i t s essential opposition to union 
with the League ~ as at Sparta i n 192 and l88; or some enforced 
a l t e r a t i o n i n the terms of the agreement uniting the c i t y as a whole 
to the League. This l a t t e r could only contravene the terms of the 
diagramma i f the specific terms of the entry into the League had been 
detailed i n i t . I n i t s e l f t h i s was an intrusion into the League's 
a f f a i r s , although, from Flamininus' point of view, easily j u s t i f i a b l e 
by the Messenian deditio and the necessity, after the conclusion of 
the Achaean foedus, of demonstrating the nature of Achaean clientela. 
But perhaps more l i k e l y , as the dispute i n I85 was essentially about 
the exile problem, i s that the diagramma had contained some specific 
p o l i t i c a l safeguards for the restored exiles - Flamininus' friend 
Deinocrates and his associates - within Messene. This was clearly 
not overstepping the bounds of equity or in t e r f e r i n g excessively i n 
Achaean a f f a i r s , as Messene had offered deditio:, and a l l parties were 
Flamininus' c l i e n t s . 
But i f Flamininus could interfere i n t h i s way on behalf of his 
friends, i t was equally possible for Philopoemen, as strate^os of 
the League, to argue his r i g h t of interference on behalf of his 
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interpretation of the constitutional rights of another section of 
the community; and as Achaean interest was concerned, this was 
equally j u s t i f i a b l e . I f Deinocrates had been established i n power 
by Flaraininus' action, he could be disestablished by Philopoemen's. 
This was p a r t i c u l a r l y l i k e l y i n the p o l i t i c a l atmosphere of Achaea 
i n 188, after the apparent solution of the Spartan problem. One 
thing which seems to suggest that Philopoemen's action was aimed 
s p e c i f i c a l l y at Deinocrates, i s the fact that Plutarch says e x p l i c i t l y 
that there was a personal' h o s t i l i t y between the two. This shows at 
i t s most extreme, i n the apparent reluctance of Deinocrates to use 
Philopoemen as a bargaining counter i n I82 after capturing him; and 
on the other side, i n the rumours freely c i r c u l a t i n g among the 
Achaeans after .Philopoemen's death, that he had been poisoned by 
Deinocrates - recorded uniformly i n a l l sources, v/hich depend on 
Polybius."^''" There i s no means of testing Polybius' evidence on t h i s ; 
but true or false, i t has the same significance for the present 
purpose: the rumours were considered believable, and therefore i l l u s -
t r a t e that i t was well knovm i n Achaea that there was a violent 
personal h o s t i l i t y between the two men. This becomes much clearer, 
i f we can interpret Philopoemen's 6i,6p5axnc as a measure which removed 
the safeguards which Deinocrates had enjoyed i n Messene as a result 
of the terms of Flamininus' diagrajnma. 
I f we accept t h i s interpretation of Philopoemen's emendation 
of the diagramma, i t f i t s i n well with the pattern of Philopoemen's 
a c t i v i t y i n th i s strategia. His aim was clearly to solve a l l 
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outstanding problems connected with Achaean predominance i n 
Peloponnese, which might i n v i t e Roman intervention. He had been 
prevented from claiming to be the u n i f i e r of Peloponnese; for i n 
that race Diophanes had already scrambled home i n his strategia of 
192/1 with the support of Flamininus, and removed the prize from the 
competition. But problems there were;' and Philopoemen could stress 
the inadequacy of Diophanes' sup e r f i c i a l l y glorious achievement by 
dravang attention to the problems l e f t unsolved, and providing inde-
pendent Acha.ean solutions to them. He could not oust Diophanes from 
his claim to fame; but he could prevent him from benefitjiing from 
his personal disloyalty. As far as Philopoemen was concerned, 
Diophanes was not going to be able to claim to be the only p a t r i o t . 
At Sparta therefore he had t r i e d to solve the outstanding problems by 
the forcible restoration of those l i k e l y to support Achaea, the 
removal of the Roman claim to interference, and the weakening of the 
opposition. I n Boeotia he had been prepared to provoke serious 
trouble i n order to se t t l e the Megarian lawsuits. I t would not be at 
a l l surprising to f i n d him in t e r f e r i n g with the settlement of 
Flamininus at Messene i n favour of a group more ready to co-operate 
with Achaea, thus reducing the prestige which had been b u i l t i n t o 
Deinocrates' position by Flamininus. 
Despite t h i s independent a c t i v i t y throughout the year, usually 
i n c o n f l i c t vjith the s p i r i t of declared senatorial policy and that 
of Flamininus, Philopoemen does not seem to have won great approval 
i n Achaea. This was made quite clear at the time of the elections 
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when Aristaenus, who must have disapproved of the heavy-handedness 
of Philopoeraen's non-compliance v/ith Roman v/ishes, was elected 
strategos. He must have had large support for his more co-operative 
programme from those vested interests, more interested i n s t a b i l i t y 
than independence, which were afraid that Philopoeraen was going too 
far i n his interpretation of Achaean rights under the foedus, and 
prejudicing the s t a b i l i t y v/hich was essential for commercial a c t i v i t y . 
Despite the violence used at Sparta, i t must have been already clear 
that Philopoemen's settlement had not created the general peace a.nd 
s t a b i l i t y which they needed, and that i t was by no means going to be 
generally accepted as the l a s t word on the problem by those most 
intimately concerned: i f he claimed t h i s , i t could already be shown 
to be otherwise. He was therefore unable to have one of his close 
supporters elected strategos for 188/7, thus breaking for the f i r s t 
time the dominant position which he had held since his return from 
Crete. 
The one event v/hich we Imow occurred i n Aristaenus' strategia 
of 188/7 vjas the siynodos of l a t e summer, held at Megalopolis, At 
'^^ '^ ^ S2S2^ 2S several embassies from abroad were received, and 
Achaean ambassadors returning from missions abroad v;ere heard. The 
f i r s t report was from Nicodemus of E l i s , v;ho brought the news that 
the Senate was d i s s a t i s f i e d at Philopoemen's action at Compasion, 
but did not intend to take any action. No decision or action seemed 
necessary from the Achaeans, and the matter was shelved.'''^ I t 
seemed clear that Philopoemen had been successful v;ith t h i s f a i t 
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a£.cofflj2li; and Aristaenus v/as not the man to shrug o f f obvious 
Achaean advantage by making an issue of the reply for personal 
p o l i t i c a l reasons. I t seemed wiser to accept the rebuke along v;ith 
the declaration of Roman non-interference, /iristaenus, as much as 
Philopoemen v/anted to give the Spartan settlement every chance of 
success. The fact was, that i f i t f a i l e d - as already seemed 
possible - no Achaean p o l i t i c i a n had an acceptable alternative to 
offer, Nicodemus' report therefore attracted no discussion. 
After Nicodemus, envoys from Eumenes of Pergamum were received: 
they offered to renew the alliance, and gave details of an offer of 
120 talents, v;hich Eunienes was making to the Achaeans, which he 
intended should be invested and the interest used to provide a pay-
ment for the sjnodos. Polybius then continues to give details of 
the debate which followed the offer, which was met by considerable 
opposition from the Achaeans. Apollonidas of Sicyon argu.ed that, 
although the amount of money was suitable to the dignity of the 
Achaeans, the purpose for which i t was offered vas disreputable, and 
even i l l e g a l . He cited an Achaean law which prevented individuals 
or o f f i c i a l s from taking presents from any of the kings; and argued 
that, i f Eumenes' g i f t v/ere accepted, a l l would be openly adjuitting 
that they were being bribed. I t v;as noiir Eumenes offering money: soon 
i t would be Prusias and Seleucus, and the Achaeans would be equally 
bound by gratitude t o each of them. The g i f t should therefore be 
refused. The second speaker was Cassander of Aegina. Aegina was 
s t i l l i n Pergamene hands, and Cassander argued that to accept 
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Eumenes' offer now, would be to acquiesce i n his continued possess-
ion of Aegina. The g^^nodos then una.nimously rejected the offer."'"^ 
Aegina had been i n Pergamene hands now for more than 20 years; 
there was l i t t l e prospect of i t s being returned to Achaea; yet i t 
was s t i l l claimed as Achaean, s t i l l the exiled Aeginetans exercised 
t h e i r Achaean citizenship. Although we hear nothing about the effect 
of t h i s issue on Achaean policies u n t i l 187, i t v;as clearly kept 
a l i v e , i n much the same way as contemporary claims of the same type 
are maintained as long-term policies. Achaea had not been rsish 
enough to commit herself to the equivalent of a Hallstein doctrine, 
but tempered Aeginetan emotion with diplomatic good sense. Never-
theless, the Aeginetan lobby was clearly of some strength. And with 
reason; for the completeness of the control which the Pergamene 
governors exercised over Aegina must have found i t s emotional 
reaction i n an Acbaea v/hich s t i l l affected p o l i t i c a l independence. 
LVen i f t h i s v;as occasionally circumscribed, the pretension was 
there, and opposition to the conditions i l l v i s t r a t e d by the Gleon 
14 
i n s c r i p t i o n must have been entrenched i n Achaea, 
This maintained h o s t i l i t y on the lo c a l issue load not resulted 
i n doctrinaire blindness on the broader. I t had not prevented the 
formation of an alliance v;ith Attalus, or action on i t when requested 
by Bumenes. But p o l i t i c a l conditions had changed since the defeat of 
Antiochus, and the f u l f i l m e n t of Roman wishes no longer directed 
Achaean foreign policy. Eumenes h3.d made good use of the Achaean 
troops which lia_d been sent to him i n 19O; and as a resul t of the 
Roman vi c t o r y over Antiochus - i n which the Achaeans had played a 
part, together with Euraenes - he had received large t e r r i t o r i a l acces-
sions i n Asia Minor. Although there i s no reason to assume that the 
Achaean troops had not been paid by Eumenes - perhaps through 
Attalus"^^ - i t was clearly i n his interest that the troops of the 
Achaeans should s t i l l be available for the future, perhaps to defend 
his new possessions, perhaps to gain more. The treaty with the 
Achaeans, which had already proved so unexpectedly useful, was there-
fore to be renewed; and as an attempt to commit Achaea to his 
support for the future, he offered the 120 talents to the s;oiodos_j_ 
The Achaeans reacted to t h i s i n exactly the same v/ay as 
Philopoemen had acted when Timolaus had t r i e d to buy his support at 
Sparta. Aristaenus ha.d no desire to compromise Achaean foreign 
policy i n advance, and there i s no reason for believing that 
Philopoemen v/ould have acted d i f f e r e n t l y . The reference to Prusias 
and SeleuGus i n Apollonidas' speech voices the fear that the Achaeans 
might f i n d themselves intimately t i e d to the support of con f l i c t i n g 
interests i n Asia, once a precedent was set by the acceptance of 
Eumenes' off e r . The new non-committal policy of the Senate could not 
be expected to help them decide on the correct course of action. I f , 
therefore, freedom was to be maintained i n policy-making, i t was 
necessary that no excessive t i e s of gratitude should be contracted 
with foreign powers. Apollonidas did not make e x p l i c i t the part-
i c u l a r disfavour v/hich an Achaean v/ould feel for being bound to 
Eumenes i n t h i s way: he p o l i t e l y disguised t h i s as an objection 
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based on opposition to the trend which i t would set. But he must 
have had i n mind that Aegina had been bought by Attalus, with the 
notorious consequences. I n these circumstances no free Greek, with 
any claim to freedom of action, could have allowed himself to act 
otherwise than i n opposition t o this flagrant example of Pergamene 
cheque-book diplomacy. He Imew his advice was popular, and could 
stipport i t with the moral appeal to the Achaean law and the r e c i t i t u d e 
of the synodos - which could no doubt have been quietly set aside, 
had interest l a i n i n that direction. But this did not prevent him 
from concluding vjith a violent personal attack on Eumenes: 610 |iT) 
laovov airecirooSat i r apexdXei xoxx; 'kxauoiQ, aXka x a t f i t c r e i v xov 
E()|a8vr| 6 t a TV e m v o t a v TTIC SOOTEOU: • Cassander appropriately did 
not have the same hesitations as Apollonidas, but came straight to 
the point, stressing the fact that Aegina had been bought. In the 
circumstances i t was not surprising that the synodos, swayed, by these 
emotional appeals of t h e i r leaders - who i n th i s case had hard-headed 
p o l i t i c s behind them - unanimously voted for the rejection of 
Eumenes' offer; and t h i s probably meant the end of the alliance.''"'^ 
I t i s possible that there were also sound internal reasons for 
synodos' rejection of Eumenes' offer. There was, at the time, 
17 
no payment for attendance at the meetings of the s2;nodos; there-
fore only those who could afford to finance themselves were able to 
play any large part i n federal p o l i t i c s . This ensured that the 
administration of the League remained so l i d l y middle and upper class. 
I f t h i s element of self-financing were removed by Eumenes' g i f t , i t 
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might well open the way for loi^rer class demagogues to play a serious 
part i n federal p o l i t i c s , to the exclusion of some of the more 
respectable but less talented middle-class members. This prospect 
would immediately arouse opposition from the c a p i t a l i s t classes, 
whose money made i t possible for them to participate i n the business 
°^ SELS^^i* '^^^ must therefore see these vested p o l i t i c a l i n t e r -
ests also at play i n the rejection of Eumenes' offer, making the 
emotional appeal about Aegina, and the s t r i c t l y foreign-policy 
18 
considerations coincide to a large extent vdth personal interest. 
The same synodos immediately found another opportunity of 
emphasising the Achaean desire to maintain unimpaired the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of forming an independent foreign policy, unhindered by any moral 
commitments, such as Eumenes had t r i e d to obtain. When Seleucus' 
envoys vjere received for the renev/al of the treaty, they made an 
offer of ten warships, v/hich v/ould ha-ve been an important addition to 
the Achaean navy. The motive was quite clear, as i t was obviously i n 
the interest of the new Seleucid king to make an early attempt at 
securing the goodv/ill of one of the more important Roman clients i n 
Greece; and from his point of view, the offer of the ships v/as i n 
i t s e l f modest, and unlikely to create the invidious impression of an 
attempt at buying Achaean support. But Eumenes had already aroused 
Achaean suspicions of t h i s kind of offer, and the same considerations 
had to be made by the Achaeans with regard to Seleucus' offer as v/ith 
Eumenes'; and although the alliance v/as renewed - a token of friend-
ship and safeguard for the future - the g i f t of the ships v;as 
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rejected. Aristaenus' cautiousness was again predominant. 
Although the rejection of the g i f t s of Eumenes and Seleucus 
represented successes for Aristaenus, they were not controversial 
or factional successes, for there i s no reason for believing that 
Philopoeraen would have advised d i f f e r e n t l y . But Aristaenus did have 
a major p o l i t i c a l success at the synodos, and this was gained at the 
expense of Philopoemen's group. Tov/ards the end of Philopoeraen's 
strategia of I89/8 he had sent Lycortas, accompanied by tv/o 
Sicyonians, Theodoridas and Rhositeles, to Alexandria, i n order to 
negotiate the renev/al of the current Achaean alliance with the 
Ptolemies. Lycortas had returned i n time to make his report at th i s 
synodos at Megalopolis, and was accompanied by Egyptians bringing 
g i f t s from Epiphanes, which consisted of 6,000 bronze peltast shields 
19 
and 200 talents of coined bronze. The negotiations had been ostent-
atiously successful, and the alliance had been sworn. A new diplo-
matic triumph for Lycortas and Philopoemen's party had been gained, 
which only required the formality of r a t i f i c a t i o n by the synodos. 
The g i f t s v/ere offered i n an essentially different s p i r i t from those 
from Eumenes and Seleucus, for throughout a great part of the t h i r d 
century Achaea had been i n receipt of subsidies from Egypt, for as 
20 
long as Achaean and Ptolemaic policies coincided. S t i l l i n the 
second century the Ptolemies ms-intained a naval station i n Achaean 
t e r r i t o r y at Methana,^ ''' and thi s must have been countenanced by the 
Achaean authorities, on the 'sovereign base' principle. We hear of 
no agitation to have the base removed - such as there was against 
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Euraenes' continued possession of Aegina - and must assume that i t 
was generally eiccepted by the Achaeans without opposition: i t no 
doubt brought some prosperity and employment to a remote part of the 
Argolid, I t might therefore be expected tliat the Egyptian g i f t s 
v/ould not be considered to have 'strings' attached, but were rather 
i n the s p i r i t of the thdrd-century subsidies, and therefore, even i n 
second-century conditions, were more a.cceptable. 
When Lycortas had made his report, ilristaenus opened the dis-
cussion. He saw i n these apparently successful negotiations of 
Lycortas and his colleagues an opportunity to blur the image of 
active efficiency which Philopoemen was trying to create for his 
group. On a point of information, he asked which of the' many 
alliances v/hich the Acbaeans had had. with the Ptolemies at various 
times, each containing v/idely d i f f e r i n g terms, had been rene^ ^^ ed by 
Lycortas. On the face of i t , this request was reasonable enough, 
for Aristaenus as stra_tej20S clearly needed to knovj such information. 
But he must have suspected some i r r e g u l a r i t y when he was prepared to 
make an issue of i t at the si^l^qd.os., lie must already have undertaken 
some research i n t o the Achaean archives i n order to discover the 
state of the alliances before Lycortas v;as sent to Egypt; and as a 
result of t h i s research, he must have realised that Philopoemen had 
not made such a thorough examination, that he therefore had a great 
opportunity to shatter public confidence i n Philopoeraen's group. 
He therefore asked his apparently ingenuous q^uestion. The result 
s highly satisfactory; for neither the Egyptian ambassadors nor wa 
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Lycortas v/as able t o answer; attempts t o make l i g h t of the matter 
by t r e a t i n g i t w i t h good-humoured l e v i t y were not successful i n 
deceiving the s^^iodos, some members of which must have been prepared 
f o r Aristaenus' manoeuvre. Philopoemen, whose was the u l t i m a t e 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , was unable t o c l a r i f y the issue. Aristaenus was i n 
s i g h t of a major p o l i t i c a l success. As strategos, he refused to 
allow the synodos t o r a t i f y the a l l i a n c e , which was therefore shelved. 
Even Polybius records t h a t Philopoemen's p a r t y was generally 
considered t o have f a i l e d t o take s u f f i c i e n t care over public matters 
which v/ere entrusted t o them; Aristaenus acquired the r e p u t a t i o n of 
alone knowing h i s business. 
Aristaenus had scored a major success over Philopoemen, who was, 
at l e a s t t e m p o r a r i l y , d i s c r e d i t e d . Yet we should not assume tha t 
Aristaenus v;as necessarily opposed t o the continuation of f r i e n d l y 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h Egypt: had t h i s been so he could have organised a 
speaker t o oppose the Ptolemaic possession of Methana. The f a u l t 
vAich he had revealed was as much a f a u l t of the Alexandrian chan-
c e l l e r y as of the Achaean strategos; and h i s r e f u s a l t o give carte 
blanche t o the ne g o t i a t o r s was only statesmanlike caution. He was 
simply using the issue - which was not of any great urgency - for 
immediate p o l i t i c a l advantage, without prejudice t o the u l t i m a t e 
r e s u l t . I n f a c t , the a l l i a n c e was not concluded i n the immediate 
f u t u r e , but had t o wait f o r Lycortas, who successfully completed the 
ne g o t i a t i o n s , probably i n h i s s t r a t e _ ^ ^ of 185A/-: he was quite as 
much committed t o the a l l i a n c e as Philopoemen, and would be l i k e l y 
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t o s e t t l e the issue as soon as he got the c h a n c e . A r i s t a e n u s , 
on the other hand, had every i n t e r e s t t o make p o l i t i c a l c a p i t a l by 
postponing the n e g o t i a t i o n s , i n order t o emphasise t h a t the i n e f f -
i c i e n c y of Philopoemen's p a r t y v/as responsible f o r depriving Achaea 
of the s e c u r i t y of the a l l i a n c e and the enjoyment of the g i f t s . As 
f a r as the g i f t s were concerned, we have seen t h a t they were 
e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t i n i n t e n t from those of Eumenes and Seleucus; 
and were therefore accepted when the negotiations on the a l l i a n c e 
were f i n a l l y successful. 
Aristaenus hs.d shovm himself a t the synodos eager, as f a r as 
p o s s i b l e , t o preserve a non-aligned Achaea. F u l f i l m e n t of the terms 
of a general a l l i a n c e depended, as always, on the circumstances of 
the moment, and the e f f e c t on the immediate p o l i c i e s of the states 
concerned. They were by no means as binding as the more s t r i c t l y 
moral t i e s , which would have been contracted by the acceptance of a 
large donative from a k i n g . Apollonidas was c e r t a i n l y correct when 
he argued t h a t the Achaeans would f e e l t h a t they had been bought -
and moreover, the donor v/ould expect them to f e e l t h i s . As a r e s u l t , 
the o b l i g a t i o n stemming from t h i s was f e l t t o be more compulsive than 
t h a t from a formal l e g a l a l l i a n c e . There could be no doubt t h a t 
Aristaenus c a r r i e d a m a j o r i t y of the s^nodos w i t h him i n t h i s , and 
i t i s l i k e l y t h a t t h i s included Philopoemen. On the other hand, 
Philopoemen had s u f f e r e d a major defeat i n Aristaenus' demonstration 
of h i s reckless i n e f f i c i e n c y over the Egyptian a l l i a n c e ; and other 
members of h i s group must have sliared h i s d i s c r e d i t . On t h i s ground 
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alone, t h e r e f o r e , i t would be s u r p r i s i n g t o f i n d Philopoemen or one 
of h i s party e l e c t e d t o the s t r a t e ^ i a f o r I87/6. I n a d d i t i o n t o the 
Egyptian business i t might be escpected t h a t a f u r t h e r t a c t l e s s 
s t r a t e g i a of Philopoeraen would lead to a f u r t h e r d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h Eorae. I f Philopoemen was the unknown strategos f o r 
187/6, he d i d not long r e t a i n his ascendancy, as /iristaenus was r e -
elected as soon as was l e g a l l y possible, i n l86/5« 
I n 185, i n the course of Aristaenus' 4th s t r a t e ^ ^ ^ , r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h Rome again assumed a preponderant importance f o r Achaea. Q. 
Ca e c i l i u s Metellus came t o Achaea a f t e r spending some time i n 
Macedonia c o l l e c t i n g complaints against P h i l i p . I t was July, and the 
time of the Nemea, when Metellus a r r i v e d i n Achaea, The Achaean 
magistrates t h e r e f o r e assembled to meet him a t Argos. Metellus had 
no o f f i c i a l l e t t e r s from the Senate; therefore i t seems l i k e l y t h a t 
the v i s i t t o Achaea v/as no p a r t of h i s o r i g i n a l i n s t r u c t i o n s from the 
Senate. The purpose of t h i s u n o f f i c i a l v i s i t seems t o have been 
simply t o impress the Achaeans w i t h h i s own importance, and t o assert 
Roman patronage a f t e r a gap of two years. Aristaenus, as much as 
Philopoemen, had attached more importance t o h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 
Senate's d e c l a r a t i o n , i n i t s reply t o Nicodemus i n I87, that i t 
intended t o talce no a c t i o n on the Spartan settlement, than t o the 
phrase of the r e p l y which deplored the Achaean violence. At the 
time, t h i s had seemed less relevant, as no a c t i o n v;as required. As 
a r e s u l t , no a c t i o n had been taken by the Achaeans i n the i n t e r v e n i n g 
p e r i o d , except such as was necessary t o continue the process of 
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Spartan i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o the League. But t o a Roman, wi t h Metellus ' 
i n t e n t i o n of i n t e r f e r i n g i n Achaea f o r interference''.sake, t h i s gave 
a u s e f u l opportunity. I t v;as l e g i t i m a t e , f o r h i s purposes, t o ignore 
the more moderate and negative aspect of the o r i g i n a l s e n a t o r i a l 
i n t e n t i o n , and drav; a t t e n t i o n to the p o s i t i v e aspect, which the 
Achaeans had so f a r ignored. Metellus chose t o r e s t a t e the Senate's 
disapproval i n h i s own terras. 
I t v/as v/ith t h i s t h a t the conference opened. Metellus repeated 
the Sena.te's disapproval of the Achaean violence a t Compasion; but 
went f u r t h e r than the Senate, v/hich had required no a c t i o n . Metellus 
irapexdXet 6 t a TrXetovwv Stop&coacuoSai 'vr]v TrpoYeYevrpevT^v H'^voiav. 
This demand took the Achaeans by su r p r i s e . Nothing had l e d them t o 
t h i n k t h a t the s e n a t o r i a l a t t i t u d e had changed since 18?; yet 
Metellus was r e c k l e s s l y demanding t h a t they re-open the whole 
Spartan question, a demand which, i f pressed i n t o a c t i o n , \.;ould 
destroy everything which had been achieved by the r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y 
of the past two years. Aristaenus, the strategos, remained s i l e n t . 
Polybius gives h i s own p a r t i s a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s : bf\Koc, o5v 
ahxoV xoB ai(mS.v STI SvaapecrTeitat TOXQ movo^ir^iivoLQ x a l 
aovevdoxet Totc W o K a t x i X t o u XeYOjievoic • This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i n 
f a c t , i s p r e c i s e l y the opposite t o v/hat we would expect Aristaenus' 
t r u e motives t o have been. Had he been so grossly d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h 
the Spartan settlement as t o approve (even t a c i t l y ) of Metellus' 
demand f o r new a c t i o n , he had himself held two s t r a t e g i a i since the 
settlement, i n which he could have put i n t o operation the means t o 
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reverse i t ; and he v/ould hs.ve been assured of s e n a t o r i a l approval 
had he undertaken t h i s . Yet he had accepted f u l l y every i m p l i c a t i o n 
of Philopoemen's settlement by his f a i l u r e t o attempt t o reverse i t : 
the presence and complaint of Metellus are s u f f i c i e n t proof t h a t no 
change h-ad been contemplated, Ha.d Aristaenus v/ished t o express 
s a t i s f a c t i o n a t Metellus' demands, h i s silence would not have been 
the best v/ay t o shov/ Metellus that he agreed w i t h everything he 
said; and i n the circumstances, Aristaenus' silence shows c l e a r l y 
t h a t he considered himself t o be t a r r e d w i t h the same brush as 
Philopoemen over Sparta. As Metellus was not expecting open 
opposition, Aristaenus thought i t p o l i t i c t o keep quiet about h i s 
r e a l f e e l i n g s , i n the knowledge th a t he would only antagonise 
Metellus by expressing them, and g i v i n g them the a i r of o f f i c i a l n e s s . 
P r o t e s t a t i o n of v/hat the Achaeans thought the Senate had meant i n 
187 had no value, even as f3.ce-saving arguments, when confronted w i t h 
the t e x t of the Senate's r e p l y and Metellus' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t . 
Silence v/as the only possible course f o r Aristaenus. 
Diophanes, however, i n sharp contrast t o Aristaenus' reticence, 
rushed i n w i t h personal charges against Philopoemen, Aristaenus had 
accepted Philopoemen's settlement of Sparta; since 191 Diophanes 
had not been allov/ed t o gain any o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n from v/hich he 
could commit himself, even t o the v/rong course; and t h i s must have 
angered him. But Diophanes had suffered more than t h i s p o l i t i c a l 
e c l i p s e : i n a d d i t i o n t o being kept out of f u r t h e r o f f i c e , he had 
been personally offended by Philopoemen's i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h 
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Flamininus' settlement of Messene, i n v/hich he had played an 
important p a r t . Diophanes therefore had adequate p r i v a t e reason 
f o r f e e l i n g aggrieved a t Philopoemen, and he was prepared to give 
voice i n support of whoever attacked Philopoemen. Metellus' 
reproaches were j u s t what Diophanes needed: he v;as h u r t , and d i d not 
consider the more d i s t a n t e f f e c t s of h i s self-defence. I t i s t h i s 
k i n d of behaviour which Polybius had i n mind when he described 
Diophanes, at t h i s time, as an ina.dequate p o l i t i c i a n Av^ponroc 
crrpaTtcoxtxdoTepoc "n iroXtTixdoTepoc « Diophanes expressed f u l l agree-
ment w i t h Metellus' condemnation of Philopoemen's a c t i o n at Sparta, 
and added h i s p r i v a t e complaint about the handling of Messene. 
Personal rancour had. broken the u n i f i e d f r o n t which the Achaeans had 
so f a r presented t o Metellus. Had Diophanes kept h i s personal 
complaints t o himself, Metellus v/ould have had the s a t i s f a c t i o n o f 
impressing himself on the Achaeans by administering h i s rebuke -
v;hich v;as a l l he had wanted i n the f i r s t place; the Achaeans v/ould 
have accepted t h i s i n s i l e n c e , and continued t h e i r i n a c t i o n . A l l 
honours v;ould have been s a t i s f i e d . 
The p o s s i b i l i t y of t h i s s a t i s f a c t o r y outcome v/as removed now 
by Diophanes' i n d u l g i n g h i s personal i n t e r e s t i n Messene and host-
i l i t y tov/ards Philopoemen. Metellus at once noticed the dissension, 
and seeing- the p o s s i b i l i t y of making a greater personal e f f e c t , put 
on a show of anger at the f a c t that the Achaeans had not yet tal^en 
any a c t i o n over Sparta. The calmness had been shattered; personal 
h o s t i l i t i e s had been allowed t o r u l e a c t i o n ; Metellus' new speech 
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provoked Philopoeraen's p a r t y . Speeches by Philopoeraen himself, 
Lycortas, and Archon made open defence of the Spartan settlement, 
and empliasised the supreme importance of al l o w i n g the stable cond-
i t i o n s a t Sparta t o continue. Despite Diophanes' t i r a d e , i t became 
clear t h a t the meeting as a v/hole approved the maintenance of the 
settlement, and Metellus r e a l i s e d t h i s . He again showed anger at 
the f r u s t r a t i o n of h i s e f f o r t s - since h i s r e l i a n c e on the s p l i t 
shov/n by Diophan.es' speech, he was more than ever committed t o 
compelling p o s i t i v e a c t i o n from the Achaeans: he could not have 
immediately r e a l i s e d t h a t Diophanes was i n a m i n o r i t y of one - and 
demanded a syncletos t o hear h i s p o i n t of view. He no doubt hoped 
t h a t the l a r g e r meeting would be less mindful of the broader p o l i t -
i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Achaea, and pay more serious a t t e n t i o n t o h i s 
b l u s t e r . The Achaean magistrates v/ere equal t o the occasion, and 
r e p l i e d by demanding t o see h i s w r i t t e n i n s t r u c t i o n s from the Senate, 
i n accordance v/ith which he would have had the r i g h t t o be considered 
an o f f i c i a l ambassador, and quoted the Achaean lav/ on the subject, 
which forbade the o f f i c i a l reception by a s^J^^l^tos^ of Roman envoys 
who were v/ithout w r i t t e n i n s t r u c t i o n s from the Senate. Metellus 
had none, and saw himself beaten: f r u s t r a t i n g indeed f o r the Roman, 
using h i s i n i t i a t i v e and a]j:*ead.y exceeding h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s , t o f i n d 
the i n t e r n a l laws of the c l i e n t state i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h h i s v/ishes, 
v/hich he considered a higher l e g a l i t y . The e x p l o i t a t i o n of 
c l i e n t e l a was complete; a.nd a t the moment, Metellus was powerless 
t o do anything about i t . I n an attempt a t rescuing what remained of 
h i s d i g n i t y , he stormed out o f the meeting before a formal ansv/er t o 
- 210 -
h i s i n i t i a l request had been given. 
Aristaenus, as st r a t e g o s , must have been more deeply involved 
i n t h i s r e j e c t i o n of Metellus' request than any other Achaean; yet 
he gets no c r e d i t f o r t h i s from Polybius. But despite the unfavour-
able p i c t u r e v;hich Polybius records of Aristaenus at t h i s meeting, 
i t v:j'as not h i s own considered v e r d i c t . For t h i s , we must look at 
the comparison which he makes between Aristaenus and Philopoeraen. 
I n t h a t place, h i s conclusion i s t h a t Philopoemen's p o l i c y v/as •)iakr\i 
Aristaenus' ehoxrp.mv , and both aa i^Xe iC • This judgement does not 
include any suspicion of t r a i t o r o u s behaviour, such as i s implie d i n 
h i s account of the Argos meeting; and as the s y n c r i s i s represents 
Polybius' q u i e t l y considered opinion, v/e must exp l a i n the occurrence 
of the e a r l i e r account, which can only represent contemporary prop-
aganda. The answer probably l i e s i n Polybius himself and h i s p o l i t -
i c a l associates. At the time of the Argos meeting, Polybius cannot 
have been much more th3.n 20 years old, an u n d i s c r i m i n a t i n g age, a t 
v/hich he v/ould be ready t o a.ccept the versions of events and assess-
ments of characters which Philopoemen and Lycortas found i t conven-
i e n t t o propound. When he l a t e r came t o w r i t e of the events, 
Polybius could not be sine i r a et stu d i o : he had been involved - even 
i f only as a passive r e c i p i e n t of the adverse propaganda - and v/ould 
tend t o react towards the events i n retrospect i n the same way as he 
had at the time. I n h i s comparison of Aristaenus and Philopoemen, 
he was judging p o l i c i e s i n general terms, w i t h a d i f f e r e n t p o i n t of 
reference. He v/as therefore able t o reach a b e t t e r balanced and less 
p a r t i s a n conclusion. 
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Despite t h i s independent view of Aristaenus' career, Polybius 
colours h i s p i c t u r e w i t h Lycortas' t i n t s when he ends the s j m c r i s i s 
w i t h (pfpt] 8e T I C eveipexev wc *Apio>T:aivo« Vccjiaiotc etvovorepov 
faSXXov T] f tXarroi(ievoc ^dpxowoQ . Although he seems t o be t r y i n g 
t o d i s s o c i a t e himself from the rumour, he had no reason to record i t 
at a l l i f he considered i t t o be v/holly f a l s e . Even i n t h i s attempt 
a t dispassionate comparison, h i s f a t h e r ' s p o l i t i c a l opposition 
a f f e c t e d Polybius' judgement. The differences i n p o l i c y were, i n 
f a c t , d i f f e r e n c e s of method rather than end, as Polybius' analysis 
shows c l e a r l y ; but i n t h i s case, where the main di f f e r e n c e had t o 
be sought i n the emphasis t o be placed on a personal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of TO naKov v i s - a - v i s TO o\)\i(f>£pov , passions ran high, and c o n t r o l 
of the source of long-term propaganda - i n t h i s case Polybius - has 
been s u f f i c i e n t t o achieve the permanent misrepresentation of a 
statesman, who was as l o y a l and p a t r i o t i c as any of h i s contempor--
a r i e s . 
Although Polybius v/as capable of discarding the contemporary 
propaganda, i t i s t h i s which has most a f f e c t e d the p o r t r a i t of 
Aristaenus i n h i s account. I n the propaganda of the Philopoeraenists, 
Aristaenus was Philopoemen's opponent, therefore capable of no 
p a t r i o t i c a c t i o n . Yet i f we r e j e c t Polybius' p a r t i s a n i n t e r p r e t a t -
i o n of Aristaenus' a c t i o n a t Argos, we f i n d nothing which suggests 
t h a t Aristaenus was i n any way i n f e r i o r t o Philopoemen i n h i s 
p a t r i o t i c desire t o maintain i n t a c t the v i t a l Spartan settlement. 
Aristaenus was not the only Achaean t o keep quiet a t Metellus' 
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i n i t i a l demand; yet Aristaenus alone i s branded as a sympathiser 
by the propaganda. V/hen the magistrates spoke on the proposal, 
Aristaenus d i d not r e p l y t o Diophanes: but s u f f i c i e n t had already 
been s a i d by Philopoemen, Lycortas, and Archon t o make i t unnecess-
ary f o r the strate_gos t o add anything, which would only have the 
e f f e c t of p r e j u d i c i n g Metellus f u r t h e r against him. I n t h i s , the 
s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t i s t h a t Aristaenus could probably have refused t o 
put the question t o the vote, had he disapproved of the i n e v i t a b l e 
r e s u l t . Yet the motion was car r i e d . Again, Aristaenus as strategos 
must have been the man who c i t e d the law t o Metellus, which refused 
him the s^^icletos; yet Polybius passes over i n silence the lead 
which he must ex o f f i c i o have taken i n t h i s . I n h i s account, the 
r e f u s a l v/as made by the sum t o t a l of the magistrates - a strange 
contrast w i t h h i s account of the 187 synodos, v/here p e r s o n a l i t i e s 
are named e x p l i c i t l y on each issue. I t seems clear t h a t Polybius 
i s simply r e t a i l i n g propaganda, i n which Aristaenus' p a r t v/as 
consciously concealed i n favour of the party of Philopoemen, v/ho were 
named i n d i v i d u a l l y , and Diophanes, w i t h whom Aristaenus i s u n j u s t l y 
associated. 
Aristaenus was a serious p o l i t i c a l danger t o Philopoemen because 
he v/as successful. He had gained two s t r a t e g i a i a t the expense of 
Philopoemen's group, and his p o l i c y v/as close enough t o Philopoemen's 
t o make the l a t t e r appear simply the more dangerous version. I t was 
necessary t o d i s c r e d i t him i f the Philopoemenists were t o survive as 
an e f f e c t i v e groLip, and they chose t h i s meeting a t Argos as the 
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c r i s i s p o i n t . I t i s not altogether clear why they thought 
Aristaenus could be successfully misrepresented over t h i s . The 
method i s cle a r enough: t o d i s c r e d i t him by bracketing him w i t h 
Diophanes as an u n p a t r i o t i c Romanophile, v/hich Diophanes' convenient 
outburst a t Argos made easier. Since h i s s j ^ a t e g i a of 192/1, 
Diophanes had moved i n t o a p o s i t i o n of severe opposition t o the 
Philopoemenists, and seems t o have begun t o r e a l i s e t h a t ^ i n the' long 
run, only compliance w i t h Roman requests and a non-partisan s e t t l e -
ment of Sparta and Messene v/as a v i a b l e p o l i c y . But t h i s p o l i c y only 
became e f f e c t i v e i n Achaea a f t e r the death of Philopoemen, when 
C a l l i c r a t e s adopted i t . I n I85 i t v/as t r a i t o r - t a l k . I t i s not c l e a r 
how the propaganda was able successfully t o associate Aristaenus v/ith 
t h i s c u r r e n t l y disreputable p o l i c y . Polybius says t h a t 'the 
Achaeans' accused Aristaenus and Diophanes of having i n v i t e d Metellus, 
and i n I88 F u l v i u s . I t seems clear thrj.t 'the Achaeans' i n question 
are no other than Philopoemen's group. But i t i s one t h i n g t o r a i s e 
a rumour, another t o make i t s t i c k as a r e p u t a t i o n . And Aristaenus 
must have been vehement i n h i s counter-propaganda. I t seems an 
i n s u f f i c i e n t explanation of Philopoeraen's success t o simply assume 
t h a t the strategos f a i l e d t o counteract t h i s h o s t i l e propaganda 
ad.equately, although i t v/as demonstrably untrue. 
The suspicions of Diophanes may bear some r e l a t i o n t o the 
f a c t s , f o r Diophanes v/as a self-confessed Romanophile. But we 
cannot assume t h a t Aristaenus courted disaster by i n v i t i n g Metellus 
t o make the disastrous appearance at the meeting of magistrates. 
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Nevertheless, the propaganda's effectiveness and the f a c t t h a t the 
Philopoemenists chose t h i s issue f o r the struggle suggest th a t there 
may have been some av/kv/ardness about Metellus' v i s i t , which prevented 
Aristaenus from defending himself e f f e c t i v e l y against the propaganda. 
The year v/as a Nemea year, and the c r u c i a l meeting took place at the 
time and place of the Neraea. This suggests at once t h a t Metellus v/as 
i n Argos p r i m a r i l y f o r the celebr a t i o n of the f e s t i v a l . Aristaenus 
strategos, and the r e f o r e must have been responsible for enter-
t a i n i n g him. I t seems u n l i k e l y t h a t Metellus would simply appear a t 
the f e s t i v a l - a v i s i t t o Achaea was not on h i s o f f i c i a l i t i n e r a r y -
without a s p e c i f i c i n v i t a t i o n . But there i s no d i f f i c u l t y i n t h i s , 
f o r i t i s l i k e l y t h a t , as the o f f i c i a l Roman representative i n 
Greece, he would be given an i n v i t a t i o n as a matter of normal d i p l o -
matic courtesy. I f so, the i n v i t a t i o n must have been issued by the 
strategos Aristaenus. 
I f t h i s r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the l i k e l y course of events i s 
c o r r e c t , we may have discovered the avi/kward s i t u a t i o n which prevented 
Aristaenus from adequately countering the propaganda of the 
Philopoemenists. He could not deny th a t he had i n v i t e d Metellus t o 
Achaea, although the i n v i t a t i o n v/as f o r a d i f f e r e n t purpose. He had 
not v/anted him t o speali t o the magistrates; but once i n Achaea, 
Metellus could be approached by any dissident p a r t i e s - whether 
Diophanes or some Spartan groups - and make a request f o r a 
meeting. I n the circumstances, Aristaenus could not refuse. The 
innocent formal i n v i t a t i o n t o the Roman ambassador t o attend the 
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Neraea ce l e b r a t i o n s was turned by the Philopoeraenists' propaganda 
i n t o a p l o t t o overthrov/ the p a t r i o t i c p o l i c y . Aristaenus v/as 
branded v/ith Diophanes. The slander i s manifest. Yet i t succeeded 
i n i t s purpose; the charges stuck; and the disreputable manoeuvre 
ended Aristaenus' p o l i t i c a l career. From t h i s time he disappears 
from Achaean h i s t o r y , and the party of Philopoeraen, now entrenched 
as the only p a t r i o t i c group, remained i n pov/er u n t i l Philopoemen's 
death removed h i s a u c t o r i t a s . 
The v i s i t of Metellus and the support given him by Diophanes 
gave an i d e a l opportunity t o the Philopoemenist propaganda machine. 
When i t set t o v/ork a f t e r Metellus' departure, i t v/as not s u r p r i s i n g 
t o f i n d t h a t Lycortas was elected s t r a t e ^ o s f o r 185/4. The year saw 
various d.evelopments, both i n the s i t u a t i o n a t Sparta and i n 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h Rome, a l l of v/hich stemmed from the r e b u f f of 
Metellus. The Acha.eans r e a l i s e d t h a t , although Metellus had not had 
any formal l e t t e r s from the Senate a u t h o r i s i n g him t o i n t e r f e r e i n 
Achaea, and although the Achaeans \-iere f u l l y j u s t i f i e d by t h e i r lav/ 
i n r e f u s i n g him a hearing at a syncletos, i t was l i k e l y t h a t he 
v/ould make b i t t e r complaints about the' lack of co-operation he had 
encountered v/hen he v i s i t e d Argos. I n order t l i a t his misrepresent-
a t i o n should not pass unopposed, Apollonidas of Sicyon v/as dispatched 
t o Rome t o represent the Achaeans, I t i s not clear whether he was 
sent by Lycortas or Aristaenus: he liad l e d the opposition t o 
Eu.raenes' o f f e r i n I87, and may w e l l have belonged t o Aristaenus' 
group. But we have seen from the evidence of the meeting at Argos 
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t h a t there v/as l i t t l e serious disagreement i n Achaea - except f o r 
Diophanes - on the issue of Sparta; and the defence made by 
Apollonidas i n Rome v/ould have been equally appropriate whichever 
s..tygjg.g°s had sent him."^ 
There v;ere tv/o aspects of the Achaean reception of Metellus 
which v/ere discussed by the Senate: the problem of Sparta, and the 
Achaean r e f u s a l t o summon a syncletos f o r him. These were treated 
separately. Over the r e f u s a l of the syncletos, Apollonidas took as 
the basis of h i s defence the same argument as Aristaenus had used 
t o f o i l Metellus a t the a c t u a l meeting: the c i t a t i o n of the law 
v/hich l i m i t e d the sT^ncle^tos t o decisions about a l l i a n c e , war, or 
l e t t e r s from the Senate. Against t h i s l e g a l argument Metellus gave 
vent t o a general accusation of Philopoemen and Lycortas, and the 
st a t e of the Spartan question - Aristaenus must have been included 
i n t h i s t i r a d e , although Polybius makes no mention of i t . I n 
contrast w i t h the violence of Metellus' language, the Senate's r e p l y 
v/as s t u d i o u s l y moderate: i t was impressed upon Apollonidas t h a t 
f i t t i n g r e c e p t i o n should always be given t o Roman representatives 
xa^dfrep x a l "Poofiatot, irotoCvTai TWV orapaYivofaevciov irpoc awTowc 
irpeopewToSv . This simply emphasised the importance, f o r any d i p l o -
matic exchange, of the grant of r e c i p r o c a l f a c i l i t i e s . No attempt 
was made t o come t o terms v;ith the Achaean law; t h i s was a question 
v/hich the Senate evaded. I t v/as qu i t e w i t h i n i t s power t o recommend 
t h a t the law be a l t e r e d , t h a t special exceptions should be made i n 
the case of Romans. Yet i t d i d not make any such recommendations. 
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I t seems clear t h a t the Senate d i d not t h i n k t h a t i t was at a l l 
p u b l i c l y i n v o lved i n the r e j e c t i o n of Metellus' demand, which i t 
had not authorised; and Metellus' p r i v a t e commitment v/as p o l i t e l y 
disov/ned by the Senate, w i t h a m i l d attempt a t saving face by the 
c i t a t i o n of general p r i n c i p l e s of diplomatic communication. The 
lavi; could c l e a r l y be u s e f u l t o the Fathers i f they wanted t o keep 
t h e i r legates s t r i c t l y i n check, i f they wanted t o preserve the poss-
i b i l i t y of r e j e c t i n g inconvenient p u b l i c involvement when p r i v a t e 
p r e s t i g e had been u n o f f i c i a l l y and unnecessarily committed. A 
s i m i l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n should be given t o the Senatus Gonsultum 
brought t o the a t t e n t i o n of the Greeks by G. P o p i l l i u s Laenas and 
On. Octavius i n winter I7O/69, v/hich i n s t r u c t e d the states of Greece 
not t o provide troops t o any Roman commander unless he v/as i n poss-
ession of a Senatus Consultum e x p l i c i t l y a u t h o r i s i n g t h i s . The usual 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has been t h a t the Senate simply wanted to recover the 
26a 
g o o d w i l l of the Greeks before the v/ar v/ith Perseus; but an 
a d d i t i o n a l - and equally important - consideration must have been 
the Senate's own i n s i s t e n c e , i n view of recent events, on the Senate 
ol i g a r c h y ' s corporate c o n t r o l of a l l f o r e i g n p o l i c y - the same 
consideration which l e d t o t h e i r disov/ning Metellus i n 185/3- I n 
l 8 4 the Achaeans r e a l i s e d t h a t the Senate was not prepared t o take 
f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the p r i v a t e actions of i t s diplomats, v/hich 
d i d not concern i t , and the lav/ probably remained on the Achaean 
s t a t u t e book. 
I n the case of Sparta, hov/ever, the new commitment which 
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Metellus had undertaken could not be shrugged o f f so e a s i l y , f o r he 
ha.d simply given new emphasis to already declared s e n a t o r i a l p o l i c y . 
The f a c t t h a t he had re-introduced the matter, when the Senate v/ould 
have p r e f e r r e d t o l e t i t l i e dormant, v/as i n t h i s case i r r e l e v a n t , 
f o r h i s p r i v a t e a c t i o n i n t h i s sphere necessarily involved p u b l i c 
commitment. I t v/as also complicated by a nev; f a c t o r , f o r v/hich 
Metellus v/as wholly responsible. His expression of i n t e r e s t i n 
Sparta had roused Areus and Alcibiades, two of the 'old e x i l e s ' who 
v/ere d i s s a t i s f i e d with t h e i r reception a t Sparta, t o go to Rome, 
Their names are s i g n i f i c a n t of t h e i r Spartan r o y a l background; and 
t h e i r aim v/as simply the re-establisbment ox a gl o r i o u s and inde-
pendent Sparta - i n v/hich the chief g l o r y v/ould f a l l t o them. They 
v/ere u n v / i l l i n g t o be ' g r a t e f u l ' t o the t r a d i t i o n a l enem.ies of t h e i r 
c i t y f o r t h e i r r e s t o r a t i o n , f o r t h i s would have meant acquiescing i n 
27 
Achaean c o n t r o l But they had not taken any a c t i o n u n t i l Metellus 
ina.dvised.ly expressed renewed Roman d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n at Philopoemen's 
settlement. The glory-seekers leapt a t the chance, and hastened t o 
Rome, v/here they v/ere received by the Senate and disputed with 
Apollonidas' l e g a t i o n . Apollonidas had had, as pa r t of his mission, 
an attempt at improving Achaean r e l a t i o n s with Rome over Sparta; 
and he conceived of t h i s as a simple explanation t h a t matters could 
not have been b e t t e r managed than hj Philopoemen. The presence of 
Areus and Alcibiades, and the p o l i c y they represented, v/as u n f o r t -
tma.te f o r Apollonidas, f o r t h i s open d e n i a l of the t r u t h of his 
statement took a great deal of weight from h i s arguments. Faced 
- 219 -
with two such diametrically opposed views, and the consideration 
that Metellus had already committed Rome to new a c t i v i t y on the 
Spartan question, the Senate lia.d l i t t l e alternative but to add Achaea 
to the terms of reference of the mission which was to investigate 
Macedonia again i n l 8 ^ , headed by App. Claudius Pulcher: there would 
be no doubt about Pulcher's having written instructions to v i s i t 
2.8 
Achaea, This prevented the Senate from committing i t s e l f to a 
course of action based on i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence, and admitting that 
i t had no positive policy towards Achaea. On the other hand, i t 
continued the non-committal apology for a policy, of asserting l e g i t -
imate interest i n c l i e n t Achaea, which Metellus had embarrassingly 
again brought to l i g h t . 
Areus and Alcibiades did not represent a l l the restored 'old 
exiles', but v/ere an extremist breakaway group. Their complaints 
before the Senate concerned the power and status of their c i t y which 
had been shattered i n the settlement of Philopoemen. They argiied 
t h e i r desire for a free Spartan state, free of a l l the li m i t a t i o n s 
v;hich the federal mechanism inevitably imposed on them ~ i n 
par t i c u l a r , the necessity to act, both publicly and individually, 
l i k e the other c i t i e s of the League, i n accordance vjith the regul-
ations l a i d down by federal magistrates, was f e l t to be irksome. 
When Apollonidas returned to Achaea and made i t known that I^lcher 
had been given e x p l i c i t instructions to deal v;ith Achaea, and that 
Areus and Alcibiades had been received by the Senate, where they 
had apparently found favour, Lycortas decided that a s^nod^ should 
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discuss a l l issues v/hich might be raised by Pulcher \vhen he 
addressed the s^ii^letos, and decide as far as possible what line 
should be taken. The great issue was Sparta and the action the 
Achaeans should take over the sectional appeal of Areus and 
Alcibiades to the Senate, The ties of gratitude, with which 
Philopoemen had hoped to hold the support of the 'old exiles' after 
t h e i r restoration, had not proved as strong as expected; and the 
synodos f u l l y shared his indignation that due gratitude owing to 
Achaea from t h i s section of the 'old exiles' had not been shown. 
Passions became inflamed at the thought that Areus and Alcibiades, 
through their t r a d i t i o n a l i s t independent view of Spartan policy, were 
ca l l i n g i n Roman intervention, which might easily result i n the loss 
of Achaean freed.om of action. Instead of quietly attempting to work 
out a solution to t h i s new facet of the Spartan problem and i t s 
implications with regard to relations with Rome, the meeting allowed 
emotionalism to take the upper hand; and Areus and Alcibiades vrere 
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condemned to death. 
There was l i t t l e reason behind t h i s . I t must have been apparent 
that a solution could not be reached i n this waj which v/ould satisfy 
the Senate; even i f i t remained essentially i n d i f f e r e n t , Metellus' 
action and the appeal of Areus and Alcibiades had mad.e i t necessary 
to act i n order to save face. Sparta was, i n any case, the one 
issue i n Achaea on v/hich the Senate had continued - even i f i n a 
desultory manner - to assert i t s interest. The purpose of the meet-
ing had been to form a policy - idea.lly, to fi n d a means v/hereby a 
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satisfactory compromise could be reached, which would Mve allowed 
the Senate to extricate i t s e l f from i t s support of Areus and 
Alcibiades, without severely damaging the Spartan settlement. I t 
had ended by destroying the p o s s i b i l i ^ of a reasonable compromise 
policy being formed. Lycortas was now condemned to face I\ilcher at 
''^^^  gXg.gjr.6tos v/ith the mandate to defend t h i s extreme position to 
him. 
But worse was to come. V/hen Pulcher arrived at Cleitor, v/here 
syncletos ha.d been called for him, he was accompanied by Areus 
and Alcibiades. Pulcher began with the now almost t r a d i t i o n a l 
statement of policy, the condemnation of Philopoemen's settlement 
aft e r Compasion. Reply was made by Lycortas on belnalf of the 
Achaeans. The speech, as found i n Livy, cannot be held to represent 
the actual words of Lycortas, and therefore a detailed examination 
i s valueless for the present purpose; but Pausanias confjjrms tha.t 
the s p i r i t of the speech i s correctly given by Livy. I t was f u l l y 
i n the s p i r i t of the most extreme members of Philopoemen's party, 
not at a l l suited to the delic3.te diplomacy which v/as required. 
Lycortas went as far as to suggest that the real responsibility f o r 
the present dissatisfaction was the ineffectiveness of Roman policy 
on the Spartan issue i n I89, the already existing stasis i n Sparta, 
and the ingratitude - t h i s could never be forgotten by Philopoemen's 
group - of Areus and Alcibiades. Had Lycortas given up a l l hope of 
reaching a negotiated settlement, and determined merely to establish 
his reputation l o c a l l y as a p a t r i o t , he could not have spoken less 
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relevantly. I t v/as a speech which found i t s origins i n frustration 
and despair,•^'^ 
The reaction of the mildest Roman could not have been favour-
able to Achaea; Pulcher did not suffer from the lack of the usual 
Claudian consciousness of his dignltas. I n fact, the only wise 
reaction on the part of the Achaeans would have been the silence 
which had i n i t i a l l y greeted Metellus the previous year. No speech, 
however conciliatory, could have had any effect on the preconcep-
tions which conditioned Roman requirements as expressed by Pulcher. 
Hovrever reasonable the defence might appear to be from the Achaean 
point of view, the very fact of Lycortas' daring to make i t showed 
the Roman that the essential nature of the client-patron re l a t i o n -
ship between the two states was being flagrantly violated by the 
Achaeans. I n the circumstances the speech v;as irrelevant; and 
worse, insolent and provocative. Roman policy could not take i t s 
arguments i n t o consideration, and i t s content was duly ignored by 
Pulcher. His subsequent statement, expressed with the usual 
Claudian. consciousness of dignity, was that, although i t was i n his 
power to treat the Achaeans hovrever he vjished - a more than usually 
naked statement of what £]J.entela could mean to a Claudian - he 
would be happier i f the Achaeans could be persuaded to act without 
compulsion, i n accordance with the normal client's desire to 
perform o f f i c i a . The threat frightened the s^nodos; faced with 
no alternative, i t could only comply. The syncletos did not 
realise that the words themselves i n Fulcher's reply to Lycortas 
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were the only r e a l i t y : the threats they expressed were mere bluster, 
There v/as no likelihood of physical senatorial intervention to 
force a settlement at Sparta, as the magistrates at Argos had real-
ised when confronting Ketellus the previous year. The larger 
sjncletos,, however, could be stampeded, by threats, as Metellus had 
hoped, and as the present case demonstrated: Pulcher was able to 
have his v/ay. There v;as nothing the sl2;;,ategos could do, despite 
his more r e a l i s t i c appreciation of the extent of senatorial commit-
ment. The s2££i£i£S gave Pulcher £agte.Jblanche over Sparta; but 
the only specific action taken v/as to rescind the recent condemna-
ti o n of Areus and Alcibiades. Pulcher v/as s a t i s f i e d to have impre-
ssed the Achaeans v/ith t h e i r real status, and v/as careful to avoid 
involving the Senate i n any complications r e l a t i n g to specific 
31 
deta.ils of the Spartan settlement, 
Pulcher dxove home his message about Roman supremacy i n the 
iPjiSiitLlS ^relationship, by granting the Spartans dispensation from 
the terms of the convention v/hich regulated the dispatch of 
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embassies to Rome, and gave them permission to send envoys. They 
v/ere ready to take f u l l advantage of t h i s , and four separate groups 
of envojrs, each representing differe.nt policies and j-nterests, v/ere 
dispatched to Rome and received by the Senate i n v/inter l8V3. The 
readiness of the Spartans to act i n t h i s way suggests that there 
v;as general dissatisfaction i n Sparta at the way i n v/hich Areus and 
Alcibiades had managed to obtain factional advantage, by having 
established close relations v/ith im.portant senators. But there, i s 
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no evidence which suggests that Pulcher allowed the Spartans to 
secede from the League,^"^ The fact that he gave them permission to 
send ambassadors to Rome clearly suggests that he was not prepared 
to take any decision on details, which would commit the Senate i n 
advance to a new controversial settlement. Despite his emphasis on 
his general a b i l i t y to take any action regarding Achaea u n i l a t e r a l l y 
he did not i n fact do more than state t h i s position. The federal 
authorities, representing Philopoemen's party, sent Xenarchus to 
negotiate the renewal of the foedus, and continue Achaean represent-
ation at the discussions on Sparta. 
I t i s fortunate that Polybius' own account of these envoys and 
the policies they each represented, i s extant, as Livy's i s summary. 
I t i s therefore possible to define more accurately the course of 
Spartan history. The f i r s t group ( i n the order i n v;hich Polybius 
describes them) v/as headed by Lysis. They represented 'old exiles', 
and predictably wanted a l l t h e i r property back - Seiv ^%eiv ahioVQ 
iramc xoc v.trfxei.Q, 04* 5v apyfic k^i^oyov .^ ^ This was the trad-
i t i o n a l and expected demand of the restored exile, and Lysis must 
have represented the largest proportion of the 'old exiles'. There 
xiias also present the r o y a l i s t splinter group, headed by Areus and 
Alcibiades. Instead of simply opposing Achaean re s t r i c t i o n s on 
Spartan independence, t h e i r policy had now taken on the more 
positive form of the desire for the re-establishment of a large 
active c i t i z e n body. Their specific proposals were a compromise on 
the main 'old e x i l e ' demands, i n favour of this positive policy: 
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that property to the value of a talent should be restored to the 
'old exiles', and the remainder of the money made available by the 
redemption of the exiles' property should be used to enfranchise more 
citizens. This seems very l i k e a revival of Cleomenes' schemes for a 
resurgent Sparta, although i t i s unlikely that Areus and Alcibiades 
represented an actual body of exiles from that time. Their policy 
was n a t i o n a l i s t , and therefore was opposed by the other 'old exiles', 
who v;ere only interested i n recovering t h e i r private property. This 
s u f f i c i e n t l y explains the existence of divided interests among the 
'old exiles' and the creation of t h i s 'royalist' splinter group. 
The ideas of Areus and Alcibiades show strong anti-Achaean bias, 
and a t r a d i t i o n a l i s t desire for Spartan independence, v/hich i s i n 
sharp contrast to the narrowly personal motives of the other groups; 
but i t i s so out of keeping with the r e a l i t y of the changed circum-
stances, that t h i s glimpse of Gleomenes' nationalism i s a l l we see: 
the demand of Areus and Alcibiades, i n the form i n which i t was 
stated, could not now be acceptable to the Senate, whose aim v/as to 
solve problems, not create more, or f i n d serious support there. 
The methods by^ ^ which they proposed to achieve their aim was also 
t r a d i t i o n a l : the enfranchisement of those 'worthy of the franchise'. 
Usually t h i s had meant helots or £erioici; but i n the circumstances 
of the time, t h e i r source of support would be the ex-adscripti, who 
had been enfranchised by Nabis and sold or exiled by Philopoemen. 
This aspect of t h e i r claim too had i t s anti-Achaean roots. But i t 
was on t h i s especially that Areus and Alcibiades must have based 
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t h e i r claim for senatorial support. For the sale and banishment of 
these nev; citizens had been one of the specific objections which they 
had o r i g i n a l l y raised to Philopoemen's settlement, i n their f i r s t 
appearance at Rome the previous spring. The re s u l t had been the 
appointment of Pulcher to examine the Spartan question: clearly t l i i s 
must have seemed to be sympathy extended to the i r complaints. This 
policy v/as now more precisely formulated, and on i t and the slogan of 
traditionalism, Areus and Alcibiades based th e i r hopes of senatorial 
support. 
The t h i r d group v/as headed by Serippus. This party was urging 
the continuation of the position which Sparta had held since i t had 
become a constituent member of the League. This statement of policy 
suggests that Serippus v/as the current representative of the pro-
Achaean group, which Tiraolaus had led, which had been established i n 
power by Philopoemen i n 192, had been expelled late i n 191, and had 
been re-established after Gompasion. This v/as the only party at 
Sparta which h8.d ever shown any enthusiasm for Achaea, as they r e a l -
ised that t h e i r position within Sparta depended v/holly on Achaean 
support: independence of Achaea for them meant exile, as they had 
learnt between 191 and l88. Therefore nov/, as Timolaus had ea r l i e r , 
Serippus recommended the continuation of the union v/ith the League, 
v/hich v/ould give him int e r n a l power at Sparta, and Achaea.n support 
for i t . 
The fourth Spartan group was led by Chaeron. Polybius specif-
i c i a l l y describes them as atro 5e Tcov 'vs^avatw^evwv xat TCOV 
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eXTre'iTTOoxoToov xara TO, Tffiv 'Axatwv SoYpiaTa • This i s clearly the 
remains of the tyrant party - the strong-arm men of the tyrants, who 
must have gone int o exile i f they escaped massacre at Gompasion. 
The purpose which Polybius attributes to Ghaeron i s simply the rest-
oration of these 'new exiles', and the re-establishment of some 
specific constitution - the text contains a lacuna at t h i s point; 
but i t seems clear that i t would be the 'free' constitution which 
they v/ould want, such as had been i n operation between the revolt 
from Achaea i n autumn I89 and the Corapasion massacre the following 
year. Their aim was anti-Achaean, as Polybius makes clear. Hopes of 
achieving t h e i r restoration must have centred on the fact that t h i s 
party v/as l i k e l y to f i n d favour at Rome, for i t was the party v/hich 
Flaraininus had consistently supported against the Achaean supporters 
of Timolaus, i n I 9 2 / I ; and t h i s support ha.d continued after he l e f t 
Greece, as the Spartan hostages v/ere restored on request from t h i s 
group. I n 189 again, they had offered dediti_o to Fulvius; and i t 
had seemed that the Senate's ambiguous reply of spring I88 had 
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favoured t h e i r continuation i n -power at Sparta; on many occasions 
since Compasion, Philopoemen's treatment of their party had been 
sp e c i f i c a l l y cond.emned by the Senate and i t s representatives. There 
was therefore every reason for Chaeron to consider that his group 
had a good cha.nce on t h i s , i t s f i r s t appeal to the Senate since 
188/7, 
These variously c o n f l i c t i n g parties appeared before the Senate 
and argued among themselves, and v/ith the Achaeans, u n t i l i t was 
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impossible for the senators enjnasse to understand a l l the issues 
involved. A committee v/as therefore appointed, consisting of former 
leigati to Greece, Fla,mininus, Metellus and Pulcher, who were expected 
to be v/ell-informed on the complicated issues involved, i n an attempt 
•yO 
to gain agreement for a compromise solution. This committee even-
t u a l l y gained agreement, that Chaeron's exiles should be restored and 
union v/ith Achaea continue - some pressure may have been exerted by 
Flamininus on these matters but discussion v/as more heated, and no 
agreement v/as reached, over the property issue. Nevertheless, a 
schedule of points of agreement was drav/n up, and Xenarchus - rather 
un w i l l i n g l y , as he had taken no part i n the negotiations - was 
constrained to put .his name to i t , together with the Spartan groups, 
giving i t his seal of federal approval. The one point about which i 
the Achaeans f e l t s a t i s f i e d was the continuation of the c i t y i n the 
League. Pausanias adds that the walls of Sparta v/ere r e b u i l t and 
that the t r a d i t i o n a l Greek method of s e t t l i n g v i o l e n t l y disputed 
cases - reference to an international a r b i t r a t i o n court - v/as to be 
employed with capital cases; a l l others v/ere to be settled by 
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federal judges. The reason for t h i s i s easy to see, and i t was 
equitable enough: i t removed from the federal j u r i s d i c t i o n the poss-
i b i l i t y of a r e p e t i t i o n of the condemnation of the tyrant group at 
Gompasion, and of Areus and Alcibiades at the sjnodos of l84 - both 
parties who had suffered were present at the negotiations; from the 
local j u r i s d i c t i o n , i t removed the r i s k of judgements on property -
now expected to be the chief remaining cause of party dissension -
being l e f t i n the hands of biassed local o f f i c i a l s . We do not hear 
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anything more about t h i s issue, which probably indicates that the 
r u l i n g worked well. 
The two groups, which had gained at least part of what they had 
hoped for from the Senate, were Serippus' and Chaeron's; and i t i s 
not surprising to f i n d that these two groups, rather than the divided 
exiles' groups v/ith t h e i r unrealistic policies, were able to be 
dominant i n Sparta u n t i l I78. The Senate had managed to avoid the 
admission that i t had no ready-made positive policy towards Sparta 
and Achaea, by appointing the committee of ex-legati to clear up the 
incomprehensible confusion. The mild policy of limited disapproval 
of Achaean action at Compasion had almost recoiled by the confusion 
which i t had caused, when i t was belatedly recognised by the Spartans 
that t h i s could be turned to factional advantage. To demand the 
acknov/ledgenient of clientela had proved to be no longer s u f f i c i e n t , 
and the 'eastern experts' v/ere called i n to resolve some of the 
confusion. I n general, however, the vagnae purpose of Roman policy 
towards Achaea since the defeat of Antiochus continued. Another 
ambassador was appointed to v i s i t Peloponnese after dealing with 
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developments i n Hacedon. This time Q. Marcius Philippus v/as the man. 
His task on t h i s occasion perhaps v/as more specific - to examine 
progress towards the establishment of the agreed compromise at 
Sparta, I n t h i s he failed.; and his presence had l i t t l e effect when 
he t r i e d to assert Roman influence i n the matter of Messene, v/hich 
also cajne to a head during his year i n Greece, 
At some time af t e r the appointment of l^e^ati, i n winter l8A'-/3^  
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Deinocrates of Messene travelled to Rome. On his a r r i v a l he found 
that Flamininus had been appointed legatus to Prusias, v/hich meant 
that he v^ /ould ha.ve to pass through Greece on his journey. 
Deinocrates v/as naturally pleased v/ith t h i s ; and as far as we know, 
made no attempt to have a formal interview with the Senate. His 
plans were for a Messenian movement towards independence from Achaea, 
and he hoped that his friendship with Flamininus v/ould be s u f f i c i e n t l y 
powerful to have his desire for secession imposed on the federal 
government with the f u l l weight of Roman patronage. But despite his 
strong hopes from Flamininus, he did not neglect preparations for 
meeting the contingency i n v/hich Hessene might u n i l a t e r a l l y declare 
independence from Achaea. He spent the greater part of the sumjner 
making arrangements - no doubt, v/ith the help of Flamininus- for v/ar 
materials to be shipped to Messene from I t a l y . By the end of the 
summer a l l preparations v/ere complete, and Flamininus, v/ho had 
delayed his departure, was accompanied by Deinocrates when he l e f t 
Rome. 
In Achaea Philopoemen was elected strategos for the 8th time at 
the autumn synodos, thus maintaining the ascendancy which his group 
had asserted since the eclipse of Aristaenus after his strategia of 
186/5. He soon heard that Flamininus had arrived i n Greece; but as 
Xenarchus had been i n Rome at the time of his appointment, i t must 
have been knovm tlia t Flamininus had no specific senatorial i n s t r u c t -
ions to deal with Achaea. I t must also have been known that Messene 
was disaffected, and that Deinocrates had l e f t for Rome. 
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Philopoemen's knov/ledge of Flaraininus' past relations with 
Deinocrates must already have led to suspicions that Deinocrates 
would t r y to e n l i s t Flamininus' support for the Messenian cause; 
and Philopoemen's own personal distrust of Flamininus can only h3.ve 
encouraged the suspicion. Tactics, therefore, had to be considered 
before Flamininus arrived, i n case these suspicions proved j u s t i f i e d . 
I t v/as fortunate t l i a t Flamininus' instructions were already knovm to 
the Achaeans, for i t made i t possible to refuse, v/ith the f u l l 
backing of Acliaean law, any dangerous request which he might make for 
a syncletos. No preparations v/ere therefore made for calling a 
syncletos to meet him. The same tactics v/ere to be used as had been 
successful with Metellus: the f u l l importance of thi s had been driven 
home by the success of Pulcher before the syncletos at Cleitor, 
VJhen Flainininus arrived at Naupactus, he wrote to the Achaean 
stratejyqs and damiOTirgoi as expected, t e l l i n g them to c a l l a 
syncletos for him. They replied with a request for details, c i t i n g , 
as to Metellus, Achaean law - i n this case the law about the prior 
publication of matters for discussion at the sj^ncletos. Flaraininus, 
who was perhaps i n a hurry to reach Bithynia before the v/inter 
f i n a l l y set in, did not press his request, and Deinocrates' hopes, 
and those of the Spartan 'old exiles', now again driven out from 
Sparta, probably as a result of the success of Serippus and Chaeron 
before the Senate and the subsequent restoration of the tyrants' 
party, v/ere disappointed. I t i s clear that Flaraininus did not v/ant 
to become involved i n a bat t l e with the entrenched Achaeans over 
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Messene, v/hen he had no formal instructions from the Senate - and 
l i t t l e personal i n c l i n a t i o n f o r l o s t causes - despite his friendship 
for Deinocrates and t r a d i t i o n a l support for the Spartan 'old exiles'. 
He had encouraged Deinocrates so far for the sake of clientela, with-
out any senatorial guidance; but positive trouble-making, which 
might bring the Achaeans to heel, but which might backfire and leave 
the Senate to rescue i t s endangered prestige at the r i s k of making 
the Achaeans even less clear about their true status, was to be l e f t 
to the Messenians themselves. The Senate could not, i n the nature of 
the relationship which i t was fumblingly trying to establish, openly 
i n t e r f e r e : Flaraininus' hands were t i e d the more so, because the 
Senate's policy v/as basically his own i n the f i r s t place.^•^ 
Shortly a f t e r t h i s the Messenian revolt broke out, and Philippus 
v/as present at an Achaean syncletos at which the question of war wit h 
Messene was discussed. He attempted to assert Roman patronage by 
i n t e r f e r i n g i n order to prevent a declaration of v/ar; but the 
Achaeans considered action to be immediately necessary, and the Roman 
advice - as that of Flamininus over Sparta i n 192 - given for personal 
p o l i t i c a l reasons, was ignored by the Achaeans. This Achaean 
disregard of Philippus' intervention was the more serious, as he had 
specific instructions from the Senate to investigate Achaea, and 
could not but produce a further deterioration i n Achaean relations 
with Rome. Philopoemen had again shown that the Achaeans, under his 
leadership, were unwilling to comply with the requirements of the 
cl i e n t e l a relationship. But the Senate's fr u s t r a t i o n at t h i s 
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apparently v / i l f u l disregard for client's obligations, i n connection ' 
v/ith matters i n which i t had only become interested through force of 
circumstances, shov/ed i t s e l f at the annual reception of foreign 
ambassadors. 
Philippus' o f f i c i a l report of his mission was highly unfavourable 
to the Achaeans: he stated bluntly that they shov/ed no intention of 
ref e r r i n g decisions on any matter to the Senate, had ideas discordant 
with t h e i r status, and intended to resolve everything themselves. 
The Achaean ambassadors of the year were then introduced. They asked 
for help against Messene; i f no positive Roman help v/as forthcoming, 
they asked that the Senate should at least prevent the I t a l i a n help 
for Messene which Deinocrates had arranged the previous year. The 
reply which they received showed clearly the Senate's Justifiable 
f r u s t r a t i o n , for Philippus had t r i e d to prevent the war's being 
declared at a l l and to reach a negotiated settlement: even i f Sparta 
or Corinth or Argos should secede from the Leagu.e, the Achaeans 
should not v/onder i f the Senate thought i t was of no relevance to 
i t s e l f . This flung back i n Philopoemen's face his own ambiguous 
position: he refused to countenance unsolicited Roman intervention, 
v/hich might have an effect on the formulation of Achaean policies, 
and therefore compromise Achaean independence; on the other hand, 
Rome was an a l l y , and as such open to be called upon for aid i n any 
emergency. He could scarcely expect the Senate to accept the i m p l i -
cations of t h i s tactless sophistry, and i t came to a confrontation 
over Messene, Philippus' intervention at the syjicletos had been 
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s p e c i f i c a l l y aimed at the prevention of further trouble i n 
Peloponnese; and he no doubt had hopes that Messene could secure a, 
negotiated settlement, as Sparta had the previous year. This poss-
i b i l i t y had been rejected outright by the Achaeans, following the 
f i r s t precept of Philopoemen's policy, and not rel i s h i n g another 
imposed solution to one of th e i r internal problems. But the necess-
i t y of invoking the second - the appeal for Roman help - came immed-
i a t e l y ; and there i s no sign of Achaean embarrassment at their 
application of double standards. But the Senate naturally f e l t 
angry at this i n s u l t to i t s ef f o r t s at negotiation, which had simply 
resulted i n an unnecessary complication of Peloponnesian p o l i t i c s . 
Polybius adds that the Senate's reply was given f u l l p u b l i c i t y , 
and v/as v i r t u a l l y an i n v i t a t i o n to any state to secede from the 
League v/ith Roman blessing. But despite this anti-senatorial i n t e r -
pretation - coming from Lycortas •• t h i s was not true, and the Senate 
did not v/holly y i e l d to i t s fr u s t r a t i o n . The envoys, who had 
received t h i s reply, v/ere not allowed to leave Rome and thus broad-
cast the nev/s of the Senate's attitude, as Polybius implies -
although knov/ledge of i t may have become current u n o f f i c i a l l y . They 
v/ere retained u n t i l such time as nev/s of the course of the war should 
reach Rome. The Senate could not take the r i s k of seeming, even ' 
ambiguously, to support the wrong side. When i t was learnt that the 
result of the v/ar v/as favourable to Achaea, the envoys were again 
summoned before the Senate, and told that supplies v/ould be prevented 
from reaching Messene, as they had requested e a r l i e r . There v/as now 
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no danger tl i a t t h i s would al t e r the course of the war. . Polybius 
interprets t h i s more r e a l i s t i c a l l y than the earli e r Senatus 
£9ilSili.tilS' "^'iiis made i t clear to everyone that, so far from shuff-
l i n g o f f and neglecting less important items of foreign a f f a i r s , 
they v/ere, on the contrary, displeased i f everything was not refer-
red t o them, and done i n accordance v;ith t h e i r decision'. I t v/as 
thi s point ^^rhich the Senate had been trying to make since 188, with 
-progressively less success, u n t i l f r u s t r a t i o n had driven them to 
anger. Polybius says that i t v;as now clear to a l l : but at least 
u n t i l 179/8, when Callicrates became povrerful, there does not seem 
to be any greater desire among the Achaeans to accept the o b l i -
gations of t h e i r clJig^S^tSiS' •^''^  "^'^^ advantage to understand the 
Senate's wishes; but the Achaeans did not immediately shov; that 
they were prepared to act i n compliance with these wishes. I n t h i s 
particular case, the change of opinion on the part of the Senate was 
simple. The Fathers had waited to see the result of the war, i n 
order to avoid committing t h e i r prestige to the support of the 
he 
losing side. 
I n the same winter, 183/2, there vrere two Spartan embassies at 
Eome. The f i r s t represented the 'old exiles', v/ho had been again 
driven out of the c i t y after the restoration of Ghaeron's party. 
They had looked to Flamininus' presence at Naupactus i n autumn I83 
to retrieve t h e i r position; but bad been disappointed, along vdth 
Deinocrates' Messenians, when he refused to press the Achaeans. I n 
the f i r s t place t h e i r embassy had been headed by Arcesilaus and 
Agesipolis ~ who had been king of Sparta 'vjhen a young man.', perhaps 
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after the death of Cleomenes -- but they had been captured by pirates 
en route and k i l l e d . We do not linow v/hich section of the 'old exiles' 
they represented: t h e i r connexion with the old royal houses suggests 
that they might have been attached to the group of Areus and 
Alcibiades. But as neither /ireus and Alcibiades nor Lysis, v;ho led 
the other section of the 'old exiles' at Rome, are again mentioned i n 
our sources, i t i s not possible to decide f i r m l y . I f they were 
attached to Areus' and Alcibiades' group, their presence may suggest 
that Areus and Alcibiades had themselves been eliminated at the time 
of t h e i r re~exile. The remainder of the members of the embassy 
managed to escape the pirates, and continued their journey to Rome. 
\Je do not know v/hat reply was given them by the Senate; but i t 
cannot have been p a r t i c u l a r l y favourable, as far as positive action 
was concerned. They had been exiled as a direct result of the imple-
mentation of the settlement, v/hich had been agreed i n the presence of 
the senatorial cominittee of ex-le^ati. Any new interference by the 
Senate involved the admission that the negotiated settlement was 
unsatisfactory - the exiles would, no doubt, say that i t had broken 
down completely; and i n the circumstances of the nev/ly strained 
relations with Achaea over Messene, i t was important that Roman 
policy tov/ards Peloponnese should maintain the appearance of consist-
ency. 
The other embassy, from the anti-exile coalition of Serippus 
and Ghaeron, who held the c i t y , was headed by Serippus. I t i s not 
altogether clear what Seriprjus hoped to gain from t h i s journey to 
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Rome, as Polybius does not make thi s e x p l i c i t . But i t seems l i k e l y 
that he had two purposes. On the one hand, he represented the 
Spartan government, the c o a l i t i o n with Ghaeron; and i n this capacity 
he had to represent the government's point of vievi; of the nev; expul-
sion of the 'old exiles'. On the other hand, he represented his ovm 
section of the c o a l i t i o n government, whose key policy v/as the main-
tenance of the union with Achaea; i n t h i s he differed from Chaeron. 
I t v;as therefore necessary, i n the new circumstances created by the 
expulsion of the 'old exiles', to reaffirm his sectional commitment 
to the continuation of the union with Achaea. The Senate was committed 
to t h i s as a result of the agreement of the previous year; but 
Ghaeron had powerful friends at Rome as a result of his association 
with Nabis' party. Serippus, therefore, had to attempt to gain a 
renevjed senatorial commitment to support the union with Achaea. This 
he f a i l e d to do. Peloponnesian p o l i t i c s were annually becoming more 
confused; and the Senate refused to increase i t s commitment over 
Sparta: 'They had done a l l they could, and for the moment did not 
think the matter concerned them'. But as v/ith the Achaeans, they 
did not allov/ Serippus to leave Rome u n t i l the summer.'^ '^  The Senate 
was non-committal, but i t did not v/ant knowledge of t h i s non-committal 
attit u d e to reach Peloponnese u n t i l some clear l i n e of development i n 
events at Messene could be seen, and a more positive attitude taken. 
When nevjs of the Achaean success at Messene reached Rome, Serippus 
v/as allovred to leave; and he reached Peloponnese v/hen i t was already 
summer, to f i n d his position at Sparta seriously v/eaikened by 
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Chaeron's declaration of secession from the Leag-ue. 
After the v;inter, the war with Messene, the declaration of 
which Philippus had f a i l e d to prevent, started again i n Peloponnese. 
By about the middle of A p r i l , the Achaean levy had been assembled i n 
order to make the conventional raids on Messene. Philopoemen, who 
should have been leading i t as st^ategos, v/as suffering from a fever 
at i\rgos; and Lycortas, who v/as hipparch, took over the command of 
the army u n t i l Philopoemen should have recovered. The war was urgent, 
as Deinocrates was supported by supplies from I t a l y , and could not 
wait for the strategos. Failure to attack at the f i r s t convenient 
moment would be interpreted as federal acquiescence i n the secession, 
and a success for Deinocrates. In the event, Lycortas' expedition 
did not achieve very much: no battle was fought, no important 
position taken, no concession ga.ined from the Messenians. I t seems, 
i n fact, that i t was the usual type of border-raiding expedition, 
v/hich served only to announce that the federal government considered 
i t s e l f to be seriously at war. Before Lycortas returned, however, 
news reached Argos that Deinocrates was attacking Gorone. I t seems 
clear that nevjs of t h i s had by-passed Lycortas; and Philopoemen, who 
v/as by t h i s time convalescent, was the only man who could take any 
action to r e t a i n Gorone for Achaea. He therefore l e f t Argos, and 
rode to Megalopolis i n a day, a distance of.-some 50-60 miles, through 
the mountains ~ no small achievement for a 70~year-old convalescent, 
which duly became a feature of the Philopoemen legend v;hen related 
by Polybius. There he collected some Thracians and Cretans and 60 
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young Achaean horsemen - probably those too young to serve i n the 
mass levy v/hich Lycortas led •- and set out for Gorone. 
The direct route from Megalopolis to Gorone passes close to 
Messene; and before Philopoemen was able to reach Corone, he v/as 
ambushed by Deinocrates at the head of 500 Messenians. In the melee 
which follov/ed, Philopoemen was captured when his horse stumbled and 
f e l l on top of him. Livy, r e f l e c t i n g Polybian panegyric, suggests 
that he could even nov; have escaped with the help of the Thracians 
and Gretans, had he not vjanted to occupy the Messenians u n t i l the 
young Megalopolitans made the i r escape. As i t was, he fa i l e d to 
take advantage of his opportunity, and f e l l into the hands of 
Deinocrates. His capture obviously was a triumph to the Messenians, 
but they were not sure hoM to take f u l l advantage of their success. 
To one section, v/ho, according to Polybius, had large popular support, 
i t seemed that an invaluable bargaining counter had been given them; 
Deinocrates - who did not have the ad.vantage of Polybius' sympathy -
had not made up his mind as to the most beneficial use of Philopoemen's 
capture. But a l l factions agreed that no r i s k of escape should be 
taken while policy was being formulated, and they locked Philopoemen 
up i n a cave-like prison, v/here he v/as soon found dead. Polybius' 
story i s that Deinocrates had had poison brought to him, thus 
indulg3.ng his personal hatred and desire t o strik e a mortal blov/ at 
'35 
Achaea by getting r i d of Philopoemen. But there can be no 
certainty of t h i s . Polybius' account, i n some form, i s the basis 
ox a l l of our accounts; and a l l information he v/as able to acquire 
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must have been subject to interpretation by his personal emotional 
and p o l i t i c a l bias. I n addition to t h i s , the grov/th of the 
Philopoemen legend cast an aura of greatness over the Achaean 
hero's death. I n the accounts v/e have, i t survives i n the alleg;ed 
death-cell conversation with the slave who brought his poison, 
according to which he expressed his a l t r u i s t i c p a t r i o t i c anxiety 
for Lycortas and his countrymen - v/hich Livy carefully introduces 
56 
v;ith ferun_t, although Plutarch gives a straight narrative. 
The problem of the accoimt of Philopoemen's death i s therefore 
essentially a source problem. The Achaean legend needed i t s hero, 
and some embroidery v/as inevitable. The death-cell conversation i s 
clearly part of t h i s growth. But information about the intentions 
of the various Messenian groups vis-a-vis Philopoemen can only have 
come, i n the f i r s t instance, from a Messenian source. I t i s clear 
from the picture which emerges of Deinocrates' part i n the events 
that his account was not the ori g i n - i n any case, i t v/ould not be 
accepted by the Achaeans, or therefore appear i n Polybius. But 
there i s a sharp contrast made i n the sources between the masses, 
v/ho were kindly disposed tovjards Philopoemen, and at the most 
wanted to use him to extricate themselves from Achaean h o s t i l i t y ~ 
nieritorum^ J22J.9®i?-'^ -™,P-9.,£§Z...-?Hil ir.£2L?'^ ,if^ ..9Luae;renda £sse pjjLesejitium 
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F^^S9Ji}-Jzi.9.S^SIS^.' This strongly suggests a major e f f o r t at 
p o l i t i c a l apologetics to the Achaeans after Messene had 
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capitulated. I t was then i n the interest of every Messenian, v/ho 
had not been too closely associated v/ith Deinocrates, to lay the 
blame for the result - and the resulting major offence to the 
Achaeans of the death of Philopoeraen -• firmly on his shoulders. 
Vie Imov/ that there v/as such a s p l i t between the leaders of the 
revolt and a m.ore moderate party, who v/ere f i n a l l y responsible for 
capitulating to Lycortas and handing over Deinocrates' party to 
Achaea. I t must therefore, be from t h i s group that the s.ccount of 
the disposition of the Messenian parties at the time of 
Philopoeraen's death, which v/e f i n d i n our Polybian sources, comes.''" 
The fact that t h i s account was accepted by the Achaean trad-
i t i o n does not shed l i g h t on i t s inherent r e l i a b i l i t y , for the 
circumstemces of t h i s group after Messenian capitulation made i t 
necessary for them to present a tale of unwilling complicity i n ; 
the defection. Mything disreputable t o l d about Deinocrates would 
be immediately accepted by the Achaeans, perhaps even believed by 
the masses. The Achaean stra^tegos had died i n capt i v i t y ; the 
Achaeans could not be expected to accept tha.t his death v/as 
natural. A scapegoat had to be found; and Deinocrates v/as the 
obvious choice, made even easier by his recent suicide. I t had to 
be said that Philopoemen v/as murdered: popular heroes do not 
otherv/ise die sudden deaths i n enemy hands. The heroic t r a d i t i o n 
added the necessary drama - perhaps i n the f i r s t instance, 
Polybius himself i n his L i f e . But i n the circumstances, a natural 
death v/ould not be unexpected. Philopoemen v/as 70 years old; he 
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had been i l l j u s t before leaving Argos; he must have been 
exhausted as a result of his journeys and the fighti n g ; he may 
v/ell have suffered i n t e r n a l i n j u r i e s as a result of his horse's 
f a l l i n g on top of hira. I n addition, the place where they kept 
himi - the state treasury ~ v/as underground, therefore airless and 
perhaps cold and damp. I n these circumstances, death, as a cumul-
ative r e s u l t of a l l these factors, would not be at a l l surprising. 
As we have seen, Polybius' poison story seems very l i k e the trad-
i t i o n a l explanation of sudden death i n enemy hands. There i s , 
therefore, serious ground for doubting the genuineness of t h i s 
elaborate account of the circumstances i n v;hich i t occurred. 
The f i r s t steps i n the creation of the Philopoemen legend 
vjere taken by the organisers of the funeral - Lycortas and his 
group. When Messene f e l l to Lycortas' subsequent campaign, 
Philopoemen's body v/as recovered and b u r n t . A s i f to 
demonstrate that t h e a t r i c a l shovjs of emotion were not the sole 
preserve of Flamininus, the urn holding the ashes was dressed with 
funeral ribbons and wreaths, and carried to Megalopolis by 
Polybius, escorted by the whole of the Achaean array i n f u l l armour. 
The procession, says Plutarch, was a mixture of triumph and 
funeral, for the captives taken i n the Messeniiin war were paraded 
i n the procession. Public mourning extended beyond Megalopolis 
i t s e l f into the surrounding countryside, and the procession was 
joined by people from the villages and tovms as i t travelled from 
Messene to Megalopolis. 
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As a climax to the pageantry, the urn v/as buried i n his 
native c i t y , and i n a primitive ceremony of re t r i b u t i o n , 
captive Messenig,ns were stoned to death at his tomb. The 
expiation was complete: Messene had paid f o r her destruction of 
a hero by creating a legend from her defeat. Posthumous 
honours f o r Philopoemen were naturally widespread i n Achaea: 
f o r the most part, they took the form of expensive statues and 
paintings, v/hich by I46 had acquired such decorative significance 
i n the cities, of Peloponnese, that they excited the greed of 
the Roman legionaries: Polybius f e l t i t his duty to intervene 
on t h e i r behalf, and made his defence of Philopoemen which 
saved the honours. The statues were allowed to remain. 
Outside of Achaea, Philopoemen was also honoured: at Delphi 
an equestrian statue v/as erected by the Achaeans, which 
Plutarch saw there and whic|i Poratow has t r i e d to reconstruct.^'^ 
But the most fulsome honours were naturally granted by his 
ng-tive c i t y . Diodorus i s f u l l y supported by a fragmentary 
i n s c r i p t i o n i n his account: 'In addition to the decrees i n 
his honour voted by the Achaeans j o i n t l y , his native c i t y set 
up 9.n a l t a r , i n s t i t u t e d an annual sacrifice to him, and 
appointed hymns tind praises of his exploits to be sung by the 
young men of the c i t y ' . ^ ^ I t v/ould not be the f a u l t of 
Lycortas and the Megalopolitans i f the legend did not take 
root. 
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Deinocrates, as f a c t and expediency suggested, v;as held i n 
Achaea t o be responsible f o r Philopoemen's death. For the moment, 
there was no st£ategos; but i n accordance w i t h the law, Philopoemen's 
predecessor took over u n t i l the next synodos. This was r a p i d l y pro-
claimed t o be held a t Megalopolis, vAich was a convenient meeting-
place f o r the immediate p u r s u i t of the war. The army too was present, 
ready t o march s t r a i g h t against. Messene as soon as the synodos decided 
vjho should be the next strategos. There could not be much doubt as t o 
the r e s u l t of the e l e c t i o n i n the highly emotional atmosphere, and 
Lycortas was chosen.''" The Messenians were qu i c k l y reduced i n the war, 
now t h a t a serious Achaean campaign was launched against them; and by 
Jul y they had been brought t o the p o s i t i o n of asking f o r terms. 
Deinocrates had soon l o s t h i s support when i t became clear t h a t the 
death of Philopoemen had committed the Achaeans more than ever t o 
complete success i n the war. He therefore committed suicide before he 
f e l l i n t o Achaean hands. The remainder of his p a r t y , whom the Achaeans 
made scapegoats f o r the death of Philopoemen, were also given orders t o 
commit suicide when the settlement and the r e - i n c o r p o r a t i o n of Messene 
w i t h i n the Leag-ue were arranged at the second synodqs of the year, 
again meeting a t Megalopolis, 'by the generosity of Lycortas and the 
Achaeans'. This generosity was also responsible f o r the dependent 
Messenian towns of Abia, Thuria and Pharae being separated from Messene 
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and given independent membership of the League. I t was fortunate for 
Lycortas that i t v/as his son v/ho interpreted his generosity for the 
world, for his solution to the Messenian defection had tv/o essential 
features i n common vrith the Spartan settlement of Philopoemen after 
Gompasion. The anti-Achaean party, which led the defection, v/as 
physically eliminated, i n order to prevent i t s becoming another 
threatening exile group; presumably the party which had negotiated the 
settlement v/as confirmed i n power. But as with Sparta at Compasion, i t 
was a new v/eaker Messene which was restored to the League: Lycortas 
clearly did not v/holly t r u s t his nev/ 'pro-Achaean' supporters. 
V/hen Serippus returned to Sparta from his embassy to Rome i n 
summer l82, he found that Chaeron had taken advantage of his absence to 
declare Spartan secession from the Leag-ue. We hear of no Achaean 
m i l i t a r y a.ctivity against Sparta this year, and must therefore assume 
that Philopoemen and Lycortas had been too f u l l y occupied v/ith the 
Messenian revolt to take any action against Sparta. But Serippus' 
return altered the p o l i t i c a l balance at Sparta i n Achaea's favour. 
With or v/ithout Achaean support, he was able to gain enough influence 
quickly i n Sparta to be able to approach Lycortas with proposals for 
the reintegration of the c i t y into the League."^ 
syncletos, which was called for this new discussion of Sjsarta, 
was held at Sicyon af t e r the settlement at Messene. Lycortas, v/ith an 
unashamed appeal to Achaean se l f - i n t e r e s t , urged that, since the Senate 
had declared i t s e l f uninterested i n Spartan problems, Sparta should be 
taken back i n t o the League, i n order to preserve f a i t h with those v/ho 
- 246 -
had been f a i t h f u l to Achaea (clearly Serippus' group); and on the 
other hand, to keep out the 'old exiles' - v/hom they had not been 
responsible for driving out - and pay them back for their ingrat-
. 4 i'cude (Areus and Alcibiades' group), 
Philopoemen's death had removed from his party the personal 
prestige which he hcd used to promote his policy. Vi/hereais there had 
previously been no serious doubts expressed that Spartan part i c i p -
ation i n the League was wholly desirable, at this syncletos oppos-
i t i o n to Lycortas' continuation of the same policy vras expressed by 
Diophanes. I t seems clear that he thought that Philopoeraen's death 
removed the Achaean commitment to unconditional Spartan participation 
i n the League, that there was now room for a f i n a l settlement v/hich 
v/ould remove the disastrous disputes from Achaean p o l i t i c s , and 
restore some security and s t a b i l i t y to Peloponnese. tod he had some 
support v;hen he ojjposed Lycortas' openly partisan argumients, and 
suggested that any settlement reached with Sparta should include pro-
vision for the restoration of the exiles. The unexpressed implicat-
ion of t h i s v/as i f this provision were not forthcoming, the Spartan 
application should be rejected. I t seems clear that this oppos-
i t i o n must represent a continuation of the factional struggle i n 
Achaea between Diophanes and the Philopoemenists. But by l82 
Diophanes had hopes of greater success. Nov/ that Philopoemen v/as 
dead, his policy might be overthrov\/n, v/ith favourable consequences 
for Diophanes. I n the f i r s t place, many had suffered from the loss 
of l i f e and destruction of property v/hich Philopoemen's policy 
entailed. This continual p o l i t i c a l chaos might be ended by a less 
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partisan interpretation of Achaean obligations tov/ards Sparta, v/hich 
might achieve at the same time a substantial benefit i n internal 
s t a b i l i t y and a. less pretentious relationship v/ith Rome. As far as 
Diophanes' ovrn position was concerned, he v/ould clearly benefit 
p o l i t i c a l l y from both of these results. He had formed a close r e l a t -
ionship v/ith Flamininus i n 191, and Flamininus had again shown interest 
i n Sparta i n I83. Diophanes might v/e 11 hope for Roman support for 
himself i n Achaea. I n addition, many may have only supported 
Philorjoemen's policy because of his personal reputation. When this 
ceased to be a p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y with his death, they would appreciate 
the benefits conferred by the renev/ed peace and s t a b i l i t y i n 
Peloponnese. Diophanes therefore stood on the side of the exiles, who 
had been immorally and i l l e g a l l y expelled from t h e i r country. 
I t was t h i s policy which, i n a more logi c a l and developed form, 
Callicrates explained to the Senate i n 179/8. For the moment the 
ghost of Philopoemen s t i l l v/alked i n Achaea, and Diophanes only gained 
a p a r t i a l success. But even th i s v/as a sign of the crumbling control 
of the Philopoemenist group. Diophanes had reminded the syncletos that 
exiles v/ould continue to be a major problem i f action v/ere not taken; 
and a compromise v/as arranged v/hereby Sparta entered the League, and 
those of the 'old exiles', v/ho had not offended the League v/ith t h e i r 
ingratitude, were to be restored. Bippus of Argos v/as then sent to the 
Senate to report on the events of the year. At Sparta the compromise 
was by no means satisfactory to a l l groups; but the restoration of 
some, and continued h o s t i l i t y to the remaining exiles, seem to have 
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mad.e Serippus and Chaeron nev/ly conscious of the i r common interests, 
and the c o a l i t i o n must have been patched up, for Chaeron v/as sent to 
Rome as representative of the Spajrtan government. Those exiles v/ho 
v/ere not to be restored - probably the group o r i g i n a l l y led by Areus 
and Alcibiades - coul.d novj only hope for restoration as a solution 
imposed on Achaea by the Senate. They therefore sent Cletis and 
Diactorius to Eome.^ 
By the time these envoys came before the Senate, the Roman f r u s t -
r a t i o n of the previous year, caused by the uncontrollable confusion, 
had disappeared with the emergence of a comprehensible pov/er structure 
i n Peloponnese. After the Senate had heard the news of the Ach-aean 
success against Messene, they had immediately altered their f i r s t reply. 
Nov^  the non-committal cautious attempt at affecting the course of 
Achaean ind.ependent policy was resumed. The Spartans came before the 
Senate f i r s t . The exiles obtained the promise of a l e t t e r to the 
Achaeans about t h e i r restoration, but nothing v/as said i n condemnation 
of the Spartan government's action i n expelling them. This could not 
have altered the present state of a f f a i r s ; and the previous policy of 
the condemnation of Achaean action at Compasion had been exploited by 
the various factional interests i n Peloponnese to the point of severe 
disaffection i n the Achaean League, and c i v i l war i n the constituent 
states, neither of v/hich the Senate had been able to control. The 
Senate, i n fact, had burned i t s fingers, and was w i l l i n g to learn frc 
i t s f a i l u r e . ^ 
When the Achaeans v/ere introduced, some days l a t e r , the Senate 
"om 
l a n 
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expressed, no dissatisfaction at their settlem.ent of the Messeni; 
v/ar of secession, and received them i n a friendly manner. The 
contrast with the previous year could not have been greater. I n 
addition to the new conditions i n Peloponnese, v/hich i n themselves 
produced a more tolerant attitude on the part of the Senate, i t must 
have been realised i n Rome that the ineffectiveness of Roman policy 
i n the past year had been f u l l y exploited by the Achaeans for their 
own advantage. There could be no objection to the Achaean success i n 
i t s e l f ; but the fact that i t had been achieved tiirough the f a i l u r e 
of the Senate's attempt at controlling the course of events i n 
Peloponnese had shattered the use of this kind of petulant non-inter-
vention, v/hich had temporarily been the form of senatorial policy the 
previous year. The purpose of policy v/e.s nov/ the same as ever: the 
conduct of diplomatic relations with the client state i n accordance 
v/ith a general acceptsjice of the mutual obligations of clientele La. 
The simple proud assertion of patronage had f a i l e d , because i t had 
been deliberately misinterpreted, and had resulted i n confusion. I t 
was nov/ necessary to be more careful: i n order to preserve i t s 
prestige, the Senate must support the successful factions. 
From the Achaean point of viev; nothing had changed. The signif-
icance of the Senate's changed attitude escaped them, i n the same v/ay 
as the r e a l significa.nce of the Senate's ea r l i e r attitude had escaped, 
them. Under the Philopoeraenists, Achaea v/as no more ready to comply 
v/ith apparent generosity than v/ith open dominance, i f the recomruended 
action did not s u i t Achaetm policies. The Spartan exiles were the 
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f i r s t to return to Peloponnese, an.d immediately presented their 
l e t t e r from the Senate to the Achaeans, v/ho decided to wait for 
Bippus' return before taking any decision. At th i s time, the agree-
ment v/ith. Messene v;as completed, and three years' exemption from 
federal ta^ces g-ra3.ited, to laake up for the serious long-terra damage 
9 
caused by the v/ar to the Messenian countryside. When Bippus 
returned he displayed the t r a d i t i o n a l Philopoemenist attitude to the 
nevi aspect of Roman policy. He reported that the Senate's l e t t e r had 
been v/ritten o(> 6 i a TT)V T?^ CTVY^XTITOU cnT0v6T|v, aXXa 6i,a TT)V TSV 
<^ Byd6tt)v (^bcXoTtfitav, and as a result the Achaeans decided to take no 
a.ction. Bippus must have been misinterpreting the Senate over t h i s , 
i n the l i g h t of his ov/n friendly reception. Polybius himself gives 
no hint of exile ^ tXoTtf i ta i n his b r i e f but adequate account of the 
reception of the Spartans; and he had every interest to do so, had 
i t been possible. I.n I88/7 he implies clearly enough that the 
Spartans acquired t h e i r l e t t e r from Lepidus by their im.portiinity. 
There i s nothing of t h i s i n l o l u n t i l the return of Bippus. This can 
only imply deliberate Achaean misinterpretation of the Senate's 
a t t i t u d e , conditioned by the Achaean attitude to the 'ungrateful' 
exiles. The eagerness v/ith v/hich they decided they could safely 
ignore the l e t t e r strongly suggests this."^*^ They v/ere, i n fact, 
acting i n exactly the same v/ay as they had under the influence of 
Philopoemen since I 8 8 , v r i l l i n g to y i e l d only v/here circumstances 
v/e.re raani.pulated to compel them by demands i n terms of pure pov/er 
p o l i t i c s . The trouble a,nd c o n f L i s i o n over the exiles v/as again bei.ng 
perpetuated by the Senate's f a i l u r e to react positively to the 
Acha.ean treatment of cljLejrbe]-a, and accordingly to indicate i t s 
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p o l i c y c l e a r l y i n terms of unambiguous orders, r a t h e r than simple 
advice which merely created controversy. As long as t h i s state of 
a f f a i r s continued, the Peloponnese vjould remain under the i l l u s i o n o f 
independence - a hang-over from Flamininus' propaganda of the vrar 
p e r i o d - and th e r e f o r e i n confusion. 
I t seems l i k e l y t h a t the e x i l e s appealed t o Rome again the 
f o l l o w i n g w i n t e r , as v;e f i n d i n summer l80 Plyperbatus, the strategos, 
holding a s^nodos v/hich again discussed the m&tter of the Spartan 
e x i l e s . Previous t o t h i s , Chaeron had been beginning to.act autocrat-
i c a l l y a t Sparta, and had been supressed by the strategos. I t must 
have seemed t h a t another Spartan secession was a t hand; and t h i s , 
coupled w i t h the i n t r a n s i g e n t a t t i t u d e o f the Achaeans t o the l e t t e r o f 
181, v;ould be s u f f i c i e n t t o send the e x i l e s t o Rome a g a i n . T h e 
e l e c t i o n of Hyperbatus t o the s t r a t e g i a already marks a break i n the 
succession of Philopoemenist s t r a t e g i a i i n autumn I81 and, follovang 
the compromise v/hich Diophanes had extracted f o r the Spartan e x i l e s i n 
182, must i n d i c a t e t h a t the opinion represented by Lycortas had 
su f f e r e d a considerable v;eakening of support since Philopoeraen's death, 
Lycortas wanted t o e x p l o i t c l i e n t e l a , the newly dominant party t o 
operate w i t h i n i t . At t h i s synqdos a c t i o n on the new l e t t e r ' a b o u t the 
Spartan e x i l e s was the occasion of a con f r o n t a t i o n of the tv;o p o l i c i e s . 
Lycortas' view vjas t h a t on which Philopoemenist p o l i c y had always 
been based: the a c t i v e a s s e r t i o n of the r i g h t t o fol l o v ; an independent 
p o l i c y , vilth appeal t o the foedus as a l a s t r e s o r t . He now stated h i s 
c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the Senate would respect Achaean law i f the necessity of 
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t h i s \-jeTe expressed f o r c i b l y enough. I f i t were pointed out t h a t 
the f u l f i l m e n t of the Roman w r i t t e n request would i n v o l v e the v/hole~ 
sale contravention of Achaean law, the l e g a l f a b r i c from which the 
st a t e v/as c o n s t i t u t e d , Lycortas argued t h a t the Senate would be 
reasonable and would not i n s i s t . This r i g h t of the c l i e n t state t o 
allov; i t s lav;s t o block Eoraaxi p o l i c y vjas denied by Hyperbatus and 
C a l l i c r a t e s . They argued t h a t they should act i n complete accordance 
w i t h the LRoman request, x a l |ar|Te vo^xov [ir]%e OTTIXTIV |ir|T* aXXo [irpev 
-uouTOV vo[iiZei\f a v a Y x a t o T e p o v • At l a s t a party i n Achaea f e l t 
i t s e l f powerful enough t o openly challenge the Philopoemenists, and 
give f o r m u l a t i o n t o the r e l a t i o n s h i p which the Senate had been t r y i n g 
12 
t o e s t a b l i s h . Lycortas could not command the l i i c t o r i t a s which had 
been Philopoeraen's alone. He had been elected i n t o the vacant 
strate£ia i n I82 on the emotional wave aroused by Philopoemen's dea.th. 
But h i s p o s i t i o n had been gradually v;eakened since then: f i r s t by the 
p a r t i a l success of Diophanes i n l82 over the Spartan e x i l e s ; secondly 
by the e l e c t i o n of Hyperbatus i n autumn I 8 I . I t was i n these circum-
stances t h a t C a l l i c r a t e s was able t o develop Diophanes' p o l i c y , 
formulate i t i n h i s ovm waiy, and introduce i t t o the Achaeans, w i t h 
the f u l l support of the strategos i n 18O. Philopoemen's death marked 
the f a t a l vjeakening of h i s p a r t y . But C a l l i c r a t e s ' i n t r o d u c t i o n of 
h i s ovm p o l i c y a t the synodos was only the f i r s t stage i n i t s f u l f i l -
ment, f o r the Philopoemenists viere s t i l l strong enough t o cause v i o l e n t 
dissension; and i t was only decided t o send ambassadors t o Rome. 
Polybius d i d not have any sympathy f o r C a l l i c r a t e s . He was the 
p o l i t i c a l opponent of Polybius himself, h i s fa t h e r Lycortas, and the 
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IDolicy of independence formulated by Philopoemen. To Polybius, 
C a l l i c r a t e s was a t r a i t o r , pursuing a p o l i c y of sycophantic acquies-
cence t o s e n a t o r i a l v/ishes, v;hile the independence party followed the 
noble i d e a l of the f r e e a l l i a n c e , i n which co-operation could be 
refused. As we have only Polybius' account of G a l l i c r a t e s ' f i r s t 
major success before the Senate, v/e must attempt t o penetrate the 
h o s t i l e web of bias and innuendo, and examine C a l l i c r a t e s ' a c t i v i t i e s 
and successes v/ithout Polybius' prejudices."'"^ The synodos, before 
which the h o s t i l e p a r t i e s expressed t h e i r fundamental differences, 
sent t o Rome G a l l i c r a t e s , Lydiadas of Megalopolis and Aratus of Sicyon, 
Touc 6c6dCovTac a AwxopTcu: X e y e i - not a mention i n these terms of 
reference of the major d i f f e r e n c e of opinion, although Polybius s t a t e s 
e x p l i c i t l y t h a t i t v/as t h i s which caused the embassy t o be sent. The 
very presence of G a l l i c r a t e s suggests t h a t e i t h e r the Achaeans 
f o o l i s h l y hoped t h a t he would represent the view of Lycortas - i n which 
case, v/hy had Lycortas himself not been sent? he had no o f f i c i a l 
p o s i t i o n - or t h a t Polybius i s g u i l t y of .sug.SggjjLQ_falsi i n h i s d e t a i l 
of the terms of reference of the envoys: given Polybius' general 
a t t i t u d e t o C a l l i c r a t e s , the l a t t e r seems by f a r the more l i k e l y . 
The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the presence of Lydiadas and Aratus, both members 
of the o l d Achaean a r i s t o c r a c y , cannot be c e r t a i n l y discovered.. Aratus 
had been appointed along with. Lycortas and Polybius t o v i s i t Egypt i n 
180, but the embassy had not t r a v e l l e d when nev;s of 'Epiphanes' d.eath 
a r r i v e d . The p a r t y s i g n i f i c a n c e of Aratus' presence even then i s not 
cl e a r , f o r he v/as sent 6 i a xa/; irpOYOVixcu; cuomoetc irpoc ir\v 
pouTtXetav . Lydiadas i s not elsev/here mentioned."*"^ 
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I f these tv/o a r i s t o c r a t i c n o n e n t i t i e s were the delegates chosen 
t o represent Lycortas, they vrere a bad choice, f o r they were t o t a l l y 
outmanoeuvred by C a l l i c r a t e s . When the envoys came before the Senate, 
Polybius again indulges h i s disapproval of C a l l i c r a t e s . He says t h a t 
he exceeded h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s , and even dared t o l e c t u r e the Senate. 
I f Polybius took t h i s p o s i t i v e approach amiss, the Senate by no means 
d i d so. When C a l l i c r a t e s had f i n i s h e d h i s speech, which advised the 
Senate openly t o take sides, and to make absolutely clear what they 
wanted i n Greece, t o ignore the i n e v i t a b l e unpopularity which v;ould 
r e s u l t , i n favour of p u t t i n g an end t o the general uncertainty which 
was making c l i e n t e l a unworkable, another Spartan envoy representing 
the e x i l e s emphasised C a l l i c r a t e s ' message. The Senate's favourable 
r e a c t i o n was t o w r i t e an open l e t t e r about the Spartan e x i l e s to the 
Achaeans, This v/as c i r c u l a t e d , t o the Aetolians, E p i r o t s , Athenians, 
Boeotisins and Acarnanians - who may have been s h e l t e r i n g some of the 
Spartan e x i l e s . These s t a t e s were thus involved, by v i r t u e of t h e i r 
s t a t u s as Roman c l i e n t s , i n the necessity f o r the e x i l e s ' r e s t o r a t i o n 
t o Sparta. I n the o f f i c i a l r e p l y t o the Achaeans, praise was l a v i s h l y 
bestowed on C a l l i c r a t e s . This success i n i t s e l f s u f f i c i e n t l y explains 
Polybius' subsequent t i r a d e against the man vjho was p a t r i o t enough t o 
see t h a t s t a b i l i t y i n Peloponnese depended less on the establishment 
of a r e l a t i o n s h i p of freedom and independence of Rome and an i n e f f i c i e n t 
and p a r t i s a n i n t e r n a l p a r t y dominance, than on making the t r u e Achaean 
p o s i t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o Rome clear both to the Achaeans and t o the 
S e n a t e . I t i s not necessary t o f o l l o w Polybius when he shows h i s 
emotional party bias i n describing C a l l i c r a t e s as jaeydXcov xaxSv 
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apxTiYoc . . . iroo-i, | j ev toiQ'^'K'krfi, [ i d X t o m 8e x o t c *A%aLOi(i. -^^ 
i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t before C a l l i c r a t e s , everything i n Achaea had been 
st a b l e and smooth-running. Only a h i g h l y p a r t i s a n i n t e r p r e t e r could 
ignore a l l the recent tr o u b l e s w i t h i n Achaea over Sparta and Messene, 
and the conspicuous f a i l u r e o f the Philopoemenist p a r t y , w i t h t h e i r 
emphasis on independence, t o f i n d any s o l u t i o n . 
The reappearance of an active Romcin p o l i c y Polybius blames 
squarely on C a l l i c r a t e s , again ig n o r i n g a l l the un s a t i s f a c t o r y aspects 
of the e a r l i e r ambiguous r e l a t i o n s h i p . No doubt i t had been possible 
p r i o r t o C a l l i c r a t e s t o appear x a x a irooov tooXoyio-v ^XBI.V irpoc 
18 
*Poo(jiatot)(: . But t h i s was only as a r e s u l t of Achaean e x p l o i t a t i o n o f 
c l i e n t e l a v;hich o b s c u r e d the r e a l r e l a t i o n s h i p betxifeen the two s t a t e s , 
and Roman unv/illingness or i n a b i l i t y t o react unambiguously t o t h i s . 
I n a v;orld r u l e d by pov/er p o l i t i c s , C a l l i c r a t e s ' perceptiveness exposed 
as the lu d i c r o u s pretence i t v/as the Philopoemenists' claim t o be 
fo l l o v d n g a free and independent p o l i c y . But the Senate iiras as much 
t o blame as the Achaean p o l i t i c i a n s f o r t h i s pretence, through i t s 
f a i l u r e t o break out c l e a r l y from the terms of the v;ar-time propaganda. 
I t knev; the r e l a t i o n s h i p i t required, but was ham-strung by the 
emotional legacy of the v/ar. No single opportunity appeared, u n t i l 
C a l l i c r a t e s ' v i s i t t o Rome, of making clear the formulation of the 
e s s e n t i a l post-vrar r e l a t i o n s h i p . I f p r o s p e r i t y and s e c u r i t y should be 
the f i r s t aims of a p a t r i o t i c statesman, C a l l i c r a t e s gained an 
increased, measure of both f o r the Acl^aeans by h i s c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the 
Achaean clieii^^tela.. Polybius' t r a d i t i o n s and emotionalism f a i l e d t o 
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consider t h i s grossly u n s a t i s f a c t o r y aspect of the 'free and inde-
pendent' p o l i c y of Philopoeraen, i n which the safety and prosperity of 
the i n d i v i d u a l were s a c r i f i c e d t o the n a t i o n a l d i g n i t y of the state -
which i n t u r n s u f f e r e d from the p a r t i s a n b i c k e r i n g of p o l i t i c a l vested 
, i n t e r e s t s . . The c i r c l e was complete. G a l l i c r a t e s c e r t a i n l y p r e c i p i t -
ated the c r i s i s which broke t h i s v i c i o u s c i r c l e ; but i t was bound t o 
come, and- was less p a i n f u l i f o r i g i n a t e d from the c l i e n t s ' side. But 
C a l l i c r a t e s was nothing i f not a r e a l i s t , and forecast h i s own unpopul-
a r i t y i n p r e c i p i t a t i n g i t . The r e a l basis f o r Polybius' c r i t i c i s m of 
C a l l i c r a t e s i s the p o l i t i c a l commitment of Lycortas' f a m i l y t r a d i t i o n . 
Even h i s assessment of the Roman character, upon which he bases h i s 
judgement of C a l l i c r a t e s ' a c t i o n , r e f l e c t s Lycortas' p a r t i s a n argument 
19 
a t the synodos. There i t was meant t o oppose the arguments of 
Hyperbatus and C a l l i c r a t e s ; Polybius has added l i t t l e of h i s ovm. I t 
was, i n f a c t , as much the i n t e r n a l v i c t o r y of C a l l i c r a t e s as the d i p l o -
matic, which a f f e c t e d Polybius' emotions and judgement, f o r i t e f f e c t -
i v e l y rendered the p o l i c y t o which he was committed u n r e a l i s t i c and 
unworkable. 
C a l l i c r a t e s used h i s success at Rome and the Senate's commendation 
t o stand f o r the s t r a t e g i a of 179/8, which he secured w i t h ease, and 
which he used t o res t o r e the remaining Spartan e x i l e s and those 
Messenians vjho b.ad been r e j e c t e d by the l a s t Acliaean settlement - the 
remains of Deinocrates' group, who had not accepted Lycortas' i n v i t a t i o n 
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t o commit s u i c i d e . We have no means of checking Polybius' accusa.tions 
of b r i b e r y and other c o r r u p t i o n - coming from a p o l i t i c a l opponent, they 
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must a__£riori be suspect - but the f a c t remains t h a t the r e s t o r a t i o n o f 
the e x i l e s by C a l l i c r a t e s was the f i n a l stage i n the s o l u t i o n of the 
Spartan and Messenian problems, which had dragged on f o r more than a 
decade, i n which time they had come l i t t l e nearer t o a f i n a l s o l u t i o n . 
The p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y v/hich t h i s secured, as a r e s u l t of the general 
r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t C a l l i c r a t e s had the f u l l support of the Roman Senate 
f o r h i s a c t i o n , must have been of great advantage t o i n d i v i d u a l and 
commercial, as v;ell as s t r i c t l y p o l i t i c a l , i n t e r e s t s i n Peloponnese. 
I t seems probable t h a t the m a j o r i t y of the a p o l i t i c a l mass of the people 
would be f a r b e t t e r s a t i s f i e d v,dth t h i s s t a b i l i t y through dependence 
than w i t h the former independent insecurity,^"'' C a l l i c r a t e s could 
deservedly take general thanks f o r t h i s success i n improving l i v i n g 
c o n d i t i o n s , which Philopoeraen's party, by excessive p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n 
l o c a l quarrels and indulgence of p o l i t i c a l vested i n t e r e s t s , h-ad 
s i g n a l l y f a i l e d , t o achieve, C a l l i c r a t e s ' acceptan.ce of the b e n e f i t s of 
the embryo pa.x Romana shov/ed him t o be more far-seeing than any of h i s 
t r a d i t i o n a l i s t contemporaries. Polybius' p a r t i s a n account should not 
b l i n d us t o t h i s f a c t . 
Lycortas 
Despite the over^-jhelming prestige w i t h which C a l l i c r a t e s took h i s 
place i n Achaean p o l i t i c s a f t e r h i s r e t u r n from .Rome, Lycortas' group 
maintained i t s p o l i c y of i n s i s t i n g on the l e g a l i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
Achaean r e l a t i o n s with Rome, v/hich had been the keystone of 
Philopoemen's most recent p o l i c y . This v;as maintained i n opposition t o 
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C a l l i c r a t e s , and succeeded i n gaining some ^ t r a t e g i a i f o r the 
p a r t y . Xenarchus, the brother of j-irchon of Aegira, v/as elected 
strategos f o r 175/^ . A staunch Philopoemenist, he had been the 
Achaean repre s e n t a t i v e a t Rome i n 184/3."^ ' Yet despite possession 
°^  '^ •^^  SilSi^SisL Lycortas' party v/as unable t o have i t s p o l i c y 
accepted at the s^fnodoi. \.\rhich Livy records f o r t h i s s t r a t e g i a . The 
immediate issue v/as of Achaean r e l a t i o n s v/ith Macedon: at some time 
p r e v i o u s l y a law had been passed v/hich prevented Macedonians from 
s e t t i n g f o o t i n Achaea. The matter nov/ came t o a head over some 
Achaean slaves v/ho had escaped t o Macedon, and because of the e x i s t -
ence of t h i s lav/, proved i r r e c o v e r a b l e . C a l l i c r a t e s v/as conscious 
of the Roman i n t e r e s t i n Macedon a t t h i s time, and urged that the 
recovery of a few slaves should not be allov/ed t o prejudice f u t u r e 
r e l a t i o n s v/ith Rome, on v/hich Acliaean s e c u r i t y depended. This v/as 
the p o i n t on v/hich C a l l i c r a t e s had made h i s stand a t Rome i n l80/79: 
he had b u i l t h i s p o s i t i o n i n Achaea on fear of Roman i n t e r v e n t i o n 
and the necessity of complying v/ith the s p i r i t and requirements o f 
s e n a t o r i a l ifishes t o the f i n e s t d e t a i l . Lycortas' group had already 
been compelled t o y i e l d i n some aspects of Philopoemen's d o c t r i n a i r e 
non-compliance w i t h Roman requests. They had come t o accept t h a t 
the w i l l of Rome v/as the most important single f a c t o r i n any s i t -
u a t i o n ; and argument had t o take the form t h a t v i t a l Roman i n t e r -
ests v/ould not be damaged by t h e i r proposed a c t i o n . This was the 
sole remnant of Lycortas' e a r l i e r appeal t o the e s s e n t i a l reasonable--^ 
ness of the Romans ~ i t s e l f a development from Philopoemen's 
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extravagant m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Achaean freedom. They were s t i l l 
the party of independence, although i t seems t o have become accepted 
t h a t only spheres i n which Rome could lia.ve l i t t l e i n t e r e s t were 
l e g i t i m a t e f o r the exercise of t h i s independence, and these spheres 
were now argued, whereas Philopoemen had simply assumed t h e i r e x i s t -
ence. The par t y ' s stand was now on reasonableness rat h e r than 
r i g h t . 
I n I75A t h e i r spokesman was Xenarchus' brother Archon.^ He 
had t o argue from a p o s i t i o n of v/eakness, but he was supported by 
the vested i n t e r e s t s o f the slave-owners. He argued th a t the p o l i t -
i c a l consequences of resuming a normal diplomatic and s o c i a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p with Macedon were by no means as desperate as 
C a l l i c r a t e s claimed, and t h a t t h i s e s s e n t i a l l y reasonable step would 
have the added advantage of regaining the escaped slaves. I t d i d 
not mean t h a t e s s e n t i a l l o y a l t y t o Rome was being betrayed, t h a t i n 
case of c o n f l i c t betv/een Rome and Perseus the Achaeans would have 
any doubts about which side t o support. An attempt at gaining t h i s 
present advantage could do no harm t o Achaean r e l a t i o n s with Rome. 
This argu.raent, an a p p l i c a t i o n of the post-Philopoeraen indepen-
dence party's p o l i c y , c a r r i e d some ^^feight w i t h the members of the 
s^/nodoS? many of whom may have been i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s i n the rec-
overy of the slaves; and C a l l i c r a t e s had to emphasise the i n d i g -
n i t y of Perseus' method of r a i s i n g the matter ~ he had sent a l e t t e r 
r a t h e r than ambassadors - before he vras able t o have i t shelved. 
This was a narrov/ escape f o r C a l l i c r a t e s and h i s conception of 
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Achaean i n t e r e s t s . Annulment i n 174 of the anti-Macedonian law 
might e a s i l y be i n t e r p r e t e d by the Senate as s i g n i f i c a n t of a 
fundamental change of heart. I t had been shown c l e a r l y enough i n 
the past t h a t a p o i n t of viev/ v/hich appeared reasonable i n Achaea 
might have an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t appearance i n Rome. C a l l i c r a t e s 
recognised t h i s . His m.ethod of maintaining good r e l a t i o n s w i t h Rome 
v/as the simple avoidance of any p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t . This p o l i c y 
might involve p r e j u d i c i n g other Achaean i n t e r e s t s , but the supreme 
solace v/as i n the f a c t t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p v/ith Rome v/as maintain-
ed i n t a c t . 
Perseus had nevertheless been encouraged by the reception of 
h i s i n i t i a l proposal, and sent envoys t o Achaea f o r the same 
purpose. A synodos v/as conveniently i n session a t Megalopolis v/hen 
they a r r i v e d . They th e r e f o r e asked permission t o present t h e i r 
proposals. This time C a l l i c r a t e s ha.d no d i f f i c u l t y i n c a r r y i n g h i s 
p o l i c y : so complete v/as h i s dominance t h a t he even persuaded the 
s^nodos t o refuse the envoys a hearing. On t h i s occasion Livy does 
not d e t a i l the argu.ments used; but as he describes C a l l i c r a t e s ' 
group as ^i,.^££e£^-.on^i__j^^ i t seems l i k e l y 
t h a t Polybius had a f u l l e r account, i n v/hich t h i s ' u n p a t r i o t i c ' 
aspect of C a l l i c r a t e s ' p o l i c y v/as emphasised. C a l l i c r a t e s ' v/hole 
p o s i t i o n depended on the ojDenly-admitted fear of s e n a t o r i a l recrim-
i n a t i o n s . He f e l t no shame i n upholding h i s view of the i n t e r e s t s 
o f h i s country i n t h i s v/ay; and he had probably made ajnple use o f 
the i n t e r v a l betv/een the two sjnodol t o re-emphasise h i s p o i n t of 4 viev/. 
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The next year, 17^, H. Claudius Marcellus v i s i t e d Achaea; 
and a t a syncletos expressed his pleasure a t the Achaeans' mainten-
ance of the law against the Macedonians. C a l l i c r a t e s ' persistence 
i n the Roman cause was thus rewarded. At the same time, Marcellus 
was c l e a r l y attempting t o gain s u f f i c i e n t support f o r C a l l i c r a t e s 
i n Achaea, v/hich would remove any fears of Achaean d i s l o y a l t y should 
a c o n f l i c t with Perseus break out. I n spring 172 Eumenes also drew 
the a t t e n t i o n of the Senate t o the p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t from Achaea,^ 
C a l l i c r a t e s ' success over the anti-Macedonian law and Marcellus' 
praise of him had not prevented Lycortas' party from maintaining i t s 
challenge, Archon gained the strategia. f o r 172/1, i n v/hich he 
t r i e d t o confirm i n p r a c t i c e the precepts of h i s speech of 17^ . 
When P. and Ser. Cornelius Lentulus t r a v e l l e d through Peloponnese 
and i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y urged the c i t i e s of the Leagu.e t o support Rome, 
the Achaeans - no doubt i n the person of Archon - protested t h a t 
they should not a l l be t r e a t e d as p o t e n t i a l enemies equally with 
the Eleans and Messenians who had supported Antiochus.^ Archon 
c l e a r l y f e l t t h a t the t a c i t accusation was as dangerous as i t was 
u n j u s t ; and t r i e d t o prove h i s p o i n t l a t e r i n the year. When A. 
A t i l i u s Serranus and Q. Marcius Philippus were received a t a 
s;yncle_tos a t Argos and asked for 1,000 Achaean troops t o garrison 
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Chalcis against Perseus, Archon had no h e s i t a t i o n i n complying. 
No Achaean of e i t h e r p a r t y , as the Roman war w i t h Perseus drev; 
closer, could a f f o r d any siisp i c i o n t h a t h i s group shov/ed any .favour 
t o anti-Roman elements i n Greece."''^ This was p a r t i c u l a r l y 
important f o r the 'independence' p a r t y . But Archon's a c t i o n was 
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not s u f f i c i e n t t o remove the t r a d i t i o n a l image of h i s party f o s t -
ered i n the Roman mind by Philopoemen and the recent continued 
opposition t o C a l l i c r a t e s . Despite t h i s help o f f e r e d to Rome, 
increased i n I7I t o 1,500 i n f a n t r y , Achaean l o y a l t y v/as not con-
sidered to be proven, and i n winter I70/69 Man.cinuB sent C. 
P o p i l l i u s Laenas and Cn, Octavius t o Achaea, i n a f u r t h e r attempt 
at confirming support against Perseus. An advance 'leakage' of 
in f o r m a t i o n made i t known t h a t P o p i l l i u s ' f i r s t i n t e n t i o n had been 
t o c a l l a s^Ticlejbos a t which he intended t o accuse Lycortas, Archon 
and Polybius of being time-servers, and i n e s s e n t i a l s opposed t o 
Rome. He had no evidence f o r t h i s - a f a c t v/hich Polybius n a t u r a l l y 
emphasises ~ but the alleged Roman fear of the e f f e c t s of t h i s 
p a r t y v/as s u f f i c i e n t t o make P o p i l l i u s ' 'leakage' f u l l y e f f e c t i v e . 
Ivhen the sMibassadors a c t u a l l y a r r i v e d , there v/as no mention made of 
SI2£2:^l£S.' bgljle v/as ca l l e d at Aegium and addressed i n 
f r i e n d l y terms - as the circumstances i n the n o r t h demanded - before 
the ainbassadors departed f o r A e t o l i a . I n t h i s way a.ny p o t e n t i a l 
t l i r e a t from Achaea. v/as cu.rbed, without any s p e c i f i c accusations 
having been brought against the independence party.''"'^ 
The presence of P o p i l l i u s and Octavius i n Peloponnese had the 
e f f e c t they had desired, aaid caused some r e - t h i n k i n g i n Lycortas' 
p a r t y . Soon afte . rv/ards, a meeting of the party t r i e d t o decide on 
the p o l i c y t o be follov/ed i n the struggle between Perseus and Rome,"'"'^  
Lycortas' ov/n p o s i t i o n v/as the most extreme viev/ expressed: he advo-
cated n e u t r a l i t y . I n t h i s viev/ there s t i l l remained a fragment of 
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the group's o r i g i n a l ideas: help t o e i t h e r side was disadvantageous 
when the might of the v i c t o r ' s -power was considered, yet opposition 
to Rome was impossible i n the l i g h t of t h e i r established rexjutation 
f o r o pposition. Lycortas must have knov/n t h a t conditions had 
changed; yet he u n r e a l i s t i c a l l y put forward t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l viev/, 
t h a t some independent a c t i o n was s t i l l possible. He d i d not f i n d 
any support i n h i s own p a r t y , f o r even Philopoemen had not h e s i t a t e d 
t o support Rome i n a major c o n f l i c t , ilrchon c a r r i e d the meeting w i t h 
him when he suggested t h a t they should adapt t h e i r p o l i c i e s to the 
changed circumstances, and give t h e i r p o l i t i c a l enemies no chance' of 
gaining an advantage on t h i s issue. He was f o r m u l a t i n g a p r i n c i p l e 
based on h i s a c t i o n i n h i s l a s t s t r a t e ^ i a . F u l l compliance w i t h 
Roman requests by the independence p a r t y might not rescue i t s r e p u t -
a t i o n with a biassed Senate; but any other course of ac t i o n could 
only be disastrous. .Archon's v i r t u e was i n recognising t h i s . They 
could not o b l i t e r a t e a l l memory of the embarrassing past; but they 
must do as much as possible t o adapt t h e i r outdated p o l i c y to the 
present circumstances. Archon was almost suggesting t h a t they 
should t r y t o beat C a l l i c r a t e s at his own game. Lycortas' p o s i t i o n 
was untenable, and Polybius was wise enough t o agree with Archon. 
Lycortas had apparently f o r g o t t e n t h a t Philopoemen had co-operated 
with Rome on the major issue of the war against i\ntiochus, and was 
applying h i s l o c a l p o l i c y t o the new major issue. His party v/ould 
not f o l l o v / him. This speech of Lycortas i s the l a s t time we f i n d 
expressed the p o s s i b i l i t y of an independent Achaean p o l i c y . 
264 
Lycortas' defeat marks the end of an era. The party continued t o 
o f f e r opposition t o C a l l i c r a t e s , and t o t r y t o combine t h i s v/ith 
obedience t o Rome. But the shov/ of independence was tempered by i t s 
e s s e n t i a l u n r e a l i t y . 
The p a r t y d i d r e t a i n s u f f i c i e n t support i n Acha.ea to secure i t 
the magistracies of I70/69: Archon v/as elected strategos and 
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Polybius hipparch. Toi^ards Rome Archon's p o l i c y was, as he r e a l -
i s e d v/as necessary, compliant. He c a r r i e d a vote i n a s2,no_dos which 
o f f e r e d the v/hole Achaean levy t o Marcius Philippus i n Thessaly. 
This u n s o l i c i t e d o f f e r - s t e a l i n g the thunder of Cal].icrates - v/as 
not accepted by the consiil; but, Polybius adds, he v/as glad t h a t i t 
had been made. I t meant t h a t there was no t l i r e a t t o the Roman cause 
from Achaea.'''^ Hov/ever, during the subsequent v/inter, when an 
embassy cajtie t o Achaea from Egypt asking f o r help i n the war against 
Antiochus IV Epiphanes, discussion v/as heated. Lycortas' party saw 
no v i t a l Roman i n t e r e s t s a t stake, and wanted to send the help. 
C a l l i c r a t e s knev/ t h a t any m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i n the eastern 
Mediterranean must arouse Roman i n t e r e s t , and therefore counselled 
caution. Further discussion was accordingly postponed t o a 
s2^n£letos a t Sicyon, Again there v/as heated discussion; and 
according t o Polybius, extensive support f o r the Egyptian proposal. 
But before the s^ncletos had. reached a f i n a l decision, Roman envoys 
a r r i v e d who urged the Achaeans t o f o l l o w Roman p o l i c y and help 
negotiate a settlement, Polybius, v/ho had been leading the oppos-
i t i o n t o C a l l i c r a t e s , v/ithdrev/ his opposition, and ambassadors v/ere 
1^; appointed 
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This was the f i n a l defeat f o r the independence party. The 
Roman i n t e r v e n t i o n made i t clear t h a t any b e n e f i t which had been 
achieved by the party's adopting an o s t e n t a t i o u s l y pro-Roman p o l i c y 
had been undone by t h i s f u r t h e r attempt a t operating an independent 
p o l i c y . C a l l i c r a t e s knew t h a t t h i s was impossible. I n the summer 
f o l l o w i n g these Achaean discussions Aemilius Paullus defeated 
Perseus a t Pydna, and i n the settlement, some 1,000 Achaeans of 
Lycortas' p a r t y were removed t o Rome, leaving free operation f o r 
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Ca.llicrates. I t v/as, no doubt, a more v i o l e n t s o l u t i o n than was 
s t r i c t l y necessary; but the Senate v/as weary of having i t s p o l i c i e s 
d e l i b e r a t e l y misunderstood and exp].oited by a few i n f l u e n t i a l 
Achaeans, who possessed a large t r a d i t i o n a l support. C a l l i c r a t e s , 
on the other hand, v/as w i l l i n g t o adapt h i s p o l i c i e s t o s u i t senat-
o r i a l p o l i c y . Rome had supported him from the beginning f o r t h i s 
reason, and t h i s had forced the independence party t o weaken i t s 
p r i n c i p l e s . But the p o s s i b i l i t y of an opposition had remained. 
During the Macedonian v/ar i t had been expedient t o keep the Achaeans 
qu i e t : t h e i r troops were not required, but t h e i r peacefulness v/a.s. 
Yet p o s s i b i l i t i e s of f u t u r e c o n f l i c t s t i l l e x isted. The Achaeans, 
i f l e f t t o c o n t r o l t h e i r own fo r e i g n p o l i c i e s , could a f f e c t issues 
i n which Rome was involved. This was clear from the siipport shov/n 
t o Egypt i n I69/8, The mass removal of t h i s p a r t y , of v/hich the 
Senate v/ould never f e e l c e r t a i n , was only the l o g i c a l outcome of 
the v i c t o r y a t Pydna and the behaviour of the Achaeans over the 
past 30 years, Achaea v/as not the only state t o s u f f e r i n t h i s 
way: the Senate took i t s v i c t o r y t o i t s l o g i c a l extreme wherever it 
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had met opposition. The r e l a t i o n s h i p betv/een Rome and the Greek 
states was now openly based on pov/er p o l i t i c s . 
I n Achaea C a l l i c r a t e s remained supreme u n t i l h i s death i n 
149/8. The strangest feature of the f i r s t phase of his predominance, 
betv/een h i s s t r a t e g i a of 179/8 and Pydna, i s t h a t he exercised i t 
v^^ithout e i t h e r himself or any member of h i s party holding another 
s t r ^ e ^ i a . I n t h i s p e r i o d , we know, of only four £trate£_qi, and i t 
i s possible t h a t the unknov/n s j t r a t e ^ o i v/ere members of C a l l i c r a t e s ' 
p a r t y : on the other hand, a l l four v/ere members of the independence 
p a r t y , and even i f the unlmovm s t r a t e g o i were C a l l i c r a t e s ' men, the 
s u r v i v i n g e l e c t o r a l s t r e n g t h of the Philopoemenists needs explain-
i n g . No s t r a t e g o i a t a l l are known betv/een Pydna and I51/O, but 
the a.ccident of s u r v i v a l of information w i l l account f o r t h i s p;ap, 
i n v/hich C a l l i c r a t e s was supreme, and i n v/hich h i s party must have 
held the s t r a t e g i a i . But i n the e a r l y period, the stra;te£oi v/hich 
are knovm are a l l h i s opponents. Yet despite t h i s f a i l u r e of 
C a l l i c r a t e s t o hold o f f i c e , he had l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y i n mak.ing h i s 
p o l i c y v/ork, and i t v/as t h i s which v/as the dominant feature of the 
period. I t seems clear t h a t i n e l e c t i o n s , C a l l i c r a t e s could not 
r e l y upon as much support as v/hen a p o l i c y c r i s i s occurred, and a t 
the e l e c t i o n s , h i s opponents' t r a d i t i o n a l sources of pov/er were 
e f f e c t i v e . 
But t h i s e l e c t o r a l f a i l u r e of C a l l i c r a t e s cannot be v.holly 
a c c i d e n t a l : he could, a f t e r a l l , have fought the el e c t i o n s by 
emphasising the permanent c r i s i s of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between Rome 
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and Achaea, and i n this way have secured his party's election at 
the expense of the Philopoemenists: i f the synodos was prepared t o 
support his policy during the year, i t would also have supported 
his party i n the elections. I t therefore seems that Callicrates 
may have been s a t i s f i e d v;ith the control of policy - which he cert-
ainly possessed - without caring excessively about of f i c e , and v/as 
prepared to l e t the Philopoeraenists have their f a i r share of 
s t r a t e ^ i a i , i n which they could demonstrate t h e i r s p l i t over the 
attitude to be taken tov/ards Rome. This would eventiially discredit 
them i n Achaea: they were already discredited i n Rome, Gallicrates 
seems to have been happy to leave them i n o f f i c e , to share the 
responsibility for the policy which v;as his alone, and for which, 
he alone would get credit from the Senate, I n Achaea, this method 
gave the Philopoemenists rope v/ith which to hang themselves, while 
Callicrates avoided the double odium of holding regular £trateg_iai 
and following an 'unpatriotic' policy. 
During the years after Pydna, the only a c t i v i t i e s of the 
remaining sympathisers with the independence party v/ere concerned 
w-th the restoration of the deportees. Embassy after embassy 
travelled f r u i t l e s s l y to Rome, u n t i l Polybius' influence with 
Scipio Aemilianus secured the release of the 3OO survivors i n 151-"''^  
The Senate considered that the hostages v/ere nox'j p r a c t i c a l l y harm-
less, yet the return of the hostages created a situ a t i o n v/here the 
Senate no longer had any important bargaining counter, and th i s may 
have contributed to the subsequent outbreak of the Achaean V/ar. 
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For the most part, i t was a nev/ generation of independent Achaean 
p o l i t i c i a n s v;hich was responsible for the f i n a l inglorious phase of 
Achaean League history, although they may have found inspiration 
for t h e i r grossly u n r e a l i s t i c attempt at a complete breakav/ay from 
Rome in. the e a r l i e r policies of Philopoemen and his followers. 
Polybius, hov;ever, v;as too r e a l i s t i c to have any illu s i o n s 
about the potential success of the rebels, and roundly condemns the 
u n r e a l i s t i c attitude shoivn by their desperate resistance to Rome. 
Neither he nor Stratius of Tritaea - both leading members of the 
old independence party, and both restored hostages ~ had any 
thoughts of supporting these latter-day patriots."'"^ V/hether or not 
others of the 300 restored hostages had learnt a similar lesson 
from t h e i r period i n Rome, is not clear. I t may be more than coin-
cidence that the events leading to the f i n a l trouble began i n I51/O, 
the year of the return of the hostages, but no connection between 
the rebels and any of the restored hostages can certainly be traced. 
Vie Icnow that no care v/as taken at Rome to ensure the trouble-free 
reintegration of the hostages, and t h i s may have caused dissatis-
f a c t i o n . ^ ^ But the new generation of p o l i t i c i a n s seems to have been 
mainly responsible. VJhen Callicrates died i n 1^9/8 while on an 
embassy to Rome, his restraining influence was removed from the 
control of Achaean po l i c i e s . Callicrates had been so successful 
since Pydna that the peace which he brought had ceased to have an 
obvious purpose, to a generation which could not remember the 
troubles during the period of Philopoemen's dominance. And i t may 
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be t h i s attitude v/hich Polybius describes: auxo TO </)uaei 
21 
This new generation, when freed from r e s t r i c t i o n s on their actions 
by the restoration of the hostages and the death of Callicrates, 
defied Rome to f i g h t . The war could only have one result. 
The Achaeans had f i n a l l y shorn themselves incapable of under-
taking t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and obligations as clients: the d i f f -
erence i n Roman attitude a f t e r Pydna had been cushioned to a great 
extent by Callicrates' p o l i t i c a l adeptness i n his long period of 
dominance. But i n the long run, i t was not s u f f i c i e n t simply for 
the leading p o l i t i c i a n s to be w i l l i n g to follow a policy which 
suited the Sen9.te, i f t h e i r willingness was not wholly sha.red by 
the people they led. The popular support which the rebels attracted 
again demonstrates the unsatisfactory nature of Achaean clientela. 
I n the settlement a f t e r the war, the Senate dissolved the League. 
The states of the Lea.gue which had been most deeply involved i n the 
f i g h t i n g were united \irith the province of Macedonia; the remainder 
existed i n varying degrees of 'independence'. A measure of formal 
Roman supervision v;as at l a s t established; at l a s t the Achaeans 
were forced to l i v e vjithin the relationship which the Senate had 
22 
expected to come automatically into existence at the beginning. 
I l l 
_[Tmj^T OF JIIS GREEKS' Plutarch records the opinion of a certain Roman, that 
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Philopoemen was ' the las t of the Greeks', and he interprets t h i s 
phrase as meaning, quite generally, that 'Greece produced no great 
man a f t e r hira, nor one worthy of her'.''' The re a l point of the 
description Plutarch clearly did not understand, therefore he pref-
erred to interpret the plirase i n vague terms, i n the l i g h t of 
emotions about 'the glory that v;as Greece'. Modern writers equally 
have found d i f f i c u l t y i n understanding the meaning of the descrip-
t i o n . Benecke, for instance, looks upon i t as a purely m i l i t a r y 
description: ', . , , v;ith him ended the li n e of Hellenic generals 
who added a touch of genius to th e i r v i r t u o s i t y i n the art of v;ar'. 
De Sanctis, on the other hand, refuses him the r i g h t to the descrip-
tio n at a l l : '. , . o I'uomo che a torto fu detto 1'ultimo dei 
3 
Greci'. His grounds for th i s denial a^ re clearly influenced by 
nineteenth-century ideals of national u n i f i c a t i o n : Philopoemen had 
no sense of supreme 'national' Greek interests, but v/as t i e d 
narrov/ly to his Achaean and Megalopolitan l o y a l t i e s . He therefore 
f a i l e d to b u i l d a nation v/hich could r e a l i s t i c a l l y r e s i s t Rome, 
Benecke's interpretation can be ruled out on grounds of inad-
equacy: no Roman would be l i k e l y to take notice of Philopoemen's 
m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s - the man who appeared to Flamininus as the 
dvSpwTrov *Apxd6a, [jitxpffiv xat oiiopoov iroXenoov o%pa%r\Yiv. Sanctis' 
attitude i s equally un r e a l i s t i c , and takes no account of what 
'Greece' could mean as a 'national' idea a.fter 150 years of 
Macedonian domination. Isocrates' fourth-century panhellenism had 
not found much encouragement i n the minds of the 'free Greeks', but 
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v/as adopted and forced upon the independent states by a Macedon 
whose imperialism found the panhellenic idea both convenient and 
congenial. More than a century l a t e r the key to the foreign policy 
of the individual Greek states lay i n achieving s u f f i c i e n t local 
independence to be able to control a f f a i r s l o c a l l y without i n t e r -
ference from the dominant power; and one stage further than t h i s -
rarely achieved ~ vjas to become s u f f i c i e n t l y independent to be able 
to choose the- protector. I t was because these two degrees of 
independence were b r i e f l y achieved by Aratus and Philopoemen for 
Achaea that they were exceptionally honoured by th e i r fellov;-
citizens; and becaxise of t h i s l a s t achievement of local independ-
ence by Philopoemen i n one of the states of Greece, he was called -
on one occasion, according to Plutarch: t h i s was not a general 
familiar term'' - ' the l a s t of the Greeks'. 
I n t h i s narrov; p o l i t i c a l sense, the description i s r e a l i s t i c ; 
for despite De Sanctis' nationalistic v;ish for the creation of a 
'Greek nation', t h i s v/as not a concept v/hich had ever played a 
major part i n the p o l i t i c s of the 'free Greeks' of any period. 
Greek p o l i t i c s had always been local, had always aimed, i n the 
f i r s t instance, at the l o c a l independence of each city-state, and 
i n the second the control of others. Nationalism i n Greece had 
always meant loca^l nationalism. I t i s necessary to make t h i s point 
emphatically because De Sanctis' interpretation of Philopoemen's 
career obscures the issue. I n fact, Philopoemen f i t s well i n t o the 
ranks of Greek p o l i t i c i a n s , the men who always put the interests of 
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t h e i r home area f i r s t , v/ho claimed for i t the r i g h t of forming 
independent poli c i e s . I n Philopoemen's case, the loc a l loyalty 
was confused - or broadened, depending on the point of viev; - by 
the incorporation of Megalopolis i n the Achaean League i n 235. 
But the federal movement v/as not a movement toivards the conscious-
ness of a 'Greek nationalism': i t wcis simply the extension of the 
loca l u n i t , v/hich remained as conscious of the desire for local 
independence as any city-state. I f we make allowance for the 
Hellenistic conditions i n which Philopoeraen was forced to operate, 
the l o c a l patriotism - i n the sense of willingness to seek personal 
advantage through the advancement of the general interests of the 
home area - was wholly Greek; and as Philppoemen was the la s t 
p o l i t i c i a n with t h i s type of policy who achieved any kind of 
success i n Greece, there i s some j u s t i f i c a t i o n for his appellation 
by a cynical Roman, 'the las t of the Greeks'. 
I f i t i s misleading to judge a p o l i t i c i a n of Hel].enistic 
Greece by the ideals of 19th~century Europe, i t i s nevertheless 
h i s t o r i c a l l y informative. This i s not as true of the 'psycholog-
i c a l ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n conveniently formulated by Hoffmann: 'Seine 
P o l i t i k i s t zu verstehen vom Soldatischen her . , . . This i s 
used as a key to explain Philopoemen's violent actions and lack of 
consideration of the effects of his action, but i t i s singoilarly 
uninformative as a h i s t o r i c a l explanation, for i t does not e:cplain 
the formation of his policies i n their h i s t o r i c a l setting. The 
blame for t h i s comparatively uninformative guide to Philopoemen's 
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a c t i v i t i e s may be l a i d at the feet of the interpreters of our 
prin c i p a l sources, Polybius and Plutarch, both of whom judge 
Philopoemen by the comparative method. Plutarch's comparison 
betvi/een Philopoemen and Flamininus deals with only two aspects of 
th e i r careers: t h e i r m i l i t a r y l i f e and the benefits granted to the 
Greeks, From Plutarch's point of viev/, these were easy issues on 
which to colD.ect information, and on which to v^rrite a discussion -
he did not understand and v/as not interested i n the p o l i t i c a l 
judgements v/hich directed his protagonists' actions - and on v/hich 
he coiild reach a nea.tly balanced conclusion: he allov/s to 
Philopoemen the crov/n e[xneipCaQ TroXentXT^ xal (npa-vr^CoQ , to 
Flamininus that b{,v.ai.ocx>vrf, xat xprfn6'r;T\%o<; . From Plutarch's 
point of viev/ t h i s v/as a satisfactory conclusion. He had pointed 
his moral and achieved a satisfying compositional balance. But 
from the point of view of the modern historian, the emphasis v/hich 
he lays on the m i l i t a r y aspect may prove misleading. 
In the case of Polybius' svn^ri^sls of Philopoemen with ' 
9 
Aristaemvs, misunderstanding and consequent misinterjjretation 
are both more l i k e l y and more important: more l i k e l y , because a 
close examination, of the text is necessary, more important, 
because Polybius' reputation as an 'authority' can lead to u n c r i t -
i c a l acceptance of what he seems to say, A close examination of 
the text shov/s, i n fact, that Polybius does not attri b u t e 
Philopoemen's policy to his m i l i t a r i s t i c a t titude. The fragment 
starts with a d i s t i n c t i o n dravm between two aspects of the two 
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men: • • • ODvepr) oiite iriv t^ '^ cuv opotav cxeZv o^%e TTIV al'pecriv 
irf TroA.n;eta< •> '^^^ (picruQ and aXpecnz 'crjc mXixeCaQ are 
clearly distinguished, and are treated separately i n the subsequent 
discussion. Polybius makes them two d i s t i n c t and separate issues, 
and one should not confuse them. Polybius f i r s t deals with the 
^voEGC! "n^  Y^P 0 |iev ^cXo^-oCjjTiv eT) ire^vxcbc iipoc T O C iroXe|ji,xa<: 
Xpeio-c Hat xam T O aco|ia xal X O T C I T:T]V t^ X'*!^ * ° t'vepoQ irpbc ta 
TToXcTixa TcSv 6ico(3oDXta)v ."^ ^ So much for their cjfiuaeic • Polybius 
does not suggest theit t h i s had any effect on t h e i r policies. He 
i s simply stating facts: Philopoemen l i k e d f i g h t i n g , and put his 
heart and soul i n t o i t ; Aristaenus v;as more the stay-at-home 
p o l i t i c i a n , v/ith neither the in c l i n a t i o n nor constitution for an 
active m i l i t a r y l i f e . These were the facts of th e i r natures, and 
Polybius describes the point of contrast objectively, as Plutarch 
describes his points of contrast with F]_amininus. Polybius does 
not suggest that t h i s difference i n temperament caused the d i f f -
erence i n p o l i c i e s , which he continues by discussing. 
He introduces the p o l i t i c a l difference simply as another 
objective difference betv/een the tx,ro men. I t was interesting that 
there vjas more than one contrast between them, but he does not 
l i n k the contrasts causally. He therefore introduces the p o l i t i c a l 
contrast v/ith a simple 6e: Trj 6* atpeaeo xaTO TTjV n-oXt'reta.v i;oi5ico 
Siec/jepov aXXriXaiv vjhich he follows vjith a detailed description 
of his view of the salient points of their policies. I n this part 
of his comparison, Polybius makes no mention of Philopoemen's 
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m i l i t a r y career. The conclusion to be drawn i s clearly that he 
thought i t was simply irrelevant, that the policies which both men 
follov/ed were based on t h e i r ov/n analyses of the situations with 
which they were faced, and these analyses were expressed i n 
p o l i t i c a l terms, Polybius does not say or imply that Philopoemen 
was more a soldier th_an a statesman: he says he v/as more soldier 
than Aristaenus - a completely d i f f e r e n t matter. We cannot there-
fore accept as either Polybian or meaningful the elegantly facile 
formulation by Benecke of the 'military hypothesis': 'He was more of 
a soldier than a statesman, at a time when Acliaea needed a statesman 
12 
rather than a soldier'. 
The only v/ay i n v/hich Philopoemen's policies can be understood, 
and therefore become h i s t o r i c a l l y informative, i s by examining t h e i r 
relationship to the problems they were intended to s o l v e . I t has 
already been demonstrated that the phrase 'the last of the Greeks' 
should be understood to refer to Philopoemen's p o l i t i c a l aim of 
lo c a l independence, which gave him room for personal p o l i t i c a l 
advancement through l o c a l patriotism. And i t i s this aspect of his 
policy which Plutarch describes v/hen he says that Philopoemen made 
the Achaeans strong enough to be able to stop relying on foreign 
protectors."^"^ But the issue could only be expressed i n these simple 
terms before the Roman alliance, and i t w i l l be convenient to d i s t -
ingiAish three phases of t h i s policy. The f i r s t i s appare.nt between 
his two v i s i t s to Crete. I t i s i n t h i s period that Plutarch's claim 
for Philopoemen i s most easily seen to have some t r u t h , for the 
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Achaean p o l i t i c a l scene was not yet complicated by the problem of 
relations with Rome. When Philopoeraen returned from Crete i n 211, 
and v;as at f i r s t supported by Philip's prestige i n Achaean p o l i t i c s , 
his position was exactly that of Aratus after Boson's repossession 
of Corinth i n 225A. The Achaean army was too feeble to protect 
Achaea, and there v;as no alternative to Macedonian domination. I t 
was when Ph i l i p found Achaea's troubles more than he could cope with 
that he encouraged Philopoemen to prepare Achaea to stand alone 
against Sparta. The achievement of the ideal of local independence 
was f a c i l i t a t e d by Macedonian, co-operation. 
Philopoemen's success against Machanidas i n 20? may have been 
more than P h i l i p had anticipated; but he shovjed l i t t l e interest i n 
Achaea during the years betv;een the v/ars with Rome. Philopoemen's 
army reforms had allowed Acliaea to break free of Macedon, to reach 
the point of being able to choose her protector. Aratus had reached 
t h i s point i n 2^3 v;hen the capture of Corinth expelled Macedonian 
interest from Peloponnese, v/hich was replaced by nominal Ptolemaic 
hegemony; but Macedonian domination had been complete since 225. 
The choice fa.cing Philopoemen i n 200, when the Roman mission t r i e d 
f i r s t to v/ean Achaea av/ay from her t r a d i t i o n a l relationship v/ith 
Macedon, was an innovation. Yet a choice had to be made, Achaea 
v/as independent enough to be able to choose between the protagonists, 
but was not strong enough to be able to remain neutral. Philopoemen 
chose, and was i n i t i a l l y defeated by Gycliadas' t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s . 
There v/as no alternative but to serve Achaea abroad, i n the p a r a l l e l 
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war against Sparta's Cretan possessions."'"' 
The second phase of Philopoemen's policy i s that of the 
$iXt,irtrtxol xal 'Avtioxtxcl xaipot , the period betv/een his return 
from Crete i n 19^ and the expulsion of Antiochus from Greece i n 
15 
191. The crucial problem of t h i s period, given that the chief 
aim of Philopoemen's policy v/cvs to assert local independence as a 
free a l l y of Rome, v/as to achieve a satisfactory compromise, as a 
result of v/hich the policy of co-operation with Rome on the major 
Issues - now the war with Antiochus - which had been follov/ed by 
Aristaenus since I98, could be made consistent with the policy of 
loc a l independence. As far as Philopoemen was concerned, refusal 
to accept interference i n Peloponnese did not a l t e r his general 
willingness to co-operate i n the major war. But the issue became 
confused as a result of the clash of personalities between 
Philopoemen and ZLaraLninus i n 192, The f i r s t sign that FlEvmininus 
v/anted to interfe r e i n 'Peloponnese against Philopoemen's viev/ of 
Achaean interest came i n the spring 192 when he recommended delay 
i n acting at .Sparta. Philopoemen's reaction was immediate, and 
aimed at denying a l l Roman r i g h t of interference i n Peloponnese. 
The clash of personalities and policies culmina.ted i n the p o l i t i c a l 
battle over Sparta, i n v/hich Philopoemen v/as i n i t i a l l y successful. 
The c i t y joined Achaea; Philopoemen gained the glory. But 
Flamininus could sooth his v/ounds by destroying Philopoemen's se t t l e -
ment at Sparta and his reputation i n Rome. The chief result of 
Philopoemen's lo c a l policy i n this phase of his career v/as to build. 
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i n his h o s t i l i t y to Elamininus, his reputation of being hostile t o 
Rome. 
Yet from Philopoemen's point of viev/, the reputation v/as not 
so l i d l y based. Denial of Roman r i g h t of intervention i n 
Peloponnese v/as one thing, denial of co-operation i n the v;ar against 
Antiochus v/as another and a v/holly different thing. By the end of 
the Achaean v/ar i n lk6 Philopoeraen's reputation for being anti-Roman 
had crystallised and caused a threat to his statues and honours, at 
v;hich Polybius f e l t compelled to protest. His defence was simple: 
the demonstration of Philopoemen's true attitude to Rome v/as to be 
found, i n his a c t i v i t i e s x a i a %o\>c ftXiirmxcvc; xat yiata TOUC 
'Av'cuoxi.y.ovQ xatpOK* Eor then he played a major part i n securing 
the Acha.ean declaration of v/ar against .intiochus and the Aetolians 
I D 
four months before the Romans crossed into Greece. This argument 
convinced the commissioners (although the fact that Polybius himself 
voiced the arguments v/as no doubt a major advantage). As far as 
Philopoemen's policy i s concerned, the issue i s clear: support of 
Rome on the major issue v/as i n the interest of Achaea; denial of 
any Roman r i g h t of intervention - after the grant of the foedus i n 
\-/inter 192/1 there v/as legal j u s t i f i c a t i o n for t h i s attitude - i n 
Ichaea, which v/as interpreted as meaning the whole of Peloponnese, 
'as equally i n the Achaean interest. Polybius' defense v/as the 
t r u t h , but i t v/as only part of the t r u t h . The real j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
for the continuance of Philopoemen's reputation as anti-Roman comes 
i n the t h i r d and f i n a l phase of his career, between the f i n a l defeat 
A 
V/ 
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of Antiochus and Philopoemen's death - v/hich Polybius' defence did 
not mention. 
, This t h i r d phase i s crucial, for i t was the f i r s t time that 
Philopoeraen's policy of local independence had been v i r t u a l l y the 
sole major issue i n Achaean p o l i t i c s since Rome became an important 
consideration. The broader issues on which he admitted the l e g i t -
imacy of Roman interest liad passed av/ay. The opportunity of 
achieving t o t a l independence of action seemed present, with the 
blessing of the Roraa.n wartime propeiganda of libe r a t i o n , the perm-
anence of v/hich seemed g-U-aranteed by the foedus. The policy was 
begun by misunderstanding clientela as expressed by Roman propaganda 
and the foedus, and continued by exploiting i t . From the point of 
view of the Se.nate, peaceful clientela was required. There v/as no 
open desire to interfere i n Achaean internal a f f a i r s u n t i l this was 
made necessary by the appeals of the Spartan exiles, Philopoeraen 
seized the opportunity offered by the Senate's protestations of lack 
of interest: Compasion v/as follov/ed by his party's becoming p o l i t -
i c a l l y entrenched behind the lines of thi s settlement. Deliberate 
refusal to accept that the Senate's messages meant more than their 
face value indicated, a complete exp)loitation of cMent^ela, v/as 
based on doctrinaire claims of local independence. 
I t was t h i s deliberate misinterpretation of cMentela, v/hich 
had developed from an or i g i n a l genuine misunderstanding at the time 
v/hen Philopoemen v/as v / i l l i n g to co-operate with Rome against the 
Kings which destroyed Philopoemen's reputation i n Rome, Polybiiis 
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seems to have realised t h i s , for his defence of Philopoemen i n l'+6 
deals only v/ith the time of the v/ar. The source of the rumour 
V'/hich he v/as t r y i n g to scotch he admits only i n the most general 
terms and adds extenuating circumstances: t aBm 6* \]V OTt 
6ta<^epon;o [ihv irphc 'Pcojiatouc noXXaxii: Wep TWV e-nimTTop.evwv, 
5ta<i!)epoiTo 6* eirl xocro^xov k^/ bcrov 8t6dcTxetv xat tretSeiv Wep toov 
qi^topiTCOBjievcov , ow6e to^Sto Troiefv e*x^ .'''^  Similarly i n his 
S2ncrls_i^ v/ith Aristaenus, he makes no specific mention of issues 
on v/hich Philopoemen t r i e d to use persuasion before yielding under 
protest; and again the time chosen for the contrast i s xam . . . 
* » l 8 
•vovQ f tXiTnrtxouc xat IOVQ 'AvTtoxtxouc xatpovc , For i t was only 
at t h i s time that i t was true that Aristaenus v/as prepared to y i e l d 
to, and even anticipate, the Roman ord.ers; to appear to keep the 
lav/s v/hile complying vi/ith Roman orders, but w i l l i n g to break the laws 
19 
i f necessary. Polybius makes t h i s a point of contrast v/ith 
Philopoemen; btit the only occasion on v/hich Philopoeraen v/as faced 
v/ith a major decision, such as faced Aristaenus i n the years after 
198, was i n 192 v/hen he encouraged the Achaean declaration of v/ar 
on Antiochus and the Aetolians: he acted i n exactly the same way as 
Aristaenus had ear l i e r i n similar circumstances. As far as 
actually breaking Achaean lav/s i s concerned, Aristaenus can only be 
accused of t h i s at the Sicyon s^/ncletos of I98, v/hen he f a i l e d to 
have the lav/ maintaining the alliance with P h i l i p annulled before 
20 
proposing the Roman alliance. This single instance cannot be 
legitimately developed B.S a general principle. I t seems clear that 
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i n t h i s aspect of l e g a l i t y Polybius v/as stretching the facts i n 
order to make a contrast which did not, i n r e a l i t y , exist. 
The aspect of Philopoemen's policy i n v/hich he was prepared 
to oppose the Romans as far as possible was the issue of local inde-
pendence and Roman interference. I t was on thi s throughout that 
Philopoeraen insisted, and the c i t a t i o n of Achaean laws i n order to 
prevent interference was a regular method. We have only one example 
of his party's giving v/ay under protest: i n l8^ ,|- at the Cleitor 
_s2ncletos Lycortas' appeal to the l e g a l i t y of Achaean action ended, 
with the syncletos' capitulation to Pulcher. But i n the same v/ay as 
Philopoemen did not d i f f e r from Aristaenus on the major war issues, 
so Aristaenus seems not to have differed essentially from 
Philopoeraen on the issue of local independence after the v;ars. The 
only example which we have of Aristaenus' a c t i v i t y i n this sphere 
i s his treatment of Metellus i n I85: there he insisted, as much as 
the other magistrates, on the sanctity of Achaean law and the undes-
i r a b i l i t y of i l l e g i t i m a t e Roman interference i n i n t e r n a l Achaean 
a f f a i r s . The contrast therefore which Polybius makes betv/een the 
essential policies of the two men i s largely i l l u s o r y , for i t takes 
no account of changes i n the direction of the policies, or the 
d i f f e r i n g circumstances i n v/hich they were operative. 
I f there i s a real contrast to be made, i t should not be so 
much between the actual vjorking of the policies, as i n the 
philosophies which directed them. This appears clearly from the 
discussion betv/een Philopoemen and Aristaenus v/hich Polybius records 
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i n some d e t a i l ; from Plutarch and Pausanias we can accept that i t 
took place at the autumn s^modos of 191, at which Philopoemen 
refused Flamininus and Glabrio the r i g h t of interference on behalf 
23 
of the Spartan exiles. ' This gives a precise point to the argu-
ments of Aristaenus: ^^r\ yap oux el vat 6vvaT0v xat <TO> 66pi) xal 
TO XT)pi)xetov ap.a irpoiretvonevovc cruvexetv a:f|V Trpoc *Pa)(.iat'ou<: 
<|)tXtav .'^ ^ This f i r s t formulation of the difference betv/een 
Aristaenus and Philopoeraen has a precise reference to the events of 
the past tv/o years: Philopoemen had opposed Flamininus over the 
Spartan v/ar (TO 66pt)), on the other hand he had supported the 
Achaean declaration of war on Antiochus and the Aetolians (TO 
XTip« x e t o v ) . Now again he was opposing Flamininus over the Spartan 
exiles, as he had opposed him at Speirta earl i e r i n the year. This 
i s the point of Aristaenus' complaint: Philopoemen v/as not consistent. 
Aristaenus seems to admit ~ the text i s corrupt - that Achaea should 
stand up for her rig h t s i f t h i s v/as possible; i f not (and 
Philopoemen v/ould agree t.hat i n the last resort resistance v/as 
impossible)|^-^ 6ta Tt abvvdtwv opeYOf-ievot TO. 6DvaTa iTaptef.iev; he 
expands t.his by explaining that he sees two goals for a state's 
policy, TO xaXov xat TO cvii^epov : when TO xaXov cannot be 
achieved (independence on Philopoemen's principles) i t i s foolish, 
to neglect TO av^Kfiipov (friendly relations v/ith Rome, which 
24 
Philopoemen's ambigiious policy v/as prejudicing)., ' Some 
Thucydidean influence may be traced i n th i s speech; but i t may not 
be correct to a t t r i b u t e i t to Polybius himself: the stock p o l i t i c a l 
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cliche of TO xaAov xal TO OT)|i(jf:epov v;ould not be out of place i n 
t h i s kind of debate at an Achaean s^_odos, and Aristaenus v/ould 
certainly have been fgj n i l i a r with i t . 
Philopoemen's reply was expressed i n emotional terms. He 
recognised the difference i n power between Rome and Achaea, but 
based his policy on appeals to equity and justice: by pointing out 
any i l l e g a l i t i e s i n Roman conduct, t h i s would make the burden of 
Roman domination l i g h t e r . Up to now the Romans had shovm due regai 
for l e g a l i t y ; the Achaeans should make use of t h i s . I t was only 
natural that i n making t h i s kind of reply he should misrepresent 
Aristaenus' policy: exetvov |iev yap OTrouSd^etv a)C lajicna ab xpswv 
*6erv Y^v6\ievov xal (yvvepyeXv TOVT({.I xaTO, bivay.iV' ahxoQ be trpbc 
TOIST' avxepeCbet.v x a l Stw^eiTa^at, xaS' ^acv ecrul SwaToc. From 
Philopoemen's point of view, i n I 9 I Aristaenus may have seemed to 
be r e s i s t i n g Rome too l i t t l e : i n fact, Aristaenus had simply taken 
a more serious view of the Roman commitment against Antiochus, i n 
which Peloponnesian a f f a i r s v/ere seen as part of the main war ~ a. 
view sha.red by Flgjnininus. Philopoemen's refusal to allov/ t h i s had 
led to the clashes vdth Flamininus and v;ith i^istaenus. In these 
circumstances i t could not equitably be maintained that Aristaenus 
'^•'^-^  '^^ complete Roman domination of Achaea: this v;as 
simply Philopoemen's highly partisan and controversial viev;point. 
The d i f f i c u l t y for /iristaenus vjas that Philopoemen's group v/as 
successful i n gaining ^ j ^ c i t e ^ g i a i u n t i l 188/7, i n which time they 
were able to establish t h e i r policy. When we reach I 8 6 / 5 , and the 
- 284 -
meeting of the magistrates at the time of the Nemea, although 
Aristaenus v/as as 'pa,triotic' as any of his fellow p o l i t i c i a n s his 
reputation gained at the time of the \i;ars - a time when Philopoemen 
too v/ould have found i t essential to co-operate f u l l y ~ was maintained 
and developed by his opponents. For th i s reason he disappears from 
Achaean p o l i t i c s a f t e r 185, leaving the Philopoemenists i n control. 
Polybius nov/here makes a judgment on Philopoero.en's and Aristaenus' 
policies during the post-war period. The v/artime was noteworthy for 
two reasons: i t vias a c r i t i c a l time for Achaea on any judgement, a.nd 
Philopoemen's policy at that time vias defensible to the Romans. 
Therefore he can conclude his s^ncrisis with t h i s judgement, to 
which he adds the partisan rumour that Aristaenus vjas more favour-
able to Rome than Philopoemen: oh \ir\v aXK* ex %wv frpoetpTjiJ.evoov 
8T)XOV OX; crvvepaive Y^vea^ai TO? |jev xaXT|v, TO^ 6 ' ehaxf^-ova xr\v 
iroXtaefav, ctfi^oTepac ye f i V aoi^Xetc* xotya'Po'^v (ieyiOToov xatpcov 
T o x e irepicTTavTcov xal 'Pcciaaiovc xat tolc *teXXrivac TCOV TE xam 
f tXin'rrov xal x a T * *AvTtoxov, 8|.icoc oiat^otepot SieTiiprioav axepaia TO, 
6i'xata xoK *Axatotc irpbc ^w^iaCovg . The point must be made: 
Philopoemen's a.ctivities i n the post-war period were j u s t l y 
responsible for his anti-Roman reputation. 
Polybius regarded Philopoemen's aim as a. noble ideal, 
Philopoemen as a p a t r i o t . This viev/ was sliared v/idely by those 
v/ho supported Philopoemen, who honoured him, and v/ho continued to 
support Lycortas after his death. But the esseirbial inadequacy of 
the policy was s u f f i c i e n t l y demonstrated v;hen i t i-jas f i r s t 
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seriously and successfully attacked after his death by Diophanes 
and Callicrates, I t had been maintained by the personal prestige 
of Philopoemen, gained through yeaa's of successful m i l i t a r y action 
and personal image-building, and could not stand vrithout him. 
Independence vjas temporarily feasible under P h i l i p ; but as soon 
as Rom.e seriously intervened, i t wa.s a mistake to persist i n i t . 
The i n i t i a l misunderstanding of clientela developed, with the 
recognition of the Senate's i n a b i l i t y to act i n a.ccordance with i t s 
code, i n t o v/holesale e:q3loitation. This drove Philopoemen further 
than necessary i n his treatment of Sparta. I n 192 he had committed, 
himself to maintaining Sparta i n the League. The resultant p o l i t i c a l 
chaos, and destruction of lives and property, were the responsib-
i l i t y of Philopoemen and his noble ideal. His commitment to Spartan, 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the League was immovable: i t had been achieved 
despite FLamininus' opiposition, and had become the key issue i n the 
Achaean re3.ationship v;ith Rome. Capitulation meant loss of face 
before the Senate, Flamininus and the Achaeans. Philopoeraen f a i l e d 
to f i n d an acceptable solution, and the i n s t a b i l i t y and suffering 
of Sparta and Messene were the price of his stubborness i n the 
cause of a doctrinaire patriotism. 
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jgPEiTOIX I 
SOURCES 
The ultimate source of almost a l l our information about the 
l i f e of Philopoeraen and Achaean p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y during his l i f e -
time i s Polybius. Polybius v/as born at an uncertain date towards 
the end of the 3rd c e n t u r y . H e viois a Megalopolitan, and i n addition 
to being a fellow-citizen of Philopoemen, was the son of his closest 
friend and supporter, Lycortas.'' The main part of Polybius' extant 
work, his Histo^Les, covers the period from 220 to l^ib B.C., and has 
as i t s theme the demonstration of 'hov/ the Rom.ans conquered the 
v/orld i n less than 33 years'.'^ His original intention v/as to go only 
as far as l68, and he only l a t e r decided to continue the vjork to l46. 
The v/ork incliided a detailed account of Roman relations with Greece; 
but as the books dealing with this survive onljr as fragments, we 
have not his f u l l account of the policies and a c t i v i t i e s of 
Philopoemen during his period of p o l i t i c a l maturity. 
Polybius himself i s eager that • his readers should Imovi his 
h i s t o r i c a l methods, and he describes thera i n some d e t a i l . The h i s t -
orian m.ust f i r s t of a l l have had active p o l i t i c a l experience, v/ith-
out v;hich i t i s not possible to understand p o l i t i c a l history; 
s i m i l a r l y m i l i t a r y experience i s necessary for the understanding of 
m i l i t a r y history. With t h i s necessary preparation, he can proceed 
to 'the study and col l a t i o n of vffitten sources, and acquaintance v/ith 
relevant s i t e s ' . But to Polybius, the most important source of i n f -
ormation to the writer of contemporary history was the results of 
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questioning as many as possible of those v/ho had participated i n 
the actual events. I t was partly for t h i s reason that Polybius did 
not s t a r t the main part of his Hisjtorie^ u n t i l 220 , for there were 
lex'i survivors v/hom he could consult about earl i e r events. In 
addition to these materials, o f f i c i a l archives v;ere available for 
consultation, and also inscriptions. 
How, then, do these methods affect the way i n v/hich Polybius 
vjrote about Greek a f f a i r s during the period of Philopoemen's l i f e -
time? As far as previous v/ritten h i s t o r i c a l sources are concerned, 
these were s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d . For the earli e r history of Greece, 
v/hich he vjrote as part of the introduction to his main ffi.,st_orieiS, 
books 1 and 2 , he used the Jfejiioirs of Aratus, and the Histories of 
Phylarchus.^ But these could not be used for the lat e r period -
which involved Philopoemen more deeply - as they both ended before 
then. There may have been contemporary local Histories, on specific 
local topics - though i f so they have vanished without trace; but 
i t seems that, for the most part, Polybius must have constructed the 
parts of his H i g t o r ] ^ which dealt v/ith these years on the basis of 
informa/tion gained from questioning contemporaries, and by personal 
experience. As an' Achaean statesman he i\fOuld have ready access to 
the federal records and archives; and similarly, as a Megalopoliteji 
and member of the family of a close associate of Philopoemen, the 
more personal and local aspects of Philopoemen's a c t i v i t i e s v;ould be 
v/ell taiown to him. This personal information was probably used i n 
the f i r s t place for the composition of his l'2:i_e^2^.^^j:^3S.2SIS:SIl^ 
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quarried from there when he came to need i t for his Hist^ories. But 
i t also required a wider interpretation i n the Histories, i f i t v;as 
to appear relevant to i t s context. The E^^tories had to be xocvoc » • 
e-iratvov xal ilfoyou , v/hich meant the inclusion i n d e t a i l of any 
unpleasant facts vjhich might have been simply omitted, or glossed 
g 
over, i n the L i f e ; 
This did not mean that Polybius v/as able to break clear comple-
te l y from his own personal and p o l i t i c a l standpoint i n the Histories. 
Despite the fact that Philopoemen had been dead for perhaps 30 years 
v;hen Polybius v/as v/riting his Histories, he seems to have reacted to 
the o r i g i n a l situations i n much the same way as he did at the time. 
For instance, i t i s e n t i r e l y due to Polybius' treatment of Aristaenus 
that he has been accused of being a t r a i t o r to his country: Polybius 
does not say as much; but i t i s a l l too clearly implied. The same 
tj'-pe of bias i s much more obvious l a t e r i n his treatment of 
Callicrates. Here Polybius i s even less the cool and dispassionate 
purveyor of facts: xoivoc . . . eiraivou xal ijroYou could apparently be 
l i b e r a l l y interpreted. A more general, but equally effective, bias 
i s clear i n the v/hole of Polybius' treatment of the Aetolian League, 
'i'his v/as l o c a l patriotism and personal loyalty i n action. I t did 
not affect seriously the treatment of his general theme of the expan-
sion of Rome; but from the point of view of the present study, 
concerned as i t i s v/ith the same local issues vjith v;hich Polybius 
took l i b e r t i e s i n his interpretation, i t i s a bias v/hich can lead to 
serious d i s t o r t i o n i n interpretaction - although probably not i n 
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matters of fact. We have no reason to dispute Polybius' claim to 
relate the facts accurately,'^ 
The reason f o r t h i s bias i n favour of Philopoeraen and his 
policies i s clear enough, Lycortas was Philopoeraen's successor as 
party leader; and Polybius - though not above disagreement with 
Lycortas i n practice'^^ ~ could not be expected to write otherv/ise 
than favourably of the policy ^^fhich they both represented. He was 
too much personally concerned with Philopoeraen, myth and man, to do 
other than support him with hj.s w r i t i n g . And th i s did not stop at 
simply w r i t i n g about him favourably. After the Achaean v/ar, i t was 
Polybius vjho prevented the destruction of Philopoemen's statues i n 
Feloponnese at the hands of the Romans, and he had a personal i n t e r -
est i n doing so. B^e could not represent his father's friend 
Philopoeraen as the enemy of Rome, but he could not deny that there 
v/as some basis for the t r a d i t i o n , <?.nd he set out to correct t h i s . 
His defence was tendentious, and ignored the part of Philopoemen's 
career v;hich had caused his anti-Roman reputation; this also had 
the effect of misinterpreting the policy of Philopoemen's and his 
1 1 ovm opponents. 
As far as the date of composition of the I-Iisto_ries i s concerned 
t h i s i s not the place t o discuss i t i n d e t a i l . A f u l l account (up 
to 1956) of the attempts to f i x a date with any precision i s given 
by V/albank, and a summary of his conclusions w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t 
here. I t seems probable that publication was extended over many 
years, beginning at about 15O and going on u n t i l his death at some 
291 -
time after l l 8 . Although i t is not possible to be certain, the 
books v/hich contain Philopoemen's collision-course v/ith Rome seem 
l i k e l y to have been published after the destruction of Corinth i n 
146.12 
Much material from Polybius' ^:Btarxes^ which has not survived 
i n the extant fragments, i s preserved i n the form i n which i t was 
incorporated i n the Roman. History of Livy. I n the books which cover 
the period of Philopoemen's p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , Livy devotes consid-
erable space to descriptions of Greek affairs."^-^ Nissen has shov/n 
conclusively that these Greek parts of Livy depend for their source 
Hjrgtories of Polybius. l i v y hov/ever, does not simply 
translate Polybius. He v/as only interested i n Greece i n as far as 
i t affected Rome, and the purely internal a f f a i r s of Greece were of 
l i t t l e concern to him. He therefore had to be selective, and abbre-
viate Polybius to s u i t his ov/n scheme. Hov/ever, i n the parts v/hich 
do depend d i r e c t l y upon Polybius, he i s usually f a i t h f u l to his 
source, and records his information v/ith tolerable accuracy. 
The occasions when he leaves his source are v/hen he takes his 
Roman readers i n t o account, and omits explanations of features of 
Roman l i f e which Polybius, v/riting for a Greek audience, had 
i n c l u d e d . S i m i l a r l y , although Polybius did not f i n d i t necessary 
to explain to his Greek readers familiar aspects and i n s t i t u t i o n s 
of the Greek v/orld, Livy must add an explanation for his Roman 
readers; and i n the process, sometimes misinterprets Polybius i n 
his attempts to expand him. Further s l i g h t changes i n Polybius' 
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emphasis, or imprecisions, Nissen explains as concessions to 
Roman patriotism on Livy's part. But tliose may i n fact be better 
explained by taking in t o account Livy's Rome-centered point of view, 
and absorption i n the a f f a i r s of Rome, rather than conscious a l t e r - • 
. 1 7 
ations. The speeches comprlseV. : the most unreliable part of his 
v/ork. His penchant for rhetoric led him to expand the speeches he 
found i n Polybius - v/hich may themselves have borne l i t t l e r e l a t i o n 
to the o r i g i n a l which they v/ere supposed to represent, although 
Polybivis did claim to be attempting speeches of a Thucydidean 
nature, representing as siccurately as possible the speaker's v/ords. 
Livy hov/ever, i s not so much interested i n accuracy as i n rhetoric 
for i t s ov/n sake, and for the contribution i t makes to the dramat-
is a t i o n of any given s i t u a t i o n . We must therefore suspect the 
content of Livy's speeches - even v/here they are clearly based on 
Polybian originals. Factual d e t a i l incorporated i n them m.ay be 
accurate; but the nuances 3.nd forms of exrpression are l i k e l y to be 
19 
Livy's ov/n contribution, 
Ira.portant h i s t o r i c a l cruce_s are a.lso created by Livy v/hen he 
f a i l s to combine his sources correctly. This affects most 
seriously his chronology; for LiAry's generally re l i a b l e l i s t of 
Roman ma.gistrates, taken from Roman annalists, i s the most valuable 
general guide to the chronology of our period. On occasion, he 
f a i l s to relate the Greek events dated by Olympiads i n Polybius 
under the correct consuls, and as the lat e r books of Polybius' 
JjisiSll^ ^•'^"^ fragmentary, we can get l i t t l e help from Polybius i n 
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correcting Livy's mistakes. Occasionally he realises tlmt his 
account i s muddled, and adds further explanation of his ov/n - which 
20 
can have the effe c t of simply adding to the confusion. On the 
whole however, these places are obvious enough; and apart from 
these various lapses on the part of Livy, he can be accepted as 
providing, i n the main, trustworthy information for the history of 
Greece during the greater part of Philopoemen's career. 
A second v/ork of Polybius of importance for the study of the 
l i f e t i m e of Philopoemen, v/as his Life of Philopoemen. The work 
i t s e l f i s wholly l o s t ; but v/e know of i t s existence from Polybius' 
21 
ov/n mention of i t i n an. extant part of his Histories. Plutarch 
and Pausanias miay have used i t as a source for t h e i r v/ritings about 
P.hilopoemen. Polybius' ov/n description of his work laas been 
analysed by Pidech, i n an attempt to discover i t s content more 
precisely; but his conclusions are v i t i a t e d by his attempt to 
extract more from Polybius' description than Polybius himself put 
i n t o i t . Hov/ever, v/e must examine his arguments i n d e t a i l . 
He s t a r t s from Polybius' staterae.nt that the Life v/as written 
i n three pvpXia; and attempts to f i t the description of the work 
v/hich Polybius gives to t h i s schema. This seems to be rendered 
f u t i l e at the outset, for Polybius promptly proceeds to divide his 
material i n t o only two parts, after the i n i t i a l mention of the 
three pw^Xia; these are the 'irai,5ixr) aYvyff] and the eirK^aveonraTat 
irpd^etC''^^ The clear and obvious meanings of these tv/o phrases are 
the actions of his youth and t r a i n i n g , on the one hand, and the 
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deeds of his maturity on the other. Polybius continues to say 
that, as far as the Ifis;bories are concerned, i t i s best to omit 
any accotmt T ^ jiev veonepinvf; ayvrfqz xal TCOW veooTepixffiv r^jXoov -
that i s , i n expanded form, the m t S l X T ) aYWfr) • He explains that 
he does t h i s i n order T o f c 8e xaTa TT^ V ax|jtf)V avT0\3 xe<^Xai,(jo8cC^ 
e x e i 6e8r|\a3fievotc ^pyoiQ irpoa^eXvai xal xaTa yipoQ.'~ ^ By th i s he 
clearly means that the account which he gave i n the Life of the 
eirct^veoTaTat irpd^eic; (here called TO, xaTO, TT)V ax|iT)v ) was 
xe(^a\aiclo6r)C . As t h i s i s used as a term v/hich i s compatible v;ith 
aCgrjCtC Twv irpd^eoov, i t indicates that the relevant background 
material V/S-S omitted, i n order to make Philopoemen's achievements 
appear exaggerated - ^lex' av^riOEax; . The essential difference 
between the v.e(f>akai<j:ibr]c, cmoKoyi'OHOQ of the Life and the treatment 
i n the Histories, i s that the Mfe was eYXco|iiacrTix6c ? the 
2ii££j2.?!iS^ xoiwoc e m i v o u xal ilfoyow? 'the Life he describes as 
xe<;f)aXaid)6T) xal fieT* augiqo'ecoc? 'the Ilistjories aXr^f^ xal . . . | ieT* 
arroSetSecoC* This means, i n fact, that Polybius v/as sim.ply v/riting 
the v/hole vrork from the point of viev/ of the hero, as was natural 
i n an eYH{jO|itov. This analysis shows clearly that Polybius made no 
attempt here to give a "contents table" of the three b j h l i a ^ o f the 
L i f e . His division i s essentially b i p a r t i t e . As he summarises 
very b r i e f l y Philopoemen's background before the hipparchy, v/e can 
say that t h i s v/as probably included i n the aratSiXT) a-ytjoVTi ; and 
his f u l l e r , circmmstantial account of the l i r t c ^ v e a r a T a i irpd^eic 
starts v/ith the hipparchy, v/here Polybius himself s p e c i f i c a l l y 
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places the apxT) irpdgewv. 
Pedec-h's treatment of th i s material i s unconvincing. He 
finds, easily enough, and with some a___£riora likelihood, material 
for the f i r s t of the three byblia i n the traiSlXT) a-fwrn ? and 
Polybius' ov/n d e f i n i t i o n of this - zCc, r]v xal %Cvm xal Ttcrov 
aYwyo-tC expi^ ciT^o veoc &vi though he badly misunderstands xCvoiv) ~ 
which Polybivis describes again further on as vecorepixri aycoYTi and 
v e c o T e p i x o l ^r\koi. This i s reasonable; and some confirmation 
comes from Plutarch's similar treatment. But there i s no certainty 
about i t , * ^ ^ Much more serious d i f f i c u l t y occurs i n his attempt to 
27 
define the scope of the second and t h i r d b j h l i a . P^dech assoc-
iates, r i g h t l y enough, the vetorepiXT) aywfn '^'^ ^^ traibinr] 
aY(orn 1 t)ut ignores Polybius' indication that the veu^epixol 
^if]Xoi are to be equally considered part of the irat6txT^ aYODYH? 
confuses thera v/ith the eirK^vecrraxai, trpd^eic* I " each case he 
makes the double phrase a correspondence, suggesting that Polybius 
v/as using the phjcases as synonyms. Pedech seems to realise that 
t h i s i s not possible, but prefers to ignore the di f . f i c u l t y : 
1'expression %aQ em(^jdvecrraTO^: updgecc parait plus eloignee de 
To5v veoareptxciov ^i^Xwv, form.e sur laquelle e l l e est reprise. En 
r e a l i t e ces deux t i t r e s pouvaient convenir a ce deuxieme l i v r e . 
L'auteur y etudiait les gouts de son heros et racontait ses 
exploits jusqu'au moment ou i l devint hipparque', He offers no 
further discussion; a reference to Plutarch, who treats of 
Philopoemen's readi.ng material and career up to the hipparchy i n 
t h i s order i s s t r i c t l y irrelevant, for we know tha.t Polybius did 
not describe these essentially minor events as luK^vecruaTai 
Trpdgeic • ^'or hira, the hipparchy i s the ap^r) tffiv Trpdriewv , There 
i s no basis for Pedech's assumption of a correspondence between 
E'ni<fyavi<yx<x%a,i, irpdgetc and veaneptxol ^rjXot ; nor for forcing 
them together i n t o the second bj;;bl_ion. He has assumed his conc-
lusion, and used i t to prove i t s e l f . The facts simply v / i l l not 
f i t his analysis.'"' 
I t i s equally impossible to say precisely what Polybius 
included i n the t h i r d b^blion. Pedech has already disposed of 
the e i r c ^ v e o T r a T a t i r p d^eic i n the second h j b l i o n , and must look 
for something else. This must be an account of the later l i f e -
the most s i g n i f i c a n t h i s t o r i c a l l y , as Pedech v/ i l l i n g l y admits. 
And we have Polybius' word for i t that he did treat this period -
even i f xe<^Xat«8«(; ( i n the sense already described). Pedech 
correctly finds that the phrase xa xaTO, Triv ax(iT)V auToB refers 
to the period of Philopoemen's maturity; but he does not see 
that a thought-connection exists i n Polybius' text with 
e i r K ^ v e o r a t a t upageic : they are essentially the same thing. I t 
v/ould be a..Pjn_orji. l i k e l y that they v/ould be treated i n the t h i r d 
ta^b]J.__on;_ but i t i s not possible to prove that they were treated 
i n the t h i r d bx^ _]J;-.on alone, v/hich Pedech desires. 
Pedech's analysis has i n fact added nothing to v/hat v/e 
already knew about the L^fe from Polybius himself. The tra i n i n g 
and youth of Philopoeraen, as v/ell as his own character and family 
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background ( tCc, r\v x a l iCvoiV x a l t t a i v aYWYatc ) were treated at 
greater length than i n the Histories, to v/hich they were not 
s t r i c t l y relevant. The p b l i t i c a l career v/as treated i n a person.-', 
alised v/ay, unrelated to the background of the time; and there-
fore perhaps at rather shorter length, than v/as suitable to the 
Histories. This v/as suitable to the biographical genre, but not 
to the ffii§i2iEi:££.3. iJi§i.Sli£§. Polybius promises to 
relate the man to his time. I n addition, the three b^bjLia suggest 
three parts - but on v/li8.t system the material v/as divided betv/een 
the b j b l i a we have , no means of t e l l i n g . This i s as much as v/e can 
t e l l about the L i f e : there are simply not s u f f i c i e n t facts for 
further speculation. 
The date at v/hich the biography v/as v/ritten i s disputed. 
Polybius' own indications are that the Mfe v/as x^ritten before 
book 10 of the K^iSjxades, and therefore before 146.^ ""^  I t i s 
possible that t.he reference i n booP: 10 to the Life may be a l a t e r 
addition, but there are no grounds for upholding t h i s . This seems 
to rule out the suggestion of Lticas, that the Life v/as v/ritten 
after 1^6 as part of Polybius' scheme to rehabilitate 
Philopoemen's memory, i n the same s p i r i t as his defense of him 
before the commissioners.'^'^ Other dates suggested are soon a f t e r 
182 (the death of Philopoemen must be the j;e£niji£3iis^ o^st_._^ ^ 
supported by Walbank and Ziegler,^''" and soon after I60, argued by 
Pedech.'' The arguments i n favour of both of these dates are 
v/eak. Soon af t e r I82 i s argued by Ziegler thus: 'Alle 
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Wahrscheinlichkeit spricht dafUr, dass diese enkomiastische 
Biographie Philopoimens der literarische Erstling P.'s gev/esen i s t , 
ins Auge gefasst von ihm als JUngling, v i e l l e i c h t noch zu Lebzeiten 
des bev/u.nderten Helden, dessen Urne er von Messene nach Megalopolis 
trug, f e r t i g g e s t e l l t etv/a um l80 oder v/enig sp^ter'. The 
argiiment i s v i r t u a l l y non-existent; and Walbank, v/ho accepts the 
date, adds nothing. There i s nothing i n t h i s to urge ready 
acceptance; but at the same time, l i t t l e objection can be brought 
against i t : the emphasis on the early years seems to require 
explanation, v/hich i t does not get s a t i s f a c t o r i l y i f v/e accept the 
Ziegler/Walbank date of soon after l82. But thi s cannot be pressed. 
The same i s true of Pedech's date. The jjurpose, he suggests, 
was to provide reading material for the education of Scipio 
Aemilianus, on the lines of Xenophon's Cyropaedia. None of his 
arguments proves t h i s , though the suggestion does ha,ve the value 
that i t explains av/ay v/ith no d i f f i c u l t y t h e emphasis v/hich 
Polybius l a i d on the early years. I t can vi/ithstand v/ith l i t t l e 
d i f f i c u l t y such c r i t i c i s m as has been brought against i t : i t can 
be argued that Philopoemen, the anti-Roman (of the Roman t r a d i t i o n ) , 
v/ould not be chosen as the hero of a v/ork v/ritten to educate 
Aemilianus. The answer to thi s l i e s i n the author: Polybius v/as 
not heir to the Roman t r a d i t i o n , and i n his opinion, Philopoemen's 
policies v/ere not anti-Roman i n the s t r i c t sense. The v/hole point 
of choosing him as a hero v/as that he v/as a p a t r i o t , and as far as 
educative value v/as concerned, i t made no difference v/hether he 
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wrote about a Soman, an Achaean, or a Persian, as long as the point 
of the exercise was made clear to the reader. I f he had this 
purpose i n mind, there would be nothing strange i n his choosing 
Philopoeraen. 
The other objection i s based on the fact that Cicero tv/ice 
states that Aemilianus could scarcely keep his hands of f Xenophon's 
Cyrppaedia. Ziegler argues that i t would ha.ve been ungrateful of 
him to prefer t h i s v;ork, had his friend Polybius written a L i f e of 
Phil^opoemen especially for him. I t i s i d l e to speculate on the 
reason for Aemilianus' preference for the G^rogaedia. V/hether 
Polybius v/rote his Li f e for Aemilianus or not, \,.je can scarcely be 
expected to understand from Cicero's light-hearted remarks that 
Aemilianus read nott-ing__but the CjroES^SiS.* ^''^ hardly needs saying 
that the C2/T;opjaedia could be his 'favourite reading matter' - v;hich 
i s a l l Cicero i s r e a l l y saying ~ while he s t i l l paid due attention 
to other works, including, i f necessary, Polybius' L i f e . V/e have 
therefore no reason for rejecting out of hand this date suggested 
by Pedech. At the same time, convenient though i t i s , he has 
provided no s o l i d argument which makes i t more l i k e l y than the date 
preferred by Ziegler a.nd VJalbank. 
I t has been suggested by Nissen, v/ho i s follov/ed by Hoffman, 
that Polybius' Iife__£f_PhiJ-0 was used by Plutarch as the main 
source for his own lii:^§_,Sl^.^El2:]2!SL9SSS.R° '^ ^^  basis of t h i s argu-
ment i s that since Plutarch gives d e t a i l from Philopoemen's early 
l i f e , v/hich can only have come from Polybius' Li:[e, he must have 
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used i t as a basis for the whole. I t should therefore be seen as 
the source of everything v;hich could come from i t . Ziegler, 
hov/ever, can f i n d no reason for assuming that Plutarch has used 
Polybius' Lif£ s-s a basis for his own work. The appearance of 
personal details ~ clearly taken from the Ldfe i n the early 
chapters of Plutarch's vjork, he explains by the assumption that 
Plutarch ha.d only glanced 3.t the early chapters of the monograph, 
and after t h i s used the Hist_ories. I n favour of th i s view i s the 
fact that Plutarch certainly loiev; the Histories, as he includes i n 
his LiJ]e Polybius' ovm defence of Philopoemen before the Roman 
commissioners i n l46/5 - an event which occurred long after the ds.te 
at v;hich Polybius v/rote his loJe^'^^ Also, the Greek sections of the 
ZiS£li5iS£ depend on Polybius. Another fact v/hich adds strength to 
Ziegler's suggestion, i s that Plutarch ha,s no information about 
Philopoemen's a c t i v i t i e s i n Grete: these v;ere irrelevant to 
Polybius' His^tories, but the Mfe cannot have wholly ignored 15 of 
Philopoemen's most active years. These arguments of Ziegler suggest 
that Nissen's conclusion i s l i k e l y to be incorrect; but a f i n a l 
decision on vjhich. of the tv;o irrecoverable Polybian accounts 
Plutarch used cannot be reached. 
I n addition to the Polybian material, Plutarch seems to have 
made use of at least two other sources. The f i r s t i s Aristocrates 
of Sparta. Plutarch names him specifically v;hen he quotes his 
(higher) alternative figure to Polybius' for those k i l l e d at 
Corapasion. He seems to have known his work well, as he cites him 
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also i n the l£CUT(yus. But the Compasion incident seem.s to be the 
only certain a t t r i b u t i o n to him i n the PMj;^ o„eraen Aristocrates 
wrote Ig^coirica, at an uncertain date -- although there are grounds 
for thinking that he was lat e r than Polybius. I t seems clear that 
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i n t h i s case he was used dn-rectly by Plutarch. The remaining 
sources must be l e f t vague. To them must be attributed a l l parts 
v/hich cannot be assigned to the named sources. They m.ay be, as 
Nissen prefers, a collection of anecdotes; they may be simply 
' t r a d i t i o n ' , or recollection of Plutarch's ovm from his memory of 
his extensive reading. I t i s impossible to name them specifically, 
but i t i s clear that Polybius and Aristocrates of Sparta do not 
adequately account for the i^rhole of Plutarch's source material."^ 
Plutarch's Plaminims i s also d i r e c t l y relevant to the 
history of Philopoemen's Achaea, Nissen's analysis of the sources 
has here survived fundamentally as i t l e f t his pen,^"' The main 
source for Greek a f f a i r s i s Polybius' Histories: 'Hauptquelle i s t 
Polybios, i n zweiter Linie ein Annalist, dann eine Keihe von 
Bemerkungen und iinekdoten aus seinera umfassenden Excerptenschatz'. 
An attempt v/as made by Klotz to show tl i a t the annalist i n question 
v/as Valerius Antias; but his arguments have been shown to be 
inadeciuate by Smith; and the position i s now much as Nissen l e f t 
ho 
i t . I n any ca.se, t h i s dispute does not affect the Greek 
sections, for which Nissen indisputably established Polybius as 
the main source. 
Two other sources which have some quantity of material ab out 
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Philopoemen remain. Suidas' a r t i c l e presents no problems •- and no 
independent information - as i t consists merely of tv/o transcripts, 
one from Polybius' ffi^bories_, the other from Pausanias' treatment 
of Philopoemen i n his Arcadia. '"^  Pausanias' account, however, i s 
of more in t e r e s t , and presents more source problems. ^ '^ lie has 
treated his sources unhistorically - for v;hich he should not 
altogether be blamed - but not u n i n t e l l i g e n t l y ; and the relevant 
chapters contain scraps of information which seem to go back to 
Pausanias' o\m fund of general knowledge. The problem i s to see 
how far t h i s type of in d i v i d u a l i s t treatment i s responsible f o r the 
variations which his account shov;s as compared with our other extajit 
sources. Nissen believed that he had simply made use of Plutarch, 
with some other scraps of information from an unidentified source, 
and concluded, '. . . i s t diese ganze Uebersicht des Pausanias vom 
Leben Philopoimens fUr die Kenntnis der Thatsachen v;ertlos'. I n 
this judgement Hoffmann and Ziegler are prepared to follow him. 
On the other hand ].?Uhl has argued that Pausanias' main source was 
Polybius' Life_, and that any s i m i l a r i t i e s between his account and 
Plutarch's res u l t from the fact that they were using the sane 
soiirce. Neither case i s v/ithout i t s weakness; but at the same 
time there are important factors which support either. The conc-
lusion to v/hich we are inevitably led -- i f we do not a.„£niorl. 
postulate Eijigue_lle^ Pausanias - i s that Pausanias must 
have used both Plutarch's Life and one of Polybius' vjorks i n his 
compiLation. I n addition, there are phrases the o r i g i n of which 
cannot be traced: they may be additions or embroideries of 
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Pausanias himself, or simply his mistakes. I t seems f u t i l e to 
re-examine a l l the inconclusive evidence vAich has been cited i n 
favour of either viev/. This examination w i l l be confined to 
c i t a t i o n of the strongest evidence which shov/s, with some cert-
ainty, the use of both Polybius and Plutarch. 
Nissen had the mass of probability on his side i n deciding 
for Plutarch. Pausanias does follov/ his order of arrangement, even 
v/here t h i s i s not chronological. This could be explained by a 
common source, but i t seems unlikely that both would independently 
choose to abbreviate the (probably) much longer Polybian narrative 
i n exactly the same details. I t i s nevertheless d i f f i c u l t to 
decide exactly v;h-at must come from Plutarch because i t was not i n 
Polybitis, VJe are f i n a l l y restricted to the accounts of Gorapasion. 
Both are confused; and Nissen refused to use them to support his 
argument. I t i s clear, hov;ever, that Pausanias' figure for the 
dead, 300, i s not Polybian (Polybius gave 80). Plutarch records 
Aristocrates' variant of 350, without actually expressing his o\>ra 
opinion; and Pausanias' figure i s clearly more i n line with t h i s 
than v/ith Polybius'. I t i s possible that Pausanias had looked 
at Aristocrates and miscopied, or 'adapted' him i n some way, i n the 
l i g h t of Polybius. But i t seems on the vfhole more l i k e l y that he 
misused Plutarch's information i n t h i s way: there i s no evidence 
that he knev/ x'lristocrates' work otherwise. This i s as m.uch as vje 
can certainly say i n favour of Pausanias' use of Plutarch: Nissen's 
other arguments are a l l inconclusive. But a reading of both texts 
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does leave the impression that the general correspondence i n the 
form of the material i n the tv;o accounts i s too great to be accid-
ental; and although t h i s cannot be ir r e f u t a b l y demonstrated, i t 
seems l i k e l y . 
I t i s much easier to show that Pausanias knev; and used 
Polybius. The c3-earest, and therefore most important, addition i n 
Pausanias i s i n 8.51.5-6, vjhere he details the part which Lycortas 
played i n the Messenian v/ar before Philopoemen's death. Plutarch 
has nothing of t h i s , and i t i s not possible that Pausanias simply 
made i t up: i t seems v/holly Polybian, and i s repeated i n (or from) 
4.29.12. Nissen does not attempt to iden t i f y t h i s source, although 
he must have suspected that this writer supremely interested i n the 
a c t i v i t i e s of Lycortas i-jas Polybius. There i s also clear confirm-
ation of Polybius' having been used i n Pausanias' account of 
Philopoemen's force, Plutarch simply says that he took cavalry 
v/ith him; Pausanias knows, clearly from Polybius, that he had 
light-armed v;ith him as v;ell (though he muddles the numbers), 
The remainder of I-JUhl's arguments are not so strong. He may be 
rig h t that Pausanias' different account of the evacuation of 
Megalopolis i n 223, th_ree times repeated, comes from Polybius' L i f e : 
Plutarch says simply, TOVC be iroXiTac ip&wov %iva TT^ C mXeaK 
e^exXeilfe ? v/hereas Pausanias specifies that more than two thirds of 
the population, with vromen and children, were led to Messene by 
Philopoemen; i/hich finds confirmation i n Plut. Cleqmenes 24. 
The authority for t h i s was probably Phylarchus, v/ho may have been 
a 
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used by Polybius i n his Life as he v/as for the I l i g t o r i ^ . ^ Hov/eve 
there are too many variables i n t h i s argument for i t to stand as 
proof that Pausanias had used Polybius. 
There are two other points which SUhl does not malce, v/hich 
have a bearing on t h i s question. The two statements regarding 
Philopoemen's appearance con:Elict. Plutarch counters an opinion 
he has met - ax; gvtot VO|jit^owcnv ~ tha.t Philopoemen v;as ugly, by 
reference to his statue at Delphi vjhich he himself had seen. 
hS 
Pausanias takes no account of t h i s , and simply repeats the opinion, 
V/e can probably define t h i s 'opinion' to represent Polybius - who 
had, after a l l , seen the man i n the flesh ~ ; Pausanias may there-
fore have been using Polybius here - and choosing his source v/ell. 
He was not misled by Plutarch's easy acceptance of the sculptor's 
heroic vision. 
The second additional point i s the very close resemblance 
between Polybius' description of Oleander halvinggevta mTptxri 
vfith the house of Craugis, and Pa.usanias' similar statement, 
Plutarch does not have any mention of t h i s . Both of these item.s 
strongly suggest that Pausanias knew and used Polybius. 
None of the other passages used i n the debate certainly add 
anything to t h i s . Final conclusion therefore about the t o t a l of 
Pausanias' sources must remain vague. I t can however, be regarded 
as certain that at least i n his account of the l a s t campaign he 
made use of a Polybian source; and there i s evidence which 
strongly suggests that he may have used t h i s for other parts of his 
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narrative. On the other hand, the general character of the 
chapters on Philopoemen and the possible c i t a t i o n of Arist 
suggest equally strongly that Plutarch's PMloESemen was used as 
ocra-ces, 
a general scheme, 
Apart from these main sources for the l i f e of Philopoemen, 
there i s l i t t l e other source material. Occasional passages of 
Appian, Diodorus, Justin and Strabo usually add l i t t l e to the 
picture gained from the other sources; and imscriptional material 
i s only present i n large enough quantity to be an important aid i n 
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elucidating events i n Crete, The content of these minor sources 
v ; i l l be discussed more conveniently at the points where they are used. 
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i^^j^i^-
'^MEME.J^i/'i-O " 179/8 
The establislmient of a .strajbegos l i s t i s essential for a 
detailed h i s t o r i c a l study of Achaea. I t i s made more d i f f i c u l t by 
the fragmentary nature of the material; and when a l l i s done, some 
gaps inevitably remain u n f i l l e d . Nevertheless, the results which are 
achieved are fundamental to the p o l i t i c a l reconstruction. 
S-^ ygjegP-i; of the early years of the League are not the 
subject of t h i s appendix. They liave been discussed i n d e t a i l by 
Vlalbank, and l i t t l e df relevance to the present study i s to be gained 
by repeating his arguments.'^ Those of the whole period of 
Philopoemen's p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y have been discussed i n d e t a i l by 
Nic c o l i n i ; 202/1 onwards by Aymard, with always illuminating, i f not 
alvfays cacceptable, results; 20l/0 onv/ards by De Sanctis.^ A 
p a r a l l e l table of these l i s t s , together v;ith earlier treatments, i s 
included at the end of t'the the^i'S. : for the sake of comparison with 
the results of the present study. In.addition to these comprehensive 
studies, the contributions to the Healencyclopjidie on individual 
stra^egoi occasionally offer new discussion, and w i l l be cited where 
relevant. 
.The f i r s t years from 21l/l0 offer l i t t l e scope for disagreement, 
strjLt^SSS. 211/10 v;as Euryleon. Polybius mentions him at . the 
beginning of his farmal introduction. of Philopoemen into his ILLstorj^, 
virhich suggests that Euryieon v\ras £t£a_tegos at the time of 
Philopoemen's return from Crete. As we knov; that Philopoeraen was 
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hipparch under Cyclicidas, whom vie shall shov; to have been strategos 
210/09, and was elected immediately af t e r his return from Crete, the 
mention of Euryleon i s only relevant i f he was strategos 211/10,-^ 
Cycliadas i s shovni to be strate^os 2IO/09 - Livy says £ene£_euin__siniima 
.i']!lE?ZiL.®£Si " by •^ '^16 "^ si-te of the battle at the r i v e r Larisus. 
Plutarch says that Philopoemen vjas hipioarch then, and the battle i s 
dated by Livy's mention of the Nemea, which took place i n 'odd' years: 
therefore 209, Livy adds some confusion by recording these events 
under the consuls of 208, M. Claudius Marcellus and T. Quinctius 
Crispinus. This however must simply be a mistake i n collating his 
sources - Polybius for the Greek events and an annalist for the 
Roman. I t does not indicate any u n r e l i a b i l i t y i n the Greek i n f o r -
me.tion he provides, vAich i s soundly Polybian. Livy also provides 
the name of Cycliadas' successor, Nicias. He ±s securely dated by 
the Olympia of 208, Elean preparations for vrhich were disturbed by 
Machanidas shortly before the expedition to Aetolia i n vjhich Nicias 
took part. Nicias was therefore straie^os 209/8. 
I n 208/7, follovjing Nicias, Philopoemen held his f i r s t strategia. 
The evid.ence for the date comes from the position i n Polybius' text 
of the fragment recording the battle of Mantinea; and the fact that 
Philopoemen was sjtra/fcegos for the second time at the Nemea of 205, 
This necessitates a f i r s t sj^rategia, i n 208/7, to avoid the i l l e g a l i t y 
of successive BtraXeglal.^ The date of the battle of Mantinea also 
makes i t clear that by t h i s time the entry-time to office of the 
Achaean strate£oi must have been i n the autumn. Before the battle 
was 
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Philopoemen had trained the Achaecga: array ow6* ISXoDC OXTOO lifjvoc 
(Pol. 11. 10. 9 ) . This means that i f the £trate£Os at this time 
entered o f f i c e at the beginning of May, as earlier ( ire pi xr]V T:r\z 
n\etd8oc efrtToXriv Pol. 4, 3?. 2), the battle would have occurred i n 
the l a t t e r part of December. This v;ould be so unusual that we woul 
expect Polybius, i n the very detailed account which he gives of the 
battle (11 . 11-18) to have given some indication that the season 
abnormal. I t seems clear therefore that at some time betiireen Aratus' 
si£aie^ of 217/6 (Pol. 5. 30. ?: Sepetoc evapxo|jevT)C )? and the 
present strategia of Philopoemen (208/7), the time of entry into 
off i c e had bee.n altered; and the o f f i c i a l strategos-year now started 
i n the autumn, as did the Aetolian yeac. Larsen says the change 
occurred i n 217? for which date he claims the support of Pol. 5. 106,1 
I t i s possible that the cha.nge occurred at t h i s time, but no weight 
ca.n be placed on Pol. 5, IO6. 1, which simply records a return to 
peacetime a c t i v i t i e s : the election of Timoxenus i s not precisely 
dated to giutumn 217. Aymard i s r i g h t l y more cautious, and leaves the 
date imprecise; and V/albank agrees v;ith t h i s caution. A further 
p o s s i b i l i t y i s that the change v/as made when /iratus died i n office i n 
his §j^£9±e£3-a. of 214/3. I t must have been then necessary to elect a 
stop-gap; and i f the idea was current at the time that a change i n 
the entry-date would be beneficial, use might have been made of the 
necessity of electing a s_trate£06 i n the autumn to have the entry 
date permanently changed to that time of year. 
'^ '^^6 Si£Sl^ §££S 207/6 i s unknovm; but i n 206/5 Philopoemen vjas 
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again i n o f f i c e . This i s dated by the Neraea after Mantinea, v/hich 
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must be that of 205. His successor we do not knov/; but i t seems 
very. l i k e l y that i n one of the years 204/3 or 203/2 Philopoemen held 
'^ •^^  .§i£.sli.®£iS* '^ ^^  --is '^^^^  ^J^^iSjSiS; when he died,"^ and we 
shall see that i t i s very unlikely that he vjas strai;e£os i n I87/6. 
The only years which are then vacant, i n order to complete his 8 
stoa^e^.ai, are 20V3 and 205/2, either of which Philopoemen may 
have occupied. I f a choice i s to be made, 205/2 seems preferable, 
as Nabis had by that time f u l l y revealed himself to be as great a 
threat t o Achaean safety as Machanidas had been. This cannot have 
been apparent to the same extent i n 20k. But events of both years 
are so inadequately known tha.t f i n a l decision i s not possible. 
"^ ^^  Si£Sl?i£S££ 202/1 was Lysippus. His stra;te_gia i s dated by 
Nabis' attack on Messene, which Polybius places at about the time 
of Philipfe b a t t l e o f f Chios, This Walbank r i g h t l y dates to 201, 
v/hich makes Lysippus strategos 202/3-,"'"*^  I n his account of events 
of 200 -• autumno_^ - Livy mentions that the strate_gia had 
passed from Philopoemen to Cycliadas. This means that Philopoemen 
must have succeeded Lysippiis, and therefore been stvate^oB^ 20l/0; 
and that Cycliadas v/as s;brategos 200/199."''"'' He was follov/ed i n 
off i c e by Aristaenus (199/8) who v/as followed by Nicostratus [ 
(198/7).''''^ The next knov/n stra^e^os^ i s again Aristaenus, leading 
the Achaean section of the a l l i e d army during Flamininiis' war 
against Nabis i n 195: therefore Ayistaenus v/as strd.tegos for 
196/5."''"^ A gap of two years, for which there i s no information, i s 
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followed by Philopoemen's 5th straj^egia (193/2) after his second 
return from Crete: t h i s i s dated by the Roman magistrates for 192, 
coss. L. Ouinctius Flamininus and Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, during 
whose year the propaganda commission to Greece, headed by T. 
Quinctius Flamininus, v/as operating."^''' Philopoemen was follov/ed by 
Diophanes (192/1), dated by the consul M'. Acilius Glabrio and the 
15 
continued presence of Flamininus i n Greece. 
. The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the £i£ate£os for I9I/O i s disjputed. 
Before Aymard's discussion of the strategoi"^^ i t had been accepted 
that Philopoemen was strategos i l l e g a l l y i n two successive years, 
190/89 and 189/8. The evidence for t h i s seemed cut and dried i n the 
17 
statement of Livy, Phii220££§ili-.SHlJiJ™^  
Aymard's attempt to argue Philopoemen into a legal succession of 
,stjcit£gmi., 191/0 followed by I89/8, met l i t t l e favour; but he 
reaffirmed his b e l i e f i n the correctness of his earli e r conclusions, 
18 
v/ithout adding any further discussion, i n Les^^Frertd^r^JSap^ . , 
There matters have rested. I t must be admitted that Aymard's 
presentation of his arguments suggests that he i s arguing a v/eak 
case: the fact that he does not tackle the Livy passage - which i s 
the crux of the whole problem - u n t i l after the prese.ntation of his 
other arguments, none of v/.hich is i n i t s e l f decisive, a.nd then only 
i n a perfunctory manner, i s unfortunate, as his date for t h i s 
6th'''^  stSi^i^Blis!; of Philopoemen deserves serious consideration. 
In his discussion of the Livy passage, Ayraard f a i l s to provide 
20 
a s u f f i c i e n t l y decisive explanation to support .his case. Since 
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the publication of his a r t i c l e , Holleaux has re-examined the chron-
ology of the whole Polybian section of Livy i n v/hich this passage 
occurs; and lia.s shown conclusively how confused Livy himself v/as 
21 
about the chronology of I89/8, One of Aymard's suggestions, that 
Livy v/as adding to the Polybian narrative his own explanation to 
his readers of 'Philopoemen's undoubted appearance as ^ trcrtegos both 
i n autumn I89 and spring I88 ( i . e . using £Oii-y.nuare v/ithout any 
reference to i t e r a t i o n ) i s a useful lead. V/e cannot accept that 
Livy v/as using £onJ:iama^urj29^ in. any but the normal tech-
22 
ni c a l Roman sense of i t e r a t i o n of magistracy. But Aymard's basic 
point, that 'lihiJ;0£o^ einen^ ^ i s non-Polybian 
i n o r i g i n , i s useful. We can accept from Holleaux' demonstration 
that 'Livy himself did not understand the exact chrono]o.gical 
relationsh5.p betv/een the beginning of the siege of Same, the out-
break of h o s t i l i t i e s i n Peloponnese, the election of Philopoemen, 
and the v i s i t of l'U.lv.ius to Rome to conduct the Roman elections; 
and t h i s brings us closer to understanding the confusion v/hich led 
to '£hi5£E2®I5Ei&™92£iii^^ 
This seems, i n fact, t o be just another case of Livy's i n t e r -
preting what he f a i l e d to understand.^"^ V/e can regard i t as 
certain thjxt he meant i t e r a t i o n , and intended i t e r a t i o n to be under-
stood by the phrase: he v/as not torturing Roman o f f i c i a l terminology 
i.n order to point out to his Roman readers the detail, of a si t u a t i o n 
vjhich vjas perfectly clear to him. He v/as rather t r y i n g to rati o n -
alise the results of his own misunderstanding and confused 
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abbreviation. I t may well be that he thought the Achaean year 
began at the same time as the .Homan. I f so 'logic' demanded i t e r -
ation as an explanation of Philopoemen's exercise of the stra/tegia 
both i n the autumn and i n the foilov/ing spring. But the fundamental 
point, v/.hich must be emphasised, i s that the confusion, as i n the 
v/hole of the passage i n which this phj.-ase occurs, i s Livy's ov/n.. 
Aymard has shown conclusively that there was no need for i t e r a t i o n 
on m i l i t a r y grounds at the time of the Achaean elections;^'^ This 
together with the general chronological confusion regarding the 
order of events i n Peloponnese, which Holleaux has demonstrated, 
seems t o allow us to reject the apparently certain evidence of t h i s 
passage. 
V/e have as yet assembled no positive evidence with regard t o 
the i d e n t i t y of the strategos of I91/O, Aymard dismisses 
unreasona.bly, and without evidence or argument, the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
a fourth s t r a t e ^ i a before Philopoemen's second v i s i t to Crete; the 
in s c r i p t i o n v/hich mentions Philopoeraen's fourth stratjegia could as 
well refer to 2OI/O as 193/2, i n both of which years he made an 
expedition against Sparta i n v/hich Cretans pl3,yed a part; and v/e 
• • 25 prefer the e a r l i e r dating, Plutarch's phrase, cnpaxr^v elc 
xoWtov awToc xaTriYaye TOWG <pv-^abajz 1 can refer only to the year of 
Compasion; and c%paxrf((!ov etc ToWt6\r-'when strategos the next 
year' (Aymard) (Compasion, v/e know from Livy, v/as I88) jxriraa 
fji-cxe^ suggests that Plutarch has simply made a mistake, or misund-
erstood his source. Aymard's dissection of t h i s sentence, using 
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otpaTrffSov etc TOWIOV i-^ favour of I91/O v/hile accepting that the 
remainder of the sentence refers to 189/8 i s an abuse of language 
v/hich can f i n d no acceptance.'"^ 
L^ " crTpaT;T]Y<«v etc, toWiov i s t o be legitimately pressed for 
clrconological information, i t must be with reference to the Polybian 
mixture of si^ratej^os-jears and Olympiad years, v/hich Plutarch may 
27 
have telescoped i n t h i s section. By th i s argument, we must 
consider the autumn sjnodos of I 9 I to be i n the strategos-year I91/O 
( i . e . the sj^^flos ma.rks the beginning of the year); we then have 
the follov/ing equivalents: 
strategos-year I 9 I / 0 = 01. 147.2/3 
" " 190/89 = 01. 147.3/4 
" " 189/8 = 01. 147.4/148,1 
I n this v/ay i t i s possible to regard etc Tomrtov i n 01. l47 . 3 
(I91/O) as r e f e r r i n g to 01. 147.4 (189/8). Plutarch's accuracy i n 
taking his evidence from Polybius i s thus to some e.xtent (but t o r t -
uously) vindicated. The system i s ingenious; but argument must be 
brought against i t on the following grounds. Can elc TOWIOH even 
meaning 'in the next year', i n such a heterogeneous passage of 
Plutarch r e a l l y be pressed to give t h i s type of l o g i c a l chronol-
ogical consistency of detail? Did Plutarch i n fact know the dates 
of the events v/hich, i t i s argued, he i s defining BO accurately? 
I s t h i s not rather jus t another of Plutarch's attempts to pay li'p-
service to chronology, using i t i n the main to provide some kind of 
r e a l i t y through r e l a t i v i t y for the events he describes? The system 
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implies that he has consciously or unconsciously preserved the 
accuracy of his Polybian o r i g i n a l , despite the fact that he has 
himself grossly telescoped the events. This seems to me highly 
unlikely, and leads us to the second objection. 
There must alv/ays be some doubt as to Plutarch's source(s) 
for t h i s chapter; but for the v;hole of t h i s L i f e , he seems to have 
made some use of Polybius' Iife_^ X.ilhil£poSS§S» although he knev/ 
Histories and incorporated a large amount of d e t a i l from them. 
I n the Life_i_ there would not be the s t r i c t e r chronological 
accuracy which.Polybius observed i n the Histories; and i f Plutarch 
was using the Lif e at t h i s point - which we cannot demonstrate, 
althoupjh the anecdotal character of the chapter suggests t h i s - he 
had no accurate chronological source to follow. He therefore could 
not preserve i t s chronologica.l accuracy. The fact that Plutarch, 
wrote that the exiles v/ere restored i n the year after the synodos 
at v/hich Philopoemen admitted his interest i n them, indicates at 
most that Polybius wanted to give t h i s impression. Polytaius would 
probably not go as far as straight f a l s i f i c a t i o n of facts; but a 
plirase such as kv i^ eirtoucrri <rcpat:r]\Cq. would have the desired 
effe c t , and could easily be misinterpreted by Plutarch - who v/as, 
i n any case, not r e a l l y interested i n dates •- and genera.lised i n t o 
etc ToWtov . A further objection to tailing l i t e r a l l y eiQ 
ToWiov to mean 'in the next year', and using i t as a sound basis 
for chronological argument, i s the v/ay that Plutarch used the 
sources which were available to him. He did not s i t down to m'ite 
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vjith a l l his sources i n front of him, and simply extract portions 
v/hich were relevant to the scheme v;hich he had drawn up for his 
work. To suggest t h i s , as those who argue i n favour of the tortuous 
accuracy of etc xoWtov do, seems to be to misunderstand the way 
the v/riter works a.nd Plutarch was, above a l l , a competent v/riter. 
The continuity of the nari^ative depended upon Plutarch's memory of 
his sources to f i l l out the framev/ork of the chapters which he had 
drawn up. Constant checking of d e t a i l , where accuracy i n minutiae 
v;as unnecessary for his purpose, was not his method; and i n these 
circumstances, the p o s s i b i l i t y of relying with security on ^IQ 
2.8 
ToWtov for argument about the d e t a i l of chronology seems remote. 
I n addition, and of more immediate relevance to the present 
purpose, t h i s system provides no information about the strate_gos 
of 191/0, There i s one piece of evidence, v i r t u a l l y ignored by 
Ayraard, v/hich suggests that Philopoemen 
WHS i n • xs. 
'^^  strategos f o r 
191/0. Plutarch's account of the autumn sjnodos, and the part 
played by Philopoemen i n leading the objections to Glabrio and 
Flamininus, gives the impression that Philopoemen was i n a leading-
position. He v;anted the exiles restored, 'through himself and the 
Achaeans'. This i n i t s e l f i s no s o l i d proof that he was s^£ate£Os 
at the time of the sjngdos^'^ but i f the motivation, taken from 
Polybius, i s correct, i t must mean that i t vro,s generally kno\m that 
he was able, i f not w i l l i n g , to carry out - clearly by virtue ox 
his o f f i c i a l position - the restoration v/hich the Senate's repres-
entatives vjere beginning t o i n s i s t upon; and for t h i s reason was 
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leader of the opposition at the sjaodos. This would suggest that, 
i f he v/as not actually styateggs at the s^nodos, he must cit least 
have been already elected: the body which v/as prepared to elect 
him v-/ould naturally support his ojpposition to Glabrio and 
I'lamininus. The iirgument i s not absolutely decisive for a 
strsrtegia of Philopoemen i n I91/O, for i t i s possible to argue that 
the Polybian motivation i s simply apologetic ~ i n v/hich case no 
conclusion can be drav/n at a l l . Such an extreme situation, however, 
seems unlikely, and the balance i s heavily v/eighted i n favour of a 
£trate£ia of Philo]poemen i n I91/O. 
£i£SiS£2£ 190/89 i s not knov/n. I t i s possible that i t 
v/as Archon of Aegira. Polybius records an undated conversation 
betv/een Philopoemen and Archon at v/hich he himself had been present; 
but he v/ould be very young i n I9O/89, and t h i s i s an objection to 
the date, Hov/ever, although a,J)rijori a l a t e r date v/ould be pref-
erable, v/e cannot rule out .'\rchon for this year for this reason 
29 
alone, as our knov/ledge of Polybius' date of b i r t h i s so imperfect. 
The order of the fragments i n the Vatican palimpsest i s also 
against t h i s , although t h i s need not be decisive: the passage may 
not have been included i n the Histories at the point at v/hich the 
conversation occurred, or i t s position may have suffered a l t e r -
ation at the hands of the excerptor. However, although no cert-
ainty i s possible i n t h i s ca,se, i t does seem l i k e l y that i f Archon 
v/as not strategos, the post was occupied by another of Philopoemen's 
supporters: he had remained i n the forefront of Achaean p o l i t i c s 
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since his return from Crete; he himself had been s^trategos twice, 
and Diophanes had been elected as his supporter; he was again 
S££2i®.S.°£ Himself i n I89/8. I t i s inconceivable that this pattern 
should have been broken i n I9O/89. 
After general agreement about Philopoemen's straj^e^ia of 
189/8, the year of Compasion and the Spartan settlement, v;hich i s 
dated by Livy,^^ disagreement starts again. Aymard, with De 
Sanctis, leaves the £trate^^ of 188/? with no najne, suggests 
Philopoemen V I I for I87/6 and Aristaenus I I I for I86/5. Ni c c o l i n i , 
follov/ing Btlttner-V/obst, places Aristaenus I I I i n 188/7, follov/ed 
by Lycortas I87/6; but to do this he ignores the date of the 
successive embassies of Q. Caecilius Metellus (185), App. Claudius 
Pulcher ( l 8 4 ) , and Q. Marcius Philippus (l83).-^"'' These embassies 
record-ed by Livy, though dependent on the accuracy of the recording 
techniques of the Annalists, must have senatorial records at t h e i r 
base; and must be accepted as the most accurate indication we have. 
Aymard's.system preserves the necessary relationship between the 
Achaean strate£o± and the Roman embassies; but he does not account 
adequately for the reason which caused Niccolini to ignore Livy. 
This i s the passage of Polybius i n which he records an embassy to 
Rome by 6t)oapecjTr)aavTec Ttvec tm kv Aaxe6at|.i.ovt TOIC feyovocri 
and dates t h i s (aeaa %r\v ev TW Kop-iracrto^  TCOV avSpwrroiiv etravatpecrtv 
After spending some time i n Rome they managed to extract a l e t t e r 
from the consul of 18?, K. Aemilius Lepidus, i n which he said that 
he disapproved of the Achaean treatment of Sparta, Philopoemen 
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countered t h i s embassy m irpeoPewovToov eteectc . . . . TrpeopeWTOC 
^(ic^liv • To be able to do thi s i t i s clear that Philopoemen was 
£trat£g'oso Nicodemus returned sjid made his report to a s^ n^qdos 
v;hen Aristaenus was stva^^J^,os.'^'' I t i s agreed that Nicodemus 
could not have taken two years over his urgent mission:"^'^' hence 
Aristaenus appears to have been strate^os i n I88/7. This i s the 
reason why BUttner-VJobst and Hiccolini preferred to ignore Livy's 
dates for the Roman embassies, i n order to preserve f a i t h i n 
Polybius. Aymard recognised that t h i s i s i l l e g i t i m a t e , and 
accepted the secure dates offered by Livy. He then set out to 
resolve the dilemma raised by the date of the embassy of Nicoderaus; 
and v;e must examine his arguments closely i n t h i s . 
The main part of his proof i s his attempt to show that Pol. 
22.3 can be used to shov^  that the embassy of Nicodemus set out i n 
the (hypothetical) 7'th strategia of Philopoemen, I87/6, and 
eirrived back i n Achaea after a suitable i n t e r v a l to f i t i n v/ith 
''^He £trate£ia. of Aristaenus i n which Metellus v/as entertained at 
Argos i n I83 (Pol, 22, 7-10). His arguments about th i s passage 
are high].y tendentious, and. extreme sympathy v d t h his views would 
be necessary before any p o s s i b i l i t y of accepting them appeared. 
The fragment of Polybius 22,3 g i v e s a perfectly clear and consis-
tent picture of what actually h a p p e n e d ; and there i s no need to 
dissect i t to f i t a i D r e c o n c e i v e d theory. 
I n order to support his case, Aymard has to argue that the 
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Spartan ajnba,ssadors v/ent secretly to Rome, unknovm to Philopoemen, 
and stayed there several months v/ithout his finding out that they 
had even gone. He arg-ues that they must have got t h e i r l e t t e r from 
Lepid.us just before he l e f t for his province, returned to Achaea 
and presented i t t o the Acliaeans. VJhen Philopoemen v/as elected i n 
autumn 18? - several months after the return of the Spartans - he 
sent Nicodemus. Polybius describes the same set of events much 
more comprehensibly: Philopoemen sent Nicodemus irpeapettovTwv 
e{)^ ecoc • Later he describes the time of the embassy of Micoderaus 
as gxt fcXoirot|aevoc crcpatTyY'otSv'coi; (22.7.1)5 shov/ing clearly that 
i t l e f t l a t e i n the s t r a t e ^ i a of Philopoemen, not early, as 
Aymard's argument for I87/6 requires. This last phrase Aymard does 
not discuss; the f i r s t he v i r t u a l l y ignores: he claims to be 
interpreting the phrase, whereas i n fact he i s making nonsense of 
Polybius' language. According to him trpecjpevovTWV evSetccM^st 
m.ean, 'some months aft e r the Spartan envoys had completed t h e i r 
embcissy and brought back a l e t t e r from Lepidus'. This he claims 
35 
i s 'nullement en contradiction avec les textes'. 
He also provides various supporting arguments for his central 
thesis, and v/e must exajnin.e thera. 'Si . . , tons les evenements 
racontes par Polybe dans les fragments 22.3 et ''4, montrent 
Philopoemen exercant sa sixi^rae, et non sa septieme strategie (by 
his reckoning t h i s would be 187/6: cf. table), s ' i l s doivent par 
consequent se placer avant I'automne 188, Polybe n'en p a r l e r a i t 
tres probablement pas dans l a ih^^ olympiade, comme i l le fait'.'^'^ 
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The reason for t h i s argu.ment is that Polytaius tends to protract 
his Olym-piad years to coincide v/ith the Achaean £trategos year; 
i n t h i s case the excerptor's in.treduction to the previous frtigraent 
37 
i n giqc_. _de_ legat .^^  gent . ad Rom, dates i t to the iVSth Olympiad. 
I f the order of the fragments i s to be preserved, Aymard argues, 
22.3 was also dated to the l48th Olympiad by Polybius. Therefore 
the Spartan embassy v/as after the end of Philopoemen's s i ^ r a i ^ i a . 
Another principle i n dating the fragments of Polybius, which 
must be used to supplement and emend the order of the fragments i n 
the Constantinian collections - v/hich must have been liable to a l t -
eration, even i f only by accident ~ i s the internal evidence 
provided by each individual fragment. This v/as not subject to 
displacement by the excerptors; and v/here i t exists i s a much 
sounder basis for calculation than the order of the fragments i n 
the excerpts, as i t certainly goes back to Polybius himself. In 
t h i s case we Mve i t specified i n Polybius' own v/ords that the 
Spartan embassy v/as despatched (ieta TT)V ev Tcp Ko|.iTra<Ttw TWV 
avSpwTTOJV ETravaupeatV, and wv irpeopevovxwv e^SecoCdates the action 
of Philopoem.en i n despa.tching Nicodemus -- which cannot, as v/e have 
shov/n, bear the interpretation v/hich Aymard requires. The whole 
point i n Polybius' dating the Spartan embassy by the reference to 
Compasion i s that i t v/3.s closely subsequent to i t . As the massacre 
at Gompasion took place i n June lo8 at the lates t , and v/as quickly 
follov/ed by the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the settlement at the Tegea 
SEP^Si?™' t h i s discontent could v/ell have come to a head by 
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August, cuid caused the embassy to be sent to Rome - there i s no 
need, v;ith Aymard, to assume that every d e t a i l of the settlement 
had to be completely put i n t o operation before discontent could 
take t h i s physical form. 
The inter.nal evidence of 22,3 decisively confirms that the 
actions recorded took place i n the same strategos-year as the 
Compasion massacre, and therefore (by Ayraard's system of reckoning) 
i n the 6th, rather than the 7th strate^ia of Philopoemen. There i s 
s t i l l , hoxifever, the order of the fragments. The principle has 
already been stated that certain i n t e r n a l evidence should take pre-
cedence over the Gonstantinian order of the fragments i n case of 
c o n f l i c t . I n t h i s case there is more reason than usual for 
rejecting Aymard's reliance on the apparent evidence from 22.1. 
For 22.1 and 2 are simply a table of contents for book 22, which 
contains the bulk of the I'-hutYi Olympiad. I n t h i s , the events 
detailed i n 22.3 are not even summarised; and although Aymard 
t r i e s to make l i g h t of t h i s , i t could only be i f they v/ere cert-
ainly a t t r i b u t e d to 01.148 i n the fragment of introduction 22.1 by 
the excerptors, that we could be sure that t h i s was so; and 
therefore be prepared to seek an alternative explanation of the 
obvious dci.te of events mentioned i n 22.3- I t i s clear then, that 
the a t t r i b u t i o n of the events mentioned i n 22.1 and 2 to 01.148 -
v/hich vie have no reason to dispute i n i t s e l f - does not affect i n 
any v/ay the dating of events recorded i n 22.3, which i s an inde-
pendently collected fragment, and has su f f i c i e n t i n t e r n a l 
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c l T T o n o l o g i c a l e v i d e n c e to refute Aymard's objection. 
.Aymard's second objection had already been dealt with - that 
a l l the terms of the settlement would have to be f u l f i l l e d before 
i t was thought worth while appealing to Rome. He says •- without 
r e a l l y shov.dng v/hy - that the embassy could not have arrived i n 
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Rome much before November, I t has already been suggested that as 
early as August matters at Sparta would be clear enough i n outline 
to j u s t i f y an embassy from the humiliated party; and Ayraard 
raises no fundamental issue v;hich would cause us to doubt t h i s . 
His t h i r d objection to the more reasonable interpretation of 
22.3 i s that, 'tres probablement, Philopoimen n'envoie Nikodemos a 
Rome qu'apres avoir connu l a l e t t r e de Lepidus' .'^'^  I n this place 
he simply ignores the evidence of 2av irpecrpeuovTOov euSewc • 'On. pense 
en e f f e t q u ' i l constitue cette ambassade des q u ' i l apprend le 
depart des Lacedaimoniens. C'est suppose.r que ce depart n'est pas 
tenu secret; mais r i e n ne l e prouve'. The reason why v;e conclude 
that P'hilopoenien sent the embassy v/hen he heard of the Spartan, i s 
]2^ i^L?®.J.^ lZi'i^ .^S®ZS.J50 - not as a result o f any a_j2Liori 
argumentation such as Aj^mard t r i e s to use to discredit Polybius' 
statement. There i s no need to follov/ him through the intrica.cies 
of his fundamentally fa u l t y argument, and show disagreements at 
each stage: once the keystone i s removed, the whole edifice f a l l s . 
After disposing i n th i s way of Aymard's attempt to postdate 
the embassy of Nicoderaus, we are reduced to the o r i g i n a l dilemma, 
v/hich made Aymard set out on his precarious course, of f i t t i n g 
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together the return of Nicodemus i n the s^;^a;tegia of Aristaenus a:Qd 
the reception of 0. Caecilius Metellus by the Achaeans, also i n the 
£trate^a of Aristaenus. This Livy dates to 185, making Aristaenus 
certainly ^tra^tegos I86/5. Aymard's arguments for a si^_tegia of 
Philopoemen i n I87/6 depend on his dating the embassy of Nicodemus 
to t h i s year; and since t h i s i s not possible, the iden t i t y of the 
Si£^JiS£S.^ must remain i n doubt. The dilemma arises from the 
admitted impossibility of allowing more than two years for the 
embassy of Nicodemus, on which a l l v/riters are agreed, and i n v/hich 
we concur. 
The resolution of the d i f f i c u l t y seems to l i e i n the examin-
ation of the fragment of Polybius i n which the return of the 
embassy of Nicodemus i s reported as well as the return of Lycortas 
from Egypt, v-.rho had also been sent by Philopoemen the previous 
year. Two meetings are recorded: one a sjnjodgs when ..Iristaenus v/as 
strategos; t h i s v/as the meeting vrblch heard the reports of the 
embassies, and received those from Eumenes and Seleucus IV, The 
second i s the meeting of the magistrates (apxac) at Argos, tfic 
iravT]YWpefc)G &,Xjja^ ovoT)C, also summoned by the strate_gos Aristaenus, 
to receive Metellus. This i s dated quite veig^uely as p.eia be 
taZxa, A l l previous v/riters have assumed gratuitou.sly that both 
of these meetings were i n the same year; and that there i s there-
fore c o n f l i c t between Livy's date for the mission of Metellus, and 
the return of the embassies from Some and Kgypt. There i s i n fact 
no reason for assuming that both the meetings v/ere i n the same year: 
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the second meeting i s simply (^em &e xa^Ttt" v/hich i n a fragment 
such as v/e have can mean v i r t u a l l y any length of time. As v/e 
know certainly from Livy that Metellus was i n Greece i n I85, i t i s 
clear that the meeting of the magistrates vjas i n I83, that the 
f e s t i v a l i s the Nemea of I83, and that Aristaenus was s_trate_g_os 
186/5. This must be beyond dispute, and Aymard was r i g h t to 
Hasise i t . 
The dispute comes over the earli e r meeting. Ayraard simply 
assumes that i t was e a r l i e r i n 185, and his arguments, as v/e have 
seen, become very involved i n his attempt t o prove t h i s . But there 
i s , i n f a c t , no reason why the synodos should not be i n I87 -- the 
natural date at which one would expect the Achaean embassies to 
return. Aymard argues against 187, as he thinks this involves pre-
dating the em.bassy of Metellus; and most of his arg-uraents depend 
on t h i s . But there i s one further point which he raises against 
187 v/hich may be raised against i t s t i l l , despite the fact that i t 
i s recognised that Metellus' embassy need not be i n the same year 
as the sjnodos. This i s the matter of the presence of simbassadors 
from Seleucus IV at the sjnodos_ i n order to renew the existing 
4-2 
alliance, ' Antiochus I I I did not die u n t i l 3rd or 4th June 187; 
therefore Seleucus could hot send out ambassadors before t h i s date. 
This precision for the date of the death of Antiochus, which 
creates a jL?iIS2i£]ig™E2§i.i3ii§iH Seleucus' despatch of the embassy, 
d.epends on evidence v/hich was not available when Aymard v/as 
4-3 
wr i t i n g . Nevertheless, he v/ould have found i t s u f f i c i e n t l y conc-
lusive for his purposes, as he thought the sjnodos_ must be e a r l i e r 
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i n the year than the Nemea (July), v/hich, v/e are arguing, v/as two 
years l a t e r . Without t h i s objection, the sjnodos can v/ell be i n 
the late summer of 187. I f the embassy to Achaea was sent out 
quickly, i t could be i n Greece by September, i n plenty of time to 
be received by the straie£os Ai-istaenus before the end of his year. 
Thus the appearance of the ambassadors from Seleucus at the s^aodos 
d be no objection to a strategic of Aristaenus i n I88/7 as well nee . 
as 186/5.^ "^ ^ 
We can now give secure dates to the events recorded i n the 
fragments of Polybius, which Aymard has called i n t o question. 22.3 
refers, as seems obvious, to 188; 22.7-9 deals v/ith the s^ nLS-^ SS 
late summer I87, i n the t h i r d strate^ia of Aristaenus (I88/7); 
22.10, i n agreement v/ith Livy 39.2^ ,'-. 13^  refers to 185, i n the fourth 
stratej^ia of Aristaenus, (I86/5). V/e have thus resolved the 
apparent c o n f l i c t betv/een Livy and Polybius; and i n the process 
have revealed another certain strategia. for j\ristaenus. 
With Aristaenus securely fixed i n I88/7 and 186/3, we must 
consider I87/6. Aymard, as a result of his misunderstanding the 
dates of the two meetings, and his resultant post-dating of the 
mission of Nicodemus, f i l l s i n the gap v/ith the strat^egia V I I of 
Philopoemen. The evidence f o r this disappears v/ith the collapse of 
his system for the £trat£giai of Aristaenus, and the gap remains. 
Btlttner-Wobst and Ni c c o l i n i , who do not attempt to reconcile the 
evidence of Polybitis and Livy, are of no help i n com.pleting the l i s t 
at 187/6. In fact there i s no evidence pointing to the name of the 
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2ii;^ ®^£2£ for t h i s year; and i t i s accordingly impossible to f i x 
i t with any certainty. The argument i n favour of Philopoemen i s 
that he was i n his 8th Btrate|£ia v/.hen he died, and we have so far 
accouirted with certainty for 6 others. I n fact, i t i s quite poss-
i b l e , and indeed l i k e l y , that he had held another unknov/n s t j r a ^ e g i a 
before his second v i s i t to Crete - a p o s s i b i l i t y which has already 
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been considered. On the other hand, as Aymard prefers, he may 
have been re-elected i n l87. Heavily against t h i s (and therefore 
heavily i n favour of the earlier unknov/n strategia) i s the gross 
incompetence v/hich he had been shov/n to have exercised over the 
renev/al of the treaty v/ith Ptolemy, ^his, £is v/e have seen, was i n 
late summer I87, only a short time before the elections. I t v/as a 
major triumph for Aristaenus, and i t makes i t seem extremely doubt-
f u l whether Philopoemen v/ould have been re-elected so soon after 
t h i s demonstration of his incompete.nce. 
Another p o s s i b i l i t y for I87/6 i s Archon. The evidence for a 
st r a t e ^ i a of Archon i n I87/6 i s the same as that used to suggest the 
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p o s s i b i l i t y that he might have been stra^tegos I9O/89. The date 
BUttner-V/obst and Nicc o l i n i f i x for Archon i s l85/4; Ayraard prefers 
184/3, as he r i g h t l y has Lycortas i n l85/4 at the time of the 
embassy of App. Claudius Ftilcher. This date for .Archon depends on 
the position i n Polybius' text of the fragment from the Vatican 
palimpsest, which BUttner-Wotast arranges as 22.19, There i s i n t h i s 
case no precise in t e r n a l evidence regarding the date of the frap;~ 
ment. The previous fragment of Vaticanus i s spe c i f i c a l l y a t t r i b u t e d 
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to book 22, but t h i s i s the only indication. I t i s therefore 
possible that Archon v/as strategos_ i n I87/6: there i s not, to the 
same extent, the objection, v^fhich v/as raised against I9O/89, about 
the age of Polybius, But i n neither case i s i t possible to be sure; 
and i n the circumstances, i t i s perhaps best to leave the year v/ith-
out a name, while acknov/ledging the p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 
For 186/5 v/e have Aristaenus secure. l85/4 i s equally securely 
fixed for Lycortas by the embassy of App. Claudius Pulcher, who was 
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appointed on the return of Metellus, i n Spring l84. V/ith l84/3 
the problem of the date of the death of Philopoemen f i r s t requires 
solution before any attempt can be made to name the strate£os. 
Attempts at f i x i n g a generally a^greed date for the death of 
Philopoemen have been notoriously unsuccessful. Opinion has gener-
a l l y been divided i n t o two groups, one favouring I83 and the other 
182, depending on whether i t v/as considered that Livy i n 39.49-50 
had brought forv/ard his account by one year, or not. The two most 
recent attempts at the problem each suggest a new approach; but 
reach the same diversity of result. Aymard comes down i n favour of 
182, and Hoffmann c r i t i c i s e s Aymard's methods and accepts I83, llie 
arguments of Ayraard cannot be said to have yet firmly established 
the case for l82. His fundamental v/eakness, as Hoffmann i s quick 
to point out, i s the excessive reliance v/hich he places on the 
order of the Polybian fragments i n the excerpts, i n order to f i x 
the £t£ate_gia of Archon i n l8V3» thus forcing the acceptance of I 
Philopoemen for I83/2, and as a result:, his death i n May/June l82 
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( to agree v/ith Pausanias' irepl ax(iTiv m 'Tou) . '^^  
Hoffmann's arguments, depending as they do on a different 
approach to the problem of the date, shed a great deal of new 
l i g h t on the issue; and although v/e f i n d his conclusion unaccept-
able, the application of his methods gives us the p o s s i b i l i t y of a 
new argument for I82. V/e must examine his position i n d e t a i l . 
Much labour has been expended on the issue of the synchronism 
of the deaths of Hannibal, Scipio Africanus, and Philopoemen. The 
question at issue has been v/hether Polybius meant Roman consul-
year, Olympiad year, or Achjaean &trate£os~year, Hoffmann's disc-
ussion of t h i s issue i s admirable, concluding as he does that 
Polybius simply meant a 12-month period, and that i t i s not possible 
50 
to press the matter beyond t h i s . Although the scheme proposed 
here would f i t i n t o an Olympiad year, t h i s i s not an important part 
of the demonstration. 
Hoffmann, uses as the basis of his argume.nt for I83 the clnron-
ological relationship betv/een the embassy of Q. Marcius Philippus 
to Macedon and Peloponnese and the Messenian war, i n the course of 
v/hich Philopoemen died. This i s suggested by Livy 39.48.5f., and 
must be talcen i n t o account. Other evidence v/hich Hof.fmann uses i s 
the reference i n the speech of Gallicrates - almost certainly 
accurate: neither Callicrates nor Polybius had reason to f a l s i f y 
the facts ~ to the fact that, 'at the time of the Messenian v/ar, 
Q. Marcius Philippus acted vigorousD.y to prevent the Achaeans from 
deliberetting about the Messenians without the prior consultation 
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51 of the Senate, but they did not l i s t e n to him, and voted for v/ar..'-^ 
The obvious conclusion to be gathered from t h i s i s that the war had 
not been declared when Philippus met the Achaeans, but was either 
at that time or shortly afterv/ards; also that there v/as a state 
existing i n which war might be considered necessary at any time. 
Further to t h i s i s the report of Philippus i n winter I83/2, to the 
effect that the Achaeans did not want Roman consultation, but would 
come to heel when the Spartans joined the Messenians, This simply 
implies that he Imev/ that war had been declared by the Achaeans at 
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the time he v/as making his report. 
From these pieces of evidence, the passage i n Livy, and the 
account i n Plutarch v/hich suggests that Philopoemen's last exped-
53 
i t i o n v/as a hasty undertaking, Hoffmann concludes that: 
Philopoemen had died on the outbreak of war early i n I83 (irepl 
&X|iT)v criTot))'^ ^  which v/as the war of Deinocrates, b£_fore the formal 
war decree had been passed; Philippus t r i e d to prevent this when 
he arrived i n Achaea, but f a i l e d ; and the war then dragged on u n t i l 
i t v/as b r o L i g h t to an end early i n l82. The war must continue i n t o 
182 as we have records of two separate Achaean embassies to Rome, 
one i n v/inter I83/2, v/hich simply asked the Senate for help i n pre-
venting the shipment o f strategic material to Messene from I t a l y ; 
the second after the conclusion of the v/ar, when Bippus of Argos 
reported to the Senate what had been accomplished by the Achaeans. 
This must have been the following v/inter, I82/I, as the Achaean 
settlement v/ith Messene v/as not arranged u n t i l the second s^nodos 
(perhaps July).-^-^ 
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There are considerable objections t o telescoping i n t h i s way 
a l l the events we know i n t o 183, and then extending the war a f t e r 
the death of Philopoemen f o r another whole year. F i r s t l y the 
d e c l a r a t i o n o f war. Hoffmann claims the support of the second sent-
ence of L i v y 39,-,'-8.5 f o r h i s dating the existence of the war i n 
summer I83. But he had f a i l e d t o analyse the passage adequately. 
I f any r e l i t u i c e i s t o be placed on t h i s at a l l , i t must be taken 
cl o s e l y i n context v i i t h the f i r s t sentence of ''f8.5 - the appointment 
of Philippuso The i m p l i c a t i o n then i s clear t h a t he was appointed 
because of the already e x i s t i n g Messenian t r o u b l e . This means t h a t 
the t r o u b l e must have broken out i n autumn l 8 4 f o r news of i t t o 
have reached Rome i n time f o r consideration; i t i s thus not possible 
t o press the argument from P l u t . Ph. 18 about Philopoemen expecting 
an easy year, as Hoffmann wants t o do i n favour of 184/3 against 
183/2. For Philopoemen must have knov/n about the impending war a t 
the time, even i f Messene had not a.ctually seceded a t the time o f 
the e l e c t i o n s . So i n t h i s respect Hoffmann i s no b e t t e r o f f w i t h 
183 than 182. 
I f the war had been continuing during the sp r i n g and summer o f 
183 before P h i l i p p u s a r r i v e d i n Achaea, and i f Philopoemen had been 
k i l l e d also before h i s a r r i v a l , i t would be extrem.ely strange t o 
f i n d the d e c l a r a t i o n of v/ar put o f f f o r so long so tha t Philippus -
whose main task v/as, a f t e r a l l , v/ith Macedonia - could s t i l l play 
a p a r t i n the discussions.. Hoffmann argues i n favour of t h i s t h a t 
the e x p e d i t i o n of Philopoemen v/as an 'improvisiertes Unternehmen'. 
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But he ignores the evidence of Pausanias t h a t Lycortas had already 
been despatched avv crTpai:cq. 5 v/hen Philopoefflen r^ifeKYeto 
[xetaaxeXv AvxopTq. to? Spyow • 'i'his second phrase i s unmotivated, 
but i f v^ e supply the background from Plutarch and Llvy - the 
sudden a t t a c k on Corone - a sound reason f o r Philopoemen's second 
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thoughts about j o i n i n g the expedition becomes apparent. The war 
seerns t o have been, i n f a c t , on a large scale, w i t h the Achaean 
army i n large numbers, therefore n e c e s s i t a t i n g a p r i o r d e c l a r a t i o n 
of wa.r. I f P h i l i p p u s had t r i e d t o prevent t h i s , i t must have been 
before t h i s e x p e d i t i o n , and therefore before the death of 
Philopoemen. This i s possible, though i t makes i t necessary f o r 
Philippus t o appear i n Peloponnese e a r l y i n the year. 
There i s hov/ever more obje c t i o n than t h i s . To s u i t the 
records v/hich we have of Achaean ambassadors t o Rome, the v/ar must 
drag on f o r a year, ending i n I82. This i s not at a l l the impre-
ssion which the sources give: Plutarch, Livy and Pausanias are 
agreed ( a l l take t h e i r accounts i n some way from Polybius), t h a t 
the r e t r i b u t i v e expedition of Lycortas was not long a f t e r the death 
of Philopoemen; and Polytaius himself implies unequivocall.y t h a t 
r-g 
the v/ar was over by the second s^.odos_ (perhaps July)."^ I t i s 
contrary t o a l l the i n d i c a t i o n s of the sources t h a t t h i s should be 
the second s^no^SS °^ ''^''^^ year a f t e r the death of Philopoemen. I t 
must be the same year; and i f Hoffmann i n s i s t s on I83 f o r the 
death, the end of the war must be 183 too. This of course, leaves 
us w i t h the problem of the Achaean embassies t o Rome, I f v;e 
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accept 183 f o r the death of Philopoemen and the end of the war, 
these two d i f f e r e n t embassies must have appeared a t Eome i n the 
same v/inter. I t i s clear t h a t they d i d not: the f i r s t would be 
rendered f u t i l e by the presence of the second, and we knov; t h a t the 
Senate r e p l i e d t o both. I83 therefore cannot be accepted. 
One l a s t o b j e c t i o n which must be raise d against I83 i s the 
mission of Deinocrates t o Rome, and h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h Flamiininus. 
At some time e a r l y i n 183 Deinocra.tes appeared at Rome; t h i s was 
probably a f t e r the usual time f o r sen3,torial receptions, as 
Flamininus had already been appointed l^e^atus t o Prusias; i n any 
case, Deinocrates does not seem t o have been o f f i c i a l l y received 
by the Senate. I f the passage of the Suda included by BUttner-
Wobst as Pol. 23.5.A'" 13 i s c o r r e c t l y placed - as i s clear from 
Livy's date f o r the embassy of Flamininus - even i f v;e make dxxe 
allowance f o r tendentiousness v/here an enemy i s concerned, the 
i n d i c a t i o n s are t h a t Deinocrates spent a considerable time i n Home 
i n the s o c i a l d e l i g h t s of diplomatic society; no doubt too he 
made arrangements a t t h i s time f o r the supplies t o be shipped t o 
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Messene, v;hich worried the Achaeans so much l a t e r i n the year. 
I n f a c t , i t seems quite l i k e l y t h a t he stayed a t l e a s t up t o the 
Peloponnesian harvest time - the time of year of the death of 
Philopoemen - as these arrangements may w e l l have taken some time 
to complete. The p o i n t of t h i s o b j e c t i o n i s t h a t i f Deinocrates 
v/as i n Rome i n spr i n g 183, He could not at the same time be i n 
Messene fomenting r e v o l u t i o n against Achaea. We know tha t he 
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hoped, even u n t i l the time of Flamininus' abortive request t o the 
Achaeans f o r a S S c l e t o s , t h a t h i s influence w i t h Plamininus would 
be s u f f i c i e n t t o get him v/hat he wanted f o r Messene. I t can only 
have been v/hen t h i s f a i l e d t h a t he had t o put his secondary plan 
i n t o operation - v/hich must even then have taken some time - of 
open war.^*^ There j u s t v/as not enough time f o r a l l t h i s before the 
Peloponnesian harvest-time of I83; and therefore another scheme 
f o r the chronology of these events, which takes acco^^nt of a l l the 
evidence, must be p r e f e r r e d i n place of Hoffmann's u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , 
though i l l u m i n a t i n g , scheme. 
I n order t o achieve t h i s , v/e must f i r s t r e j e c t the i m p l i c a t i o n s 
of L i v y 39• A'-S.55 t h a t the v/ar s t a r t e d i n autumn l8'^ i- - as v;ould 
Hoffmann ~ as a confusion of the usual junction-passage type. At 
the same time, of course, Livy has brought forward by one year the 
Polybian chapters 9^ and 50, which, despite t h i s , are i n t e r n a l l y 
r e l i a b l e . V/ith t h i s s a i d , the re c o n s t r u c t i o n can be attempted. 
I n s p r i n g I83 ~ sometime a f t e r s e n a t o r i a l appointments had been 
made ~ Deinocrates a r r i v e d i n Rome, made contact w i t h Flamininus 
and other persons who might be able t o supply v;hat he vjanted f o r 
the contemplated Messenian r e v o l t , and arranged f o r the shipment of 
t h i s m a t e r i a l . This took the greater p a r t of the summer; and when 
Deinocrates, t r a v e l l i n g w i t h Flaraininus, a r r i v e d at Naupactus, i t 
was already autumn and Philopoemen had taken o f f i c e as strategos. 
There i s no d i f f i c u l t y i n p l a c i n g Flamininus* departure so l a t e i n 
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the year, as he does not appear i n Eome again u n t i l iSl.^"'" 
Philopoemen refused t o c a l l a syncletos f o r Flaraininus. I t must 
have been already well Imovin i n Achaea t h a t Deinocrates was w e l l on 
the path t o r e v o l u t i o n when his hopes i n the e f f i c a c y of Flamininus' 
i n t e r v e n t i o n were dashed. A discussion therefore on the matter of 
v;ar or peace v;ith Messene must have followed f a i r l y quickly on the 
r e t u r n of Deinocrates; and Ph i l i p p u s , r e t u r n i n g from Macedonia, 
v;as i n e f f e c t i v e i n h i s attempt t o get the matter r e f e r r e d t o Rome. 
Hov;ever, an embassy was sent to the Senate asking them t o prevent 
m a t e r i a l from being shipped t o Messene. 
Over the v/inter P h i l i p p u s reported t o the Senate; and the 
Achaean envoy received an u n s a t i s f a c t o r y r e p l y . V/hen spring came, 
Achaea v/as a t v/ar w i t h Messene, and Philopoemen was k i l l e d i n the 
course of i t . A f t e r h i s death i t took Lycortas some two months t o 
f i n i s h o f f the v/ar before the second s^^2£^^5 "^•'^  i"- ''^^^  autumn 
Bippus of Argos v/as sent t o Rome t o t e l l the Senate the r e s u l t o f 
the war. 
This scheme f o r the events of I83/2 explains a l l the source 
problems and creates no more. Livy's mistake i s common enough i n 
his v/ork t o arouse no serious objection. The synchronism i s e a s i l y 
explained, e i t h e r on the Olympiad reckoning, or Hoffmann's 12~month 
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p e r i o d system. Scipio's death can be put as l a t e as August I83 
(though there i s no need f o r the sake of the present argument f o r 
i t t o be placed at i t s chronological l i m i t ) ; Hannibal's, as 
I-Ioifmann says, can be s p r i n g or ea r l y summer I82 - while Flamininus 
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was i n the east, i n any case, t o account f o r h i s t r a d i t i o n a l assoc-
i a t i o n w i t h Hannibal's death;""^ and Philopoemen's at harvest-time -
May or June - 182. 
V/e can now r e t u r n t o the Achaean £trategos l i s t . As we have 
established t h a t Philopoemen met h i s death i n l8r2, i n h i s 8th 
Si^^iSSr^:? must have been stTa.te£os I83/2. This leaves us a gap 
u n f i l l e d , l8A'-/3. Aymard argues a t l e n g t h from the order of the 
Polybian fragments i n Vaj;_icaHUs t h a t Archon was strate_£os i n t h i s 
year. But we have already shovm t h a t Archon's strategia. cannot be 
f i x e d e x a c t l y by t h i s method, as there i s no i n t e r n a l evidence i n 
the fragment i t s e l f which gives us any c e r t a i n i n d i c a t i o n of the 
precise date. The most we can say i s t h a t l o V 3 i s a p o s s i b i l i t y 
f o r Archon, i n the same way as I87/6 i s a p o s s i b i l i t y . The a 
^ r i o r j . argument from the age of Polybius which we used against 
190/89 cannot be applied at a l l against l8V3; but t h i s i s no 
p o s i t i v e argument i n favour of the year being the s t r a t e g i a of 
Archon. Hov;ever, we can conclude v;ith some c e r t a i n t y t h a t i f 
Archon was not s^ateg_os i n l8V3? the o f f i c e must have been held 
by some other supporter of Philopoemen, thus maintaining unbroken 
the succession of Philopoemenist sj^ na;c£^ iai^ _ 
A f t e r Philopoemen's death, Lycortas, with the intermediacy of 
his predecessor i n o f f i c e , (perhaps Archon), took over the vacant 
o f f i c e f o r the remainder of the year.*^^ The stra;b£g_os f o r I82/I 
again i s extremely uncertadn. I t i s suggested, both by BUttner-
VJobst/Niccolini and Aymard, th a t i t was Lycortas; and De Sanctis 
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accepts t h i s with a query. Reasons f o r t h i s Ejre not very comp-
u l s i v e . As Aymard p o i n t s out, i t i s not possible t o show t h a t the 
Sicyon g^clet^^ - a t v/hich the r e i n c o r p o r a t i o n of Sparta v/ithin 
the League v/as discussed - v/as a f t e r the beginning of the strate^os; 
year 182/I. His ov/n argument, stemming from the proposed embassy 
of I,ycortas, Polybius and Aratus t o Ptolemy Epiphanes (v/hich d i d 
not a c t u a l l y set out, as Epiphanes died i n the meanv/hile), i s 
suggested by the order of the fragments of Polybius, and cannot be 
regarded as conclusive. His r e j e c t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the 
r a t i f i c a t i o n of the t r e a t y with Ptolem.y during Lycortas' stra.te£ia 
of l85/'^ .S v/hich he b o l s t e r s up with his f a u l t y dating of the 
Megalopolis sjmodos of I87, equally cannot serve as proof. There 
i s no reason v/hy we should not allov/ the p o s s i b i l i t y of a r a t i f -
i c a t i o n i n 185/A'-. 
This 8.djnis8ion destroys Aymard's arguments f o r a more c e r t a i n 
strc;;;tegia of L y c o r t a s . i n 182/I. On the other hand i t does nothing 
t o remove the a^^lorl l i k e l i h o o d of t h i s . Lycortas v/as now head 
of Philopoem.en's p a r t y ; and his course i n his stop-gap sj:rat_e£3-a 
of 182 v/as consp)icuously successful. One could e a s i l y conceive 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of h i s being re-elected i n the autumn - there was 
probably no room f o r the n o n - i t e r a t i o n r u l e here, as the stop-gap 
^?iLt£,Si?: ^ "'^ s irregu.lar. The Achaean unv/illingness t o act on the 
l e t t e r supplied by the Senate to the Spartan e x i l e s , and the 
eagerness t o shelve the ms.tter as soon as Bippus made h i s r e p o r t 
also suggest t h i s , but do not add anything t o make Lycortas more 
c e r t a i n l y strategog• 
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-'-^•'^'5 Si£IL£SJ22S °^ l o l / O was Hyperbatu.s„ During h i s £t£atej£ia 
the a b o r t i v e embassy t o Epiphanes was plann.ed; and a meeting a t 
v;hich the Spartan question was discussed v;as held.°'^ The order of 
the fragm.ents ~ i n t h i s case the only chronological i n d i c a t i o n we 
have ~ suggests t h a t the mission t o Ptolemy vras planned and f r u s t -
r a t e d before the meeting a t v/hich the e x i l e s were discussed took 
place, and the embassy of G a l l i c r a t e s , Lydiades and Aratus was sent 
t o Rome. Since Aratus was a member both of the a b o r t i v e mission t o 
Epiphanes and the mission t o Home, the embassies cannot have been 
contemplated, a t the same time. Since the order of the fragments 
suggests t h a t the mission t o Some was second, vje must define as 
clo s e l y as possible the date of the abandomnent of the - Egyptian 
mission. As the news that Epiphanes had died prevented the mission 
s e t t i n g out, i t cannot have been planned long before h i s death. 
The l a s t known document from the r e i g n of Epiphanes i s dated to 
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Pharmuthi 16 , year 25 20 May l80. This means t h a t the Achaean 
embassy cannot have been abandoned before t h i s date - and i n f a c t , 
probably somewhat l a t e r . 
Given t h i s d ating f o r the Egyptian mission, we must put the 
meeting a-t which the Spartan e x i l e s >;ere discussed a f t e r t h i s . 
This suggests t h a t the matter v;as perhaps brought up by the r e t u r n 
of another (otherwise unknovm) l e t t e r from the Senate, brought by 
the Spartan e x i l e s , r a t h e r than raised spontaneously by Hyperbatus, 
as Aymtird suggests. For t h i s t o be the case, we v/ould expect i t t o 
be bi'ought up as soon a.s Hyperbatus gained o f f i c e , i n autumn l 8 l ; 
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and the date of the Egyptian mission shows c l e a r l y t h a t t h i s v/as 
not so. There was p l e n t y of time before the date of t h i s s^oodos 
( a f t e r May 20th) f o r a Spartan embassy t o have returned from Rome 
69 
with a more f o r t h r i g h t l e t t e r . The Achaean embassy would then 
be despatched, and i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t they v/ould be received by 
the Senate before the v/inter 180/79, as they could scarcely a r r i v e 
before the a.utumn. This m.eans t h a t G a l l i c r a t e s could not be 
elected strat_egos i n autumn l80, as he v/as on t h i s mission at the 
time. He cannot t h e r e f o r e have d i r e c t l y succeeded Hyperbatus, as 
Aymard, De Sanctis and N i c c o l i n i agree he d i d , and be s;trate_gos 
180/79. The r e t u r n of the embassy, i f received by the Senate at the 
usual time, v/ould be i n s p r i n g 179; and as Polybius i s at pains t o 
p o i n t out t h a t G a l l i c r a t e s used the p r e s t i g e and influence v/hich he 
had gained on t h i s embassy t o secure the ^.t^ate^gia f o r the next 
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year, he must be strate^os 179/8„ 
This leaves a gap i n l80 /79 which i t i s not possible t o f i l l . 
I t i s j u s t possible t h a t the mission had been quickly accomplished, 
during the summer, and t h a t G a l l i c r a t e s v/as elected f o r I8O/79; 
but t h i s involves l e a v i n g l i t t l e gap betv/een each stage of the 
course of events knov/n during the year, and making the Senate meet 
i n high summer t o receive the Achaean embassy - v/hich by t h i s time 
must have been regarded as an annual occurrence, and of l i t t l e 
signi3?icance. I t seems altogether more l i k e l y t h a t the embassy was 
received a t the usual tim.e under the new consuls of 179» 
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SOME ACMEAN COINS 
Coinage of the Achaean League i s n o t o r i o u s l y d i f f i c u l t t o date, 
or even t o assign t o mints. As t h i s i s the task, of the professional 
numismatist, no attempt i s being made here t o o f f e r a comprehensive 
examination of the extant coins. One s i l v e r s e r i e s , however, seems 
t o o f f e r some evidence f o r the continuation i n a c t i v e existence of 
the Arcadian League, a f t e r Arcadia had been incorporated i n the 
Achaean League. This issue has occurred r e g u l a r l y i n every hoard. 
The coins are: obverse, hea.d of Zeus (the regular obverse both of 
the Arcadian and Achaean Leagnj.es); reverse, naked seated Pan w i t h 
the monogram e i t h e r MEr or AP (instead of the regular Achaean 
wreathed monogram)."'' The condition of these coins i n two hoards, 
probably buried i n the second century, has l e d the numismatists 
p u b l i s h i n g these hoards t o suggest t h a t they mv^st have been st r u c k 
comparatively soon before they were buried, therefore c e r t a i n l y 
during the p e r i o d of Achaean League dominance i n .Arcadia.^ The 
question a r i s e s as t o v;hy the c i t y or c i t i e s s t r i k i n g these coins 
v.;ere allovred t o perpetuate t h i s vestige of Arcadian separatism, 
instead of p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the f e d e r a l coinage. 
I t seems clear t h a t the coins with MEr represent Megalopolis, 
and i t i s possible t h a t (some o f ) the others v;ith AP instead of 
ME as monogram also o r i g i n a t e d i n Mega].opolis. Miss Grace, i n 
p u b l i s h i n g her hoard, tenta.tively a t t r i b u t e d the coins t o Megalopolis 
or Mantinea, and suggested t h a t they were "a manifestation of 
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'na t i o n a l consciousness'". This may, she suggests, have taken the 
form of a b r i e f r e v i v a l e a r l y i n the second century of the Arcadian 
League, under the leadership of one or other of the two c i t i e s to 
which she a t t r i b u t e s the coins. The r e a l o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s - v/hich 
she h e r s e l f recognises ~ i s simply t h a t there i s no shred of evid-
ence f o r such a movement; and general p o l i t i c a l conditions are 
s t r o n g l y against the hypothesis. The one case of disenchantment i n 
Arcadia leading t o a secession, v/as the case of the tov/ns which 
Fhilopoemen caused t o separate from Megalopolis i n 193; but th.ese 
were an a d d i t i o n t o the League, M, Thompson, i n publishing her 
hoard, suggests t h a t her coins of t h i s type were struck by 
Megalopolis purely as l o c a l issues, intended f o r l o c a l c i r c u l a t i o n 
only, and f o r t h i s reason d i d not com.e i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h f e d e r a l 
coinage p o l i c y . I f t h i s were the case, we should not expect these 
purely l o c a l coins t o have survived t o the quantity of approximately 
ll/'o i n these hoards ox mainly fe d e r a l s i l v e r . I n any case, i t seems 
u n l i k e l y t h a t coins intended f o r purely l o c a l c i r c u l a t i o n would be 
of s i l v e r . 
However, t h i s suggestion, implying t h a t the continuance of 
apparently independent Arcadian coinage xieed not i n d i c a t e any • 
n a . t i o n a l i s t i c c o n f l i c t or secessionist movement among the Arcadian 
members of the Achaean League, may provide the means t o a s o l u t i o n 
of the problem. The Arcadian League might be p o l i t i c a l l y defunct 
by the end. ox the t h i r d century, as other evidence suggests,'^ but 
i t c e r t a i n l y v/ould not be r e l i g i o u s l y defunct. I n t h i s r e l i g i o u s 
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sense, i t m i g h t be t r u e t o speak o f a ' n a t i o n a l consciousness' -
v / i t h o u t any o f t h e p o l i t i c a l o vertones w h i c h the phrase seems t o 
i m p l y ; f o r t h e r e i s no evidence o f mass Arcadian, d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n a.t 
t h e i r membership o f t h e Achaean League. 
Continuance o f t h e A r c a d i a n k o i n o n on a r e l i g i o u s b a s i s a f t e r 
234 ~ t h e y e a r o f M e g a l o p o l i s ' e n t r y i n t o the Achaean Leaf:?ue, and 
t h e r e f o r e c r i t i c a l f o r our purpose ~ i s suggested by two i n s c r i p t i o n s 
as w e l l as t h e c o i n s . The f i r s t , f r o m Magnesia on. Maeander, 
r e c o r d s a decree, p r o b a b l y o f M e g a l o p o l i s , i n f a v o u r o f r e c o g n i s i n g 
a s ^ l i a f o r t h e c u l t o f A r t e m i s Leucoph_ryene. I t concludes aMoXov&coc 
6e gSogev ilrric^icracr^at xal IOXQ &XXotc *Apxdcriv, f o l l o v / e d by a L i s t o f 
18 c i t i e s , w h i c h i n c l i i d e . t h e non~Arcadi£m c i t i e s o f P e l l e n e , T r i t a e a 
and Cerynea. A r e a s o n a b l e e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e presence i n the l i s t 
o f these c i t i e s i s t h a t t h e Magnesian mason or o f f i c i a l r e s p o n s i b l e 
s i m p l y d i d n o t d i s t i n g u i s h t h e Arcadians from non-Arcadians: t o him 
i t was c o n v e n i e n t t o d e s c r i b e a l l r e l a ^ t i v e l y obscure Peloponnesians 
as A r c a d i a n s . The d a t e o f t h e . i n s c r i p t i o n i s n o t known e x a c t l y . 
I t i s one o f a s e r i e s o f a s y l i a decrees f o r A r t e m i s Leucophryene 
n 
which D i t t e n b e r g e r , f o l l o v r i . n g Kern, p l a c e s i n 207/6. For our 
purpose t h e e x a c t date i s n o t i m p o r t a n t , as i t i s agreed t h a t i t i s 
c e r t a i n l y a f t e r 234. There i s n o t h i n g i n t h i s case which suggests 
t.b.at t h i s l i s t o f Arcad.ians represe.nts a s e c e s s i o n i s t movement; 
and as t h e y a r e i n v o l v e d i n a p u r e l y r e l i g i o u s f u n c t i o n , t h e n a t u r a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s t h a t t h e reason why t h e y r e t a i n e d t h e i r ' n a t i o n a l 
conscious.ness' was f o r t h i s r e l i g i o u s purpose. 
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The o t h e r i n s c r i p t i o n y i e l d s t h e same r e s u l t . I t i s a 
m u t i l a t e d decree r e c o r d i n g t h e posthumous h e r o i c honours t o be p a i d 
t o Philopoemen, Again t h e purpose i s e s s e n t i a l l y r e l i g i o u s , and 
a l t h o u g h t h e r e l e v a n t s e c t i o n i s t o o fr a g m e n t a r y t o p r o v i d e more 
thein t h e g e n e r a l o u t l i n e o f t h e sense, the words 'Apxcuji agi'av are 
p r e s e r v e d (1,3'^). The c o n t e x t of t h e decree makes i t s u f f i c i e J i t l y 
c l e a r t h a t t h e emphasis i s l a i d on t h e r e l i g i o u s aspect o f A r c a d i a , 
t h a t t h e h e r o i c honours f o r Philopoemen r e c a l l the t r a d i t i o n a l 
r e l i g i o u s and n a t i o n a l i s t i c background o f A r c a d i a , v / i t h o u t e x p r e s s i n g 
any sentim.ents as t o t h e p r e s e n t p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n o f the are a . 
T h i s c o n t i n u a t i o n o f an A r c a d i a n ' n a t i o n a l consciousness' i n 
th e r e l i g i o u s sphere o f f e r s an a c c e p t a b l e e x p l a n a t i o n o f the AP and 
MEr c o i n s . V/e must acce p t t h a t t h e r e v/as no s e c e s s i o n i s t s i g n i f -
iccince i n t h e i r i s s u e , and t h e r e i s l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y i n e n v i s a g i n g 
a s p e c i a l Acha.ean dispensa/tion t o M e g a l o p o l i s i n 23'^f- "to c o n t i n u e 
m i n t i n g her c o i n s i n t h e o l d s t y l e : M e g a l o p o l i s was an i m p o r t a n t 
a c q u i s i t i o n f o r t h e League, q u i t e i m p o r t a n t enough t o be a b l e t o 
e x t r a c t t h i s t y p e o f concession i n t h e e a r l y stages o f her member-
s h i p . S u g g e s t i v e o f t h e c o r r e c t n e s s o f t h e e x p l a n a t i o n i s a comp-
a r i s o n o f t h e w e i g h t s o f the d i f f e r e n t i s s u e s . The weights o f t h e 
MEr and AP c o i n s o f t h e Leagu.e p e r i o d i n t h e Herv/erden c o i n room o f 
th e Asbrnolean Miiseura a t O x f o r d compare f a v o u r a b l y with those o f t h e 
League c o i n s , v/hich. were clearly s t r u c k on the same s t a n d a r d . I n 
comparison w i t h t h e s e , t h e e a r l i e r A r c a d i a n c o i n s are u n i f o r m l y 
h e a v i e r , and suggest a d i f f e r e n t s t a n d a r d , a l t h o u g h t h e c o i n t y p e s 
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a r e t h e same. T h e r e f o r e t h e r e v;as a change t o t h e League s t a n d a r d 
i n or soon a f t e r 234.'^  The c o i n s , on t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , o f f e r an 
i l l u s t r a t i o n o f t h e p o l i t i c a l importance o f A r c a d i a w i t h i n t h e 
Achaean League ~ v;hich i s c l e a r enough a l r e a d y from t h e l i t e r a r y 
s o u r c e s ~ b u t do n o t add a n y t h i n g t o our knov/ledge o f p o l i t i c a l 
movements. 
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APPMpIX 4.. 
The v i e w adopted i n t h e t e x t ( c h . 4, ^^  ^ C"2 ) , t h a t an a l l i a n c e 
v ; i t h Pergamum was f i r s t formed w i t h A t t a l u s i n 198, i n 190 was 
c o n f i r m e d by t h e Achaeans who then s e n t h e l p t o Euraenes, i s based 
on t h a t o f Aymard (PR, 374 & n.9). There i s however, t h e d i f f i c u l t y 
t h a t i t was a l r e a d y seven y e a r s a f t e r t h e d e a t h o f A t t a l u s when 
Eumenes appeared t o be a p p l y i n g f o r a renewal o f the a l l i a n c e 
( P o l . 21.3b). For t h i s r e a s o n we p r e f e r t o c o n s i d e r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n 
i n 190 as b e i n g n o t f o r a f o r m a l renev/al, v;hich was no doubt c a r r i e d 
o u t soon a f t e r t h e d e a t h o f A t t a l u s , b u t f o r a s t r i c t l y unnecessa.ry 
( b u t t a c t f u l ) e n q u i r y as t o whether the Achaeans were prepared t o 
s t a n d by t h e terms o f the a l l i a n c e and send h e l p . T h i s would 
e x p l a i n P o l y b i u s ' use o f einxwpoCv i n s t e a d o f avo.veo\5o"9at w h i c h 
p u z z l e s Aymard ( i b . n.9). But t h e r e i s a t e x t u e i l problem connected 
v / i t h t h e o r i g i n a l a l l i a n c e . At L i v , 32.23«1 Weissenborn-MUller. 
p r i n t : s_ocietatem_cum^^ i®'^££to 
5£Si-£iriES£HSi» A t t a l o i s a c o n j e c t u r e by e,dyores^j/eteres, who o f t e n 
emend from t h e co,ntext. The MSS however r e a d : cjiin^^omajiis^ a^ 
( B ) , o r s i m p l y PhoA^ Ag• ^^^^ read.ing o f B can be defended by 
assiirning a temporary t r e a t y with Home f o r t h e d u r a t i o n o f the v/ar; 
o t h e r w i s e i t i s c o n t r a d i c t e d by the following sentence d e a l i n g with 
r e l a t i o n s v / i t h Rome, But A t t a l u s i s nov/here mentioned' i n the MSS,"^  
There i s t h e r e f o r e no MSS a u t h o r i t y f o r an a l l i a n c e w i t h 
A t t a l u s i n I98; and P o l . 21,3b, as we have suggested, need n o t 
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r e f e r t o a renev/s.l ( i t does n o t ^ jns(^___ taciB_) ^  We must, hov/ever, 
a l s o c o n s i d e r t h e l a t e r a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e a l l i a n c e . I n I87 Eumenes 
se n t aanbassadors t o Achaea who TT]V cru|i|ia)(iav TT)V mTpiXTiv 
aveveoocravTO, ( P o l , 22.7.8). Two p o i n t s here t e n d t o su p p o r t our 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f P o l . 21.313. i ' i r s t t he vise o f mTptxri t o d e s c r i b e 
t h e a l l i a n c e . I t c o u l d be argned t h a t t h e word i s s i m p l y used 
e m o t i v e l y t o d e s c r i b e an a l l i a n c e v/hich was i n f a c t o n l y formed s.s 
r e c e n t l y as 190; b u t i t i s f a r s i m p l e r t o a l l o v / t h e word i t s f u l l 
meaning, and assume an a l l i a n c e w i t h A t t a i n s . Secondly, the f a c t 
t h a t t e n y e a r s had a l r e a d y passed s i n c e t h e de a t h o f A t t a l u s and t h e 
renewal o f t h e a l l i a n c e v/hich had been formed w i t h him i n I98, o n l y 
t h r e e s i n c e 190. T h i s i s by no means c o n c l u s i v e evidence, b u t 
a l l i a n c e s f o r t e n y e a r s were f a r more common t h a n a l l i a n c e s f o r f o u r 
y e a r s . The evidence as a whole, t h e r e f o r e , s u p p o r t s t h e c o n j e c t u r e 
o f the £dl;tores___vetj5^^ a t L i v , 32.23,1 i n a.dding A ^ t a l o t o our t e x t . 
.« 1 am g r a t e f u l t o Dr. A. H. McDonald f o r t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n about 
L i v y ' s t e x t . 
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I n 191 Gato v i s i t e d Corinth, Patrae and Aegium as represent-
ative of the new consul G-labrio (Plut. £at_o_ Ma_,i_^ , 12), The 
l e g a l i t y of these v i s i t s i n Achaean lav; has been qtiestioned by 
Aymard (PE, 330), v/ho concludes that they v/ere, i f not formally 
il].egal, at least contrary to the s p i r i t of the lav; v;hich rep;iilated 
embassies sent by the independent states of the League (cf. Aymard, 
.4Sil§I5^jJ-?Ji9 n. 3)« The example usually cited as an i l l u s t r a t i o n 
of t h i s law i s that of the Megalopolitans to Macedon i n 229/8 (Pol. 
2.^ 1-8. 6--7); but i n t h i s case i t i s not made clear by Polybius tl i a t 
the Megalopolitans were lega l l y obliged to consult the Acbaeans. 
The v;hole point of t h i s consultation was that A.ratus had organised 
the v ; i l l i n g Megalopolitans to open negotiations on. belialf_ pjr_the 
League. I t i s clear that t h i s required federal endorsement. But 
i t i s not relevant to a discussion of the legal obligations of the 
member states who v;ished to negotiate i2Sv„il3£i2L^ l^'l_kSiS~l!° 
I n fact, the only r e s t r i c t i o n of this kind for v;hich v;e have 
evidence i s on sending embassies to the Senate. Evidence for t h i s 
comes from Pausanias (7.9»''i; 12.5)5 based on Polybius, and shov;s 
that i t had been the subject of a convention agreed between Rome 
and Achaea - clearly included as one of the terms of the foedus. 
I t i s obvious that t h i s W3.s to the advantage of the Senate, as i t 
v;as of the Achaean federal government, that a l l Achaean matters 
arising on any one occasion should be presented by one set of 
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ambassadors. That t h i s convention was often broken, or ignored, 
especially by the Spartans, who were i n many cases encouraged by 
the Senate's agreeing to receive them, i s not i n dispute. But i t 
i s clear that the convention v/as a matter of mutual convenience, 
v/hich the Senate could set aside i f i t suited i t , and ^ /^hich the 
federal government found d i f f i c u l t to enforce. An agreement of t h i s 
kind clearly v/as not concerned with the regulation of the reception 
of Roman missions i n Achaea, whether by the federal govermient or 
by the constituent states. There i s therefore no evidence v;hich 
suggests t l i a t Gate's action was i n any yay i l l e g a l or irregular, 
ifhether i n contravention of an Achaean law, or of the convention 
betv/een Eome and Achaea. 
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This fragment of Polybius, v;hich i s v i t a l for an understanding 
of the reasons for Philopoemen' s settlement of Spiarta after 
Compasion, i s desperately corrupt i n the most crucial passage, 
BUttner-V/obst maizes sense of the early corruptions (11. 1-4, p.69 
of his text) with acceptable emendations, but does not attempt to 
f i l l the lacuna (1.5 ) 5 assessed by Boissevain at 17 letter-spaces. 
Of the emendations v;hich he records i n his a££aratus (none of v/hich, 
i n f a c t , reach Boissevain's 1? letter-spaces), there i s a remarkable 
agreement as to the general sense of the passage, variation 
occurring only i n d e t a i l . The emendation of Hultsch has therefore 
been accepted as the basis of the interpretation offered i n the text 
(ch. ' l - , ! ^ ^ ! ) , V7hich makes the passage read: e^copffiv b* oxt iraarf 
paoiXetoc enuvopS^cocrewc al'Tia) ta -xprpma (yeYovev, S-')Te <j!>ucrei 
vovvByjyz oov xal crtpatr\Yt.y<.oQ, irepiep<XeTrev tva (ar| irccel ) yevoiTo 
This i s , hov/ever, the counsel of desperation, and certainty on 
the problem i s not possible. In an attempt to illuminate the 
problem, Professor E. Badian v;as kind enough to examine the MS 
(Vaticanus gr. 73) i n the Vatican, but v/as unable to read anything 
i n the crucial place, even v;ith the aid of u l t r a - v i o l e t rays. V.'e 
must therefore continue to r e l y v/holly on what earli e r scholars 
read - or claimed to read: a glance at BUttner-V/obst's apjpa££L!'iis 
villi show that there i s not even t o t a l agreement on t h i s . : 
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However, as ph i l o l o g i c a l scholars have heen able to agree on 
the general sense, i t seems legitimate to use t h i s as the 
basis f o r p o l i t i c a l interpretation. 
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Close attention to the chronology of the various references 
to Spartan parties at thi s period can make a comprehensible picture 
of the apparently contradictory evidence. We take as starting 
point Polybius' d e f i n i t i o n of ti}.e parties at Rome i n v/inter 184/3 = 
Four groups were present, of v;hich two represented factions composed 
of 'old exiles', one the Achaean party (led by Serippus), and one 
the ex-tyrant party, essentially anti-Achaean, led by Chaeron. The 
agreement v;hich was reached v/ith the Roman senatorial committee, 
and v;hich Xena.rchus, representing the Achaeans, \\'as induced to 
endorse, contained tv;o points relevant to the present discussion: 
i t v;as agreed that Chaeron's group, i n exile since Gompasion, sho^ild 
be restored; and that Sparta should continue to belong to the 
Achaean League."'' 
By autumn 183^ v;hen Flamininus unsuccessfully asked the 
Achaeans for a syncletos, the 'old exiles' were again i n exile; and 
the i r hopes, along with Deinocrates', were disappointed by Flaxnininus' 
f a i l u r e : a l |aev Toi5 AeivoxpaTovc IXiTi6ec xai T W V apxatwv AeYO|ieva)V 
^vfdbwv, Toxe 8e trpooi^Twc ex trf Aaxe8at|iovcc ememmoioiv, xal 
ovKhr§br]V f) xot5 TtTOD mpouci'a xat irpoaSoxta T O B T ; O V T O V TpoTrov 
SieireOTEV The exiles clearly hoped for restoration; but as there 
had been no problem about t h e i r restoration to be discussed at Rome 
the previous winter, they must have been exiled i n the period 
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between the return of the embassies and the appearance of Flamininus 
at Naupactus i n the autumn. 
The next evidence i s from the following winter: two Spartan 
embassies v/ere present at Rome, one representing the exiles (that 
o r i g i n a l l y led by Arcesilaus and Agesipolis), the other led by 
Serippus. The exiles clearly wanted th e i r restoration; Serippus' 
demand i s not made clear, but i t i s unlikely that he had changed from 
his previous support of Achaea. The Senate's ansv/er to him was non-
committal: powX6{j.evoi [leiewpov eaaat T T I V iroXiv, Stoit irdvTa 
ireirot-qxacrtv autotc to- SvvaTa, xara 8e T O irapov oh vo^C^omiv eXvai 
Tot5To TO iTpaYliOi, irpoc avtOK . ^ The Senate's reply to Serippus 
became knov/n i n Achaea i n the late summer of l82, after the death 
of Philopoemen and the settlement of Messene. Lycortas called a 
SiI}£JzSi.9S. ^ t Sicyon: (av)e6i6oD 6tapoi5Xtov Wep T O W 'rrpooXopeoSai 
<I;TIV UirdpTTiv) eic, %r]V cn)|iiToXn;etav», c/xlcyjcwv'Poofxatovf; (aev ario-cptpeo&at 
TTjv TTpotepov adxoK SoSetTcrav eircTporrriv Wep i:r\z iroXewt; Tauxric • 
atroxexpi'cf^at Y^P attotc v^v [irpev etvat TO5V xaxa Aaxe6at|j.ova 
irpaYVtaxoov irpoc auTouc* T O K 6e xupiewovTOG TT^C EirdpTTic xctxa T O 
irapbv poiSXeaSai cr< i^cnv ^eiexetv Trjc cn)|j.TroXiTei'ac. 8to irapexdXet 
irpoa6exeo9ai xrjv iroXtv . S^ om t h i s , i t i s clear that by late summer 
182 Sparta v;as no longer a member of the Leap;:ue; yet the party i n 
povjer at that time v;as i n favour of reunion. Lycortas continues by 
describing t h i s party as %ovQ 6iaTeT;T]pT)x6Tac T T I V trpoc T O ^ S V O C 
irioTiVj and contrasts them with the 'old exiles' who had f a i l e d to 
show due gratitude for t h e i r original restoration. Lycortas 
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implies that t h e i r present exile i s nothing less than they deserve,"^ 
The gaps i n the information which we have from Polybius are 
considerable; yet they do not present v;holly unsurmountable 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . The iej;t^riij£s_jair for the expulsion of the 
'old exiles' i s aiitumn 183 (Flamininus at Naupactus)j tba.t for 
Spartan secession summer l82 (Achaean smcletos at Sicyon), The 
occasion of the expulsion of the exiles coming so rapidly after the 
return of the eiiibassies from Rome i n spring I83 seems l i k e l y to have 
been closely associated v;ith the restoration of Chaeron's party -
the party which, i n i t s various earlier guises, had created the 
or i g i n a l 'old exiles'. I n th i s nev/ expulsion, v;e have no reason to 
deny the complicity of Serippiis' group, or even of the Achaean 
federal government. Philopoemen had not rea l l y v;anted to restore 
the 'old exiles' i n I88; and the ingratitude of Areus and 
Alcibiades since then must have made him regret his earlier decision. 
I t seems possible therefore, that t h i s expulsion v;as carried out by 
a c o a l i t i o n of a l l a n ti-exile elements. This m.eans that i n Sparta, 
Chaeron and Serippus^ must have co-operated. They v;ere clearly 
united i n t h e i r h o s t i l i t y to tlie 'old exiles'; yet there v;as a 
major difference of opinion: Serippus' main policy vias co-operation 
v;ith Achaea; Chaeron, v;hose group v;as formed of those exiled by 
Achaea i n I88, must have been fundamentall.y opposed to the League, 
and at the Roman conference, only accepted this as a means of 
ensuring his group's restoration. The coalition was therefore 
fundamentally unst3,ble. 
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Polybius does not specify the reason for Serippus' v i s i t to 
Rome i n vjinter I83/2, and the Senate's reply does not give us more 
information than that i t v/as concerned v/ith the status of the c i t y 
- on which the Senate suspended judgement. He cannot have been 
urging a restoration of the c i t y to Acha.ea, for the secession had 
not yet taken place: the SenajUi^J^on^^^ v/hich contained the 
Senate's reply to the Achaeans clearly implies thisJanEXptStjCjav 
6e ScoTt o()6'av o Aaxe&ai|j.ovtcov Koptv^icov fi (TWV)'Apyetwv o^i'oTTjTat 
6%i.oc, ou ber\cfeL toxiQ *AxaiOVQ 5a«|j,dgetv eav lai^ irpoc avTovc r)Y5)VTat 
I f Sparta liad already seceded, i t was not known at Rome; therefore 
Serippus cannot have been contending for restoration. On the other 
hand, the Senate's settlement of Sparta had already been upset by 
the expulsion of the ' old exiles'; and i t might be considered that 
the v/hole v/ould require negotiation anev/. I n this case, Serippus 
would need to j u s t i f y the treatment of the 'old exiles' on behalf 
of the government as a v/hole; and on behalf of his ov/n group, he 
had to make his sectional position clear: he would attempt to 
obtain a SenatU£_^_on^^ confirming that, even i n the nev/ condit-
ions, the Senate v/ould ensure that Sparta remained Ach-aean, This 
was the more important as his paxtners i n the coalition had the 
opposite intention. 
Serippus cannot have been responsible for the secession; and 
i t i s unlikely that Ghaeron v/ould be able to command suf f i c i e n t 
support to declare Spartan secession once Serippus had returned 
from Rome. This rules out action i n accordance with the Senatus 
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£onsultum proclaiming Roman lack of interest, for Serippus brought 
7 
i t v;ith him. I f Chaeron v;as eager to secede, the best time v;as 
i';hile his c o a l i t i o n partners, v;ho v;ould oppose the secession, mre 
av;ay from Sparta, while t h e i r influence could not be brought to 
bear.on the matter, and v;hile the winter prevented Achaean m i l i t a r y 
a c t i v i t y . Yet although the secession had taken place by the summer, 
after the return of Serippus i t v;as possible for Lycortas, i n 
recommending the acceptance of Sparta into the League, to say that 
those i n pov;er at Sparta naxa T O irapov wanted to re j o i n the League, 
and these v;ere the people who had preserved f a i t h with Achaea, I n 
these circumstances, the only possible meaning t h i s can have,.is 
that Serippus had carried out a coup on his return, and was, xam 
to irapov at least, i n poller and strong enough to be able to enforce 
his policy. There v;as no question of either of the groups of 
exiles having changed sides vis-a-vis Achaea, for they were only 
selectively restored after Sparta was reunited to the League. 
There v\fas no further question of Spartan secession; but despite 
the restoration of the less offensive 'old exiles' - those v;ho had 
not abused Achaean friendship - the problem of the die-hard 
l o y a l i s t s of the 'old exiles' remained. I n winter I 8 2 / I Ghaeron x-ias 
i n Rome, and disputed before the Senate with envoys from the exiles, 
Cletis and Diactorius, I t seems clear that Ghaeron was acting on 
behalf of the Spartan government - Polybius says: Aaxe8ai.|i6vtoi 
loxx; irept Xatpwva xaTeorriaav^ - and we must assume that the coal-
i t i o n had been patched up after Serippus' coup and the reunion v;ith 
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Achaea. They must s t i l l have been united against the a c t i v i s t 
exiles, and Chaeron could clearly be a useful representative for 
the Spartan government, v/ith his old connections v/ith the Senate 
from his association v/ith Nabis' party. Serippus clearly could not 
afford to leave Spartaagain himself, and take the r i s k of a repet-
i t i o n of the events of the previous year. 
The result of these emba-ssies v/as that the Senate sent a 
l e t t e r to the Achaeans, v/hich was duly ignored."'"^ Probably the 
next v/inter, lol/O, the exiles were again represented at Rome, and 
another l e t t e r v/a.s sent to the Achaeans.'''"'' I n l 8 0 Chaeron had 
managed to gain a dominant position i n Sparta; Polybitis says 
nothing about the p o l i t i c a l aspect of t l i i s , but mentions only the 
personal; but the threat was considered serious enough for Ghaeron 
12 
to be suppressed by federal intervention. This interference must 
mean that Chaeron was thought to be planning another secession; 
and Hyperbatus, learning from the l a s t period of Ghaeron's dominaxice 
i n 182, stepped i n before the secession became a fact. Achaean 
ambassadors were again sent to Rome - Callicrates, Lydiadas and 
Aratus - during v^inter I80/79: the result v/as Gallicrates' triumph, 
which included, i n i t s f i n a l v/orking out, the f i n a l restoration of 
the remaining Spartan exiles, and the ending of another phase of 
Spartan confusion."'''^ 
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NOTES TO CHiVPTER 1 
1 , Pol. 2 3 . 1 2 , 1 ; Liv. 3 9 , ^ 9 ; Plut, Ph, l 8 , l ; Pans, 8 . 3 1 . 5 . 
For the date of death, cf. discussion i n app, 2 , '^ I'X ?^, 
2 , Cf, l i t e r a t u r e and discussion i n V/albank, Coram, I , 272 . 
3 , P3-ut, Ph. 5 . 1 ' - V\br] be ai)To\5 tptdxcvm ^ T T ) Y^XOVOXOC; . 
^l-. Hoffmann, RE 'XK 1 , 7 6 f . 'Philopoimen', wrongly bases his 
calculations on a death date of June I835 and as a result 
finds 253 as the year of his b i r t h from the Polybian evidence. 
5 . Pol. 1 0 . 2 2 . 1 ; Plut. Ph. 1 . 1 - 2 ; Pans. 8 . 4 9 . 1~2. 
6 . Pol. 1 0 . 2 2 , 2 ; Plut, Ph. 1 . 2 - 3 ; Paus. 8 . 4 9 . 2 . The problem of 
the correct form of the names Ecdemus? and Megalophanes? seems 
insoluble. Cf. Capelle, Iffi 'Megalophanes' (accepted here); 
Beloch IV 1 , 6 l 4 ; Ziegler, Rhj_J;kis. 83 , 1934 . On 
Aristodemus cf. Tarn CR. 39 , 1925 . 
7 . Pol. 1 0 . 2 2 . 4 . 
8. Cf. H i l l e r , RE XTf 1 , 'Megala Polls', 128; 1 3 4 f . On the ba t t l e 
at Mantinea., Paus. 8 . 1 0 . 6 - 9 , cf. Vlalbank, i^ra-tos^ 3 6 5 n.l; 
Beloch, IV 2 , 5 2 1 ; 609 . Paus,, 8 . 2 7 . 1 2 , dates the accession 
of Lydiadas 2 yeveat after the death of Aristodemus. This 
cannot be correct: at the most the time i s 10 years, cf. 
Schoch, Hi X I I I 2 , 2202 'Lydiadas'. 
9 . Pol, 4 , 7 7 - 1 0 : irpoc HIVOQ t6i'a<; irpd^eic; aXKa-fi^v bovcoQ . Did 
they help him gain the tyranny? cf, Beloch IV 1 , 620 ; Vlalbank, 
JI-K, 1936 , 
1 0 , Pol, 2 , 4 1 , 1 ; 4 l , 1 2 (reiinion); 4 l ,13- -15 (Aegium, Bura, 
Cerynea); -15,1-2 (administrative change). On the chronology 
2A 
of the early development of Achaea, cf. Walbank, £omra. I , 233f ' . 
and v/riters c i t e d there. W.'s system does explain a l l the 
data, although i t i s necessary to employ exclusive calculation, 
v/hereas Pol. seems to have preferred inclusive elsev/here. 
1 1 . Pol. 2 . 4 3 , 3 ; Plut. Ar. 5-9 (Sicyon); Pol. 2 . 4 3 . 4 ; Plut. Ar. 
:L6 .2-24 . 1 (Corinth); Pol. 4 3 . 5 ; Plut. Ar. 24 .3 ; Paus. 2 . 8 . 5 ; 
7 « 7 « 2 (Megara, Troezen, Epidaurus), On extra-ethnic expansion 
i n the F i r s t Achaean League^ c f, Larsen, Jiobinson^taada^ 8 0 7 f , 
1 2 . Plut. Ar. 24 . 4 ; 4 l . 3 ; CI. 1 9 . 4 ; Paus. 2 . 8 . 5 . cf. Walbank, 
Axatos, 4 5 - 4 9 . 
1 3 . Plut. Ar. 3 1 . 1 ; Agis 15 ; . cf. Walbank, Aratos, 5 3 . 
1 4 . Pol, 2 . 4 4 . 1 ; Plut. Ar. 3 3 . 1 . 
1 5 . Polyaenus ( 2 . 3 6 ) records the a.ccession of Heraea under Dioetas. 
I t i s probably best pilaced at t h i s time of Achaean expansion 
i n Arcadia; and the strategos-list ( c f . V/albank, Aratos, 
l 6 7 f . ) allov/s 2 3 8 / 7 or 236/5 as the most probable years. I f 
the incorporation of Heraea i s seen as a result of an attack 
on Sparta, as Walbank (Aratos, 5 8 ) , i t i s best to place i t i n 
2 3 6 / 5 . V/ith Heraea. went Cleitor and Thelphusa (Be_lo_ch IV 1 , 
6 3 2 ) . Alea may also have been taken v/ith Heraea: i n 227 
Gleomenes takes Heraea and Alea (Plut, Gl. 7 , 3 ) ? and they v/ere 
perhaps taken together i n 236; but i n any case Alea v/as 
Ach_a.ean before 227 , (MSS of Plut. Gl. 7 ,3 reac? ^AXouiav •> which 
i s unknov/n. Suggested emendations are 'Aceav and'AXeav . Asea 
was a small v i l l a g e belonging to Megalopolis (Strabo 8 . 3 4 3 ) ; 
3A 
and seems unlikely to have been mentioned i n Plutarch's source 
along v;ith Heraea, Alea \ia.s of greater importance, and there-
fore more l i k e l y , Cf. V/albank, AratSS? 8 5 ) . Cleonae was 
added to Achaea probably i n 235 - a Wemea year (Plut. Ar. 
2 8 . 3 ) . Perhaps at t h i s time too Gynaetha and Stymphalus v;ere 
annexed (cf. N i c c o l i n i , ]£;.S:^^JL..^Sh' 2 8 - 9 ) . 
1 6 . Pol. 2.44 .5; Plut. 3 0 . 2 ; cf. Walbank, Aratos, 6 2 - 3 . 
1 7 . Plut. Ar. 3 0 . 3 : (^tXoTifioi5|jevoc 6e ev^VQ WeppaXetv xov "Apa-vov. 
I t i s clear that Aratus, whom Plut. i s using as source here, 
had the sole intention of developing his own point of view: 
i n Plut. the faults are a l l Lydiadas'. cf. Plut, Ar. 3 5 , 3 . 5 f o r 
more evidence of Aratus' interpretation of Lydiadas' (^iXoTifafa. 
1 8 . Plut, Ar, 3 5 . 1 - 3 ; Pol. 2.44.6. 
1 9 . Mantinea: Aetolian i n 229 (Pol. 2.46 .2 ) ; Achaean before t h i s 
(Pol. 2 . 5 1 . 1 . ) . Orchomenus: probably at this time. In 223 
a f t e r Antigonus had captured the town from Cleomenes, oux 
diToxaxecrrT)ae -ror^'Axaioic (:PO1. 4.6 .5) . This implies that 
0 . had been Achaean before 223; but i n 229 i t v/as Aetolian 
(Pol. 2.46 . 2 ) , so that c.234/3, the time of Achaean expansion 
i n t o Arcadia, seems the necessary date; and Dittenberger 
at t r i b u t e d Syai. 490 - the accession terms for 0 . - to 2 3 4 / 3 . 
On the other hand, Foucart, the original publisher of the 
i n s c r i p t i o n (HeVj^A^LSiV 3 2 , I 8 9 6 ) , followed by Niese, GGMS I I I , 
35 n . 3 , prefers to take i t vnth Liv. 32.5.4 (199 B.C.), where 
i t i s described hov; Ph i l i p evacuated Orchomenus and gave i t to 
Achaea. I t i s possible that t h i s i s correct, notv;ithstanding 
4A 
Pol.'s use ofaiToxaSiaTT^t i n 4 . 6 . 5 . Of. Pol. 3 0 , 9 , 8 , v/here 
the word means only 'hand over' (although t h i s i s the only 
example of t h i s usage cited by Mauersberger, ^IjJol^Sj^Lexj^xm 
and therefore t e l l s against the interpretation). 
20. Pol. 2 ,44.6 - Hermione and Phlius; Plut, Ar. 34,5 - Aegina 
and T) irXetCTTT] TT^IJ *Apxa6tac : i n th i s phrase may be included 
at least Pheneus and Lasion: i n 225 they v/ere among tov/ns taken 
by Cleoraenes, and 229 seems to be the most l i k e l y time for them 
to j o i n Achaea. Pol. 2 .52,2; Plut. Gl. l 4 - i n this passage 
I'tSS. read AdyY^vi ptherv'/ise unknov/n, Manso suggested Aacricovi., 
accepted v;ith reservations by V/albank, Aratos, 8 I ; Plut. kr. 
3 5 . 3 - strate£ia of Aristomachus), 
2 1 . Pol. 2 .46.2 (Aetolian, taken by Gleoraenes); Pol. 2.57,2 
(recovered i n 227) ; Pol. 2 .58.4; Plut. Ar. 3 9 . 1 (loss i n 
226 /5 ) . 
22. Plut. Gl. 4 .4 (accession of Caphyae); 7,3 (loss of Heraea and 
Alea); Pol. 2 .58 .4 ; Plut. Ar. 39 (Mantinea, Pheneus, Pellene, 
Phlius); Plut. Gl. l 4 . 2 (Lasion); Pol. 20,6.8 (Megara); 
2 . 5 2 . 2 (others). On events of these years cf, Walbank, Aratos, 
89 f , 
2 3 . Pol. 2 . 4 7 , 5 - 5 1 , 1 (preliminary negotiations); 52 .3 -4 (loss of 
Corinth and f i n a l agreement v/ith Antigonus). On the date of 
the f i r s t negotiations (227/6) , cf. Walbank, P h i l i g , 13-14; . 
Porter, Plutajcli^^ p. I x x i i . 
24. Pol. 2 . 5 2 . 5 f , 5 Plut. CI. 20; Ar. 43 (Antigonus i n 
Peloponnese). On the chronology, cf, Walbank, Coram. I , 254-5, 
• 5A 
Pol. 2 . 5 4 , 5 - 1 4 ; Plut. Ar. 45 ; Cl. 23 (events of 2 2 3 ) . 
2 5 . Plut. Pli. 4 . 
2 6 . At Sellasia Philopoemen v;as a cavalryman (Plut. Ph.6), v/hich 
suggests that he had been i n the habit of serving v;ith the 
cavalry. As Achaean cavalry fought under Lydiadas at Ladoceia 
(Plut. Ar, 3 7 ) , P^hilopoemen may have been among them. 
2 7 . Pol. 2 , 5 5 . 5 . 
2 8 . Pol. 2 . 5 4 . 1 4 . 
2 9 . Pol. 2 , 5 4 . 4 - 5 ; Plut. Ar. 45 ; cf. Freeman, ^^ist^_of^,Z^6.eral 
Government, 3 8 2 - 3 ; Beloch, IV 1 , '712 -13 ; Walbank, P b i j i ^ , 
15-16 (& bibliography); Conim. I , 256 . I t i s surprising that 
the large amount of detailed study of the working of the 
synimachj; has blinded scholars to the primary t r u t h , so clearly 
(but emotionally) observed by Freeman, that the syraraachy v;as 
simply a facade to disguise the regularisation of Macedonian 
domination - i n t h i s respect no different from Alexander's 
Corinthian League, or the LeagT;.e of Demetrius Poliorcetes. 
Even V/albank, when confronted icLth Antigonus' l^^SiESGij; °" 
Achaean Leagiie (Plut, Ar_. 3 8 . 6 ) , and the lav; enjoining Achaean 
magistrates to summon an assembly v/henever the hegemon v;ished 
(Pol, 5 . 1 . 6 ) , can v;rite: '. . .so long as the king of Macedon 
v;as prepared to abide by i t s terms, the domination which i t 
offered him was largely i l l u s o r y ' . (Gornm. I , 2 5 6 ) . I t i s not 
necessary for the dominant m i l i t a r y pov;er to break the terms 
of an agreement i n order to dominate. 
3 0 . Pol. 2 . 5 5 ; 6 1 - 6 3 ; Plut, Ph, 5; ,G1. 2 3 - 2 5 ; Paus. 4 . 2 9 . 7 , 
6A 
states that Messene was a member of the League at this time; 
but he seems to be making the inference from the friendly 
reception of the Megalopolitans, We know that as late as 221 
the alliance x^lth the Aetolians v/as s t i l l o f f i c i a l l y i n force 
(Pol. 4 . 3 , 9 ) 5 and i n 220 the Messenians had to appeal to the 
"League as friends, but not members, for help (Pol. 4 . 7 , 2 - 5 ) . 
That they v/ere not members of the symt^^chjr either seems clear 
from Pol. 4 . 5 , 8 - although again friendly relations are implied. 
Cf. Walbank, ^ili£, 24; Comm. 1 ,453 , against Fine, AJP, 1940 , 
1 5 6 - 7 . 
3 1 , Paus. 2 , 9 . 2 ; 4 . 2 9 , 7 - 8 ; 8 . 4 9 . 4 . Paus. seems to have as his 
source here the sajne material as Plutarch, but indulges i n some 
melodrainatisation: for instance, Plut.'s VOKTOQ k^ai(f>vyy; 
(Ph. 5 , 1 ) 5 turns i n t o irapdoirov8a ex Tot5 <^vepotS(2.9,2); and 
etXev . . . ev crirov5ari; ( 4 . 2 9 . 7 ) - v/hich even Polybius could 
not say. But cf. app. l^^.l&oj^. 
3 2 , Plut, CI. 2 4 . 5 . 
3 3 , Pol. 2 . 5 5 , 
3 4 , Pol. 2 ,61 .^1-6 . ' 
3 5 , D i t t . §J2-1.') 626 , and stemim of Polybius suggested there. Cf. 
Stmielin, I® X A, 1382, no. 1 ; Africa, Phylarchus, 3 2 - 3 , 
3 6 , The suggestion (ad. Sj^ll. 626) that Lycortas married a daughter 
of Philopoemen, thus making him Polybius' maternal grandfather, 
i s unlikely i n the absence of mention by Polybius himself. 
Hov/ever, t h i s does not mean that the suggestion need be v/holly 
false: i f Philopoemen's daughter v/as Lycortas' s,ecOTad v/ife, 
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from whom Thearidas I I v/as born, ^ would be Polybius' h a l f -
b rother. This v/ould explain, perhaps b e t t e r than Ziegler 
i'RE ]{XI 2, - out of respect f o r Philopoemen's g l o r y ) , the 
continuance of the name 'Philopoemen' i n the ^temma^ and at 
the same time i t explains the absence of mention by Polybius. 
3 7 . P l u t . £ 1 . ?A. 
3 8 . P l u t . Ph. 5 . 
3 9 . Pol. 2 . 6 1 . 9 - 1 0 . 
^•0, Pol. 2 . 6 2 . On the whole episode, c f . Beloch I ? 1, 713; 
Walbank, ^£i,tos, 107-8; A f r i c a , Phz2j-££]™^? 3 2 - 5 . 
^1. Pol. 2.6A'-. 
42, Pol. 2 . 6 5 - 9 ; P l u t . £ 1 . 28; Ph. 6; c f . Kromayer, Antike 
§.9j2iMllli?6M£!£ ^ 1 1 9 9 f f ; comprehensive discussion of date 
and aspects of Pol.'s account i n Walbank, Gomm. I , 272fo 
4 3 . P o l . 2 . 6 5 . 3 . 
¥h. P l u t . Ph. 6 . 
A'-5. On the d i s p o s i t i o n s , c f . Walbank, ,Comm. I , 279f. (Map on 
p. 2 7 6 ) . 
46. Gf. Ferrabino, At^W-^jJ^la^^R^ 
l9n££.'> 1918/19, 756f. 
47 . Tohc eat)TO« 'iroXi'Tou: ( P o l , 2 . 6 7 . 5 ; c f . P l u t . Ph., 6 . 3 ) . These 
were almost c e r t a i n l y the cavalry, not the i n f a n t r y , who were 
also a t hand: Philopoemen, himself a cavalryman, would not 
lead an i n f a n t r y a t t a c k on the Spartan cavalry. 
Pol. 2 . 6 7 . 8 . Plut.'s account (Ph. 6 ) , i s i n the memner of an 
aptcTTeia , and i s accordingly confused i n d e t a i l . 
48 
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49. P l u t . Ph, 6 .7 - 7 . 1 ; Pol. 2 .68.1--2 . 
50 . Pol. 2 . 6 9 ; Pluto Gl. 28-29. 
51c Of. ch, 2^ 
5 2 . Polo A'-,25. Cf, i n general, K.ne, MP, 1940; Walbank, 
5 3 . On the d e t a i l of t h i s , c f . Niese, GGtIS I I , 408f.; Walbank, 
Arat_os, 126 f . 
5^: Cf. Badian, .^SR, 1952 = Studoes, 1-33. A b r i e f e r account i n 
ESIJ:^]-^.") '^'•5-6. For e a r l i e r work c i . b ibliography i n StiidieB, 
25 . 
3 5 . Cf. Niese, GGI^ K I I , 459; Walbank, 3M±jD, 51f.; Aratos_, 139 f . 
Polo 5 » 1 0 4 (Agelaus' speech): the h i s t o r i c i t y of t h i s speech, 
has been questioned (without argument), by Schmitt, Eom^und 
Ehodos, 54 n . l ; but Roman infl u e n c e i n I l l y r i a had been close 
enough f o r 12 years t o make the speech e n t i r e l y p l a u s i b l e . We 
ra t h e r agree w i t h Walbanl^, P h i l i p , 66: 'For a l l i t s t a c t f u l 
phrasing, the speech v;as fundamentally a request t o P h i l i p not 
t o h u r l himself thoughtlessly i n t o a war w i t h Rome'» 
56. Cf. Walbank, K i i l i B 6 8 f . 
57» Cf. Bad-ian, ES£s.S2^"> 55~7; on the date of the t r e a t y , c f . 
Badian, Ii3:;i^omus, 1958; bibliography i n SEG 13 , 382 . 
5 8 . Pol. 7 . 1 2 ; P l u t . Ar. 50; c f . Niese, GGJIS I I , ''-f69--71; Walbank, 
Ara;tos, I 5 6 ; P h i l i p , 72-5 . 
Pol. 8 , 1 2 ; P l u t , Ar. 5 . 3 ; c f . Walbank, i^ratos, 157. 59 
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NOTESJIX^ 
1. c, 220-210 and 2 0 0~c . l 9 4 . 
2 . Pol. 4 , 5 3 - 5 5 . As f a r as Philopoemen i s concerned, Plutarch 
si.mply records t h a t on each occasion he returned Xajjtrrpoc -
l i t t l e more than conventionally 'successful', (Ph. 7 8< l 4 ) . 
3 . P l u t . Ph. 7 . 
4 . Paus. 8 . 4 9 . 7 : 6e'AyTtyovot) |iev oXtyov [leXrfreiv g|ieX\e. 
5 . Pol. 4 , 5 5 . 2 , 
6 . Van E f f e n t e r r e , l£^ i?£et£_£i^ J^ e^ __n^ ^ 
l 6 5 f . 
7 . i b . , 167. 
8 . V i / i l l e t s , A r i s t o c r a t i c Society i n •ftocient Crete, 187-191? c f . 
Forbes, Neoi, £assiffl. 
9 . Pol. 4.53--55 (events of war and Gortynian s t a s i s ) ; Pol. 7 . 1 1 . 9 
( P h i l i p ' s ££Ostasia). 
10 . The date of the foundation of the koinon i s disputed. 
Guarducci ( R i V j ^ ^ i l . , 78 , 1950) suggests tha.t i t v;as founded 
a f t e r the War of L y t t u s , and th a t P h i l i p ' s 'P^ostasla v;as a 
r e s u l t of the p a r t he had taken i n founding i t . Van 
E f f e n t e r r e , on the other band (o£t„.Gii* 5 1 3 2 f . ) , considers i t 
t o be e a r l i e r i n the t h i r d century: ' l a fondation du k^inon 
peut en somme ^ t r e rapportee tiu troisieme quart du I I I s i e c l e ' 
( i b . 1 3 8 ) . The date of the foundation i s not s t r i c t l y 
r e l e v a n t t o the present study; but the e f f e c t of the v/ar and 
the i n t e r v e n t i o n of P h i l i p mark an important change i n the 
lOA 
Cretan balance of povjer, v/hich van E f f e n t e r r e notes. We 
need not re-examine a l l hi>s epigraphic evidence, but his 
conclusion i s a u s e f u l statement of the p o s i t i o n : 'Ce n'est 
surement pas du au sexil hasard des t r o u v a i l l e s s i nous avons 
aux I I I e t I I s i e c l e s tant de t r a i t e s ou Gortyne fip;ure et 
semble memo souvent jouer un r o l e determinant', (op^„2ii« 
1 5 4 ) , Wha.tever the f a c t s a^bout the date of the k o i r w n j ^ 
foundation, the i n t e r v e n t i o n of P h i l i p i s , as Guarducci and 
vaji E f f e n t e r r e would agree, a v i t a l l y important event i n 
i n t e r n a l Cretan a f f a i r s . 
11 . Pol. 4 , 5 3 . 8 - 9 ; c f . Walbank, Comm. I , 509. 
12 . I n g c r ^ ^ l - 167. 
1 3 . Polyrrhenia and Lappa, the leaders of the Cretan war e f f o r t , 
appealed both t o the Achaeans and P h i l i p f o r help (Pol, 4 . 5 5 . 
1 ) ; the in f l u e n c e of Aratus i s implie d by Pol. 7 . 1 4 . 4 and 
P l u t , Ar. hQ. 
14 . Pol. 4 . 5 5 . 5 , 
1 5 . Pol. 1 3 . 8 , 2 ; c f . L i v . 3 4 . 3 5 . 9 . 
16. Cf. ch. 3 , ^ .'S^ , 
17. Cf. Dubois, ]:^ss_J^±£jJi^s^JE^ 74 n. 5 . Also 
below ch. 3^ ^ ^(is[, 
18 . P l u t . Ph. 13 ; Paus, 8 . 5 0 . 6 . 
19 . Paus. 8 . 5 0 . 6 ; c f . Ins^ x^ .,„Gret IV, 176',!, v i i i , 9 (which 
Guarducci dates t o t h i s t i m e ) . 
20. P l u t . Py.rrlH£? 27 (Areus i n Crete); c f . C a r d i n a l i , 
Stopj^.iffl>tica, 9 , 190^f~5; van E f f e n t e r r e , o;^j_^_cit., 203; 
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Guarducci, I n s c r . Cret. IV, praef. h i s t . p. 20 , (Gortynian 
help of Sparta). 
2 1 . Cf. Ehrenberg, ^ XVI 2 , 'Nabis'. 
22 . Homolle, BCH, 20, 1896, 502f . 
f 
2 3 . S E i . ^ t , , 21^. 
24 . By 189 Gortyn and Cnossos were co-operating i n a v/ar against 
Cydonia ( L i v . 3 7 . 6 0 ) . 
2 5 . D i t t . S ^ l . 594; c f . SEG 3 , 3 1 3 ; Boethius, BSA 25 , 1921-3 . 
26 . L i v . 3 4 . 2 9 . 1 4 . 
2 7 . SEG, 3 , 312 . Boethius, i n h i s discussion of the h i s t o r i c a l 
s e t t i n g of both, of these i n s c r i p t i o n s , i s i n c l i n e d t o place 
them both a f t e r the peace of 195 (BSA 25 , 4 2 5 ) . His argument 
i s t h a t only a f t e r the peace and the r e s t o r a t i o n of ' f r i e n d l y ' 
r e l a t i o n s between Achaea and Spaxta v/ould the Mycenaeans be 
v ; i l l i n g t o pass a pro-Spartan decree. This view seems 
excessively n a i f . The two decrees seem incompatible, and 
ther e f o r e incapable of having been passed u.nder the same 
p o l i t i c a l circumstances. Protimus' decree must be a f t e r the 
los s of the A r g o l i d by Nabis, therefore a f t e r 195. i t v;ould 
have been f a r too dangerous t o pass i t before then, 
Damocleidas' decree, demanding as i t does e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t 
p o l i t i c a l circumstances, must surely be dated t o the period 
of Nabis' c o n t r o l of the A r g o l i d i . e . between I 9 8 and 195; 
and the i n d i c a t i o n s are tha t i t would be ea r l y i n t h i s p e r i o d , 
f o r once Nabis had c o n t r o l , the Mycenaeans would be eager t o 
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accommodate him as f a r as possible and as qu i c k l y as possible. 
There i s no d i f f i c u l t y i n t h i s : a community d i d not have t o be 
free t o pass decrees honouring i t s masters. Cf. ( f o r instance) 
.OGIS, 329 (Aegina), 
28. L i v , 3 5 . 2 9 . 1 . At about t h i s time, a Telemnastus of Gortyn, son 
of Antiphatas, was honoured a t Epidaurus (IG IV^, 244) ; i t 
seems l i k e l y t h a t t h i s vras the same man. The statue was 
erected i n the Asclepieion by Cretan s o l d i e r s t o honour t h i s 
29 . Pol. 3 3 . 1 6 . 6 . 
30 . l£g£r.__Gret. I I , x x i i i , 12A. 
3 1 . Pol. 4 . 5 3 . 6 - 7 ; 5 5 . 5 . 
3 2 . Holleaux, Etudes 4, l 8 9 f . 
33« Gnossos v;as also one of the c i t i e s which d i d not receive 
Perdiccas, as Mas Lappa., which had been closely associated 
w i t h Polyrrhenia i n the V/ar of Lyt t u s (Pol. 4 , 5 3 - 5 5 ) ) Gnossos, 
we have argued, was one of Wabis' c i t i e s ; and i n t h i s case, 
anti-Macedonian too. Polyrrhenia and Lappa ( i f we accept 
Holleaux' demonstration of t h e i r anti-Macedonian s t a n d p o i n t ) , 
should also have enjoyed the support of Nabis. I n the cases 
of the other two c i t i e s , Ehaucus and Cyd.onia, which c e r t a i n l y 
d i d not receive Perdiccas, no other connection w i t h Sparta, can 
be traced, apart from t h i s a ssociation w i t h Cnossos. 
34 . Pol. 1 3 . 4 . 2 : etc 6e TTiv Kp-qirriy 'irpeapewTOc eSctirecrtetXe TOVC 
epeSioBvcoc x a l irapopfiiTcrovrou; eirl TOV xaxa'PoStwv iroXefiov. 
Pol. 1 3 . 8 . 2 : exotvcovet (iev Yo-p TOIC Kprp'l TWV xam ^dXauxav 
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Xi^crTetwv. c f . l 8 . 5 4 . 8 - 1 2 ; Diod. 2 8 . 1 , 
3 5 . Herzog, l O i o 2 , 1901-2; G a r d i n a l i , Eiv^_J2;l,, 35 , 1907; 
Holleaux, gbude_s 4 , l 6 3 f ; 178f; Segre, Riv. F i l . , 61 , 1933; 
Guarducci, .EpiSSSPiSSS 2? 1940; V/albank, Philr£, 109f , 
3 6 . P l u t . Ph, 13; Paus. 8 . 5 0 . 6 . 
5 7 ' lilsc£._Gret. I , praef, h i s t , p. 49; IV, praef. h i s t , p. 22 . 
Walbank, Ph-ll±£, 110, also suggests t h a t Nabis may have been 
v/orking w i t h Dicaearchus. The general imprecision involved i n 
t a l k i n g about 'the Cretans' should be avoided. I f t h i s means 
•^1^® iL°i£2£» 1^ should be stated c l e a r l y . The Kre1n^_o£ I^_eraos 
i s s u f f i c i e n t t o show t h a t there v/as l i t t l e unanimity a t t h i s 
time (as v;e v;ould i n f a c t expect). 
3 8 . L i v , 3 1 . 2 5 . 4 - 7 . 
3 9 . L i v . 3 2 . 3 8 . 1 - 6 . 
40. Diod. 2 0 . 8 8 . 9 ( 3 0 5 ) ; Pol, 4 . 5 3 . 1 - 2 ( 2 2 1 ) ; D i t t . S x n . 581, 
11.7'^f-7. c f . Guarducci, ad Inscr. Cret. I l l , i i i 3A. ( c . 2 0 0 ) , 
c f , van E f f e n t e r r e , 2 l 4 . 
4 1 . Pol, 1 6 . 3 7 . 3 . 
42 . D i t t , Sy 1 1 . , 600 - i n accordance v/ith our dating the f o u r t h 
_straj^e^ia of Philopoemen to 2OI/O ( c f . app. 2 ) t h i s i n s c r i p t i o n 
must be redated t o t h i s year. 
4 3 . L i v . 3 3 . 3 . 1 0 . Cydas i s a common enough name at Gortyn ( c f , 
index t o Ii2££r,t-_2££i'' 1^^' f u r t h e r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s 
hazardous. But a Cretan Cydas i s used by Eumenes i n I 69 t o 
carry on h i s n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Perseus (Pol. 2 9 , 6 . 2 ; 7 . 8 ; 
L i v . 4 4 . 1 3 ; 2 4 . 1 0 ) , I t may be tha t he i s the same as our 
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Cydas , as c o n t a c t c o u l d have been made w i t h E\imenes as a 
r e s u l t o f h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Gynoscephalae campaign. 
The p e r i o d o f 3O y e a r s s e p a r a t i n g t h e two e v e n t s i s l o n g , b u t 
need n o t w h o l l y r u l e o u t t he i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . C f . Niese G_®iS 
I I I , 323 n . l ; Schoch , RE Supp. 4, 1123; he may have been 
Cosmos a t G o r t y n i n l84 ( P o l . 2 2 . 1 5 ) . A g a i n s t t h i s , c f . v a n 
E f f e n t e r r e , 264 , n . 3 ; i b . , 298 . 
44. De S a n c t i s , § t o r i - a . I V 1 , 78 and n . 159» a c c e p t e d by WalbaJilc, 
P h J J j L £ , 167 n.4; Aymard, PE, l 4 7 , n . 5 2 - well d i s c u s s e d by 
v a n E f f e n t e r r e , 2£j^^c±t. 2 0 6 . 
4 5 . L i v . 3 2 . 4 0 . 4 . 
46. L i v . 3 7 . 6 0 . 
4 7 . L i v . 3 4 . 3 5 . 9 . 
48. P o l . 2 2 . 1 5 . 
4 9 . D i t t . S j l J . . , 6 2 7 . 
5 0 . L i v . 3 9 . 4 9 . 2 ; , Paus . 8 . 5 1 . 5 . 
5 1 . I n - s c r j _ C r e t . I ( v i i i ) 3 3 ; c f . G u a r d u c c i , K i v . . . . F i l . NS, 1 2 , 
1934 , 
15A 
IJOIK _ TO___C^^ 
1 . P l u t . Ph. V'; Paus. 8 . 4 9 . 7 ; (Philopoemen); L i v . 2 7 . 3 1 . 1 0 
(Gycliadas) Cf. app. 2,^;^'],ftV'^i and s t r a t e g o s - l i s t . 
2 . L i v . 3 2 . 1 9 . 2 . . 
3 . Cf. ch. 2 , passini. 
4 . Pol, 1 0 . 2 1 . 1 (E\;.ryleon); 1 1 . 8 . 1 - 3 (stra^be£;oi); 1 0 . 2 2 . 8 - 1 0 
(hipparchs), 
5 . L i v . 2 6 . 2 4 , 1 - 4 ( A e t o l i a ) ; Pol. 9.29--39 (speeches at Sparta); 
3 0 . 6 ( E l i s and Messene). On the t r e a t y , c f . Ivlaffenbach, 
SDAW 1954, no. 1 ; SE6 I 3 , 1956 no. 3 8 2 . On the date ( 211 ) c f . 
Badian, Ljdx)mus, 1958 . 
6 . Refs. i n Broughton, MER I , 272; c f , S c u l l a r d , Eoraan^Jr^o^ 
6 3 . 
7 . L i v , 3 1 . 2 5 . 3 . 
8 . P l u t , Ph. 4 . 3 . 
9 . Pol. 9.42 , 5 - 8 ; 1 1 . 5 . 8 (capture); 2 2 . 1 1 . 9 - 1 0 , c f . D i t t . 
OGIS 281 (sale t o A t t a l u s ) . Cf, Niese,.GGMS I I 4 8 4 ; De 
Sanctis, I I I 2 , 4 2 0 - 1 ; STaceliere, Les_jU^toli^ens_a^ 
300 n . 2 . 
1 0 . P l u t . Pli. 7 . 3 - 5 ; Pol. 1 0 . 2 3 . Philopoemen's explanation was 
made touQ TS iroXXotc xal TOIC airoTeXetoic , ( 9 ) . The , • 
airoTeXetot v;ere the l o c a l commanders of the l o c a l detachments 
of the feder.al army ( c f . D i t t . S^^^l. 6OO). I t must be 
assumed t h a t o l iroXXot i n t h i s case were the l o c a l cavalry-
men, t o whom alone Philopoenien's information vras r e l e v a n t . 
Gf. Ayraard, A^sseraWjesj, 102 n . l . 
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1 1 . Pol. 1 0 . 2 4 . 
1 2 . L i v , 2 7 . 2 9 . 9 , Hachanidas i s c a l l e d ^2[rajxm^Jj^ 
but Pelops v/as s t i l l a l i v e , f o r he was ki]. l e d by Nabis (Diod. 
2 7 . 1 ) 5 and i t seems l i k e l y t h a t he was nominally king. Cf, 
L i v , 3 4 . 3 2 . 1 . 
1 3 , L i v . 2 7 . 3 0 ; c f , Walbank, P h i l i p , 8 9 - 9 1 . The t e c l i n i c a l form 
of the concilium i s disciissed by Larsen, RejOj^Gov., 3.70: 
'Probably i t v/as, so t o spejil-c, a combination of an extra-
ordinary meeting of an Achaean assembly and of the synedrion 
of the Hellenic League'. P h i l i p v;as f u l l y e n t i t l e d t o c a l l 
such a meeting, but may not ha.ve paid as much a t t e n t i o n t o 
co n s t i t u t i o n a . l form as modern scholars: i n the present circum-
stances he had no need t o worry excessively about Achaean 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l n i c e t i e s v/hen his supporters were i n o f f i c e 
and needed h i s help. 
1 4 . L;Lv. 2 7 . 3 0 . 
1 3 . Cf. Schmitt, ^£ta^_^nd^Sh£dos^ 5 6 : 'man sprach vom Frieden, 
ohne i h n zu v/ollen, und schob die Schuld am Hisslingen der 
Verhandlungen dem Geg.ner zu'. 
1 6 . L i v . 2 7 . 3 0 . 1 1 . 
1 7 . L.iv. 2 7 . 3 0 . 1 5 ; 1 7 . 
1 8 , L i v . 2 7 . 3 1 , 1 - 3 . 
1 9 , L i v . 2 7 . 3 1 . 9 . De Sanctis, I I I 2 , 427 n. 75 , i s r i g h t 
against Niese, GGMS I I , 487, t h a t the urbs i s E l i s . Gf. 
V/albank, i ^ i i l i E , 9 1 n . 6 . 
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2 0 . L i v . 2 7 .31.9 - 1 1 ; P l u t . Ph. 7 . 
21. L i v , 2 7 . 3 2 . I f . (Romans i n E l i s e t c . ) ; 32 . 10 (Menippus 
and Polyphantas), 
2 2 . The a t t a c k on Dyme i s only knoiijn tlxrough l a t e r a l l u s i o n s . 
I t has usually-been placed i n 208 (De Sanctis, I I I 2, 427 n. 
7 5 ; Walbank, P M l i ^ j 9 8 ) , but the autumn of 209 i s supported 
by Pausanias, 7 . 1 7 . 5 : Trai3i;T)V ftXiinroc 6 ATprprptow iroXe|a5)v 
\i6vr\v Twv 'Axaixfflv gcrxev WIKOOV, xat eirl aiTiq. Tavxig 
SOWXTTIXIOC Tffe|iobv x a l ohioQ TPccfiatcov eTrexpeii/e aTpaTiq 
Stapirdcfat T:T]V Ai5{iT)V • I f we can accept t h i s statement as even 
pa r t t r u t h , i t suggests that there was a close connection 
between P h i l i p ' s use of the tovm and Galba's sacking, and 
does not c o n f l i c t w i t h the evidence t h a t Dyme v/as s t i l l i n 
Achaean hands and habitable a t the time of P h i l i p ' s exped-
i t i o n . The only d i f f i c u l t y i s i n f i n d i n g a time when P h i l i p 
could r e s t o r e the town: he l e f t Achaea a f t e r the Elean 
ejqDedition, and d i d not r e t u r n u n t i l July 208 ( L i v . 2 8 , 7 . l 4 f ) . 
L i v y ( 3 2 . 2 2 . 1 0 ) i m p l i e s t h a t the r e s t o r a t i o n • f o l l o w e d r a p i d l y 
on the d e s t r u c t i o n (cajj^is_jiuj3CT^^^ The probable 
explanation i s t h a t Menippus and Folyphantas v;ere responsible 
f o r the r e s t o r a t i o n on P h i l i p ' s orders: P h i l i p v/ould s t i l l 
get the c r e d i t from the g r a t e f u l Dyraaeans. 
23. L i v . 2 7 . 3 3 . 5 . 
24. L i v . 2 8 . 5 . 5 . Nothing i s known of Tegea between i t s capture 
by Antigonus i n 223 (Pol. 2 . 5 4 . 6 - 8 ) and 207, when i t was 
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Spartan (Pol. I l , l 8 . 8 ) . This a t t a c k of Machanidas on Argos 
seems the best time f o r the Spartan capture of Tegea, rat h e r 
than the autumn. Cf. Walbank, P h i l i p , 98 & n . 2 . The 
argument of De Sanctis, I I I 2, 427 n. 73, t h a t i t cannot have 
been before summer 208 because P h i l i p d i d not help Achaea 
recover i t , i s not persuasive. I t i s u n l i k e l y t o Lave been 
Spartan as e a r l y as 210 (Niese, GGPIS I I , 483) . 
25 . L i v . 28 .7 ,14 . Walbank, P h i l l E , 96 & 304 n . 5 , suggests t h a t 
Acliaea h9.d gai.ned c c n t r o l of Olympia by t h i s time, and had 
taken over the preparations f o r the games: Machanidas v/as 
bherefore a t t a c k i n g on^Jaeh|i]_L_^ his a l l i e s , the Eleans. 
There i s no.support i n Livy f o r t h i s , i n a Polybian passage: 
S.Sk^.r.§.^i.£!b3ilii§ .^» l-'^ V/albank were co r r e c t , Polybius would 
ha.ve been sure to emphasise t h a t the Achaean r i g h t t o super-
i n t e n d the games was threatened by Machanidas, and t h i s must 
have been r e f l e c t e d .in. Lii'y. Niese's c o r r e c t i o n of the te.xt 
(GGMS I I , A'-92 n . l ) Achae_os f o r Eleos - which Walbank's 
suggestion e.ntails - i s unnecessary. Machanidas' attack on 
h i s frie.nds i s quite corapre.hensible, and should not be 
explained av/ay: there i s probably some party s i g n i f i c a n c e -
v;hich v;e cannot f i n d c l e a r l y - and the p a r a l l e l w i t h Nabis' 
a t t a c k on f r i e x i d l y Messene i n 201 i s close, ex. below, p- '^Jt 
26, L i v , 28 .7 ,14-17. On the ginodos,, c f . Larsen, Re£_._j3ov., I 7 0 , 
27. L i s t of garrisons and fig^ure (20,000 to~30,000) i n Niese, 
19A 
GGi'4S I I , 600 n . 2 . G r i f f i t h , Mercenariesj^, 7 1 - 2 , estimates 
a t l e a s t 1 5 , 0 0 0 . 
2 8 . L i v . 2 8 . 8 . 1 - 6 . There i s a d i f f i c u l t y i n t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , 
f o r L i v y simply ssuys, £edxiidij^_^^ ( 6 ) . Hov;ever, the 
c i t i e s , v;ith Orchomenus, were not i n f a c t handed over u n t i l 
198 ( L i v . 3 2 . 5 . 5 ) . I t seems u n l i k e l y tha.t they v/ere handed 
over i n 20o , recovered by P h i l i p a t some time l a t e r , and 
.handed over again i n I 9 8 . I t i s b e t t e r t o see the 208 
' r e s t o r a t i o n ' as an u n f u l f i l l e d jpromise. Cf. Niese, GGFIS 
I I , 492 n . 3 ; V/albank, Phi]-i£, 9 6 - 7 ; Aymard, PR, 59 n . 5 3 . 
2 9 . L i v . 2 8 . 8 . 7 - 1 0 . 
3 0 . Gf. app, 2 , ^.-ia"^^, 
3 1 . Pol. 1 1 . 9 . Gf, Larsen, Re]3_._Gov., 1 7 0 - 1 ; Aymard, 
A£semblees, 95~102. 
3 2 . P l u t . Ph. 9 . 1 - 7 ; Paus. 8 . 5 O.I; c f . Kromayer-Veith, 
.%.6£i^ ®sen_jmid^ J 1 3 1 - 2 ; Niese, GGMS I I , 4 9 5 - 8 . 
3 3 . P l u t . Ph. 4 .3 (quoted above, p. ) , 
3 4 . Pol. 1 1 . 1 1 - 1 8 ; P l u t , Ph. 10; Paus, 8 . 5 O . 2 . The b a t t l e i s 
discussed i n d e t a i l i n , Kroraayer, Antik.e_ j c h l a I , 
2 8 l ~ 3 l 4 ; E o l o f f , P£obl^ ae___auj3_ja^ ^ 
3 
cM_chte, I l 6 - l 4 l ; Delb-ruck, ^eschij^hX^ I ' , 
2 5 2 - 6 . 
3 5 . Pol. 1 1 . 1 8 , 8 . - 1 0 , 
3 6 . L i v . 2 9 . 1 2 . 1 : P,egl£ctee_eo_Joi^^ 
Balsdon, JES 1954, p o i n t s out t h a t t h i s cannot mean t h a t 
Galba was withdrawn, as h i s successor was not appointed u n t i l 
20A 
l a t e 206- ( L i v , 29.12.2., Cf. MRR, promagistrates ad 207 and 
2 0 6 , ) . 
3 7 . Pol. 1 3 . 6 . 1 ( 2 0 4 ) : gxoc "f^ fiT) tpCxov ^xwv Tf|v apxr]v. This 
means t h a t he had established himself by mid -206 at the 
l a t e s t . Cf.. Ehxenberg, RE XVI 2 , l 4 7 1 ( 2 0 7 ) ; Niese, GGMS 
I I , 4 6 3 - 5 . 
3 8 . There i s no evidence f o r De Sanctis' improbable assertion 
( I I I 2 , 428) t h a t Philopoernen had been supported by 
Macedonian troops, 
3 9 . Cf, Niese, GGIffi I I , 5OO. 
4 0 . Cf. n. 28 , above. 
41. Pol. 1 1 , 1 8 . 1 0 . The number i s perhaps exaggerated, and 
c e r t a i n l y includes mercenaries and helots; but the loss was 
s t i l l heavy. 
42. Pol. 1 3 , 6 - 8 . Cf. 1 6 . 1 3 . 1 - 2 . 
4 3 . Cf. chs. 4 , 5 & 6 . 
4 4 . L i v . 2 9 . 1 2 . 1 ; App. Mac. 3 ; c f . Walbank, H T i l l | ) , 9 9 - 1 0 1 ; 
De Sanctis, I I I 2 , ^f31"2; Niese, GGMS I I , 5 0 0 - 1 . . 
4 5 . L i v , 2 9 , 1 2 . 3 - 7 (events of war); c f , V/albank, P h i l i p , 1 0 2 - 3 ; 
L i v . 2 9 . 1 2 , 1 3 - 1 4 (terms of peace). A canvenient bibliography 
and discussion i n Balsdon, JBB^ 1954, 30--34, v/hose arfi^iment 
f o r accepting E l i s , Messenia and Nabis seems acceptable, 
Cf. Badian, For_.^__Cl^, 59 '»60 . 
46. P l u t . Ph. 1 2 . 2 ; Paus. 8 , 5 0 , 4 (who r a t i o n a l i s e s , and puts the 
attempt a t Megalopolis, Philopoemen's home town); c f . J u s t i n , 
2 9 . 4 , 1 1 . 
21A 
47. On P h i l i p ' s a c t i v i t i e s durcing these years, c f , Walbank, 
Phili£, 108f, 
48. Pol, I0 . 7 . 6 (Flaraininus). A l i s t of the alleged murder 
v i c t i m s of P h i l i p has been c o l l e c t e d by V/albank, GO 1943, 
4 n . 3 . 
49. V/albank, GC), I.e. ; P h i l i p 124 n ,6 , notes r i g h t l y that the 
source of the t r a d i t i o n miust be contemporary, and c a l l s i t 
untrustworthy; but he does not argue the p o i n t , 
50. L i v . 32.19.2, 
51. Cf. Po l . 24.11,3: t h i s r e f e r s onl^^ t o the time of the Mars 
v/ith P h i l i p and Antiochus. i . e . a f t e r Philopoem.en had l e f t 
f o r Cretedh 200 and a f t e r his r e t u r n ; c f . ch. 6, p, 
52. P l u t , Ph, 13.4, Most modern scholars accept t h i s assessment 
without exai'nination, e.g. Niese, GGKS 11, 616 n . l ; De Sanctis, 
IV 1, 57; N i c c o l i n i , LaJiOnfj____Ach., 121. Aymard, PR? ^'•'7 
79, almost real.ised the f a c t , but defers t o the s o l i d i t y of 
the t r a d i t i o n . 
53. Pol, 11,11.7. 
54. N i c c o l i n i , Sj2idi^__stor._j)e:c^^ 1913, 194f. 
55. Pol. 18,1.4; 18.13.8; 24.11 (from Suda); P l u t , Ph. 13.4; 
17.3. Cf. N i c c o l i n i , op^ j„_ci._t., I96. 
56. Accepted by De Sanctis, IV 1, 57 n. 113; Aymard, PR, 68 
n. 93. 
57. P l u t . Ph. 17,3. 
58. Pj^JjDhica I I , 52. Text also i n .Ditt. _ 3 y l l . ad 702; 
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N i c c o l i n i , o]3_,,„_cvb., 194f . 
59. Gf, c.h. 2,^,'J)l|_; Dubois, M.©.§^ 51t9.l2;u?SH..,£i„A?^ ^^ l^ ^^  74; 
N i c c o l i n i , Iia„OVra^_jlch., 122 n . l - but t h i s was not the 
only reason. 
60. P l u t . Ph. 13 .2 -3 , c f . Pa.us. 8 .50 .6 . 
6 1 . Gf. £tr£3L®S.9S,"lls''". 
62. Aymard, PE, 45f. & n .79 (and b i b l i o g r a p h y ) . 
63. P l u t . Ph. 1 1 . 
64. P l u t . Ph. 12; c f . PauB. 8 .50.3; Pol. 20 .6 . I t i s not, i n 
f a c t , c e r t a i n t h a t Philopoemen v/as strategos: we are only 
t o l d t h a t the Boeotians thought he was, Cf. N i c c o l i n i , La 
G_ojif^j£h., 106;- Aymard, PE, l 4 n . 7 ; V/albank, Phlli£, I 6 5 
(206 /5 ) ; Niese, GGHS I I , 567 n . 2 (201 /0 ) ; Beloch, GG, IV 2 , 
434; Meyer, ffl; XV, I 9 6 'Megara' (193/2). Also possible i s 
Philopoemen's ( u n c e r t a i n ) stra_;tejjjj|. of 204/3 or 203/2 ( c f . 
.^ i-!™™§ii2S.~lis''^ ) " r u l e d out by 7lymard's argu.ment, .As 
t h i s i s uncerteiin, 206/5 i s accepted i n the t e x t , but the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would be e s s e n t i a l l y unchanged i f . 204/3 or 203/2 
were the year. 
64a. A f u r t h e r f a c t o r m.ay h.ave been fede r a l considerations. Since 
the re-accession of Megara, .Achaea shared a f r o n t i e r v/ith 
Boeotia. I t v/as t h e r e f o r e i n her i n t e r e s t t o preserve as 
f r i e n d l y as possible r e l a t i o n s v/ith Boeotia. 
65. Pol. 13 .8 . Polybius' comment (7 ) t l m t Nabis had been looking 
f o r an excuse t o a t t a c k Achaea f o r some time i s e n t i r e l y 
convincing. 
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66, The formal war motion v;as c a r r i e d at a sj_ncljetos at the end 
of 200 ( L i v . 31.25.3"'^). 
6'^ * £i£,'^ii®£2.S"list and ap)p. 2, ^,''o*G, 
68o I n 219 Dyme, Pharae and Tr i t a e a decided t o look a f t e r t h e i r 
oivn i n t e r e s t s - Pol. ^ODO. 
69. Pol. 16,13.3; P l u t , Ph. 12; Paus. 0,50.5. Cf. Niese, 
GGMS I I , 566; W i c c o l i n i , La^_Conf.__J^._, IO9. 
70. Didascalondas the Cretan (and probably others): Pol. 16.37.3, 
71. Pol. 16,36T7; c f . Niese, GGMS I I , 566. 
72. Cf. Broughton, MRR I , 321 and 322 n.A^ f o r r e f s . 
73" Pol. 16.27. On the Roman propaganda, c f . Badian, For. CI., 
62f.; StiK3d£s, 22-3. On the chronology. and the purpose of 
the embassy, c f . McDonald and Walbank, JKS 1937, l89f; 
VJalbank, K i i l i p , 313-317. The d e t a i l e d problems concerning 
chronology and Roman p o l i c y i n the years preceding the Second 
Macedonian V/ar do not concern us here; but i n a d d i t i o n t o 
the v/orks already c i t e d , cf. Petzold, '^J,^ii^^£/') S t i e r , 
J^2iL?^^?£ii££5 '^'^f'! Ferro, Le o r i g i n i d e l l a 11^  guerra 
™^^A°£iS^* McDonald's review of Ferro, op_._ci;t., i n JjSS 
1963, l87f.5 contains a valuable statement of the nature of 
the problems, and a. summary of proposed eicplanations. 
7'^ -. Aymard, PR, 47 n.79? suggests tha.t Philopoemen was aiming a t 
a p o l i c y of neutralism. (Cf. N i c c o l i n i , Iia^i^f,.._Ach,, 119; 
Hoffmann, EE XX 1, 83) . He i s l e d t o t h i s by h i s f a i l u r e t o 
reach the correct conclusion from the closeness of Arista.enus 
2A'-A 
and Pliilopoemeiio He therefore denies t h a t Philopoemen can 
have contemplated an eriten/be v j i t h Rome. Yet vje have shown 
t h a t t h i s i s the only s a t i s f a c t o r y conclusion from iDoth his 
ass o c i a t i o n w i t h Aristaenus and h i s v i r t u a l e x i l e i n Crete. 
J u s t i n (29.''f.ll) may preserve the remains of an o r i g i n a l 
Polyloian statement t o t h i s e f f e c t . 
75. Tjie ord.er of events i s t l i a t established by Walbank, Phila£, 
313-317. 
76. Pol. 16.355 c f . Schrnitt, Rom und Khodos, 67; N i c c o l i n i , 
is . . .-2^lL?__42i° 9 119. 
77. On Achaea durinp; these years, c f . general works, and Aymard, 
PR, I f . N i c c o l i n i , Lj;i,„C_02.il,_Ji£}u 119f.; C a s t e l l a n i , 
^SE^riJSiiii 5 6 6 f . 
78. For a d e t a i l e d account of these years, see.all.standard vjorks, 
and esp, Vfalbank, P h i l i p , 138f.; Badian, ^]or_.__Gl,, 69f . ; 
S t i e r , Rom£_JuJ]^stj^^ 119f. 
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1. L i v . 3^-.57.1. 
2. L i v . 3A'-o57-59; Biod. 28.15; App. Syr. 6; c f . De Sanctis, 
IV 1, 131; Badian, S t o r i e s , 126-7. 
3 . Cf. L i v . 3^!-.57.3' }?£^ISl'^,Si2^I^2^^^^S^S^93^E,' 
Cf. ch. 2, ^^A^^ .^ 
5. P l u t . Ph. 13.5. 
6. Head, Hisi^^JJum., '^ 1-17; on an associated coinage problem, c f . , 
app. 3o On the Megalopolitan koinon, of. Paus. 8 .27.3f . ; 
H i l l e r , EE }CV 1, 'Megala P o l l s ' . 
7. Cf. s t r a t e g y - l i s t and app. 2, ^ .''o\V. 
L i v . 3'^f-.59.8; 35.22.1; Badian, Studies, 128. 
9. Cf. Larsen, TAPA, 1952, I f . 
10. L i v . 3 5 . 1 2 .If.; c f . Aymard, PR, 295f. 
11. L i v . 35.29.2; 22.2. 
12. L i v . 35.13.1-2. 
13. Pol. 2^l-.ll -13 (comparison of Aristaenus and Philopoemen); c f . 
Aymard, PR? 30A'-, follovred by C a s t e l l a n i , ^oS^;I2zS2i;2:.'> 7^' 
most probable date f o r the foedus, accepted here, i s t h a t o f 
Badian, JJSS 1952, 76f . , of wint e r I 9 2/I. Cf. also, C a s t e l l a n i , 
C o n t r i b u t i , 8'^ 1-6. 
L i v , 35.10.11 ( e l e c t i o n s ) ; 35.20.8f . (provinces). There i s 
some confusion i n Li v y on t h i s p o i n t : he has mixed up the 
appointments of Baebius and A t i l i u s , but i t i s quite clear t h a t 
the naval preparations should go w i t h the f l e e t , and th e r e f o r e 
are A t i l i u s ' . 
26A 
15. L i v . 35.37.3 ( a r r i v a l of A t i l i u s a t Gytheum); Zon, 9.19; c f , 
Aymard, PR, 309 n . l 3 ; 3IO ( e f f e c t i v e n e s s of A t i l i u s ) ; L i v . 
35.23.5 (appointment of propaganda mission). 
16. For r e f s . c f . MKS. I , ad. jannum. 
17. L i v . 35.25,2-3; c f . Aymard, PR, 301f. 
18. L i v . 35,25,'^1-5! lil™9^ °JL5.1J!-i?_iSl^ L^^  
.2S££§.§®21^ iSl.J-ILSPi^ L%tS:6._ This suggests tha,t 
F]-amininus' l e t t e r d i d not a r r i v e u n t i l at le a s t the second day 
of the sj£ncletos_^ v;hen there had already been considerable 
discussion. Cf. Aymard, PR, 30'^ f^. On the nature of the 
meeting, c f . Aymard, ilssemble_es, 313; Larsen, Ee£,__Gov., 172. 
19. P l u t . Ph. 15,2; Paus, 8,50.10. 
20. L i v . 35.25.6-10; c f . Niese, GGMS 11, 683; Aymard, PR, 305-6, 
21. P l u t . Pli. 15; F l . 13; cf. Nissen, K r i t _ j _ U j ^ , , 284; 290f. 
22. L i v . 35.47,4. 
23. Winter l84/3: P o l , 23-5.2. 
24. L i v . 35.25.11-12 ( P ) . 
25. L i v . 35,47.4 ( A e t o l i a n s ) ; 35.25.11-12 (Gytheum). 
26. L i v . 35.26.4. 
27. L i v . 35.25.12-26.10; P l u t . Ph. l 4 . The f a c t t h a t Patrae was 
the r e g u l a r base of the Achaean f l e e t seems f a i r l y clear from 
L i v . 38.7.2-3? and the fact t h a t the ships returned t o Patrae 
a f t e r the expe d i t i o n ; i t i s also worth n o t i n g t h a t the 
admiral, Tison, v/as from Patrae. I t t h e r e f o r e seems l i k e l y 
t h a t the f l e e t had set out i n i t i a l l y from Patrae (the f a c t t h a t 
the ancient quadrireme had been s t a t i o n e d at Aegium i s of 
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l i t t l e s i g n i f i c a n c e i n t h i s respect: i t v;as a famous ship, 
t h e r e f o r e on view t r a d i t i o n a l l y i n the c a p i t a l ) . The 
reading Patras (26.9) ha.s been questioned by Rlthl, (Neue 
^^^:^}lt..Ji^.^^iS-l.'i 1883), who suggested I^rasias (on the 
grounds t h a t Prasiae was closer t o Sparta f o r the subsequent 
e x p e d i t i o n ) . This was accepted by Meischke, Sjmbo].ae, 59? 
and De Sanctis, IV 1, 13 -^. Aymard, PR,306 n.2 cannot decide 
betx'jeen the established t e x t and the conjecture. But the 
sound judgement of Niese, GGMS I I , 683 n . l , followed by Mundt, 
Nabis, 13, i s supported by Dr. A. H. McDonald, who has k i n d l y 
confirmed t h a t Patras has f u l l MSS a u t h o r i t y , 
28. Livo 35.27-1-10; c f . P l u t . Ph. l 4 . 4 ; Paus. 8.50.8 ( n i g h t 
r a i d ) ; L i v . 35.27.11-30.13 (main e x p e d i t i o n ) . Cf. Niese, 
GGMS I I , 683-^^; De Sanctis, IV 1, 13^1-5; Aymard, PR, 306f. 
On the topography, see Lorlng, J ] ^ , l895. 
29. L i v . 35.29.1 (Telemnastus) c f . ch. 2,Wik<\; 27 .11 ( E p i r o t s 
and Acarnanians). I t i s also suggested t h a t Eumenes v;as 
present at some stage i n the operations of t h i s year against 
Nabis ( c f . Aymard, PR, 3O9 n ,12 , & works c i t e d there; also 
now McShane, .A^t^ta^J-ds, 139). I t i s clear t h a t l a t e r i n the 
year Eumenes was i n Greece ( a t Chalcis and Athens: L i v . 35. 
3 9 . I f . ) ? but he i s nowhere mentioned i n Livy's Polybian a.cc-
ount of the wax with. Wabis. An i n s c r i p t i o n from Pergamum 
however ( D i t t , SjU.., 605A) records a dedication of s p o i l s 
by those |aexa poatXeooc eV^VOV irXeucravtec TO Seuxepov etc 
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Tr|V *EXAa6a crTpaTiooxai, ex Tot! iroXe|iOV TOS irpoc Nd(3tv 
xai 'AvTCoxov liincrrpaTevJoavcoc Totc'fe^Xrp-iv 
Dittenberger's explanation, accepted by Aymard (.liC^)^ i s 
t h a t the reference i s t o a hy p o t h e t i c a l expedition against 
Nabis i n 192 and t h a t ( c e r t a i n l y established) against 
Antiochus i n 191. An equally possible explanation, whj.ch 
also accounts f o r the absence of mention by Livy of Eumenes 
i n Philopoemen's expedition, i s t h a t the s o l d i e r s making the 
de d i c a t i o n regarded the expedition of 195 against Nabis and 
t h a t of 191 against Antiochus as two phases of the same ;war. 
Cf. Walbank, PMlxE, 195n.3. 
30. Cf. Oost, Homa^^PoU^ 56-58. 
31. The circumstances i n which t h i s truce v/as negotiated are not 
cl e a r , f o r L i v y does not mention i t and we must r e l y on P l u t . 
Ph. 15 and Paus. 8.50,10, who do not give the circumstances. 
I t i s a t t r a c t i v e ( w i t h Aymard, PR, 312) t o assume t h a t 
Flamininus openly intervened v/hile the Achaean army was 
a c t u a l l y i n the f i e l d , but the sources do not allov; c e r t a i n t y 
f o r t h i s . I t ma.y be safer t o conclude, as i n the t e x t , t h a t 
Philopoemen had already ended h i s expedition unsuccessfully, 
and Flamihinus simply vjanted t o prevent another attempt on 
Sparta. 
32. P l u t . Ph. 15.1; c f . F l . 13.2-3; Aymard, PR, 313f'. & n.26. 
33. P l u t . Ph. 11. Gf. ch . 3 , 
34. P l u t . 1"1. 13.3. One of these honours, set up by Aristaenus, 
29A 
has been i d e n t i f i e d by Bousquet, BGH, 1964, 607f. 
35. D i t t . S x l l . 37i\- i.Gk ( P h i l i p p i d e s ) ; i b . 62k- 1,10 
(Philopoemen); i b . 289 1. 39 (d ecree -• Athens); i b , 37^ 1» 
66; 1003 1, 15; 912 1. Zk ( p r o e j r i a ) . Cf. Gundel, RE 
}G{IV, 'T. Ouinctius Flai'dininus' 1075-6. 
36. P l u t . n . 13.2. 
37. L i v . 3A'-.35.11; Pol, 21.1. 
38. L i v . 35.3^.^-5; 3 5 . I f . Gf. Badian, Studies, 131-2, 
39. L i v . 35.35. I f . ( d e t a i l of Aetolians a t Sparta); 37.1-3; 
c f . P l u t . Ph. 15.2-3; Paus, 8.50.10-51.1 (Philopoemen at 
Sparta). Cf. Niese, GGI;IS I I , 687-9; De Sanctis, IV 1, 138-
9; Aymard, PR, 315f.; S t i e r , Roffls__Aufst£i^  l60f. 
-^ fO. P l u t . Pli. 15.2. 
A'-l. P l u t . H i . 15.A'-f. 
42. Aymard's-discussion (PR, 3 l8 f . ) , of Sparta w i t h i n Achaea i s 
v i t i a t e d by two major faults i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n : ( i ) f a i l u r e 
t o distingu.ish betv/een the various Spartan i n t e r e s t s ( i i ) 
w i l l i n g n e s s t o assume a s t a t i c p o l i c y f o r Philopoemen, and a 
s t a t i c p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n Sparta u n t i l 188. 
43. Pol. 20.12; P l u t . Ph. 15,^ 1-6; Paus. 8.51.2. Paus, places 
the o f f e r a f t e r Philopoemen's defense of Sparta against 
Flafflininus and Diophanes; P l u t , makes i t clear t h a t i t i s 
a d i r e c t r e s u l t of the i n i t i a l establishment i n pov/er of 
Tiraolaus' group. Paus. also makes the o f f e r of the a c t u a l 
household, not the money from i t s sale, and rounds o f f the 
f i g u r e t o 'more than 100 t a l e n t s ' . None of the v a r i a n t s are 
3 OA 
more than i n a c c u r a c i e s stemming from a b b r e v i a t i o n . 
i|if» P l u t . Ph« 15. 5-6, The philopoemen legend was probably r e s -
p o n s i b l e f o r the grovrth of the t r a d i t i o n about Timolaus' 
conventiona^l three v i s i t s , 
45. P o l . 20.12,6-7; c f . P l u t . Ph. 15.6, 
46. P o l . 21.9; L i v , 37.20,2. These two passages, and the general 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of Philopoemen's i n f l u e n c e , seem d e c i s i v e against 
the view of De S a n c t i s , IV 1, I 6 9 , t h a t Diophanes was 'avversario 
p o l i t i c o d i Pilopemene', and of Aymard, PR, 323 & n.40, 
' i n t e r m e d i a i r e entre l e s deux p o l i t i q u e s opposees d'Aristainos et 
de Philopoimen', followed by C a s t e l l a n i , C o n t r i b u t i , 79. The 
f a u l t i s i n the assumption of s t a t i c conditions and p o l i c i e s , 
47. L i v . 35.47.2-3 ( A e t o l i a n estimate of Philopoemen); 31.2 
(Plamininus* t r u s t i n Achaea); 48.1 (Flamininus a t Aegium). 
48. On the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the d e c l a r a t i o n f o r the e x i s t e n c e of a 
f o e ^ s , c f . Badian, JRS. 1952, 76f. On Philopoemen's support 
f o r Diophanes, P o l . 39.3.8. 
49. L i v . 3 5 . 5 0 . 3 - 4 ( g a r r i s o n s ) ; f o r other Achaean s e r v i c e abroad: e.g. 
L i v . 33.l8(Rhodian Peraea); L i v . 37. 20-21(Pergamum i n I90) c f . 
below^ |. 
50. L i v . 35.50,3-4; P l u t . Ph. I 7 . I . 
51. P o l . 20.3; L i v . 36.5.2-5. 
52. Cf. Badian,, JRS, 1952(& bibliography, to which add C a s t e l l a n i , 
C o n t r i b u t i , S i j - f . ) . 
53. Despite the attempts of s c h o l a r s to see t h i s . Of. S c u l l a r d , 
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ItoraaiT^  j'^oli^t^^^ , 110 f . 
54. Cf. ch. 3, \(!sS^ .^ 
55. L i v . 34.43. 1 ( e l e c t i o n of Afric a n u s ) ; 4f. (provinces); c f . 
Badian, Studies^, 122f. 
56. L i v . 34.23.5 (Flamininus' commission); 24 .1-3 ( e a r l y e l e c t -
i o n s ) ; 24 .5 ( e l e c t i o n of Gl a b r i o ) . 
57. P l u t . Gato_J;ia2. 12. The order of the tovms i n the t e x t i s 
th a t given by Plu t a r c h . Aymard (PR, 329 n .25), unnecessarily 
wishes t o a l t e r t h i s t o f i t the route of a t r a v e l l e r from 
I t a l y , P l u t , does not say tha t Cato v/as en route from I t a l y , 
On the l e g a l aspect of these v i s i t s , c f , app. 5. 
58. P l u t . Ph. 16.1-2; c f . Paus. 8.51.1; c f . Niese, G&IS I I , 
715^.; Aymard, PR, 330 f. (both l a y emphasis on Spartan 
desire f o r restora,tion of the coastal towns), 
59. Aymard, PR, 334 n . l 2 , has doubts ( s t r a n g e l y ) about Plut.'s 
s p e c i f i c statement t h a t Sparta vfas out of the League. 
60. Paus, 8.30.5. Aymard, PR, 335 n,15, r e j e c t s Schorn's i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n (Geschi^ cM;_£_ 289), t h a t Diophanes 
wanted t o equal Philopoemen's glory - an obvious personal 
motive - i n fa.vour of his a p p l i c a t i o n of Polybius' biassed 
judgement of Diophanes at another time as o-rpaTcoaTtxcoTrepoc 
*Ti iroXlTtxcoTepoC (22.10.4). I n f a c t , everything we know of 
Diophanes, supported by his i n s c r i p t i o n , suggests t h a t 
Schorn was exact i n h i s understanding. On Pol. 22 .10.4, c f . 
ch. 5, f. 
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61. Cf. Pol. 22.lO .4f,; L i v . 38.32.6-7. 
62. L i v . 36.32.1 (purchase of Zacynthus); 31.1-4 ( E l i s and 
Hes.sene). 
63. L i v . 36.31.2: cura_Aetola^ 
64. L i v . 36.31.5-9. 
65. See below^ ^ ^\. 
66. Pol. 23.5.2 - the Aaxoovixoc troXejaoG can only be tha t against 
Nabis i n 195'. the ejcpedition of I 9 I v;ith Diophanes v/as not a 
j o i n t a l l i e d venture, and scarcely even a iroXejiOC , The f a c t 
t h a t Deinocrates v/as the o f f i c i a l representative of Messene 
i n 195 seems clear from the concessions granted t o Messene 
i n the settlement, L i v , 34,35.6; c f . Seeliger, Messenien, 
18. 
67. Pol. 23.5. 
68. Roebuck, lles^enla, 92 ?< n. 117, t h i n k s t h a t the o f f e r of 
dedi.tio v/as not 3,ccepted: 'The seq^uel of Livy's account 
shovjs t h a t Flamininus himself made f i n a l arrangements f o r 
Messene's entrance i n t o the League; had he accepted the 
surrender on behalf of Rome he could scarcely have done t h i s , 
although a RomaJi commander who accepted d e d l t i o had v/ide 
povrers . . .' This misunderstands the nature of . d M i t i o , 
which was e s s e n t i a l l y an agreement between the Roman 
commander and those g i v i n g the surrender. Cf. Heuss, Vo].k. 
Grund., 60 - a work v/hich Roebuck c i t e s ! 
69. Well seen by Seeliger, ilessenlen, 19, but denied by Aymard, 
33A 
PR, 34 l n, l 4 , on the grounds t l i a t t h i s would have i n t e r -
ested L i v y : therefore he v/ould have been bound t o include i t . 
But L i v y lias already s u f f i c i e n t l y i n d i c a t e d t h a t Messene v/as 
an A e t o l i a n sympathiser; i n any case, i t may not have been 
i n Polybius' i n t e r e s t t o make t h i s v/holly clear: Deinocrates 
was no f r i e n d of Achaea. Aymard pr e f e r s t o r e f u r b i s h the 
oligarch/democrat d i v i s i o n a t Messene, f o r which the only 
evidence i s Pausanias' d e s c r i p t i o n of Deinocrates as Suvaxoc 
Xp'rp.ajCTL (8,51.7)» This viev/ v/as apparently founded by 
Freeman, ]^::Starj^oi_^Feder&^^ 505) and became 
standard when accepted by Co l i n , Rome et _la Grece«i 227 and 
N i c c o l i n i , Iia„0£nf^_Ach., 157. Cf. Roebuck, Jfesseni^ 95 n. 
126. I t should nov; be abandoned. 
70. L i v . 36.31.10-32.9; c f , Aymard, PR, 35O-I, 
71. L i v , 36.32.4. 
72. Mong them may have been included Aristaenus (as Ayraard, PR, 
350-1), who i n any case v/as closer t o Philopoemen than has 
oft e n been thought. Cf. above, ch. 3? \.'^'h\. 
73. I t seems l i k e l y t h a t by t h i s time i t v/as about September, 
the time of the autumn s^nodos, therefore the time of the 
e l e c t i o n s . Cf. Aymard, PR, 352 n . 2 ; Larsen, Re;g_t,_Oov,, 
173; a?, app. 2^ 
74. Paus. 8.30.5. 
75. L i v . 36.35,7- de exu.libus Lacedaemonigrm^^ 
est. 
76. L i v . 34.26,12-14. 
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77. P l u t . Ph.. 17.4, 
78. Aymard argues t h a t t h i s p o l i c y must have been passed dovm 
t o Flaxnininus by the Senate, without o f f e r i n g any conclusive 
argument:- i t was usual f o r the man-on-the-spot t o formulate 
a p o l i c y i n good f a i t h , v/hich v/as then adopted by the 
Senate, and i t seems l i k e l y t h a t t h i s was done i n t h i s case. 
His attempt (PR, 356f, n . l ) , t o prove t h i s by arguing tha.t 
P o l , 21,1 r e f e r s t o summer I 9 I i s not convincing, see below^Ultf 
79. L i v , 36,35.7; c f , Aymard, PR, 353f. Another matter i n 
v;hich Diophanes perhaps concerned himself vjas the n e g o t i a t i o n 
w i t h Glabrio f o r the resettlem.ent of the Elateans, who had 
been made homeless on the d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e i r c i t y , probably 
by the Aetolians, and had taken refuge at Stym.phalus, The 
ma t t e r . i s recorded i n an i n s c r i p t i o n from Styraphalus (SEG 11, 
1107)5 the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n accepted here t h a t of Passerini, 
.Ath. 1948; but c f . Mitsos, REG, 1946/7; Accame, RiX;„,Fil., 
1949 (both argue unconvincingly t h a t Elatea was destroyed by 
the Romans). I t i s not clear whether the Diophanes mentio.ned 
(1.12) as envoy t o Glabrio i s i n f a c t the s t ^ a ^ ^ ^ s . 
Against t h i s i s the f a c t t h a t he was sent by the Acha^eans 
outside of Peloponnese as an ambassador on a r e l a t i v e l y 
unimportant matter, Vifhich the strat_e£os_ v;ould not normally 
undertake i n person. However, i t may be th a t t h i s mission 
v/as a f t e r h i s stra.'begia, but before Glabrio l e f t Greece. 
80. L i v . 37.4,6. 
81. Pol. 21.1. 
em 
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82. A.ymard, PR, 356f,, n . l . Exajiiples of embassies introduced 
otherv/ise than by consuls are comparatively r a r e : L i v , 34, 
57.3; 37.46,9; Died, 31.5.1 c f . Pol. 30.4; D i t t . 
612. 
83. The d i s t i n c t i o n v/as appreciated by Niese, GGI4S I I , 7l6 n.3, 
although not elaborated, but s u r p r i s i n g l y de.nied by Aymard, 
PR, 359 n.9. 
84. Pol. 21.3.4, 
85. Pol, 21.3b (dis p a t c h of Diophanes); L i v . 37.20; 37.39.9, 
c f . App. S;^r. 31; D i t t . S j l l . 606 (Magnesia): the pro b l 
of the numbers should be resolved by accepting Livy (P). 
Cf. De Sanctis, IV 1, 199 n. I36. On the a l l i a n c e w i t h 
Eumenes, c f . app. 4, 
86. L i v . 38.7,2-3 (operation w i t h P l e u r a t u s ) ; 38.39.3f. 
(Cephallenia). 
87. L i v , 38.30-34; Holleaux, Etudes, 5, 249-294. 
88. Cf. also Aymard, REA, I928, l 4 f . 
89. On t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the s^nodos and s2£ncletos, c f . 
Badian and E r r i n g t o n , ^j^stwla,) 1965 (and b i b l i o g r a p h y ) , 
90. Larsen, Kep_._J:fOV., 175f. 
91. On .Romans at syji£letoi, cf. Larsen, .5e£._^J3ov., appendix 
£SSsim. At s^nodoi a f t e r 188: Pol. 28.3.7-10 (I7O); Pol 
38,10 ( 147) . 
92. Cf, Badian and E r r l n g t o n , Hist^oria, I965. 
93. Pol. 21.1.3, 
94. Pol. 21.32c.2; c f . appendix 6, ^ .^S^. 
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95. L i v . 38,31.1: the f a i l u r e t o i n t e r p r e t t h i s phrase i n i t s 
context has l e d t o t o t a l f a i l u r e t o understand Philopoemen's 
a t t i t u d e towards the e x i l e problem. Ci. Niese, GGMS I I , 
715; Ayraard, PR, 321; 338. 
96. L i v . 38.30.9 (appeal of e x i l e s t o Achaea); 31.5-6 (appeal 
of government group t o Rome). 
97. Tv/o passages make i t clear t h a t the 'old e x i l e s ' were i n 
f a c t r e s t o r e d i n I88: Pol. 22.11.7'. ol)T;ot 8' •fp'av TC5V 
apxat'cov (^ DyaSoov toav wro TOB §iXoTroi|ievo(; x a l TWV 'Axaiwv 
veoxr-rt xaTrjYjievwv etc TTJV o l x e t a v . Cf. L i v . 39.36.l4 (Areus 
and A l c i b i a d e s ) ; Pol. 23.4.2-3, i n v/hich the dispute of the 
'old e x i l e s ' i s not t h a t they demanded r e s t o r a t i o n , but t h a t 
t h e i r settlement a f t e r r e s t o r a t i o n was u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , 
98. L i v . 38.32.6-10 (Achaeans a t Rome); c f . Pol. 24.12-13 
(comparison of Philopoemen and Aristaenus); 2.2.10.14 
(Unanimity of Aristaenus and Diophanes). I n the foejius t o 
which Lycortas r e f e r s ( L i v . 38.32.8) i t seems preferable t o 
understand the agreement betv/een Sparta and Achaea ra t h e r 
than the foedus v/ith Rome, as Lycortas' v/hole emphasis i s on 
the f a c t t h a t t h i s i s an Achaean i n t e r n a l matter, Cf. Niese, 
G§;IS, I I I , 44, 
99. L i v . 33.32.9-10. 
100, L i v , 38,33.4-5. The 'captive e x i l e s ' v/ere restored, there-
f o r e must have been present at Compasion (Pol. 21.320.3). 
At lea.st Areus and Alcibiades of the 'old e x i l e s ' v/ere 
present ( L i v . 39.36, l4-l6.) 
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101. L i v . 38.33.6-11; P l u t . Ph. I 6 . 3 ; Paus. 0.51.3, 
102. Pol. 21,32c. 
103. P l u t . _Ph. 16.3; J35H, I I I , 591. I'he fragitients and t e s t -
imonia do not allow us to echo Aymard's Judgement of 
Ar i s t o c r a t e s as 'auteur d'assez f a i b l e valeur' (PR, 330 n . l ; 
c f . S t i e r , Rsig^jVufs^i^^ 174 n. 396: 'Der spartanische 
Tendenzhistoriker . . , ' ) . We must be c a r e f u l t o take 
Polybius' n a t u r a l bias i n t o consideration. For there v/as 
la.ter a group of Spartans which Pol., 23.4.5, describes as 
airo 61 Tcov teSavaTcoiievwv x a l TOOV exTrerrTcoxoToov xaxa ira xSv 
'Axaiwv SoYViaxa » This suggests t h a t f u r t h e r J u d i c i a l pro-
ceedings v/ere i n f a c t c a r r i e d out a,fter Compasion, i-zith the 
r e s u l t t h a t the a c t u a l number condemned i n the whole of the 
settlement of Sparta was f a r higher than Polybius' 80, 
v/hich only recorded the deaths of the tv/o days. V/e cannot 
therefore simply ignore A r i s t o c r a t e s (as, e.g. Niese, GGMS, 
I I I , 45). Pausanias' account (3.51.3) i s b r i e f e r than 
Plutarch's, and contains some v a r i a t i o n s : he does not 
me.ntion any deaths at a l l , says 300 were 'expelled from 
Peloponnese', agrees th a t 3OO hel o t s v/ere sold. Where Paus.' 
f i g u r e f o r expe]_lees comes from i s obscure: perhaps a con-
fused attempt t o combine A r i s t o c r a t e s ' and Polybius' f i g u r e s 
from Plutarch? 
104. L i v . 38.34.1-9; c f . Chrimes, Mcj^_t__Sparta, 43f., esp. 
46-7, 
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105. L i v , 38,34.7. 
106, Pol, 21.32c,4; c f , app, 6^  \ 
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l-H ^ 1 . Pol. 2Z.y.).-¥c The conjecture of VJunderer, which B~V/. p r i n t s 
at 30I5 Aaxe6at,|iovioi)V against the MSS '.PocjiaCoov makes the 
sentence meaningless. . Ci. Badian, .5!2L.^.C1.5 9 1 n. 2 . 
2 , Pol. 2 2 . 1 1 . 7 . 
3» Pol. 2 3 . ^ . 5 . 
4 . Pol. 22.3<>'4-. On the clironology, cf, app. 2 , 
5 . Liv. 3 8 . 3 2 . 9 ( 1 8 8 ) ; cf. ch. 4 , ; Pol. 2 2 . 7 . 6 
(Nicodernus). The text i s corrupt, but su f f i c i e n t remains to 
make the policy clear. 
5a . ' The lacuna i n Pol. 2 2 . 7 . 6 must have contained some mention 
of the constitutional alteration (as B~W.'s conjecture). 
6. Pol. 2 2 . 3 . 2 . The actual time when the l e t t e r was written 
v/as probably not long before Lepidus' departure for his 
province. He clearly did not v;ant to commit himself u n t i l 
he Imew the attitude of the Senate as a whole, which he 
simply echoes. Cf. Niccolini, La Conf. Ach., I 3 0 . 
Castellani, Contributi, 9O, by following Aymard's faulty 
chronology (Cf. app. 2,^ r^ \'&t".) makes Lepidus' l e t t e r precede 
the Senate's reply to Nicodemus by nearly a year. No sat-
isfactory explanation i s therefore available for t h i s delay, 
but i t must become simply 'altro segno del disinteresse dei 
Eomani'. 
7 . Pol, 22.^^. Cf. Niese, G§IS I I I , l 6 ~ 1 7 (who puts the events 
i n 1 8 6 ) . 
8 . Liv. 3 6 . 3 1 . 9 ( o r i g i n a l settlement); Pol. 2 2 . 1 0 , 1 - 6 
(Philopoeraen's amendment). On the general nature of th i s 
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type of ilijjS^sJffma, cf, V/elles, AJI l , I938. 
Roebuck, MfLssenia, 93 n. 126. Ayraard, PR, 365 n .26, does 
not speculate about the nature of the amendment, but 
suggests: 'en 191/O cette intervention est a sa date logique 
et normale'. However, he does not cite any evidence to 
support t h i s . Philopoemen's 5 th £tra_-te£ia i s also supported 
by Seeliger, ^ fes^eni^n, 19--20 (although he dates this to 
190/89) . This cannot be correct. Diophanes v/as i n Rome i n 
spring 188 opposing Lycortas and Philopoemen (Liv. 38.32. 
6 -7 ) ; and although the main point at issue was Sparta (as 
i t was i n 183)5 Dioiahanes would have been certain (as i n 
185) to have raised the matter of Messene i f Philopoeraen's 
emendation had already taken place at th i s time. As he did 
not, we are j u s t i f i e d i n placing Philopoemen's intervention 
after spring l 8 8 . Aymard and Seeliger are r i g h t i n agreeing 
that Philopoemen must have been .strategog at the time; and 
as life have no evidence for a £trategia betiireen 189/8 and 
183/2, i t seems best to put this intervention i n his 'reform 
year', I 8 9 / 8 . 
10. Cf. ch. h-^ ^AS^V 
11„ Plut. Ph. 18.3 (personal h o s t i l i t y ) ; Liv, 39 .50 ,7-8 ; 
Pans. 8 ,51 .7 ; Plut. Ph. 20; Pol. 23-12.3 (poisoning), cf. 
belowj 
12. Pol. 22 .7 .5 -7 . 
13. Pol. 22 .7 .8 -8 .13 . 
l ^ ^ . D i t t , OGIS, 329. 
^flA 
15. Gf, D i t t . SjJ^l., 606, 
16. Despite Pol.'s avewecocrav'TO . (22 .7 .8 ) . Ci. De Sanctis, IV 
1 , 238; McShane, A t t a i i t e , l64 8; n . 5 1 . There i s no need 
\rlth De Sanctis, IV 1 , 238, and Niccolini, li^^C^i^t^^^Aclu^^ 
151? to interpret t h i s as an anti-Roman move: the Achaeans 
had- s u f f i c i e n t cause of grievance against Eumenes sirnply i n 
his capacity of King of Pergamum and Lord of Aegina, 
17. Gf, Aymard, As^jnb_lees, 331f . 
18. Larsen, 'Roman Greece', i n Frank, .%on^ om^ c _S^^ IV 366-75 
suggests that t h i s i n f l u x of money would have the effect of 
depressing interest rates, thus causing the commercial 
classes to oppose the offer. But i n the t o t a l absence of 
background information about the Achaean commercial scene, 
t h i s must remain speculation. 
19. Pol, 22 .3 .6 (d.espatch of embassy); 9.1-12 (return and. 
discussion). 
20. Plut, Ar. 1 4 . 1 ; 24 ,4; 4 l . 3 . 
2 1 . D i t t . OGIS, 115; = Arsinoe i n Peloponnese? cf. OGIS, 102 
1,12 (& D i t t . ' s n , 7 ) . 
22. Pol. 2 4 , 6 . 5 . Cf. De Sanctis, IV 1 , 246 n. 20. 
23. Pol. 22 .10 . On the date of the Nemea, I 8 Panemos = early 
July, cf, BoethiuB, Der_A££ivi^h£_ 5 1 . 
24. Pol, 22 .11 .12 . Gf, Larsen, Re^j^^Gov., 89 f . 
25. Pol. 24,11-13 (syncrisis); cf, ch. G^%\\U The most 
recent estimate of Aristaenus i s also the most unperceptive 
of Pol.'s bias - Gastellani, GontT±hnt±^ 92-3; cf. De 
42A 
Sanctis, IV 1 , 2^0. 
25a. Cf. Paus. 7.8.6. 
26. Pol. 22 .11 .6 ; 1 2 . 1 ; 12.5-10. 
26a. Pol. 28 ,3 ; l 6 . 2 ; Liv. 43.17.2 . Cf. Meloni, Perseo, 
270--1 (& bibliography). 
27. Achaean reaction was based wholly on th i s f a i l u r e to show 
due gratitude. Pol. 22.11.8; Liv. 39 .35 .6-8 . 
28. Pol. 22 .11 .7 ; 12 .1 -4 , 
29. Liv. 39.35.5-8; cf. Pol. 22.11.8. 
30. Liv. 39 ,36 .1-2 (Areus and Alcibiades); 3-4 (Pulcher's 
disapproval); 36.6 - 37.17; cf. Paus. 7 .9 .4 (speech of 
Lycortas)0 
3 1 . Liv, 39 .37 .18 -21 . Cf. Niese, GGMS I I I , 48-9; De Sanctis, 
IV 1 , 241; Castellani, GjDntrd^uti, 96 f . 
32. Paus. 7 . 9 . 4 . Gf. app. 5f ^.'hW^, 
33. As N i c c o l i n i , La,J3onf._j\ch., 154; De Sanctis, IV 1 , 2 4 l . 
34. Pol. 2 3 . 4 . 1 1 . 
35. Pol. 23.4; cf. Liv. 39.48.2-4. 
36. B-V/ conjectures KXfVrcv,for MSS A5criv at Pol. 23 .4 .2 , because 
Cletis i s mentioned at 2 3 . I 8 . 5 . This i s unnecessary, when 
we consid.er the rapid turnover of Spartan p o l i t i c i a n s at 
t h i s period. Cf. app. 7. B. Shiraron ( i n a private l e t t e r ) 
suggests that Lysis' group represented the descendants of 
the 'old oligarch' opponents of Cleoraenes, This i s possible, 
but i t seems dangerous to be so specific: there must also 
have been numbers of exiles created by the factional 
43A 
struggles a f t e r Cleomenes' death, and by the regime of 
Machanidas (now a l l considered 'old exiles', along with 
the exiles from Nabis' time), which v/ould tend to blur 
precise distinctions after more than 40 years. The t o t a l 
restoration of property vras the regular demand of the rest-
ored e x i l e , and cannot be taken to describe any particular 
group. Cf. D i t t . OGIS 2 (Mytilene); D i t t . S j l _ l . 306 
(Tegea); Michel, 4 l7 (Galymna), 
37. Cf. ch, 4, .^ n-s. 
38. Pol, 2 3 . 4 , 7 . Pulcher's name must be added from Paus. 
7 . 9 . 5 . 
39. Paus. 7 . 9 . 5 . Nothing suggests that the 'lav/s of Lycurgu.s' 
viere now restored, (as Castellani, GjMitj^jati, 99 ) . 
40. Discussion of these embassies i n : Niese, GGIAS I I I , 49--50; 
N i c c o l i n i , l^^Gont^jXch.., 156-7; De Sanctis IV 1 , 241-2; 
Castellani, C(m;trJ.M 98-9. 
4 1 . For refs., cf. WSR I , 379. 
42. Pol. 23 .5 . On the chronolopry cf. app, 2,^.1)1>A 
43. Pol. 2 3 . 5 . l 4 ~ l 8 (Flamininus at Naupactus); cf. Liv. 
31.25.9 (Achaean law). 
44. Pol. 24.9.12 (not i n Larsen's l i s t of assemblies); cf, 
Castellani, ^ojvl^rJJ^-Lbi, 100. 
45. Pol. 23 .9 .8-10 (report of Philippus); 12~l4 (reception of 
Achaeans and ansv/er of the Senate), 
46. Pol. 23.17. 3--4. 
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47. Pol. 23.5.18 (expulsion) cf. app. 7 for discussion of 
circumstances, 
48. Pol, 2 3 . 9 . 1 (two embassies); 6,1-3 (Arcesilaus and 
Agesipolis), 
49. Pol, 2 3 . 9 . 1 1 . 
50. Pol. 23 .9 .14 , Although Serip pus i s not e x p l i c i t l y 
mentioned as having been retained at Rome, this must be 
inferre d from the fact that his return vjas around the time 
of the f i n a l Acha.ean settlement at Messene (Pol, 23 .17 .5 ) . 
5 1 . Gf, app, 7^ ^,'\SU\. 
52. Pans. 4 , 2 9 . 1 1 . This i s the only mention of Lycortas' 
expedition, but may be accurate, as the other sources are 
v/holly concerned with Philopoemen at t h i s point, 
Philopoemen's alleged death-cell inquiry about the safety 
of Lycortas (Liv. 39.50.7; Plut. Ph. 20.2) supports Pans, 
i n t h i s point. 
53. Liv. 3 9 . 4 9.I; Plut. Ph. 18.3 gives the name of the 
threatened town, i n the accusative case, as KoXa)vi6a = 
Golonides. The two tovms are i n the same direction from 
Mepj'alopolis and about 30 km. apart; i n the absence of 
Polybius' ov;n account vje cannot recover the t r u t h of t h i s 
d e t a i l . Gorone v/as more important, and nearer Messene; i t 
i s therefore accepted here. Seeliger, iless^nien, 21-2, 
misreads Plutarch and invents an otherwise unknovm s e t t l e -
ment Colonis, v/hich he places i n northern Messenia, He 
envisages Philopoemen's capture i n northern Hessenia, and 
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argiaes that Philopoemen's attempt on Corone v/ould not be 
frustrated i n the north. This i s more faulty than a simple 
misreading of Plut., for no source states that the battle 
was near the threatened town: only that Deinocrates l a i d 
his ambush i n the mountains near Messene. The direct route 
from Megalopolis to Gorone (and Colonid.es) passes close by 
Messene. There viere clearly numerous opportunities for 
ambush. Cf. Niese, GGRS I I I , 52 n . 6 , 
54, Liv. 3 9 . 4 9 . 2 . Plut. does not mention the Thracians and 
Cretans, but Livy's statement i s conclusive for their having 
been i n one of Pol,'s accounts. The presence of this s o l i d 
professional support made Philopoemen' s und.ertaking less 
hazardous than the account of Plutarch, centred on 
Philopoemen, suggests, for i t mentions only the young 
ca-valrymen „ 
55. Recorded i n a l l sources: Pol. 23 .12.3; Liv. 39.50.7--8; 
Plut. Ph. 20; Paus. 8 .51.7 . Uniformly accepted by a l l 
modern writers v/ith no expression of uncertainty: Neumeyer, 
E^lSRPSISSR^ -54; Seeliger, Yj-^ssenwn^ 22; Niese, GGI'iS 
I I I , 53-4; N i c c o l i n i , M„£on_f ,_Ach,, 16O; De Sanctis, IV 1 , 
2'^ ^3; Benecke, GAH 8, 29o; Hoffmann, RE XX 1 , 92-3, 
'Philopoimen'; Castellani, C^OTiJ^^^ti, 102. 
55. Liv. 39 .50 ,7 -8 ; Plut. I ^ i . 20 .2-3 . 
57. Liv, 39 .50 .5 -6 ; cf. Plut, Ph. 19 .2 , 
58. Pol. 2 3 . l 6 . 2 f . 
59. Plut. Ph. 21 .2 ; Paus. 8 . 5 I . 0 . 
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60, P l u t , Ph. 21,2-4. 
61, P l u t , Pli, 21.5-6; Pol, 39.3.3-11. 
62, P l u t , Ph, 2; D i t t , S^n. 625; Pomtow, K l i o 9,l60, 
63, Diod. 29.18 (Loeb t r , ) ; D i t t , Syia. 624; c f , L i v . 39.50,9. 
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I 
1. Plut, Ph, 21.1, This explanation follows Larsen, Re£_o;_ 
Gov., 1780 The law regarding the assumption of office by 
the predecessor on the death of the strategos i s only 
knov/n from l46 (Pol, 38.15.1)? but i n the absence of evid-
ence to the contrary, i t i s reasonable to assume that i t 
was operative i n I82. 
2. Pol. 23.16-17.2 (end of v/ar and settlement); Plut. Ph. 
21.2; Paus. 8.51.8 (death of Deinocrates). Cf. Niese, 
GGMS I I I , 54-5. 
3. Pol. 23.i7.5f. Gf, app. 7^ ^AS§. 
4. Pol, 23.17.7-11. 
5. Pol. 23.17.12, 
Pol. 23.18.1-2 (decision of sji i c l e t o s ) ; l8,3-5 (embassies 
to Rome). Gf. app. 7 on Spartan parties. 
7. Pol. 24.1,1; 1.4-5; Liv. 40.20.2. 
8. Pol. 24.1.6-7; Liv. 40.20.2, 
9. Pol, 24.21-2 (return of Spartans); 2-3 (Messenian s e t t l e -
ment); cf, 23.15 (damage to Messene), 
10. Pol. 24,2,^i-5. Gf. 22.3.2 (187). 
11. Pol, 24.7. 
12. Pol. 24.8.1-7. 
13. Pol.'s opinion of Gallicrates has usually been accepted as 
the basis of modern interpretations: cf. Niese, ^HS I I I , 
59, 'Er x-/ar ein eh_rgeiziger, gewissenloser P o l i t i k e r , i n 
6 
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erster Linie Parteimann, nicht P a t r i o t L e s s violent, 
but s t i l l seeing the issue i n terms of 'servitu' against 
' l i b e r t a ' , De Sanctis, I V 1, 247 -8 , N i c c o l i n i , La_Conf. 
Ach., 167, made a b r i e f objection to th i s u n c r i t i c a l trend, 
but did not expose Polybius' bias at length, Gary, a^^ek 
WOTM, 198, i s again too b r i e f to have made an impression 
on the t r a d i t i o n . Badian, Fo:r.__Cl., 90-93, i s the f i r s t 
r e a l attempt to come to terms v;ith the Polybian assessment; 
yet even t h i s penetrating analysis i s not accepted by 
Castellani, Gjjntrijm IO7, who, although recognising Pol.'s 
bias, accepts the t r a d i t i o n a l picture. 
14. Pol. 24.8.8. 
15. Pol. 24 .6 .3; 6.6. On the part of Aratus and Lydiadas on 
the embassy to Rome, cf. Niese, GGMS I I I , 59J 'zv/ei 
unbedeutendere My,nner rait angesehenen Namen'. Cf. 
Castellani, Contributi IO6. 
16. Pol. 24.8.9-9.1 5'Ispeech of CalliorateS;); 10. 6-7 (senat-
o r i a l reaction). 
17. Pol. 24.10.8. 
18. Pol. 24.10.9. 
19. Pol, 24.10.11-12 (Polybius); 8.2-4 (Lycortas). 
20. Pol. 24.10.14-15; cf. D i t t . s^n., 634. 
21. Cf. Badian, For_j___Gl., 91. 
I I 
1. Liv. 4-1.23.4; 24.1 (strate^gia); Pol. 23.4.11 ( i n Rome); 
Castellani, Cpntxlbuti IO9, f a i l s to see the significance 
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of Xenarchus' connection with the Philopoemenists, and 
sees him simply as 'un esponente . . . di un ri s o r t o p a r t i t o 
filomacedone'. 
2. Liv. 41.23.2; 6-7; 42.6.2, There i s no indication as to 
v/hen the lav; had been promulgated, De Sanctis, IV 1, 106 
n. 217^  suggests that i t dated from the time of Aratus' 
struggle against Macedon and v/as resuscitated i n I98. 
Aymard, PR, 112 n.4 prefers to place i t i n I98, and he i s 
follov/ed i n t h i s by Gastellani, Con;trib^ 71. Against 
t h i s are the Macedonian troops which participated i n 
Flaraininus' v/ar against Wabis i n 195 (Liv. 34.26.10), 
Dubois' suggestion (Li|Sies__£t^ienn^ 82-3) 
that i n 174 i t had been passed recently, i s attr a c t i v e , and 
not wholly ruled out by the reference to i t i n 172 as vetus 
.4§iL¥l?i^ -iE» (Liv, 42.6.2). I t could v/ell have been passed by 
Gallicrates' group, vi/hose rise to power i n Achaea coincided 
with the deterioration i n relations betii/een Rome and Macedon. 
The fact that i t only became an issue i n 174 and Callicrates' 
eager defence of i t (Liv. 4l„23.5-]8), sup;gest that i t s 
enforcement, at least, v/as only recent, and that Gallicrates 
had been involved, 
3. Liv. 41.24.1-18. 
4. Liv. 41.24.19 (rejection of l e t t e r ) ; 20 (Megalopolis 
s^nodos). Gastellani, £ontanl)u^  113, considers both meet-
ings to have been S2;n_cletcii. But cf. Larsen, Rej3_^ ,Gov., 
l8l-2 (apparently unloiown to C.). 
50A 
5. L i v , 4-2,6,1-2, Cf, C a s t e l l a n i , Con/bnl^Ati^ I I 3 , Brougnton, 
ICfflR I , 4lO n .3, accepts the opinion of V/eissenborn t h a t t h i s 
M. Claudius Marcellus was cos. l83» 
6. L i v , 42.12.6. 
7o Pol. 27.2.11. I t i s also suggested, from Paus, 7.10.9, t h a t 
Xenon of Patrae, another of Lycortas' p a r t y , held a 
§Ji£^9JtE2^ ^ t about t h i s time. Aymard, REA 1928, 6l-2 and 
N i c c o l i n i , La_ &onfj_j£h., 311, o f f e r e i t h e r 174/3 or 173/2. 
De Sanctis, IV 1, 4o6, vdth reservations, p r e f e r s 173/2. 
I n f a c t we cannot b u i l d on t h i s evidence: the only conc-
l u s i o n t o be drawn from Paus. 7.10.9 i s t h a t Xenon was 
.Si£Si§jS2£ before I 6 7 . 
8, L i v . 42.37.7-9. 'J^he t e x t a t 8 i s corrupt; and as p r i n t e d 
by Weissenborn-MUller makes the Achaeans claim t h a t E l i s 
and Messene had supported P h i l i p . I f the restored t e x t i s 
co r r e c t , t h i s accusation i s vffong - although t h i s does not 
mean t h a t i t was not made. 
9. Pol. 27.2.11-12; L i v . 42.44.7-8. 
10, At some time a Spartan, Leonidas, v;ho v/as i n touch v;ith 
Perseus, v;as condemned by the Achaeans f o r h i s a c t i v i t i e s . 
He l a t e r l e d a contingent of troops f o r Perseus ( L i v , 4-2. 
51.8). V/e do not knov/ vriien, or i n v;hose £;tra'tegia the 
condemnation took place; but i t i s e a s i l y explicable v/hich-
ever p a r t y was responsible. I t i s not therefore s i g n i f i c a n t 
f o r i n f o r m a t i o n about the p a r t i e s . Cf. C a s t e l l a n i , 
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11. Liv. 42,55.10. 
12. Pol. 28.3,3-10; Liv. 43.3-7.2-4; cf. Badian, .For_Cl., 96; 
Castellani, £oiitrJ.buti, 117-8, A decree of Argos i n honour 
of Octavius has been found: cf. Gharneux, BCH 1957? l 8 l f , 
13. Pol. 28.6. Gf. Gastellani, C^ntriboiti^ ll8-9; Briscoe, 
1964, 70. 
14. Pol. 28,6,9; 12-13; cf. D i t t , Sxll.^ 851; cf. De Sanctis, 
•IV 1, 406. 
15. Pol. 28.12-13. The dispatch of the troops f i t s well enough 
v/ith the declared policy of Archon for us to consider i t to 
have been a serious offer, v/ith Scullard, Roman_Poll^^ 
204; Bi'iscoe, JRS 1964, 70; Against t h i s viev/: De Sanctis, 
IV 1, 3OO; Meloni, Perseo, 313; Castellani, Contnhirti., 
120-1, 
16. Pol. 29.23-5. Gf. Niccolini, 'k^_2231j^i9h'-> 173-4; De 
Sanctis, IV 1, 347-8. 
17. Paus. 7.10,7-10; cf, Liv. 45.31.9-11; Pol. 30.13.8-11. 
Cf, N i c c o l i n i , Con_fj\ch 175-6; De Sanctis, IV 1, 
348-9; Gastellani, Corrtidbu^^ 126-30, 
18. Detail i n Ni c c o l i n i , ]£^oj}i,t...A^h-•) 179-82, 
19. Pol, 38,10,8-13 (Polybius); 17.4 (Stratius). 
20. Pol. 35.6.3-4. 
21. Pol. 36.13.3. 
22. Gf. Accame, p„orri.___Rom., 12'-l-62 (discussion of details of 
settlement); also Larsen, 'Roman Greece', i n Frank, 
Ecojionu^.Su,r^^^^^ IV, 301f. . Cf. Badian, For.,„,Cl., 113-5 
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( p o l i t i c a l aspects of Achaean V/ar), 
I I I 
1. Plut. Ph. 1.4; cf. Ar. 24.2. Paus., 8.52.1, has a variant 
of the phrase, which seems to be simply his own interpret-
ation: Philopoemen was the lastetjepYetTy;; -of Greece, as 
Miltiades v;as the f i r s t . 
2. CAH 8, 299. 
3. De Sanctis, IV 1, 243-4. 
4. Plut, Ph. 13.2. 
5. As Hoffmann, RE ivX 1, 'Philopoimen' 95; cf. Stier, Ronis 
Aii£stie£, 172f, 
6. Hoffmann, RE XX 1, 94. 
7. Plut. Comp. Ph. et iJ'lam,, passim. 
8. Plut. £orap^,___^Ph._^__et^^ ., 3.3. 
9. Pol. 24.11-13. 
10. Pol. 24.11,2. 
11. Pol. 24.11.3. 
12. .CAH 8, 299. Cf. also Stier, Rom^J^ufsti^e^, 172, ' . . vor 
allem Soldat'; Gelzer, Kleine_Jch£i I I I , l4-9. This i s 
not a Polybian judgement. 
13. Plut, Ph. 8.3. 
14. On thi s i n d e t a i l , cf. ch, 3, £assiiB. 
15. On t h i s i n d e t a i l , cf. ch. 4, passimi. 
16. Pol. 39.3.3 = Plut. Ph. 21.5-6; Pol. 39.3.4-8. 
17. Pol. 39.3.3. 
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18. Pol, 24,11,3; cf, 13,9, 
19. Pol, 24,11.5. 
20. Liv. 32.22,3f. 
21. Plut, Hi. 17.3; Paus. 8.51.4. But cf. Aymard, PR, 362 
n. 23. 
22. Pol, 24.12,1, 
23. Pol. 24.11.8. 
24. Pol, 24.12,2-4. 
25. Pol, 24,13.1-7 (7 c i t e d ) . 
26. Gf. ch. K, ^-l-Vftl. 
27. Pol. 24.3-3.8-10. 
5U 
1. For discussion of date, c f . VJalbank, Comm. I , 1 n . l ; c f , 
also Pedech, L^s^,%2ide£_£la^^ I 9 6 I (supporting 208). 
2. H i l l e r von Gaertringen (ad D i t t . SjOl., 626) suggested t l i a t 
Polybius v/as r e l a t e d t o Philopoemen. V/albank, Comm. I , 
228, objects t h a t Polybius would have been sure t o mention 
i t , Cf. Z i e g l e r , 1 ^ 'Polybios' ( i ) , l445; also ch. 1, 
n. 36. 
3. Pol. 1.1.5; 3.1. Since the Achaean sections of the 
H i s t o r i e s appear t o be outside t h i s declared purpose, 
Gelzer h3.s developed the view t h a t these v/ere e i t h e r w r i t -
ten separately and included v/hen the main work v/as begun 
(•Die feellenische npoxaTaaxewn^ im zv/eiten Buche des 
Polybios' = Kl^_Schr. I l l , l l l f , ) , or included, separately 
from the main purpose, as an attempt to open the eyes of 
the Achaeans t o the f a c t t h a t the glorious development of 
the LeagTie had been betrayed by G a l l i c r a t e s ('Die Achaica 
im Geschichtsv/erk des Polybios' = K_3^ .__Schr. I l l , 123f.). 
Gf. a l s o , 'Ueber die Arbeitsv/eise des Polybios', = K l . 
Sch£. I l l , l 6 l f , 
4. Philopoemen f i r s t appears ( i n the main part of the 
I K s t o r i e s ) i n 10.21; his death i s recorded i n 23.12, and 
a summary of h i s p o l i c i e s and achievements i n 24.13.-13. 
5. Pol. 12.25e; 4.2.2-3. Jtom I 6 . I5.8 i t i s clear t h a t he 
made use of Rhodian documentary sources, but whether 
d i r e c t l y or through Zeno i s not clear; from 3.26.1 i t i s 
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clear t h a t he vised Roman. Cf. V/albank, Comni. I , ad 3»21. 
9-10. There i s nov/here e x p l i c i t mention of the use of 
Achaean records, but i t i s unreasonable t o assume t h a t they 
v/ere not consulted. For his use of epigraphic m a t e r i a l , 
c f , 3.33.17-18; 56.'^ f (the Lacinian bronze). For f u l l 
discussion of P.'s sources, c f . V/albank, Coniiii. I , 26f. On 
•P.'s 'pragmatic' h i s t o r y , c f . Gelzer, 'Die pra,gmatische 
Geschichtsschreibung des Polybios', i n Kl_._S_chr. I l l , 155f. 
6, Pol. 2,56.2; c f , Walbank, Comm. I , ad l o c . & p.27. On 
Phylarchus, c f . Africa., lihcxlar£hu^ __a^  
Rev^o3jrH.on. 
7. Cf. Treu, jl i s t p i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 195V5, 222. 
8, Pol. 10.21.8. 
9. Pol. 16.1/-!-.6 ( p a t r i o t i c b i a s ) ; 2.'^ •6.3; A'-,3.1; 9.3o.6 
( A e t o l i a ) , On Aristaenus and G a l l i c r a t e s c f . ch., 3 & 6,,')v.<!5(il 
Generally, c f . Ifelbank, Coram. I , 12f. 
10. Pol. 28,6; c f , ch. 6, ^Xhl. 
11. Pol. 39.3; 24.11-13; cf. ch, 6^  ^ .IWV 
12. Walbank, Ca;iim.I, 292f.; but c f . McDonald, reviev; of 
Walbank i n JES 1958, I8O; Erbse, Eh^._2Ii,is. , 1951, 157;c. 
(the whole composed a f t e r \kk from e a r l i e r notes), 
13. From book 2.k- onwajds, Livy's i n t e r e s t increases i n Greek . 
a f f a i r s i n p r o p o r t i o n t o the Soman involvement. He records 
the death of Philopoemen i n 39.50. 
I'^l-, H. Nissen, K£it_.^ „U»i;t. , passim. 
15. Gf, 35,40.1; 39.'!-8,6; 41.25.8. Gf. Nissen, o£^.,,.i?,it. 
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pp. 8l»2o 
16. E . g . 37.33; 21.12.10 (the S a l i i ) ; c f . Nissen, 2?. 
17. Nissen, 0£._cit., 28-30; Walsh, Mv^;, l^+3f.; 151f. 
18. Cf. V/albank, £orara. I , 13-l4; see now i n Ilisce2.]^_n^ea^_d^^ 
^i^i„.S2-£^,^Ii^£.i}^J^. S^Ji}£^.2S..^j-^.^I^!iISiSi^^ 211-213. 
19. Cf, Nissen, . o j o ^ ^ i t . , 23-2?; Walsh, L i v j ; , 219-2A'-4. The 
r h e t o r i c a l a l t e r a t i o n s do not only occur i n the speeches; 
but i t i s here t h a t they are most apparent. 
20. E . g . L i v . 39.'^ 9-50 (death of Philopoemen, l82, r e l a t e d under 
183: c f . app, 2, ^ .^ IS^ O; 38.30-3^ '-: on the confusion here, 
c f . Holleaux, Etud.es 3» 263f. 
21. P o l , 10,21.5. 
22. REG 6^1-, 1951, o2f. 
23. Pol. 10.21.6; Pedech, 0£^_ci_t., 83. 
24. Pol. 10.21.7-8. 
25. Pol. 10.21.1. 
26. Pol. 10,21.3; Pedech, oj^__£it., 84 - a-<(iiy^aX(; must not be 
taken w i t h TCVMV' Cf, Treu, Higt^oria, 193V5, 220f. 
28. I n t h i s connection, i t i s as w e l l t o poi n t out t h a t 
(iexaxetpicracf^at iroXeiiov, ( P l u t . Ph. 7) does not i n d i c a t e 
•reforraes dans I'arraee c r e t o i s e ' (Pedech, . ^ . ^ ^ ^ i t . 5 88), 
29. Pol. 10.21.6. At 13.30.10. P, mentions Carthage as s t i l l 
e x i s t i n g , and therefore had ^ ^^ritten up t o t h i s p o i n t before 
146. Cf. Walbank, Comm. I , 292f, 
30. Lucas: UeJ)^^J:es__PplyMos^ 
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Bundes, 35. 
31. v/albank, Gomm, I , p.2 S< n.2; Z i e g l e r KE 'Polybios' l472. 
Cf. Nissen, op^^ c r t , , 280. 
32. 0Rt™Sili,5 88f. 
33. Cic, Tus£, I I 62; Mjg.1.1. 1,23; Ziegler i b . , l473 n . l . 
34. Nissen, 0£^_cit., 280-7; Hoffmann, RE XXI 1, c o l . 77, 
35. EE, 'Polybios', c o l . l472. 
36. P l u t . Ph' 21; Pol. 39.3. 
'37. Cf. Schwartz, RE ' A r i s t o c r a t e s ' no. 25; Jacoby, FGB I I I B, 
no. 591. We scarcely need t o a_ttribute the whole of P l u t . 
Ph. l 6 t o A r i s t o c r a t e s , as Nissen og^.^^ci^., 284, simply 
because i t deals v^ith Sparta: i t i s seen e s s e n t i a l l y from an 
Achaean viev/point. 
38. Nissen, op_.__cit., 23l. 
39. 2E„;„^ Lt.? 290-2. 
40. A. K l o t z , RbeJlus.., 84, 1935, 46f . ; E. E. Smith, G^ , 1944, 
89f. 
4lo Suidas, 'Philopoemen' = Pol. 10.22; Paus, 8,49 (v/ith minor 
di f f e r e n c e s and omissions), 
42. Paus, 8.49-52. 
43. Nissen, o p ^ c i t . , 287-91; Hoffmann EE, 'Philopoimen', c o l . 
77; Z i e g l e r , H i ^ i J u s . 83, 1934, 229 n . l , 
:IS:Mk^Jl^JilS:S.^.j^.F.l}2^'''> 127, 1883, 33-46, 
45, P l u t . Pli. 16; PauE. 8.51.3. I cannot understand how EUhl 
(p.43) can claim t h a t the f i g u r e 3OO comes from Polybius. 
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46. P l u t . Ph. 18.7; Pans. 8.51.3; c f . L i v . 39.49.2. 
47o Paus. 8.49.4; 8.29.8; cf. P l u t . Ph. 5. 
48. P l u t . Ph. 2; Paus, 8.49.3. 
49. Pol. 10.22.1; Paus, 8.49.2; c f . P l u t . ;Ph. 1. 
50. Cf. ch. 2, -passim. 
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NOTES TO iUPPENBIX 2 . 
1 . Walbank, Aratos_, 167-173 ; c f . also Comm. I , ad l o c , on 
i n d i v i d u a l problems and bibliography. 
2 . N i c c o l i n i , M....S£!l£i„i^M 285--313; Ayraard, PEA 3 0 , I 9 2 8 , 
I - 6 2 ; De Sanctis, IV 1 , 402 -406. Older treatments include: 
Nissen, Sh^„Mu^., I 8 7 1 ( 2 I O / 0 9 - I8O / 7 9 ) , and BUttner-Wobst, 
^SHlS£2.JS}L„t2];:lh^z2S.i (Beigabe zum Jahresbericht des 
Gymnasions zum h e i l i g e n Kreuz zu Dresden), 1 9 O I . Further 
reference w i l l not be made i n every case t o these studies: 
they are fundamental and should be consulted ( i n the comp-
a r a t i v e t a b l e ) i n each case. 
3 . P o l , 1 0 . 2 1 , 1 : g x t Et)pv\e(ov o xoov'Axato5v cnrpaTriYOG &TOX[JIOG 
xal i roXefj i iXT^ xpeCoji; aXXot rp ioc . tot5 6e x a i p o ? to^ x a m i:r\v 
biTcOlpiv e</)ecrTax6Toc vp.a4 e i r l xr\v apxrjv T65V $ tXoiro i | ievoc 
irpdgewv . . . Cf. Niese, GG^ IS I I , 483 n , 5 . 
4. L i v , 2 7 . 3 1 . 1 0 (Cycliadas); P l u t , Ph, 7 ( L a r i s u s ) ; L i v . 
3 0 . 1 7 - 3 1 . 9 (Nemea), Cf. Walbank, PMli£, app. I I I , 3 0 4 . 
5 . L i v . 2 8 . 8 . 1 0 ( N i c i a s ) ; 7 . l 4 (Olympia). 
6 . Pol, 1 1 , 9 - 1 8 ; P l u t , Ph, 10 (Mantinea); P l u t . Ph, 1 1 , 1 
(Neraea), 
7 . Pol. 5 . I O 6 . I : ' A x a i o t |jiev ouv SSTTOV aireSevxc xov ir6Xs | iov, 
CTpaTTiYbv aWo5v eXof i evo i Ti|i6gevov, avaxcopTTcavTei: e t c i^oi 
cn^exepa v6 ( i i j i a x a l T O C SiayoDYck . . . Gf. Larsen, Reg. 
Gov., 9 3 ; Aymard, .AssemWjj^ 238-247; Walbank, PhUi£, 
300 n . 2 . 
8 . P l u t . Ph. 1 1 . 1 - v/rongly dated by Boethius, J^J_J-}£l^2:S:,92}^ 
60A 
Kalender, 43, t o 207, 
9. P l u t . -ph. 18.l; Paus. 8.51.5. 
10. Pol. 16.13-14,1 (Messene and b a t t l e o f f Chios); P l u t . Ph, 
12,4 (Lysippus), Gf, Walbank, Phili£, 121-2, 
11. L i v . 31,22,4; 25.3. Of. D i t t , S^1.M 600; c f , below, "Brt, 
12. L i v . 32.19.2; 20.3; 21,1 (Apistaenus); 39.7 ( N i c o s t r a t u s ) , 
13. L i v . 34.24.1; 25.3; 30.7. 
14. L i v , 35.25.7; 26,3f.; for Roman magistrates, c f , MRR ad 
192, 
15. L i v . 36.31; 32.1-2. 
16. Op, c i t . (n.2). 
17. L i v . 38.33.1. 
18. PR, 365 n.26 ( c i t e s c r i t i c i s m of e a r l i e r work, t o which add: 
Hoffmann, EE IX 1, 'Philopoimen', 87. 
19. By Aymard's reckoning (Cf. t a b l e ) , t h i s i s Philopoeraen's 
£L-L™..J.^ £,CL®iS-39 -^ ^ ^-^  discussed as such i n his a r t i c l e . 
20. Oj3.._cit., 19-23. 
21. BCH 1930, l " 4 l = .ttiides 5 , 249-294, esp. 263f. ( c i t e d i n t h i s 
form). For a summary of Holleaux' chronology, c f . ch, 4, 
22. Aymard gives no examples of t h i s suggested non-technical 
usage, and there are none c i t e d i n .'ELL, ' continuare'. 
23. Cf. examples i n Nissen, l)£^i_<.^]3ntc ^ 31f. 
2^'-. E^-i^ -Sit"» l 4 f . - some of v/hich needs a l t e r a t i o n i n the l i g h t 
of Holleaux' a r t i c l e , 
25. D i t t . Sy;,!!., 6OO (dated by Dittenberger t o 193/2): e-rrl 
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(TTpaTaYotJ Tcov'Axatoov ^iXmoCyisvoQ TO a-eTa[p]Tov \ Cretans 
a t 11. 26f. For Cretans i n 200, c f , Pol, I6.37.3 
(Didascalondas and probably o t h e r s ) , 
26, P l u t . Ph . 17.4: Mavi'oT) 5e T O ^ 'Pco|iai'a)V WdTou vevcxTjxoToc 
[lev ' A V T I C X O V , a l t o u i i e v o t ) 6e i rapa tcSv'Axatcov otrwc eaotixri. 
T o l c Aaxe6ai | jiovia)v (^DydSoc x a T e X 9 s t v , x a l T i x o v TavTO T~I 
Mavtc^ i r e p l TWV (^VY^SCOV a^iotJVToc, StexcoXvcev 0 f i.XoTroi|ir|V 
o() T:OT<: ^ivifojcri TroXejiffiv, aXXa (SouXofievoc 6i ' a v T o t 5 x a l tm 
'Axatcov, aXXa y.r] Ti ' tow |jT)5e %3(iai'(ov x'^P''''^'' 'CO^TO i r p a x ^ f i v a i . 
x a l crxpatTiYCov e t c T O W I O V au toc xaxTiYo-Ye "'^ o '^C <^UYd8a(:. 
o^TocG elxe irpoc xoc e^ovcn'oc Wo <^povr||.iaToc 6i)crepi x a l 
(^ tXove ixov . The meeting w i t h Glabrio was the autumn 
191: Li'v. 36.35.7. l^or Compasion, c f . L i v , 
38.33-34; c f , Aymard, £p,i_cit,, 8f. For the purpose of 
the argu.ment I use Aymard's t r a n s l a t i o n of ecc xoWtov 
(= ' i n the next y e a r ' ) . However, i t seems probable t h a t the 
phrase should bear the much vaguer meaning, simply ' i n the 
f u t u r e ' , (distance u n s p e c i f i e d ) . This use i s found from 
Thucydides (4.61,3; 5.9.8) t o Lucian (I:^s;U__Gon£cr., 13; 
ZS.-E.j.Jii.-Si*'9 2.27)5 ^"^^ seems b e t t e r f i t t e d t o the imprecise 
and anecdotal character of chs. I6 and 17. This usage cannot 
be proved, hov/ever, f o r t h i s instance, and i t seems best to 
meet Aymard's argximents as they are presented. But i f v/e 
accept the vague i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the arguments used i n the 
t e x t t o d i s c r e d i t Aymard are unnecessary. 
27. I am g r a t e f u l t o Dr. A. H, McDonald f o r t h i s i n t e r e s t i n g 
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suggestion. 
28. For a sympathetic d e s c r i p t i o n of Plutarch's method, c f . 
Gomme, S°^^£i2£L.°I},JS^9I^iP^9. I? 78. 
29. Pol. 22.19. On Pol.'s date of b i r t h , c f . Walbank, COTm. I , 
1. 
30. L i v . 38.30-34. 
31. Cf. t a b l e . On the Eom.an embassies, see MEE ad locc. 
32. Pol. 22.3. 
33. Pol. 22.7.2 ( s t r a i ^ j j i a of Aristaenus); 5-7 (r e p o r t of 
Nicodemus), 
34. Aymajpd seems t o accept, t h i s too, o p ^ ^ ^ t , , 32-3, though h i s 
ovm system, as he admits, necessitates an l8-month absence 
f o r Nicoderaus. 
35. Pol, 22.7.1; Aymard, opj^^cit^., 30-34, 
36. 2E,v.,.sii'') 35. 
37. Pol. 2|,1,1. 
38. 2Li._9ii°? 36-7. 
39. 2RZ^1"> 37-40, 
40. Pol. 22.7.9 ( s j n o ^ i i ) ; l ' ^ (magistrates). 
41. Even i n a non-fragmented part of h i s v/ork [aexa 6e TaTSm can 
introduce a perio d of up to 30 years (2,39.8), 
42. 2a..,,cit., 41-2, 
43. New Ba.bylonian evidence i s published by Sachs and Wiseman, 
Ira_a, 1954, 202f,, who adduce a date of 3 or 4 July, I87. 
However, Aymard, EEA 1955, IO8, has shoivn conclusively from 
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the same evidence'that t h i s i s one month l a t e , and tba t the 
true date i s 3 or 4 June, I87. 
44, Some doubt i s possible as t o the l i k e l i h o o d of such a ra p i d 
announcement i n Greece of the accession of Seleucus IV; but 
i n f a c t tv70 considerations s t r o n g l y suggest th3.t i t viould be 
i n the i n t e r e s t of the new king t o have the announcement made 
as r a p i d l y as pos s i b l e , ( i ) Seleucus was bound t o be 
reminded a t his accession of the s i t u a t i o n at the beginning 
of the r e i g n of Antiochus I I I , when Antiochus was faced w i t h 
. the p o t e n t i a l o p p o s i t i o n of Achaeus (Pol. 4.48.10). This 
suggests t h a t Seleucus would be eager t o broadcast the nev;s 
of h i s accession as r a p i d l y as possible i n order t o prevent 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of a r e p e t i t i o n of Antiochus I l l ' s i n i t i a l 
i n s e c u r i t y . ( i i ) Achaea would be p a r t i c u l a r l y l i k e l y to be 
ear l y on the l i s t f o r the despatch of envoys by a new 
Seleucid monarch, as a r e s u l t of the f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s 
Achaea was reputed t o have wi t h Rome (Cf. L i v . 38.32.9.)? 
and the importance f o r the Seleucids of raa,intaining good 
r e l a t i o n s v/ith the fr i e n d s of Eome a f t e r Magnesia, These 
considerations mek.e i t f a i r l y clear t h a t the general announ-
cement of the accession of Seleucus could be expected very 
soon a f t e r the death of Mtiochus; and t h a t , as a r e s u l t , 
the envoys from Seleucus to Achaea t o renew the t r e a t y could 
be i n Achaea before the end of Aristaenus' strat_eg_os~year, 
188/7. Any d i f f i c u l t y about the ti m i n g of t h i s embassy i s 
6U 
not i n the act u a l time spent t r a v e l l i n g ( l -2 weeks would Tae 
q u i t e s u f f i c i e n t f o r even a slow ship from Phoenicia - and 
3 months are allowable i n our scheme), but the time taken 
f o r the co u r t t o announce the changeover and send the envoys. 
This seems l i k e l y t o have been done as q u i c k l y as possible, 
( l am g r a t e f u l t o Professor K. M. T . Atkinson f o r discussioa 
of t h i s problem). 
43. P l u t . Ph. 18.1; Paus.. 8.51.5. 
46. Cf, above, Y'^N^-
47. Pol. 22.19. 
4«. L i v . 39.33.3-5. 
49. Paua. 4.29.11; Aymard, REA 1928, 43-53; Hoffmann, Hermes, 
1938, 22^ 4-8. 
50* Op,. Qj-t., 245-6. 
51. L i v . 39.48.55 Le^atus i n Macedoniam p. Maroius est missus, 
iussus idem i n Feloponneso sociorum res aspipere. nam i b i 
c[up_9ue et^ ex yeterls^ d i s c p r d i i s ^ r e s i d u i motus erant|_ e t 
Messene descivei'&t a c o n c i l i o Ackaiop. Pol. 24.9.12-13! 
Trp'^riv i-iev y^P ev TOXQ MeooTivtaxoirG iroXXa irofnottvtoc KotvTou 
Mapxiov irpoc T O |jT)&ev tovc, 'kxaiovQ poDXeuoaoSat irepl 
MsooTivtwv Hvex) TT^C 'Pcoiiatooy irpoatpecrecoc, mpaxouoavToc 
xal \^r](f)i.cra^evoviQ auTowc %ov iroXejiov. . . 
52. Pol. 25.5.8-1 0: irept be TCOV xaTO neXoir6vvr|Oov 0 Mdpxtoc 
TotavxTjV eTreTroiTjxo %r]V arraYYeXtav 5L6X I , , TOOV 'AXO-I-WV OV 
j3ovXopevtov ava<;fcepet,v ou6ev I T C I xfiv C V Y X X T I T O V, aXXa 
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(f>povqj.atii^o[.iiv(iiv x a l i rdvca fit,' eautoSv n-paTtetv empaXXofievo^v, 
eav irapaxovcwo't ( iovov a^tcov x a m -ro i rapov x a l ppaxe iav 
gfitjkio't,V TroiT)owoi,v dooapecrtriaewc, xaxewc t) Aaxe6ai|.ia>v 
MecroTjviQ c"0[i(f>povY\crei,. nodtov 6e Yevo|.ievov laexo. lieyaXiTC 
xdptToc ^ g e t v Tot)c ' A x a t o k S</jTivxam'ire9')eVY0Ta<; STTI 'Pcofiatovt : . 
53. P l u t . Ph. 1 8 , 3 : ^ 61; ftXoirotVnv ^ t u x e | i ev ev "Apyet 
irupecrowv, iruSonevoc 8e m ^ m cruveTeivev e l c MeYdXiqv TTOXIV 
Tjjiepq, |j.t,q, axabCoVQ TrXeiovoc 'cetpaxoo'touc • xaxe iSev ev^VQ 
e^orpei XOVQ Imrefc avaXa|3(ov . . . Gf, L i v . 3 9 . 4 9 .If.; 
Paus. 8 ,51 .5 . 
54 . Paus. 4 . 2 9 . 1 1 . 
55. Pol. 23.9 .12 ( 1 s t embassy); l 8 . 3 (2nd embassy); c f . 
Aymard, Assmiibl_ees3^ 275 (2nd s^nodos i n J u l y ) . 
56. O g ^ c i t . , 247 -8 . Gf. L i v . 39 .43.5 (quoted above i n n. 51) ; 
P l u t . Ph-. 1 8 .1: "f^Xm^ev oh [iovov e x e i v r i v T f jv apxriv arrcXej-icoc 
S t d g e t v , aXXa x a l TotS p to t ) T O XoiTrov a^Tw |jie5' rpvxCoQ 
•natapiSSvai la i r p d Y | j a m Trape^etv. 
57. Hoffmann, o p t . _ c i t . , 247; Pans. 8.51-5; P l u t . Ph. I 8 ; L i v . 
3 9 . 4 9 , 1 , 
58. P l u t , Ph. 21,1: ohb' rivcivo^v avapoXr^v euotria'avTo - r f ^ 
Ttiacopiox; . . , L i v , 39 .50.9: H.°il^iiJ£'jH£S^^^^ 
J91^ )if3£.l^ ^ Paus. 8 .51.8: AvxopTcu; be iien' 
ov TToXv oSpotooc Sx Te *Apxa8tac x a i n a p ' *Axaiii5v 5 » v a f i t v 
ecTTpdTeucrev en t Mecror|vrjv, Pol. 23.16. 12-13: tTf [lev ovv 
mrep TCOV (SXOJV StaXtjiJ/eax; Tf|v ava<^opav e m T O ^ S V O C STroiTioaTO 
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" x a l Y^p Sioirep eirixriSec ouvepacve Toxe irdXcv crovdYsoSat 
Towc ' A x a t o K e tc MeYdXrjv i r o X i v e i r l xr]v Seuxepav ovvobov » • 
Cf, Aymard, iiss£mb_lj_es_, 275 (2nd synodos). 
59. Pol, 23 .5 ; L i v , 3 9 . 5 1 . 1 . 
6 0 . Pol. 23 .3 .18: a t jiev xotJ Aetvoxpaxooc eXn'tSec. . . x a l 
o'uXXrjpSTiv f| ToB TtTou irapovdCa x a l trpoo'Soxta T O B T O V T O V 
Tpoirov SteTreoEv, 
6 1 . Cf. Gundel, RE XXIV 1 , IO93, 'T. Quinctius Flaraininus'. 
62. Mommsen, R^RU^Fqrsch I I , 488f. 
63. Cf. P l u t , F l . 20; App. S^r. 1 1 ; L i v , 3 9 . 5 1 . 1 . 
6 4 . P l u t , Ph. 2 1 . 1 , Cf. discussion i n Larsen, Rep_j_J3ov., I 7 8 , 
65. Pol, 24 .6 (Egyptian embassy); Aymard, EEA 1928, 53^. 
66. This i s argued i n ch. 5^ above,!*"?!; Cf. De Sanctis, IV 
1 , 246 n . 2 0 . 
67. Pol. 24.6 (Egyptian embassy); 8. 1-8 (meeting). 
68. Skeat, Rei_gis_o^f,^^the__^^^^ 32. But c f . Samuel, 
i^fi°]r3?}J?-?:£^J}^9}}Pj-J?J2>l'> -^ -59: 'The ostrakon i s from Hermonthis, 
and since t h i s i s q t i i t e a distance up r i v e r , i t i s e n t i r e l y 
possible t h a t Epiphanes was dead before 20 May l80„ To be 
safe, we should allow three months f o r the news of h i s death 
t o reach Hermonthis, an.d that would mean v;e might say t h a t 
Epiphanes xfas a l i v e on 20 February 18O, but possibly also he 
was s t i l l a l i v e when the ostrakon was w r i t t e n . At any r a t e , 
i t i s hardly l i k e l y tlia.t he was dead before 20 February I8O, 
and so i t i s betv/een t h a t date and 6 October I 8 0 , the end of 
the 25th year, t h a t vje place his death'. 
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69. Gf. Aymard, 0£i,„cit., 58f.; Larsen, Rep^ . j3_ov., l 8 0 ~ l , 
considers the meeting a s ^ ^ j l e i o s : 'Since there seems t o 
have been no s ^ o d ^ i n the autumn a f t e r the e l e c t i o n s , the 
meeting must have been a s^n^cl^tos'. With the necessary 
d a t i n g of t h i s meeting to summer l 8 0 , the necessity f o r 
considering i t a syiicletos disappears. 
70. Pol. 2 4 , 1 0 , 1 4 - 1 5 . 
68A 
NOKiSjrojPP^^ 
1 . On Leagu.e coinage i n general, see: Clerk, iL2& . l 3 i 9 S i ® - . ^ 
^l}S^,9jrIlS.J^I^.^ifi}-S:^ApPS'9SP- J'.®S-&ISJ Weil, Z_.__jT[lr_j'ton,, l882; 
Gardner, BtlG Peloponnesus, Achaia; Lbbbecke, Z^v.fy^ L-JSEE" 5 
1908; Grosbj'- and Grace, liy;iiLiSM.tjiO_J^_t_^^ 
1936; Thompson, Hesperia, 1939; Head, Hisi^oxia^hm^^^^ 
417. 
2. Crosby and Grace, o;p^_cij;., Thompson, o p ^ _ c i t , 
3. Thompson, .0£.,_,^ cit,, l42 goes a,s f a r as t o say: 'That 
Megalopolis minted these issues of the seated Pan w i t h the 
Zeus obverse seems beyond question. The i d e n t i c a l type 
w i t h the l e t t e r s MEr , s i g n i f i c a n t of the c i t y name, i s v/ell 
knovm, and there i s no reason f o r supposing t h a t the League 
coins o r i g i n a t e d from anywhere else but the same c i t y ' , 
4. P l u t . J?h. 13 .5 . 
5. Cf. Tarn, GE, 1925 - though h i s c r i t e r i o n of the use of the 
ethnic 'Apxd<; t o indica.te the continuance of the Arcadian 
League as a p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y must be rendered doubt f u l by 
the suggestion advanced here, 
6. D i t t . S y l l . 559. 
7. D i t t . S j l l , 557-562; Kern, Die ^ J^^^raj^^^ 
16-87. 
8. D i t t . S j l l . 624. 
9. I am g r a t e f u l t o the s t a f f of the Herwerden coin room f o r 
shov/ing me t h e i r Achaean coins and drav/ing my a t t e n t i o n t o 
the s i g n i f i c a n t weight differences v i s - a - v i s the e a r l i e r 
Arcadian coins. 
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NOTES_TOJH™I^^ 
1 . Pol. 23 .4; PauB. 7 . 9 . 5 . c f , ch. 5, l l k ^ . 
2. On the date, c f . app. 2 , 
3 . Pol. 23 .5 .18 . 
4. Pol, 23,6 (Arcesilaus and A g e s i p o l i s ) ; 9 . 1 (both 
embassies); 9 .11 ( r e p l y t o Serippus). Cf. ch. 5, Xl'^^l 
5. Pol, 2 3 . i 7 . 5 f . 
6. Pol. 23 .9 .13 . 
7. Pol. 23 .17 .5 . 
8. Pol, 23 .18 ,2 , 
9. Pol. 23 .18 .4 . 
10, Pol, 24 , 1 , 5 ; 2 . 4 , 
1 1 , The Achaeans discussed a l e t t e r from the Senate i n summer 
180 (Pol. 2 4 . 8 . I f . On the date c f . app. 2,^^'si) and i t 
seems l i k e l y t h a t t h i s would only r e s u l t from a request by 
the representatives of the Spartan e x i l e s . 
12, Pol. 24 .7 . 
13, Pol. 24 .8 .9-9 .15 ( C a l l i c r a t e s i n Rome); 10.15 (stj:a.te^^^^ 
and r e s t o r a t i o n of the e x i l e s ) . 
7QA 
I t seems unnecessary t o give a l i s t of e d i t i o n s of texts. 
Oxford and Teubner t e x t s have been used f o r the most p a r t , except 
i n the case of c e r t a i n authors, who are c i t e d by standard e d i t i o n s 
(but Diodorus by reference t o Loeb e d i t i o n , v o l . 11 ) , This should 
cause no d i f f i c u l t y . 
This b i b l i o g r a p h y c o l l e c t s works c i t e d i n the notes i n an 
abbreviated form, except f o r standard works of reference (e,g, CAH 
and RE), and some v/orks c i t e d only once, f o r v/hich necessary b i b l i o -
g r a p h i c a l m a t e r i a l i s given where they appear. References t o 
Dittenberger, Sxy i^SSS,? "^^^ t h i r d e d i t i o n unless othervdse 
i n d i c a t e d . 
AC CAME, S. li,.doraijiio^ 
Augusjto. Roma, 1946. 
" 'Elatea e l e nuova epigrafe d i S t i n f a l o ' . RiY,s.Jlil« 5 
NS 27, 1949, 217f. 
AFRICA, T. Phylarchus,and the Spartan Bevolution. Berkeley-Los 
Angeles, I 9 6 I . 
AYMAED, A, 'Les strateges de l a Confederation achaienne de 202 
a.172 av. J.-C EEA, 30, 1928, I f . 
" 1®^ .AgseiiiMees djg l a Confederation^ Acha^^ 
Bordeaux, 1938. 
" l e s Prera_iers Rapports___de Rome e't_ de_^  la_^ C_^ oji.^ ^^ ^ 
Achaijewe. Bordeaux, I938. ( c i t e d PR,). 
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TABHEj: 
IIIVENTS AT SPARTA, 192-178 3 . G. 
Autumn 192 
Spring 191 
Spring onwards 
Autumn I 9 I 
Later autumn 
Winter I91/O 
Spring/summer 190 
Sparta united vjith Achaean League by 
Philopoemen; Timolaus' group -- the ari_s_toi 
- i n s t a l l e d i n pov;erj tyrant party not 
exiled. 
Factional trouble at Sparta; tyrant group 
on top, secession from League. Philopoeraen. 
intervenes to restore Timols.us to power and 
Sparta to League; prevents Flamininus from 
supporting,' tyrant group, 
Flamininus continues to support tyrant 
group. 
AclTa.ean sjnodos; Glabrio and Flamininus 
s t a r t Roman agitation about restoring 
Spartan exiles of tyrant period; 
Philopoemen accepts d e s i r a b i l i t y , but 
refuses to act. 
Timolaus' group expelled from Sparta. 
Spartans (Tyrant party) ask Sena.te for 
restoration of hostages given by Nabis i n 
195. S.C. describes exiles from tyrant 
period as 'old exiles' for f i r s t time. 
Hostages, except for Armenas, restored to 
Sparta; no action on exiles. 
Autumn I89 
Spring 188 
Winter I88/7 
Spring 187 
July 185 
Winter l85/4 
Spring/Suiiimer l84 
Summer l84 
80A 
Tyrant party - the government - attacks 
exiles - Timolaus' group? •• at Las; appeal 
of exiles to Achaea, Secession from Leag^ ue 
by Spartans; f i r s t stages of vra.r; Spartan 
appeal to I l i l v i u s . 
Gompasion: j u d i c i a l murder of 70 of tyrant 
party. Restoration of 'captive exiles' -
Timolaus' group? - and 'old exiles' by 
Philopoenien, Some of tyrant party exiled. 
Some discontented Spartans at Rome comp-
lai n i n g about Gompasion ~ probably tyrant 
party sympathisers. 
Letter of Lepidus deploring Compasion. 
Metellus complains about Compasion to 
Achaean magistrates. 
Areus and Alcibiades ('royalist' 'old 
exiles') at Rome; dispute with Apollonidas 
about the merits of the Corapasion s e t t l e -
ment. 
Areus and Alcibiades condemned to death by 
the Achaeans, 
App. Claudius Pulcher at Cleitor syncle;b^ 
with Areus and Alcibiades; death sentence 
on Areus and Alcibiades removed. Pulcher 
81A 
Slimmer l84 (cont.) 
Winter l84/3 
Before autumn I83 
Winter I83/2 
Summer l82 
About August 182 
Later l82 
Vanter I82/I 
Spring 181 
Winter I8I/0 
Spring 180 
Winter 18O/79 
gives general permission to Spartans to 
send envoys to Rome, 
Four Spartan embassies i n Rome: Serippus, 
Areus and Alcibiades, Lysis, Chaeron. 
Coalition of Serippus and Chaeron expels 
•old exiles'. 
Serippus i n Rome. I n his absence, Chaeron 
carries out Spartan secession from Achaea. 
Serippus returns; regains control i n 
Sparta. 
Achaean s;n;;Clet^os at Sicyon; Sparta rejoins 
LeagLie, 
Selective restoration of exiles; coalition 
between Serippus and Chaeron patched up, 
Chaeron, and Cletis and Diactorius, dispute 
before the Senate. 
Letter from Senate about exiles reaches 
Achaea; no action taken. 
Envoys from remaining exiles i n Rome. 
Chaeron's newly acquired dominance crushed 
by Achaean federal intervention under the 
stra^begos Hyperbatus, New ].etter from 
Senate about exiles. 
Callicrates, Lydiadas, Aratus i n Rome; 
82A 
V/inter l80/79 (cont,) envoys of Spartan exiles i n Rome also. 
Autumn 179 ~ Autumn I78 £fcrat^ lia of Gallicrates; restoration of 
remaining Spartan exiles. 
TABLE I I 
ACHAEAN STSATEG0L211/10 - 179/8. 
EESINGTON AYI'LfiED"'" DE SANCTIS^ NICCOLINI-^ '^ •/BBTTNER-WOBST^  NISSEN-^  • 
211/10 Euryleon Euryleon n .6 
210/9 Cyclia.das Cycliadas Cycliadas 
209/8 Nicias Nicias Nicio-S 
208/7 Philopoemen I Philoxooemen I - Philopoemen I 
207/6 - - _ 
206/5 PhiloiDoemen I I Philopoem.en I I Fhilopoemen I I 
203/4 
7 
Piiilopoemen I I I ? 
- _ 
20V3 -
203/2 7 Philopoenien H i ? -
202/1 Lysip'ous 
g 
Philopoemen IV ( I I I ) 
Lysippus . LjTsippus Lysippus 
201/0 Fhilopoem.en I I I Philopoemen I I I Fhilopoemen I I I . Philopoem.en I I I 
200/199 Cycliadas I I Cycliada.s Cycliadas Cycliadas Cycliadas 
199/8 Aristaenus I .;lristaenus Aristaenus I Aristaenus I • '- . - /iristaenus 
198/7 Nicostratus Nicostratus Nicostratus Nicostratus - ; • Nicostratus 
197/6 - - - - _ 
196/5 Aristaenus I I Aristaenus Aristaenus I I Aristaenus H. i1rista.enus 
195/4 - - - -
194/3 . 0 - - -
193/2 Philopoemen V (IV) Philopoemen IV Philopoemen IV Philopoemen IV Philopoem.en IV 
192/1 Diophanes Diophanes Diophanes Diophanes . Diophanes 
191/0 Philopoemen VI (V) Philopoemen V - -
190/89 ilrchon?'^ 
g 
Philopoemen V I I (VI) 
- Philopoemei V Philopoem^en V .•' Philopoemen V ' 
189/8 PhilopGem.en VI Philopoemer Vj^, Philopoemen Vi: -  •-10 ' Aristaenus I T l 
Philopoemen VI Philopoemen VI 
188/7 Aristaenus I I I - - • . • 4.' 10 i-iristaenus Archon 
187/6 : 0 
' Archon'? • • • (Or-. 
8 
PMlopoemen^'VII-??) 
Philopoemen VIl^ ;;vv;;;'::| PhiBiilp (|eme|ic;VI;I::S •;;I^02^taS'^ :" ' . Lycortas' /' • Philopoemen-Vil\ -
186/5 • -Aristaenus I  Aristaenus :7lrslstaenus .fcv" ••V-^' ..>'';P'bi;iopoemen-Vil" ': PMlopoemen VII? Aristaenus 
185/4 Lycortas I Lycortas ;Ij;^eortas 3.[ •'•:ArchQn:'' 
Lycortas 11"^ '"^  
' Archon Lycortas 
18V3 9 Archon? Archon 
Archon I Lycortas"''~ Philopoemen V I I I 
183/2 Philopoemen V I I I ; Philopoemen V I I I ; Philopoemen V I I I Philopoeraen VII.I';: Philopoemen V I I I ; Lycortas 
12 
Eycortas I I Lycortas 
Lycortas Lycortas 
182/1 Lycortas I I I ? ? Lycortas Lycortas H? Lycortas Lj'^cortas 
181/0 Hyperbatus Hyperbatus Hyperbatus Hyperbatus Hyperb3.tus 
180/79 Callicrates Callicrates Callicrates liyperbatus 
179/8 Callicrates - — 
1. EEA 30, 1928, pp. 1-62. 
2. Storia dei Romani IV"^ pp. 402-406. 
3. La Confederazione Achea pp. 267-311. 
4. BeitrSge zu Polybios (Beigabe zum Jahresbericht des Gynmasiohs zum heiligen Kreuz zu Dresd^.-^^^^ 
5<> Kh. Mus. I 8 7 I : 'Die Oekonomie der Geschichte des Polybios'. 
6. I n n . l , p. 248, N. recognises that Euryleon may stand for 2II/IO, but does not include him.^ printed l i s t 
7. Philopoemen was most l i k e l y strategos I I I i n 204/3 or 203/2. 
8. The bracketed number indicates the number of Philopoemen's s t r a t e g i a i i f the strategia othe. ^ x -, „ ^ 
^ — — , — . -ase unaccounted f o r were I87 /6 . 
9e Archon was strategos f o r one of the years I9O/89, I87/6 , l84 /3 . 
10. 3.-y makes no attempt to use Livy's m.agistrate l i s t s as a chronological guide; hence his.-,€ . . , . 
•-••••.o^  m placing xhe Aristaenus/Lycortas 
series i n 188/7 and I87 /6 . N i c c o l i n i follovjs him i n t h i s mistake. 
11 . B.-W and N i c c o l i n i have Lycortas here i n order to comply with the Achaean law regarding the • . , •, ^ ^ , 
^ ^ " . ° <- -.uccessxon -co a dead strategos; t h i s 
i s not necessary. 
12. Lycortas was elected on the death of Philopoem^en to serve the rest of the term,. 
13. Nissen does not include Callicrates' strategia i n his l i s t . 
